CDV17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CDV17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 726

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: CDV17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3489
File number: VID 1652 of 2018
Judge: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 23 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to file notice of appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court - judicial review - where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed decision by Minister for Immigration and Border Protection – inadequate explanation for delay – no merit in appeal - application dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 44.12

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.12, 35.13

Cases cited:

Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Philip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170

Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (the costs of the Cup of Tea Case) [2019] FCAFC 36

BAO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214

BYY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 116

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

DKX17 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2019] FCAFC 10

House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v. Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Iannuzzi v Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCAFC 39

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 152 ALD 478

Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 116 ALR 625

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 195

SZJRV v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 298

SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500

SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91

SZSPR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection and Another (2013) ALD 109

SZSPR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection and Another (2013) 139 ALD 109

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

Date of hearing: 14 May 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H Smart
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr C van der Westhuizen of DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1652 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CDV17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Home Affairs.

2.The applicant’s application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal is dismissed.

3.The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 726
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case CDV17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an application by the applicant, a Malaysian national, for an extension of time and leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCC). The applicant had previously applied for a protection visa, which was refused by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. This refusal was upheld by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which found that the applicant's claims about threats from a loan shark and her brother were fabricated or exaggerated. The applicant sought to appeal the FCC's decision to dismiss her application for judicial review, but the application for an extension of time was denied.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had provided an adequate explanation for the delay in seeking leave to appeal the FCC's decision. The court also had to consider whether the applicant's case had sufficient merit to warrant setting aside the FCC's judgment. Additionally, the court examined whether the trial judge had erred in refusing the applicant's application for an adjournment.

The court found that the applicant's explanation for the delay was inadequate and that there was no merit in her appeal. The court held that the AAT's decision was correctly made, as it was based on findings that the applicant's claims were fabricated or exaggerated. The court further determined that the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment was justified, as the applicant had not provided sufficient grounds for the adjournment and had delayed in seeking legal representation. Consequently, the application for an extension of time and leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the applicant's application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal the FCC's decision. The court found that the applicant had not provided an adequate explanation for the delay and that there was no merit in her appeal. The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to refuse an adjournment. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Home Affairs.

2. The applicant’s application for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal is dismissed.

3. The applicant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the application for an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal the FCC Judgment is dismissed with costs.RELEVANT BACKGROUND The applicant is Malaysian. She arrived in Australia in July 2015. She claims to have left Malaysia because she feared that her personal safety was at risk at the hands of a “loan shark” (from whom she says she had borrowed money that remained unpaid) and her brother (who she claims has previously assaulted her, apparently in connection with drug-related legal troubles, the particulars of which the Court cannot presently articulate). On 9 October 2015, she applied to the Minister for a protection visa. The Minister, by his delegate, refused that application. That refusal was the subject of an application for review by the AAT. On 28 April 2017, the AAT affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the applicant’s application for a protection visa. In doing so, the AAT concluded that the applicant’s claims about having borrowed money from a loan shark were untrue and had been fabricated for the purposes of applying for a protection visa. Further, it concluded that her claim about the threat posed to her by her brother had been exaggerated or fabricated. On account of those fabrications or exaggerations, it was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, if returned to Malaysia, there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm (as defined). En route to those conclusions, the AAT adverted to a number of inconsistencies in what the applicant had said about her dealings with loan sharks and the purpose of the loan that she claimed to have obtained. In her initial application for a protection visa, the applicant said that she left Malaysia because she was being threatened by a loan shark. She said that her dealings with the loan shark took place in September 2015, when she was unemployed (a circumstance that she attributed to the failure of her business). She otherwise offered no particulars of how much she borrowed, when or from whom. She said that her company had closed down in September 2015 and that, prior to June 2015, she had worked as a nurse in Malaysia. When asked by the AAT to elaborate upon her dealings with the loan shark, the applicant said that she had borrowed 50,000 Malaysian ringgit in September 2014 (not 2015), and that she had done so to support her mother’s failing restaurant business. That business commenced in 2013 and, despite the loan, ceased in December 2014. She also said that, in August 2014, her brother was arrested for “snatch theft” and marijuana possession, and that 30,000 of the 50,000 Malaysian ringgit that she claimed to have borrowed went toward his legal expenses and money that she paid “as his guarantor” (that latter amount was later returned to her). She told the AAT that her tenure as a nurse ceased in January 2015 (not June), and that she resigned at the demand of her matron, who was said to have complained about money lenders having attended her hospital to issue threats toward the applicant, and also about the amount of time that the applicant was spending assisting her troubled brother.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Even if, contrary to the conclusion above, it were open to this Court to set aside the FCC Judgment merely on the ground that the applicant’s case below was arguable, I would not do so. That ground is itself also without merit. The AAT was not obliged to put to the applicant, in advance of finalising its decision, the concerns that it formed about the credibility of her evidence, at least not in the circumstances that presented in this case (see: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 253 FCR 496, 524-525 (McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ)). Pressed to identify the source of any such obligation, counsel for the applicant submitted that it was part of the “umbrella of procedural fairness”. Respectfully, that submission cannot be accepted.The FCC’s decision to refuse an adjournment For equivalent reasons, a similar finding must be made with respect to the applicant’s complaint that the trial judge ought to have granted her adjournment application. Before this Court, the applicant submitted that she required a last-minute adjournment to the proceeding for which she’d had nearly a full year’s notice because, only a few days before it, her lawyer inexplicably withdrew his representation of her. Assuming that to be true—and assuming, perhaps wrongly, that it is not an unduly generous reading of the applicant’s evidence on the point— there is no evidence that it was explained to the trial judge. From the reasons for the FCC Judgment, it is apparent only that she sought an adjournment in order to secure legal representation. Her efforts to that end, so his Honour was informed, began only two weeks prior to the hearing, despite its having been listed since December 2017. The application was opposed. It was declined. The applicant contends that, in refusing the adjournment application, the trial judge failed to take account of her personal circumstances: in particular, that she is a single mother who, at the time, worked on a farm and resided in rural South Australia. Two points spring immediately for consideration from that contention. First, there is no evidence before the Court that his Honour was informed of those facts, let alone asked to weigh them in the exercise of his discretion to grant or not grant an adjournment. Second, it is not apparent why or how they might properly inform the judicial exercise of that discretion: why or how, for example, it is that a farm-working single mother might be indulged by way of adjournment more readily than any other self-represented litigant. In DKX17 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2019] FCAFC 10, Rangiah J (with whom Reeves and Bromwich JJ agreed), considering a trial judge’s refusal to grant an adjournment in a matter not dissimilar to what confronted the FCC in this case, observed (at [83]):An adjournment is not granted merely for the asking. Wider issues are at play, even if they were not expressly referred to by the trial judge. As Toohey and Gaudron JJ observed in Sali v SPC Ltd (1993) 67 ALJR 841 at 636:The contemporary approach to court administration has introduced another element into the equation or, more accurately, has put another consideration onto the scales. The view that the conduct of litigation is not merely a matter for the parties but is also one for the court and the need to avoid disruptions in the court's lists with consequent inconvenience to the court and prejudice to the interests of other litigants waiting to be heard are pressing concerns to which a court may have regard.The trial judge must have been conscious that if an adjournment was granted, the time set aside for the hearing would be wasted and another hearing date would have to be found. The Minister had engaged a legal representative for the hearing and was ready to proceed. It is true that allowance must be made for the disadvantages faced by self-represented applicants, particularly those whose first language is not English. However, in circumstances where the appellants had adequate time to seek legal advice, but had delayed in doing so for reasons they did not explain, it was open to the trial judge to give little weight to the mere possibility that they might find an arguable ground.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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