FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Siddique v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 1352
Citation: Siddique v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1352 Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Siddique v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1028 Parties: NOOR ALAM SIDDIQUE v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 576 of 2014 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 12 December 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal – relevant principles - primary judge dismissed application for review of Migration Review Tribunal decision pursuant to r 44.12 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) - applicant failed to achieve the requisite points in respect of English language ability – whether or not the primary judge failed to exercise discretion under r 44.12 – whether or not primary judge failed to address material claim or mistook facts – whether or not primary judge erred in finding no prospects of success because there was “intelligible justification” and that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the applicant had ample opportunity to achieve requisite scores – consideration of principles in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 308 ALR 280 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 44.12(1)(a)Cases cited: Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 308 ALR 280
SZTGS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 676
SZTTW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 837Date of hearing: 22 August 2014 Place: Perth via video-link to Sydney (Heard in Sydney) Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 55 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Reynolds with Ms A Nguyen Solicitor for the Applicant: Fragomen Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Smith SC Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 576 of 2014
BETWEEN: NOOR ALAM SIDDIQUE
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 DECEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
PERTH VIA VIDEO-LINK TO SYDNEY (HEARD IN SYDNEY)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave to appeal in terms of grounds 2, 3 and 4 in these reasons be granted.
2.The rules of Court as to the institution and preparation of the appeal be waived.
3.The appeal be heard instanter.
4.The evidence and arguments on the leave application be evidence and arguments on the appeal.
5.The appeal be allowed.
6.The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.
7.The matter be remitted to…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1352
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge did not fail to exercise the discretion under r 44.12 as the applicant had submitted. The court held that it was sufficient for the primary judge to proceed in the way she did, considering the merits of the application for judicial review. The court also found that the primary judge did not misconstrue or fail to address material claims, as she correctly identified the applicant's complaints concerning the Tribunal's decision. Furthermore, the court found that the primary judge did not mistake the facts, as it was open to the Tribunal to find that the applicant had ample opportunity to achieve the requisite scores.
Leave to appeal was granted on grounds 2, 3, and 4. The appeal was allowed, the orders made by the primary judge were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for the application for judicial review to be considered on its merits. The first respondent was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal in terms of grounds 2, 3 and 4 in these reasons be granted.
2. The rules of Court as to the institution and preparation of the appeal be waived.
3. The appeal be heard instanter.
4. The evidence and arguments on the leave application be evidence and arguments on the appeal.
5. The appeal be allowed.
6. The orders made by the primary judge be set aside.
7. The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for the application for judicial review to be considered on its merits.
8. The first respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave and the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Further, when considering whether a decision pursuant to r 44.12(1)(a) is attended by sufficient doubt, the principles relating to appeals from a discretionary decision are applicable: SZTGS. ConsiderationGround 1 The first proposed ground of appeal contends that the court below erred by misconstruing or failing to apply the applicable law or by acting on a wrong principle. The power in r 44.12(1)(a) has two components: lack of satisfaction that an applicant has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed, and a residual discretion whether or not to dismiss the application: SZTTW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 837 at [20]. I accept that it would be wrong for the court below to proceed on the basis that if it is not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed the application should necessarily be dismissed. To do so would involve a misunderstanding of the applicable law, a failure to exercise the discretion at all, or an exercise of power based on a wrong principle. That does not mean that the answer to the first question will not, in very many cases, lead inevitably to the answer to the second. I accept the Minister’s submission that the precondition to the power is not only relevant to the question of whether to exercise it, but can be sufficient reason to exercise it. The applicant does not suggest otherwise. The applicant submits that the primary judge failed to expressly acknowledge, and therefore failed to exercise, the discretion under r 44.12(1)(a). At [21], the court below expressed its conclusion as follows:In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the application has raised an arguable case for the relief claimed. Accordingly, the proceeding before this Court, commenced by way of application on 16 January 2014, should be dismissed pursuant to r.44.12(1)(a) of the Rules, with costs. This, the applicant submits, discloses that the court dismissed the proceedings because it was satisfied as to the state of satisfaction that enlivened the discretion to dismiss but failed to exercise any discretion, which it was bound to do. The only matters relevant to the exercise of the power that were before her Honour were the merits of the application for judicial review. As already noted, those merits were not only critical to the first question raised by r 44.12(1)(a), but were significant to the residual question of discretion. In those circumstances, I accept the submission that there was no need to deal with the two aspects of r 44.12(1)(a) separately and it was sufficient for her Honour to proceed in the way that she did. I would not grant leave to appeal in respect of this proposed ground. Ground 2 The second proposed ground of appeal involves a contention that the court below misconstrued or failed to address a material claim or consideration or it mistook the facts before it. The applicant acknowledges that the primary judge correctly identified the basic complaint made by him concerning the Tribunal's decision, namely that:(a)the Tribunal had failed to consider his personal circumstances in refusing the adjournment application to it (at [12]) (Personal Circumstances Complaint); and(b)the Tribunal's exercise of discretion in refusing an adjournment miscarried (at [17]) (Miscarriage of Discretion Complaint).