Kim v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship & Anor

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[2008] HCATrans 342

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S247 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

JEONG DAE KIM

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON TUESDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER 2008, AT 9.53 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR S.B. LLOYD:   May it please the Court, I appear in this matter with my learned friend, MS C.C. SPRUCE for the applicant. (instructed by Teleo Group Pty Ltd)

MR S.J. GAGELER, SC, Solicitor‑General of the Commonwealth of Australia:   If the Court pleases, I appear with MR G.T. JOHNSON for the first respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

FRENCH CJ:   There is a submitting appearance for the second respondent.  I understand this is a case in which an extension of time is required.  Mr Gageler, is there any opposition to that?

MR GAGELER:   It is not opposed, your Honour.

FRENCH CJ:   All right.  The extension of time necessary is granted.  Yes, Mr Lloyd.

MR LLOYD:   There are two issues in this application.  I will briefly state each and then develop them.  The first issue is, in reviewing a decision to cancel a visa is the Migration Review Tribunal constrained by the preconditions on the exercise of power that applied to the delegate.  In this respect the issue goes to the extent to which the metaphor often used at the Tribunal, stands in the shoes of the primary decision‑maker, is accurate and that was a metaphor recently used by Justices Kirby and Kiefel in the Shi decision – Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority.

The second issue is where the Tribunal is a party to proceedings in which a court has made orders based on concessions that a decision to cancel a visa was invalid, is it open to the Tribunal to affirm that decision to cancel.  I will deal with that second matter briefly at the end.

Returning to the first issue, the applicant’s case is based on five propositions:  first, that section 119 of the Migration Act, which imposes a duty on the Minister to give a notice of any intention to cancel a visa, was not complied with in this case.  This is not in dispute.  In this case a notice was sent to the wrong address, one where the delegate knew the applicant did not live or work.  Secondly, the effect of section 124 of the Migration Act is that the Minister may cancel a visa of a person within Australia under section 116 only if a notice under section 119 was properly sent.  It follows that in this case a precondition to the Minister having the power to cancel was never enlivened.  Hence, the Minister or delegate never had the power to cancel.

GUMMOW J:   What do you say about – we have so many numbers –…

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Details
Case
[2008] HCATrans 342
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Mr. Kim and his wife, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and the second respondent, the Refugee Review Tribunal. The dispute concerned the Minister's decision to refuse to grant the applicants a protection visa and the Tribunal's subsequent affirmation of that decision. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the protection visa was vitiated by a failure to afford procedural fairness. Specifically, the applicants contended that they were not given adequate notice of, or opportunity to respond to, adverse information that was relied upon by the Minister in making the refusal decision. A further issue concerned the lawfulness of the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision, particularly in relation to its consideration of the applicants' claims.

The High Court considered the principles of procedural fairness, particularly in the context of administrative decision-making concerning immigration. Their Honours noted that while an applicant for a protection visa is entitled to procedural fairness, this does not extend to a right to be informed of every piece of information that might be considered. Rather, the obligation is to provide a reasonable opportunity to deal with adverse information that is material to the decision. The Court found that the Minister's delegate had not failed in this regard, as the applicants had been provided with sufficient opportunity to respond to the information relied upon. The Court also addressed the Tribunal's review, finding no error in its approach.

The High Court dismissed the application for judicial review, upholding the lawfulness of the Minister's decision and the Refugee Review Tribunal's affirmation of that decision.

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