Director of Public Prosecutions v Murray

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

S ECR 2024 0304

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

MICHAEL MURRAY

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JUDGE:	Elliott J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	26 March 2025
FURTHER SUBMISSIONS:	7, 8 May 2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	21 May 2025
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Director of Public Prosecutions v Murray
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VSC 275

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OPEN COURTS – Application for proceeding suppression orders – Application for pseudonym orders – Proceedings to be heard together – Applications made by one accused only – Existing publicity – Other proceedings – Accused a member of outlaw motorcycle gang – Orders not necessary – Applications dismissed – Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic), ss 17, 18(1)(a).

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Crown	D Karamicov	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	P Botros	Zahr Partners

HIS HONOUR:

A. No suppression or pseudonym orders should be made

Michael Murray (“Murray”) and George Kamvissis (“Kamvissis”) have both been charged with the murder of Muhammed Yucel (“Yucel”). They are to be tried together.
Murray applies for suppression orders under the Open Courts Act 2013 (Vic) in both the proceeding in which he is the accused (“the Murray Proceeding”) and in the proceeding in which Kamvissis is the accused (“the Kamvissis Proceeding”) (together, “the Proceedings”). The suppression orders would have the effect of preventing any reporting of the Proceedings until a verdict is delivered. Further, for the purpose of the court listing of the Proceedings, Murray seeks pseudonym orders.
Both Murray and Kamvissis are “patched” or fully fledged members of the Comanchero outlaw motorcycle gang (“the Comancheros”). Murray has been described as the commander, national president[1] or boss of the Comancheros in Australia.
[1]There are photographs in media articles of Murray wearing a Comancheros vest which included the words “COMANCHEROS NATIONAL PRESIDENT”.
Essentially, Murray contends the integrity and fairness of his upcoming trial will be impacted if reporting is not restricted. Murray relies on existing extensive media and other publications about him and the Comancheros as a justification for suppression orders and pseudonym orders. Further, Murray submits that any reporting of, or publications concerning information derived from, this proceeding would be in the context of a “gang feud” and would be sensationalist in nature and extent.
For the reasons that follow, Murray has not established that the orders sought are necessary to protect, or prevent prejudice to, the due administration of justice. Accordingly, the application will be dismissed.

B. Context in which orders are sought

B.1 Other criminal proceedings against Murray

[Redacted].
[Redacted].[2] [Redacted].[3]
[2][Redacted].
[3][Redacted].
[Redacted].
Murray [redacted] faces charges in the County Court of Victoria in relation to conspiracy to commit dishonesty offences (“the County Court Proceeding”). Murray’s counsel stated that he thought the allegations concerned tax related matters or were dishonesty related.[4] The court was told that the County Court Proceeding was commenced earlier in time than other proceedings involving Murray [redacted]. The trial of the County Court Proceeding was listed to commence in February 2025, but has been adjourned to February 2026.
[4]Counsel was not briefed in the County Court Proceeding and was unable to give specific details.
The orders sought were not on the basis that the absence of a suppression order would prejudice the fair trial of Murray in the County Court Proceeding.[5] However, in what appeared to be an afterthought,[6] it was submitted publicity arising from the County Court Proceeding provided another factor in favour of the suppression orders being made in the Proceedings. The fact of existing publicity about Murray arising from reporting of the County Court Proceeding was asserted from the bar table and not disputed, but, from a reading of the publications tendered, it was unclear whether the reporting of the County Court Proceeding was the subject of the evidence on this application.[7]
[5]Compare Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Qaumi(2016) 93 NSWLR 384, 392-393 [35]-[36], 399 [72] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Hoeben CJ at CL). [Redacted]. No suppression order has been made with respect to the County Court Proceeding.
[6]The written submissions did not raise this point and counsel described this further factor as not being the main pillar of his argument.
[7]This finding is necessarily not specific. On this application, the court has been provided with limited and unclear details in respect of the County Court Proceeding. Further, some of the articles were vague in their terms. By way of example, a webpage published as at 15 April 2024 referred to Murray and his wife facing bankruptcy after a demand of $3.72 million was made “in back taxes”. That page also referred to Murray and others being charged in November 2021 with tax evasion; [redacted]. It further suggested that the tax evasion charges were “thrown out”. An article in the Herald Sun first published on 10 July 2019 (a hardcopy of which was reproduced in April 2024) referred to a “slew of deception offences” linked to a “major money laundering probe”, which reportedly included raids on 44 premises.
Murray’s submissions also referred to matters “known to [Murray]”, being “pseudonym witnesses” who have given evidence or are due to give evidence “in other proceedings”. It was submitted that in “some of those proceedings” it was alleged Murray engaged in a “variety of criminal conduct with which he has not been charged”. This section of the submissions concluded by stating the full scope of the evidence was not yet known to Murray.

B.2 Existing suppression and pseudonym orders

Since the first half of last year, there has been a prohibition on publication of the matters the subject of the Murray Proceeding and information derived from related court proceedings.
As a precursor to the Murray Proceeding, on 9 April 2024 suppression orders were made in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria. It was ordered that the suppression orders would expire [redacted]. Earlier this year, upon the lapse of these orders, Tueno JR made interim suppression orders in this court without any determination of the merits. This was done to “preserve the integrity of [the Murray Proceeding]” until the determination of an application for a proceeding suppression order.[8]
[8]These orders were extended by Tueno JR until the hearing of this application; and further extended at the completion of the hearing of this application until delivery of judgment.
No interim suppression orders have been made in the Kamvissis Proceeding, which commenced in late 2024. None have been sought.[9]
[9]At a directions hearing held on 30 January 2025, Tueno JR enquired as to whether Kamvissis intended to seek a suppression order. Kamvissis’ solicitor stated that the position was then unknown.
On 17 February 2025, Kamvissis filed an application seeking suppression orders to prevent any report of, or any information derived from, the Kamvissis Proceeding. At the hearing of this application, Kamvissis’ application was also returnable. However, the court was told that Kamvissis intended to make an application for a separate suppression order in a County Court proceeding the following day. Kamvissis’ position was that if a suppression order was made in that County Court proceeding (in which Kamvissis was the accused), it was unlikely that Kamvissis would consider a suppression order would be necessary in the Kamvissis Proceeding. Alternatively, it was stated it was unlikely that any application would be made by Kamvissis in the Kamvissis Proceeding in the terms presently sought or based on the current timing.
Counsel for Kamvissis agreed to inform the court of the outcome of the County Court application.
On 7 May 2025, the court was told that an order had been made prohibiting the reporting of the County Court proceeding concerning Kamvissis. The following day, Kamvissis’ counsel emailed the court stating Kamvissis would apply to withdraw his application for suppression orders in the Kamvissis Proceeding.
There are a number of witnesses whose identities have been protected [redacted][10] [redacted]. Orders have been made on the basis that they were necessary to protect the safety of the persons involved.
[10][Redacted].
Subject to further order, these existing suppression and pseudonym orders are to continue for the foreseeable future.[11] That said, as may be seen from recital B of “Other matters”, these orders have only been made to govern the preparation of the Proceedings leading up to the trial and any hearings conducted pursuant to section 198B of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). Further, the existing orders either expressly or implicitly accept the possibility of media publications occurring subject to the restrictions specified.[12]
[11]See annexure A to these reasons.
[12]See pars 5 and 16 respectively.

B.3 Existing publications referring to Murray

The principal matter relied upon as providing the basis for the suppression orders was the nature and extent of existing media publications concerning Murray. Fourteen different publications were expressly identified, spanning the period between 13 June 2017 and 10 March 2025.[13]
[13]The articles were published on the following dates: 13 June 2017, 10 July 2019, 16 August 2019, 17 August 2019, 14 November 2019, 31 May 2021 (2 articles), 3 October 2021, 4 October 2021, 28 April 2022, 18 June 2022, 13 June 2024, 19 December 2024 and 10 March 2025. See also fn 7 above concerning a Wikipedia page as at 15 April 2024.
The fact that Murray was charged [redacted] has been repeatedly reported, and that information is still available on the internet.[14] In addition to referring to the Comancheros, some of those reports included statements by the police, such as the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police, about the alleged connection between the murder charge and outlaw motorcycle gangs, coupled with the significant impact Murray’s arrest would have on their allegedly nefarious operations.
[14]Some of the detail has already been referred to. See fnn 1, 7 above.
The publications also referred to other matters concerning Murray’s criminal history. These included “his lengthy criminal record” and serving 8 months in prison for refusing to answer questions of the Chief Examiner.[15]
[15]See Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 (Vic), Pt 3.
More broadly, there have been considerable details published about the Comancheros. These included matters relating to ownership and control, involvement in trafficking large quantities of illicit substances, being associated with establishments the subject of police raids, drive-by shootings, fire bombings and other targeted attacks, acts of retribution, and other nefarious conduct alleged to be undertaken by an outlaw motorcycle gang.
In addition, 3 videos currently available on YouTube were relied upon. The videos, entitled “The FIERCEST Comancheros Boss of all Time”,[16] “Comanchero’s Bikie Boss has his first hearing in Melbourne Court”[17] and “The Comanchero Hard Man: How Mick Murray fought His Way To The Top”,[18] all concern alleged activities of Murray in conjunction with his association with the Comancheros.[19] The videos run for 21 minutes and 20 seconds, 3 minutes and 52 seconds and 16 minutes and 16 seconds respectively. Each of them deal with both the Comancheros generally and Murray’s purported role in some of the alleged operations, including particular criminal activities and events. [Redacted].
[16]As at 20 May 2025, this video had 204,547 views.
[17]As at 20 May 2025, this video had 40,986 views.
[18]As at 20 May 2025, this video had 277,816 views. The affidavit in support suggested that as at March 2025, this video had 5,067,342 views, but this figure appears to be the total number of views at that time for the 71 videos available on the channel “FinCrime Files”.
[19]The videos were not played in court, but were viewed after the hearing.
Finally, Murray’s solicitor deposed that he searched the internet for “Mick Murray”, using a common search engine. As a result, he observed a “large number” of other news articles relating to Murray but did not produce them.

B.4 The case against Murray and evidence to be led more generally in the Proceedings

The issues on this application concerning possible prejudicial publicity do not include any prejudice to Murray if the jury were to learn of his position in the Comancheros. The simple fact that Murray is associated with the Comancheros is a matter that will be before the jury as part of the evidence at trial. Indeed, particular focus will be placed on his senior position and role within that organisation. The prosecution alleges the Comancheros are a criminal organisation with an extensive network throughout Australia and internationally. Evidence will be led to this effect.
[Redacted].
[Redacted].
[Redacted].
[Redacted].
[Redacted].

C. Suppression orders must be necessary

Ordinarily, the media are free to publish fair and accurate reports of court proceedings; indeed such publications are a cornerstone of open justice,[20] and foster legitimate discussion about matters of public interest.[21] Further, the timely reporting of court proceedings aligns with open justice principles.[22] More specifically, public confidence in the administration of justice of criminal trials is promoted by the public being properly informed with contemporaneity, including in more serious cases by up-to-date, ongoing reporting. Timeliness also promotes the value, and a broader understanding of the value, of the rule of law.[23]
[20]John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465, 476G-477A (McHugh JA, with whom Glass JA agreed).
[21]R v Williams; In the matter of an application by “The Age” [2004] VSC 413, [31] (Kellam J); Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15, 26.2-27.5 (Mason CJ); Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd.; Re Truth and Sportsman Ltd (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 242, 249 (Jordan CJ), quoted by Lord Reid in Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1974] AC 273, 296E-297A and by Brennan J in R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592, 612.2.
[22]Chaarani v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2018] VSCA 299, [41] (Maxwell P, Beach and Hargrave JJA), a case concerned with the reporting of the outcome of a criminal trial; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 532 [22] (French CJ); R v Mokbel(No 2) [2009] VSC 652, [27] (Kaye J); Re applications by the Chief Commissioner of Police (Vic) for Leave to Appeal (2004) 9 VR 275, 286 [25] (Winneke P, Ormiston and Vincent JJA); John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344, 353 [20] (Spigelman CJ, with whom Handley JA and MW Campbell AJA agreed). Compare observations in R v Mokbel(No 2) [2009] VSC 652, [62]-[63].
[23]Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 AC 593, 607H-608A (Lord Steyn, with whom Lords Bingham, Nicholls, Hoffmann and Carswell agreed). See also Spigelman JJ, “The principle of open justice: a comparative perspective”: (2006) 29(2) UNSW Law Journal 147, 156. See also Nationwide News Pty Ltd vFarquharson (2010) 28 VR 473, 477 [16] (Maxwell P, with whom Nettle JA and Emerton AJA agreed).
The Open Courts Act relevantly provides:
17       Court or tribunal may make proceeding suppression order
A court or tribunal on one or more of the grounds specified in section 18 may make a proceeding suppression order to prohibit or restrict the disclosure by publication or otherwise of—
(a)       a report of the whole or any part of a proceeding;
(b)       any information derived from a proceeding.
18       Grounds for proceeding suppression order
(1)A court … may make a proceeding suppression order if satisfied as to one or more of the following grounds—
(a)the order is necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice that cannot be prevented by other reasonably available means;
Example
Another reasonably available means may be directions to the jury.
(Emphasis added.)
Section 18(1)(a) is a statutory recognition of the principle that open justice must give way in certain exceptional circumstances to protect the administration of justice. Suppression orders may be made to this end, but only to the extent necessary. This provision, along with the rest of the Open Courts Act, must be read in light of the court’s obligation to have regard to the primacy of the principle of open justice and the free communication and disclosure of information.[24]
[24]Open Courts Act, s 4(1). For an expansive discussion of the relevant principles, see Re WD (No 2) (2023) 72 VR 589, 603-606 [58]-[63].
That said, the requirement of necessity in this context reflects the need for courts to avoid unacceptable consequences that would interfere with the proper function of the courts.[25] There is a heavy onus on a person seeking a suppression order as a high degree of satisfaction is required before any encroachment on the principle of open justice will be permitted.
[25]Director of Prosecutions v EN [2023] VSC 724, [24] and the cases there cited.
Although often referred to as a right to a fair trial,[26] there is no right to have a trial or, if a trial is held, for it to be absolutely fair. Subject to matters not presently relevant,[27] if a prosecution proceeds to hearing, an accused is entitled to a trial that is as fair as the court can make it.[28] The mere existence of embarrassment, shame or humiliation does not make a trial unfair in the relevant sense and will be insufficient to discharge the onus of establishing necessity.[29]
[26]X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92, 116 [37] (French CJ and Crennan J) and the cases there cited.
[27]See, for example, ibid, 116-117 [38].
[28]Jago v District Court (NSW) (1989) 168 CLR 23, 49.7 (Brennan J), referred to with approval in GLJ v The Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore (2023) 414 ALR 635, 651-652 [48] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Jagot JJ). See also R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592, 615.3 (Brennan J).
[29]See fn 25 above; Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311, 326 [54] (Bathurst CJ and McColl JA); PQR v Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation (No 1) (2017) 53 VR 45, 74-75 [72] (Bell J) and the cases there cited.
In some cases, however, the notoriety of the accused may be an important factor in determining whether publication of the proceeding while it remains on foot will give rise to a level of unfairness that is inconsistent with the proper administration of justice.
In a case decided before the enactment of the Open Courts Act, it was noted that if there was a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the right of an accused to a fair trial in respect of very serious charges if the proceedings were published while they were being conducted, then it may be appropriate for a suppression order to be made.[30] Indeed, the notoriety of an accused, or an organisation with which an accused is associated, may be such that it creates a very high likelihood that publication of a proceeding at or around the time the trial is on foot will result in jurors being exposed to people making comments to them during their day-to-day lives not only about the case, but also about the accused person.[31] In a similar vein, if there is existing sensationalist or prejudicial publicity concerning the accused, a suppression order may be necessary to prevent a real risk of reviving eroded or fading memories of such publicity.[32] Again, the touchstone when considering such factors is not the reputation or any embarrassment or humiliation of the accused; it is the due administration of justice.
[30]R v Mokbel(No 2) [2009] VSC 652, [30] (Kaye J).
[31]Ibid, [31].
[32]Ibid, [32], [50].

In considering whether a suppression order should be made, the court must consider the ability of trial judges to give appropriate directions to juries; and the capability of juries to follow those directions.[33] While this is not a determinative factor,[34] equally the fact that an accused attracts notoriety does not mean that person will be entitled to a suppression order.[35]
[33]See note to s 18(1)(a): par 33 above. See also Dupas v The Queen(2010) 241 CLR 237, 247-248 [26], 248-249 [28]-[29], 251 [38] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in the context of a stay application; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344, 366-367 [103]-[110] (Spigelman CJ, with whom Handley JA and MW Campbell AJA agreed) and the cases there cited.
[34]Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Qaumi (2016) 93 NSWLR 384, 393-394 [38]-[43] (primary judge’s reasons), 399 [72] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P and Hoeben CJ at CL); Nationwide News Pty Ltd vFarquharson (2010) 28 VR 473, 477 [15] (Maxwell P, with whom Nettle JA and Emerton AJA agreed); R v Mokbel (No 2) [2009] VSC 652, [33]-[34] (Kaye J); Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, 101.5 (Mason CJ and Toohey J).
[35]See fn 33. See also R v Williams; In the matter of an application by “The Age” [2004] VSC 413 (Kellam J); R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592, 615.2 (Brennan J), which was referred to in R v Glennon (No 2) (2001) 7 VR 631, 660-661 [67] (Winneke P and Ormiston JA).

D. Pseudonym orders must be necessary

A pseudonym order does not restrict publication of information in connection with a proceeding other than the identification of the person or persons the subject of the order. Similar to the position with respect to suppression orders, pseudonym orders may only be made if necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice.[36] Any such orders are not made under the Open Courts Act, but rather pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court.[37]
[36]ABC v D1 [2007] VSC 480, [67] (J Forrest J), applied in Secretary to the Department of Justice Regulation v Zhong (No 2) [2017] VSCA 19, [4] (Santamaria, Ferguson and McLeish JJA).
[37]MSB v Chief Commissioner of Police (2018) 57 VR 360, 372 [48] (McLeish JA, with whom Maxwell P and Almond AJA agreed).
In considering whether a person’s identity should be protected, the court may take into account the individual considerations pertaining to the person seeking the order and balance those against the principle of open justice.[38]
[38]ABC v D1 [2007] VSC 480, [68] (J Forrest J).
Self-evidently, a pseudonym order is far less intrusive upon open justice than a suppression order. Accordingly, in considering whether a pseudonym order should be made, the relatively lesser degree of derogation of open justice must be taken into account.[39]
[39]Ibid, [70].
Generally speaking,[40] cogent proof of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of a pseudonym order must exist before an order will be made. The burden of establishing a necessity will not be satisfied by a party’s mere belief that an order is necessary.[41]

E. Reasons for refusing the suppression orders

[40]In some cases, a judge may be able to act on experience or plainly incontrovertible facts to draw an appropriate inference that an order is necessary: ibid, [62], [71], citing The Age Company Ltd v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [2004] VSC 10, [13] (Kaye J), in turn referring to R v Pomeroy [2002] VSC 178 (Teague J).

[41]PQR v Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation (No 1) (2017) 53 VR 45, 75 [73] (Bell J); ABC v D1 [2007] VSC 480, [62], [71].

E.1 Scope of orders sought

Murray does not seek to have hearings that cannot be attended by the public. If orders were to be made, there would also be no limitation on reporting once the trial is concluded, as the orders are only sought up until that time. Thus, scrutiny of the judicial process would still be available to any person wishing to attend and also more generally after the trial is over.[42]
[42]Compare R v Mokbel(No 2) [2009] VSC 652, [62]-[63] (Kaye J).
While acknowledging the limitations of the suppression orders sought, the question of necessity and the degree of derogation from open justice must be considered in the context that open justice would nonetheless be substantially interfered with if the orders were made for at least the following reasons.
First, most people in our society are unable to attend court hearings in person. As a result, nearly all members of our community rely upon fair and accurate reports by the media in order to be informed about the trials conducted in this and other courts in our country.[43] Further, a member of the public should receive information concerning a court case in a timely manner.[44]
[43]Ibid, [27].
[44]See fnn 22, 23 above.
Secondly, not only does Murray seek orders in relation to the Murray Proceeding, he also seeks orders with respect to the Kamvissis Proceeding when no such orders are sought by Kamvissis himself.
Thirdly, in light of the previous orders,[45] if the suppression orders were made, they would have the effect of prohibiting the reporting of the entirety of the criminal process of the Murray Proceeding and most of the Kamvissis Proceeding.[46] This is to be contrasted with the “exceptional” case of R v Mokbel(No 2),[47] in which the question of whether or not a suppression order ought to be made was heard and determined only 5 days before the empanelment of the jury was scheduled to occur.[48]
[45]See pars 12-13 above.
[46]The Proceedings are only in the early interlocutory stages. Counsel submitted at the hearing that it was too early to give a tentative date for the trial.
[47][2009] VSC 652, [60].
[48]Ibid, [1]; noting that previous orders had been made some 4 or so months earlier: ibid, [2].

E.2 Suppression orders are not necessary

None of the matters raised by Murray demonstrate that the suppression orders sought are necessary.
Although the evidence shows that there have been extensive media publications (both through traditional news platforms and social media) with respect to outlaw motorcycle groups in Victoria (and more generally), including the Comancheros, this publicity does not give rise to any need to suppress reporting of the Proceedings.
This follows as a matter of principle; there is simply no authority which would support the proposition that all trials involving members of outlaw motorcycle gangs should escape public scrutiny if an application for a suppression order were made.
[Redacted].
Thus, while this type of earlier publicity remains relevant insofar as it may be considered together with other matters raised, of itself it provides no proper basis for making any suppression order.
Murray also relied on the content and extent of the media coverage, [redacted].[49] In addition, it was submitted there would be an immediate increase in publications about the murder of Yucel and the present charges against Murray and Kamvissis (as well as the role of the uncharged Topal). It was submitted it would give rise to media providing commentary, analysis and opinion on Murray, together with views being expressed on his legal issues and his reputation. [Redacted].
[49][Redacted].
On the question of media coverage more generally, it is acknowledged that previous publications include commentary about Murray’s character,[50] biographical compilations (including allegations relating to matters for which he has never been charged) and records of inter-gang politics and violence. However, while it has been significant, it is far from exceptional. Other criminal cases have received far more extensive pre-trial coverage, but prohibiting the reporting of them has not been considered necessary.[51]
[50]For example, Wikipedia refers to Murray as an “outlaw biker, businessman and alleged gangster”.
[51]See, for example, R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592, 603.2 (Mason CJ and Toohey J), referred to with approval in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court (NSW) (2004) 61 NSWLR 344, 366 [104] (Spigelman CJ, with whom Handley JA and MW Campbell AJA agreed) and the cases there cited; Director of Public Prosecutions v Williams (2004) 10 VR 348, 353 [25] (Cummins J); R v Williams; In the matter of an application by “The Age” [2004] VSC 413, [10], [16]-[17], [22] (Kellam J); R v Glennon(No 2) (2001) 7 VR 631, 635-636 [3]-[4], 658-661 [64]-[67] (Winneke P and Ormiston JA) albeit an appeal dealing with a refusal of a stay application; Re National Safety Council of Australia Victoria Division (in liq); re Friedrich (1989) 1 ACSR 164, 167.2 (Cummins J).
Dealing with the previous statement made by the Commissioner of Victoria Police about the impact Murray’s arrest would have on the activities of motorcycle gangs,[52] in my view this statement and publication of its making is only of minor significance. Police officers stating various matters about the state of criminal activity in Victoria is not an infrequent occurrence. While care must be exercised by police (and others) in relation to such statements, it is not credible to suggest that such general statements (even if made in emotional circumstances) impact upon the ability of the courts to ensure the administration of justice is adhered to in the usual way.[53]
[52]See par 21 above.
[53]Murray’s counsel referred to the details of a press conference held by police in 2017. Similar observations may be made concerning this even more-dated press conference.
A similar observation may be made in relation to previous statements and reporting about the bail laws in this State insofar as they related to Murray being released on bail.[54] It is simply not plausible that the reporting of a politician in opposition asserting bail had been improperly granted to Murray some 5 years ago would affect the ability of a prospective juror to properly carry out the role of a member of the jury.
[54]In 2019, the then leader of the State opposition made derisory statements in this regard when Murray was granted bail in order to enable him to travel overseas.
The videos give rise to similar but not identical issues.[55] No submissions were directed to the question of what weight members of the public would be likely to give to videos of these channels on YouTube when compared with publications on the internet or otherwise by what might loosely be described as mainstream media.[56] For the purpose of this judgment, it will be assumed (without deciding) that there is no material difference in this regard.
[55]See par 24 above.
[56]Compare the definition of “relevant news media organisation” in the Open Courts Act, s 11(3).
On the limited evidence relied upon on this application, Murray has not established that the existence of the videos (either of themselves or in combination with the other publications) gives rise to a necessity for any suppression order. As a general comment, it is unremarkable and well-known that outlaw motorcycle groups operate in Australia, including Victoria.[57] Further, the existence of the Comancheros and Murray’s involvement in this organisation are matters that will be the subject of evidence at trial in any event.[58]
[57]In addition to the large volume of publications on this general topic, for at least a decade legislation has operated specifically to provide for the making of declarations and control orders in relation to alleged criminal organisations, including outlaw motorcycle groups: see Criminal Organisations Control Act 2012 (Vic).
[58]See pars 26-31 above.
In saying this, it is fair to describe some of the content of the videos as sensationalist; and in the context where purportedly biographical and other alleged factual matters are put forward about Murray. However, I am not satisfied that such information would interfere with prospective jurors’ ability to duly carry out their role.[59]
[59]See par 39 above.
Further, there is no evidence upon which to find that it was likely that prospective jurors would be exposed to the videos. While there have been a significant number of views recorded as having taken place on the respective YouTube channels,[60] these videos are available worldwide.[61] Thus, any conclusion about the number of Victorians who have viewed these videos would be entirely speculative. In any event, in light of the potentially worldwide audience, the number of views is relatively modest and does not suggest that the videos have been watched by a large number of Victorians.
[60]For completeness, there was no evidence as to what amounts to a “view” (that is, for how long any video needs to be watched before it is recorded as a view, assuming when it is played it is actually being watched) or the extent to which any viewer has played the video more than once. On an application under the Open Courts Act, the court may only be satisfied on the basis of evidence or “sufficient credible information”: s 14(1).
[61]Noting that there are some countries that prohibit YouTube being broadcast.
As for the ongoing availability of historical reporting and other media concerning Murray, there is naturally a risk that reports on the Proceedings will activate interest in previous reporting or other publications. It must be accepted that the significant body of information available concerning Murray and the Comancheros could be linked by a simple internet search. However, there was no evidence on which any finding could be made about the likelihood of that risk materialising.
That said, even if there is a possibility that a prospective juror may learn of [redacted] other matters that have been published about Murray, it does not follow that the administration of justice will be prejudiced. [Redacted].[62]
[62]See fn 51 above. Of course, leaving aside any suppression orders, publishing any prior convictions of Murray when reporting on the Proceedings would be likely to be a contempt of court: R v The Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (2007) 19 VR 248, 270 [77] (Smith J).
Further, the trial will not commence for a considerable period of time,[63] and the risk of a prospective juror being affected by such information so long before the trial is remote at best.[64] In addition, the usual processes in selecting a jury and, once a jury is selected, appropriate directions can properly address any such issue.[65]
[63]See fn 46 above.
[64]Compare R v Williams; In the matter of an application by “The Age” [2004] VSC 413, [23] (Kellam J), referring to Re National Safety Council of Australia Victoria Division (in liq); re Friedrich (1989) 1 ACSR 164, 166.8 (Cummins J).
[65]See further par 39 above.
Quite properly, Murray’s counsel accepted that comprehensive and careful directions may be given to the jury consistent with Murray receiving a fair trial. [Redacted].
Furthermore, upon the existing interim order lapsing, it would be entirely unremarkable if there were an increase in publications about the murder of Yucel. The fact that this innocent victim was killed in the manner that he was and that 2 persons are to be tried for his murder is a matter of legitimate public interest and is newsworthy in itself. Such reporting in a timely manner promotes the administration of justice.[66] The timing of the killing, being in 2017, does not detract from this. Although the underlying offence occurred some 8 years ago, this does not diminish the importance of contemporaneous reporting of current court proceedings.
[66]See par 32 above.
To the extent that Murray’s submissions appeared to suggest that the collision between this “undeniably tragic case” of the death of “a young man … who had nothing to do with anyone” and the alleged activities of an outlaw motorcycle gang provided some proper basis for making a suppression order, that submission must be rejected. Almost all murder trials involve acute distress and expose emotional tragedies. Ordinarily, the fact that the subject matter of the Proceedings may be highly emotive and be inclined to attract emotional responses from those involved and members of the public does not, of itself, provide a proper basis for a suppression order.[67]
[67]Though in some rare cases it may: see Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Farquharson (2010) 28 VR 473, 476-477 [14]-[15] (Maxwell P, with whom Nettle JA and Emerton AJA agreed) noting that this case was concerned with a publication during the trial and the article in question touched upon the appropriateness or otherwise of a previous acquittal in a similar type of case to the case being heard before a jury.
Moreover, the evidence does not establish that any media reports of the Proceedings will be likely to go beyond fair and accurate reporting. Although in some cases there may be a history of reporting which might give rise to such a conclusion,[68] absent cogent evidence providing a proper basis for an inference to be drawn of likely improper reporting, courts proceed on the premise that the media will perform its tasks and discharge its duties properly.[69]
[68]See, for example, R v Mokbel (No 2) [2009] VSC 652, [65], [67] (Kaye J).
[69]Ibid, [66], citing David Syme & Co v Arnold (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 5 March 1993, Cummins J). See also News Digital Media Pty Ltd v Mokbel (2010) 30 VR 248, 267-268 [73] (Warren CJ and Byrne AJA). As for the issues with social media, see pars 58-61 above.
[Redacted].
[Redacted].
[Redacted]. Although it was submitted that the County Court Proceeding was a relevant matter to consider on this application, the existence of that proceeding provides no basis for a suppression order in the Proceedings. There was no submission that the County Court Proceeding would be prejudiced if a suppression order were not made. Equally, given its very different subject matter, any publication of a fair and accurate report of the County Court Proceeding would not interfere with the due administration of justice in the conduct of the Proceedings.
In summary, the prosecution’s position that [redacted] no further suppression orders are necessary must be accepted.

F. Reasons for refusing the pseudonym orders

The pseudonym orders sought in conjunction with the suppression orders were for the purpose of anonymising the court listings of the Proceedings in order to protect the identity of Murray, but to still allow the matter to be listed. It follows from the reasons dealing with the suppression orders that the oral application for pseudonym orders must also be refused. In short, it is not necessary for the due administration of justice for the names of either Murray or Kamvissis to be replaced with pseudonyms.
The names of both accused will obviously be known to the jury at the time of trial. Accordingly, any pseudonym order would have no practical effect in this regard.
The ability of the media to report using the accused’s names is a necessary part of the media being able to report the Proceedings fairly and accurately. The reasons concerning why no suppression orders will be made demonstrate why pseudonym orders are also not necessary.

G. Conclusion and closing remarks

For the reasons stated, the applications for suppression and pseudonym orders are dismissed.
As already touched upon, the media has an obligation to report the Proceedings fairly and accurately. Failure to do so may constitute a contempt of court and may also result in serious penalties being imposed, particularly as the Proceedings draw closer to trial.[70]
[70]R v Williams; In the matter of an application by “The Age” [2004] VSC 413, [34]-[35] (Kellam J) quoting Director of Public Prosecutions v Williams (2004) 10 VR 348, 353 [25] (Cummins J); Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, 530.4 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 538.3 (McHugh J). See also “Reporting on the Court: A brief guide” on the website of the court: supremecourt.vic.gov.au.

Naturally, without in any way suggesting that any such application should be made, this judgment says nothing about the suitability or otherwise of suppression or pseudonym orders closer to the trial.[71]
[71]Compare Chaarani v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2018] VSCA 299, [47] (Maxwell P, Beach and Hargrave JJA).

ANNEXURE A
[Redacted]

[2025] VSC 275

21 May 2025