FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BYY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 116
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: BYY15 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 2772 File number: VID 1246 of 2016 Judge: STEWARD J Date of judgment: 19 February 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for extension of time to file notice of appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – Judicial Review – Medical Certificate – inadequate explanation for delay – no merit in appeal – Application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 36.03, 36.05
Cases cited: BYY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2772
Gulati v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 255
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 519
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585
MZABV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCA 105
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 150
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86
Date of hearing: 13 February 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the Respondents: Mr A Cuninghame Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
VID 1246 of 2016 BETWEEN: BYY15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
STEWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or as assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STEWARD J:
INTRODUCTION
This is an application made under r 36.05(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the “Rules”) for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the “FCC”). On 13 September 2016, the FCC dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the “AAT”) to affirm a decision of the first respondent, by his delegate, not to grant the applicant a Protection visa: BYY15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2772. The applicant filed the application for an extension of time and supporting affidavit on 19 October 2016 and sought an extension of 15 days.
The applicant was self-represented before the FCC, as he is on this application. The applicant did not file any written submissions in support of his application.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a Sri Lankan citizen of Sinhalese ethnicity. On 16 January 2013, the applicant lodged a valid application for a Protection…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 116
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary issue before the court was whether to grant the applicant an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from the FCC's decision. The applicant sought an extension of time on the basis of personal illness, relying on a medical certificate and an affidavit. The court noted that the medical certificate did not address whether, and if so why, the applicant's illness would have prevented him from seeking legal help and filing a notice of appeal during the 21-day period allowed under the Federal Court Rules. The certificate appeared pro forma and did not establish any connection between illness and the failure to file an appeal during the relevant period. The court found that the applicant's reliance on the medical certificate was misconceived and that the affidavit and medical certificate did not establish any proper foundation to enable the court to grant the extension of time on the basis of the applicant's illness.
The court dismissed the applicant's application for an extension of time, finding that the explanation for the delay was deficient and that the proposed appeal lacked merit. The court ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or as assessed. The court noted that, even if the delay was not particularly lengthy and there was no prejudice to the first respondent if the court were to grant the extension of time sought, the applicant's proposed appeal was unmeritorious. The court found that the grounds of appeal identified in the draft notice of appeal were not sufficiently arguable and that granting the extension of time would be futile. The court's decision was based on the principle that, in exercising the court's discretion in an application for an extension of time, factors to take into account include the extent of the delay, any prejudice a respondent might suffer because of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and the merits of the proposed appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or as assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s draft notice of appeal identifies the following grounds of appeal:1.The proceeding in the order which the application relates was pronounced involves a question of law. 2.There is a jurisdictional error occurs in the order (sic). CONSIDERATION In exercising the Court’s discretion in an application for an extension of time, factors to take into account include the extent of the delay, any prejudice a respondent might suffer because of the delay, the explanation for the delay and the merits of the proposed appeal: Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 150 at [19]; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348 - 349. I accept the delay was not particularly lengthy and the first respondent concedes there is no prejudice to him if the Court were to grant the extension of time sought, beyond the public interest in the finality of administrative decision making. However, I nonetheless reject the applicant’s application because of his explanation for the delay, which is deficient, and because his proposed appeal is unmeritorious. Explanation for the delay I agree with the first respondent’s submission that the applicant has not provided a proper explanation for the delay. The period of time addressed by the medical certificate does not pertain to the 21-day period within which the applicant was entitled to file a notice of appeal under r 36.03 of the Rules. It was obtained after the time for filing an appeal had already expired and the period of illness does not include any part of the prescribed 21-day period. Moreover, between the date it was obtained and the date from which it states the applicant will be “unfit to attend work” (20/10/2016), the applicant filed the application for extension of time and supporting affidavit. Further, the content of the supporting affidavit was equally unhelpful in establishing an explanation for the delay. The content is nearly identical to that described in an affidavit filed by the applicant in MZABV v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCA 105. In that case, the applicant filed an application for an extension of time and then sought an adjournment of the hearing. Pagone J said at [5]:It is unfortunate that certificates of this kind are provided to the Court because they are unhelpful to the Court or to the applicant for whose benefit they have been obtained, perhaps upon the payment of a fee. The Court needs information upon which it is able to make a decision about whether an adjournment ought to be granted, and a medical practitioner ought to know that it is important to provide material for the Court to determine whether the significant step of an adjournment is warranted. That would usually require a certificate to be meaningful to enable the Court to make a decision. An application for an adjournment, in generally similar circumstances, was rejected by Justice Lindgren in the case of NAKX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559 in which his Honour said at [5] to [10]:5.The medical certificate dated 13 December 2003 in respect of the male applicant states as follows:This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Dermatitis atopic and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 01/01/2004 inclusive.6.The certificate of the same date in respect of the female appellant states:This is to certify that on 13/12/2003 I examined the above named person. In my opinion he/she is suffering from Anxiety disorder/Depression and will be unable to attend court from 13/12/2003 to 13/01/2004 inclusive.7.The medical certificates are quite unsatisfactory. They do not address the critical question whether, and if so why, the medical condition would prevent the appellant from travelling to the Court and participating effectively in a court hearing.8.I do not accept that either of the medical conditions referred to would make the sufferer ‘unable to attend court’ – apparently each was able to attend upon the medical practitioner.9.If the certificates were meant to say that the medical condition would prevent the sufferer from participating effectively in a court hearing, they do not in fact say that and do not explain why the medical condition would have that effect.10.I take into account the fact that the two medical certificates are structured identically, use the expression ‘he/she’, and are dated the same day, which was only two days before the hearing. The certificates have the appearance of being pro forma certificates which are available for the asking.11.In any event, even accepting the certificates on their face, I find them unpersuasive for the reasons given at [6]–[8] above.What that case indicates is that what needs to be provided in a medical certificate in order for the medical certificate to be meaningful is the basis to establish why it is or how it is that an appellant suffering from a medical condition would be unfit for participation at a hearing in Court. A description such as that of having a “medical condition” and that a person is “unfit for work” for nine days are unhelpful, relevantly uninformative and unsatisfactory. The certificate in this case, and the statement by the applicant in this case, do not enable the court to evaluate why it is or how it is that the applicant’s condition would prevent him from attending the court and, therefore, do not establish a responsible foundation to adjourn a court hearing. Statements of this kind do not help the patient in making the case that he needs. Doctors providing certificates of this kind assist nobody. Accordingly, to the extent that the applicant’s request in his fax is to be treated as an application for an adjournment, it is rejected.Notwithstanding that these comments were made in respect of the application for an adjournment, rather than the extension of time application, Pagone J’s reasoning, in my view, applies to the explanation for the delay in the present case. In the present case, the medical certificate does not address whether, and if so, why the “personal illness” would have prevented the applicant from seeking legal help and filing a notice of appeal during the period in which he was entitled to do so. At best, it is evidence that the applicant was unwell for part of a period taking place after the time for filing the notice of appeal had already expired. The certificate appears pro forma and does not establish any connection between illness and the failure to file an appeal during the relevant 21-day period so as to provide meaningful evidence. It follows that the applicant’s reliance on the medical certificate is misconceived. The affidavit and medical certificate do not establish any proper foundation to enable the Court to grant the extension of time on the basis of the applicant’s illness.