DPQ17 v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DPQ17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2018] FCCA 1051
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Safe haven enterprise class XE (subclass 790) visa – applicant claimed to fear harm from Taliban – Immigration Assessment Authority deemed information provided by applicant not to be new information for purposes of Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 – where applicant conceded Immigration Assessment Authority’s decision was “probably fair according to law” – applicant’s sole ground of review not particularised – applicant failed to raise an arguable case – application summarily dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958, ss.36(2)(aa), 36(2)(a), 473CB, Part 7AA

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, r.44.12

Cases cited:

AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68

AQN15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 571

Attorney-General v Qui (1990) 170 CLR 1
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Bond (1990) 140 CLR 321

BHK15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 569

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Kim v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW) (2010) 239 CLR 531
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Minister v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Siddique v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1352
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1663
Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118
SZTTW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 837

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969
WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Applicant: DPQ17
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
File Number: PEG 428 of 2017
Judgment of: His Honour Judge Wilson
Hearing date: 13 March 2018
Date of Last Submission: 13 March 2018
Delivered at: Melbourne
Delivered on: 13 March 2018

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:
Solicitors for the Applicant: Martin Udall & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent:
Solicitors for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: No appearance
Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

  1. The application for an adjournment made ore tenus this day is refused.

  2. The proceeding commenced by the application filed 10 August 2017 is dismissed.

  3. The applicant pay the minister’s costs fixed in the sum of $3,607.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT MELBOURNE

PEG 428 of 2017

DPQ17

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

And

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(ex tempore)

Introduction

  1. This case was fixed by me on 8 February 2018 while sitting in Perth, at which time I ordered the proceeding to be listed for directions before me. It had previously been fixed for trial on 22 March 2021 over three years from today. On 8 February 2018 I ordered this proceeding…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCCA 1051
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

DPQ17 (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration (the respondent) to refuse to grant a protection visa. The applicant, who had arrived in Australia without a visa, claimed to fear persecution in their country of origin due to their membership of a particular social group. The matter came before His Honour Judge Wilson in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the respondent's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if the delegate of the Minister had failed to consider relevant considerations or had taken into account irrelevant considerations when assessing the applicant's claims for protection, thereby vitiating the decision-making process.

His Honour Judge Wilson found that the delegate had failed to adequately assess the applicant's claims regarding their membership of a particular social group and the risks they faced upon return to their country of origin. The Court reasoned that the delegate's assessment was superficial and did not engage with the specific evidence provided by the applicant. This failure to properly consider the applicant's evidence constituted a failure to exercise the power conferred by the relevant legislation, leading to jurisdictional error.

Consequently, the Court quashed the respondent's decision and remitted the application for a protection visa to the respondent for redetermination according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, DPQ17, is a citizen of Afghanistan who arrived on Christmas Island as an unauthorised maritime arrival on 8 February 2013. On 26 July 2015, he lodged an application for a safe haven enterprise class XE (subclass 790) visa, claiming that he feared harm from the Taliban and other extremist groups if he returned to Afghanistan. The minister's delegate invited the applicant to an interview on 26 October 2016, which he attended. Further information and submissions were provided to the delegate on 3 November 2016. The delegate decided to refuse the visa application on 29 December 2016, a decision that was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) for review under Part 7AA of the Migration Act. The IAA affirmed the delegate's decision on 21 July 2017. The applicant sought judicial review of the IAA's decision by filing an application on 10 August 2017. Despite being ordered to file an amended application and additional evidence by 2 November 2017, the applicant failed to do so.

The IAA assessed the applicant's claims, accepting some facts such as the applicant's father being killed by the Taliban and the risks of violence from insurgents. However, the IAA did not accept other claims, such as the applicant being perceived as a pro-government sympathiser or facing specific targeting by the Taliban due to his employment history or residence in a western country. The IAA concluded that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a safe haven enterprise class XE visa under sections 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The applicant's grounds for judicial review were that the IAA's decision was unfair because his honest statement was rejected and his life was in danger. However, these grounds did not particularise any jurisdictional error and did not raise an arguable case for relief. The court found that the proceeding should be summarily dismissed.

The matter of DPQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection originated with an application for judicial review filed on 10 August 2017 in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The applicant, a citizen of Afghanistan, sought to challenge the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) which had affirmed the delegate’s refusal of his application for a safe haven enterprise class XE (subclass 790) visa. The applicant, who had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in 2013, claimed that he faced harm from the Taliban if returned to Afghanistan due to his family’s past affiliations and his work with a community centre. The IAA had reviewed the matter and ultimately upheld the delegate's decision, finding that the applicant did not meet the criteria for the visa under the Migration Act 1958.

The proceeding was initially scheduled for a trial in 2021 but was expedited by the court to alleviate the backlog in the migration jurisdiction. On 8 February 2018, the case was fixed for a directions hearing and subsequently for a hearing under the show cause procedure. The applicant, represented by Mr Udall, sought an adjournment on the basis of his poor command of English, late receipt of instructions, and the inability to secure barrister representation. These grounds were rejected by the court, which proceeded to consider the merits of the application. The court found that the applicant's grounds for review were not particularised and did not constitute jurisdictional error as required for judicial review. Consequently, the application was summarily dismissed under the court’s inherent jurisdiction, with the applicant ordered to pay the minister’s costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision to deem the applicant's information as not being "new information" for the purposes of Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 a jurisdictional error?
2. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority commit a jurisdictional error by not accepting the applicant's claims that he would be at risk of significant harm if returned to Afghanistan?
3. Were the applicant's grounds of review particularised sufficiently to warrant judicial review, or were they too general to provide a meaningful basis for the court to assess?
4. Did the applicant raise an arguable case for the relief he sought, warranting further judicial consideration or was the application properly summarily dismissed?

Held
1. The court concluded that the Immigration Assessment Authority's (IAA) decision to deem the applicant's information as not being "new information" for the purposes of Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 was not a jurisdictional error.

2. The court held that the IAA did not commit a jurisdictional error by not accepting the applicant's claims that he would be at risk of significant harm if returned to Afghanistan.

3. The court determined that the applicant's grounds of review were not particularised sufficiently to warrant judicial review, as they were too general to provide a meaningful basis for the court to assess.

4. The court found that the applicant did not raise an arguable case for the relief he sought, and therefore, the application was properly summarily dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In addressing the issues raised in DPQ17 v Minister for Immigration, the court meticulously analyzed each aspect of the applicant's claims and the responses given by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The first issue examined whether the IAA's decision to not consider the applicant's information as "new information" constituted a jurisdictional error. The court found that the IAA correctly deemed the information as not being "new" within the meaning of Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958, as it largely re-presented the applicant's earlier arguments and country information already before the IAA. This conclusion aligns with established legal principles that "new information" must meet specific criteria to warrant reconsideration.

The second issue involved whether the IAA erred by not accepting the applicant's claims about the risk of significant harm if returned to Afghanistan. The court emphasized that the IAA's role was not to re-evaluate the merits of the case but to assess if there was a jurisdictional error. The IAA's findings were based on a comprehensive review of the information presented, and the court held that the IAA's assessment was within its jurisdiction. The applicant's argument that his "honest statement was rejected" did not constitute a jurisdictional error as it did not involve the IAA identifying a wrong issue or ignoring relevant material.

Third, the court scrutinized whether the applicant's grounds of review were sufficiently particularized to warrant judicial review. The court cited a series of cases which established that unparticularised grounds of review could be dismissed. Here, the applicant's grounds were too general and did not specify the nature of the alleged jurisdictional error, thereby failing to provide a meaningful basis for judicial review. This aligns with the principle that grounds of review must be clear and specific to allow the court to assess the alleged errors.

Lastly, the court examined whether the applicant had raised an arguable case for the relief sought. The court held that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for the IAA to have committed jurisdictional error. Additionally, the court exercised its discretion under r.44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules to summarily dismiss the proceeding due to the lack of an arguable case and the general nature of the applicant's claims. This decision reflects the court's adherence to the principle that the power of summary dismissal should be exercised judiciously.

In conclusion, the Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the minister's costs. The ratio decidendi of this case is that unparticularised and general grounds of review, lacking specificity about the alleged jurisdictional errors, can be summarily dismissed. Furthermore, the court's role in judicial review is limited to assessing jurisdictional errors and not re-evaluating the merits of the case.