Siddique v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Siddique v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 1352

Citation: Siddique v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1352
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Siddique v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1028
Parties: NOOR ALAM SIDDIQUE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 576 of 2014
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 12 December 2014
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal – relevant principles - primary judge dismissed application for review of Migration Review Tribunal decision pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) - applicant failed to achieve the requisite points in respect of English language ability – whether or not the primary judge failed to exercise discretion under r 44.12 – whether or not primary judge failed to address material claim or mistook facts – whether or not primary judge erred in finding no prospects of success because there was “intelligible justification” and that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the applicant had ample opportunity to achieve requisite scores – consideration of principles in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 308 ALR 280
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12(1)(a)
Cases cited: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 308 ALR 280
SZTGS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 676
SZTTW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 837
Date of hearing: 22 August 2014
Place: Perth via video-link to Sydney (Heard in Sydney)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Reynolds with Ms A Nguyen
Solicitor for the Applicant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Smith SC
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 576 of 2014

BETWEEN:

NOOR ALAM SIDDIQUE
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 DECEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

PERTH VIA VIDEO-LINK TO SYDNEY (HEARD IN SYDNEY) 

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal in terms of grounds 2, 3 and 4 in these reasons be granted.

2.The rules of Court as to the institution and preparation of the appeal be waived.

3.The appeal be heard instanter.

4.The evidence and arguments on the leave application be evidence and arguments on the appeal.

5.The appeal be allowed.

6.The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.

7.The matter be remitted to…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1352
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Siddique v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, Siddique, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the primary judge) to summarily dismiss his application for judicial review of the Migration Review Tribunal's (the Tribunal) decision to refuse him a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) visa on the basis of his insufficient English language scores. The applicant sought leave to appeal against the primary judge's decision, arguing that the primary judge failed to exercise the discretion under r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), misconstrued or failed to address material claims, and mistook facts.

The court found that the primary judge did not fail to exercise the discretion under r 44.12 as the applicant had submitted. The court held that it was sufficient for the primary judge to proceed in the way she did, considering the merits of the application for judicial review. The court also found that the primary judge did not misconstrue or fail to address material claims, as she correctly identified the applicant's complaints concerning the Tribunal's decision. Furthermore, the court found that the primary judge did not mistake the facts, as it was open to the Tribunal to find that the applicant had ample opportunity to achieve the requisite scores.

Leave to appeal was granted on grounds 2, 3, and 4. The appeal was allowed, the orders made by the primary judge were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for the application for judicial review to be considered on its merits. The first respondent was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to appeal in terms of grounds 2, 3 and 4 in these reasons be granted.

2. The rules of Court as to the institution and preparation of the appeal be waived.

3. The appeal be heard instanter.

4. The evidence and arguments on the leave application be evidence and arguments on the appeal.

5. The appeal be allowed.

6. The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.

7. The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for the application for judicial review to be considered on its merits.

8. The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

However, the parties were content for the substantive appeal to be determined were leave to appeal granted. There was accordingly full argument on the merits of the appeal. Relevant facts On 25 June 2010, the applicant applied for a Skilled (Residence) (Class VB) visa. On 13 July 2010 his solicitors lodged further documents in support of that application including a certified copy of the results of an International English Language Testing System (IELTS) exam, which were insufficient for the applicant to meet the relevant criteria for the grant of the visa. The solicitors noted that the "applicant will pass the point test when he achieves proficient English and passes the [National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI)] test". Three years later, on 6 August 2013, the delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa because the applicant did not meet the points test relevantly on account of the language score. On 21 August 2013, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review. On 30 October 2013, the applicant was invited to a hearing before the Tribunal which invitation he accepted. At the conclusion of the hearing on 14 November 2013 the applicant asked the Tribunal to adjourn the hearing until July 2014 to enable him to provide evidence of obtaining the requisite English language ability scores. The Tribunal refused to do that, but agreed that it would await the outcome of the English language test which the applicant was booked to take on 7 December 2013 and it did that. The applicant still failed to obtain the necessary language ability scores, despite this indulgence. By letter dated 27 December 2013 sent by facsimile on 2 January 2014, the applicant reiterated the request for an extension of time. This was refused. The Tribunal in early January 2014 affirmed the decision of the delegate. This was relevantly because the applicant did not have evidence of his achieving the requisite IELTS and NAATI examination results to obtain the points he needed. By that time, the applicant had undertaken the IELTS test "12, 13 or maybe even 15 times". The challenge to the Tribunal's decision concerns its refusal to grant the adjournment sought by the applicant to sit IELTS and NAATI tests that he had booked, which inevitably led to the Tribunal affirming the decision under review. The predominant reason for refusing the adjournment, it seems, was that the Tribunal considered that he has had ample opportunity to attempt the test and achieve the necessary score (at [17]). The applicant subsequently applied to the court below for judicial review, which application was rejected summarily pursuant to r 44.12 of the FCCR. It is this decision that is the subject of the present application. The first issue is whether leave should be granted, and if so, in whole or in part, and, second, to the extent that leave is granted, whether the appeal ought succeed. Legislative frameworkRule 44.12 of the FCCR Relevantly, r 44.12 of the FCCR provides:(1) At a hearing of an application for an order to show cause, the Court may:(a)if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed - dismiss the application; or...(c)without making an order under paragraph (b), make final orders in relation to the claims for relief and grounds mentioned in the application.(2)To avoid doubt, a dismissal under paragraph (1)(a) is interlocutory.Extension of time

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am satisfied that leave to appeal on these grounds should be granted and that the appeal on these grounds ought be allowed. Conclusion There will be orders in the following terms:1.Leave to appeal in terms of grounds 2, 3 and 4 in these reasons be granted. 2.The rules of Court as to the institution and preparation of the appeal be waived. 3.The appeal be heard instanter.4.The evidence and arguments on the leave application be evidence and arguments on the appeal. 5.The appeal be allowed. 6.The orders made by the primary judge be set aside. 7.The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for the application for judicial review to be considered on its merits. 8.The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Further, when considering whether a decision pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) is attended by sufficient doubt, the principles relating to appeals from a discretionary decision are applicable: SZTGS. ConsiderationGround 1 The first proposed ground of appeal contends that the court below erred by misconstruing or failing to apply the applicable law or by acting on a wrong principle. The power in r 44.12(1)(a) has two components: lack of satisfaction that an applicant has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed, and a residual discretion whether or not to dismiss the application: SZTTW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 837 at [20]. I accept that it would be wrong for the court below to proceed on the basis that if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed the application should necessarily be dismissed. To do so would involve a misunderstanding of the applicable law, a failure to exercise the discretion at all, or an exercise of power based on a wrong principle. That does not mean that the answer to the first question will not, in very many cases, lead inevitably to the answer to the second. I accept the Minister’s submission that the precondition to the power is not only relevant to the question of whether to exercise it, but can be sufficient reason to exercise it. The applicant does not suggest otherwise. The applicant submits that the primary judge failed to expressly acknowledge, and therefore failed to exercise, the discretion under r 44.12(1)(a). At [21], the court below expressed its conclusion as follows:In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed. Accordingly, the proceeding before this Court, commenced by way of application on 16 January 2014, should be dismissed pursuant to r.44.12(1)(a) of the Rules, with costs. This, the applicant submits, discloses that the court dismissed the proceedings because it was satisfied as to the state of satisfaction that enlivened the discretion to dismiss but failed to exercise any discretion, which it was bound to do. The only matters relevant to the exercise of the power that were before her Honour were the merits of the application for judicial review. As already noted, those merits were not only critical to the first question raised by r 44.12(1)(a), but were significant to the residual question of discretion. In those circumstances, I accept the submission that there was no need to deal with the two aspects of r 44.12(1)(a) separately and it was sufficient for her Honour to proceed in the way that she did. I would not grant leave to appeal in respect of this proposed ground. Ground 2 The second proposed ground of appeal involves a contention that the court below misconstrued or failed to address a material claim or consideration or it mistook the facts before it. The applicant acknowledges that the primary judge correctly identified the basic complaint made by him concerning the Tribunal's decision, namely that:(a)the Tribunal had failed to consider his personal circumstances in refusing the adjournment application to it (at [12]) (Personal Circumstances Complaint); and(b)the Tribunal's exercise of discretion in refusing an adjournment miscarried (at [17]) (Miscarriage of Discretion Complaint).