Director of Public Prosecutions v Williams

[2025] ACTSC 67

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

DPP v Williams

Citation: 

[2025] ACTSC 67

Hearing Date: 

26 February 2025

Decision Date: 

28 February 2025

Before:

Mossop J

Decision: 

See [70]

Catchwords:

CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – attempted aggravated burglary – accessory after the fact to murder – home invasion to obtain drugs and money planned by offender, to be carried out by others including minors – home invasion carried out on wrong premises – victim shot and killed – offender covered-up murder – plea of guilty – offender suffering from PTSD – limited criminal history – evidence of work and treatment in AMC but mixed prospects of rehabilitation – sentence of seven years’ imprisonment imposed – non‑parole period of four years and two months imposed

Legislation Cited: 

Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT)

Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 7

Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 12

Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 45, 45A, 312, 717

Cases Cited: 

Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571

Director of Public Prosecutions v Connors (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 280

Director of Public Prosecutions v Connors [2022] ACTSC 279

DPP v Ncube [2023] ACTSC 16

DPP v Rowntree (a pseudonym) [2024] ACTSC 155

DPP v Taylor [2023] ACTSC 39

DPP v Williams [2023] ACTSC 224

R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269

R v Sikounnabouth [2019] ACTSC 119

Parties: 

Director of Public Prosecutions

Nicole Williams ( Offender)

Representation: 

Counsel

T Hickey ( DPP)

FJ Purnell SC ( Offender)

Solicitors

Director of Public Prosecutions

CODA Law ( Offender)

File Number:

SCC 241 of 2022

MOSSOP J:  

Introduction

1․Nicole Williams has pleaded guilty to two offences:

(a)one count of attempted aggravated burglary; and

(b)one count of being an accessory after the fact to murder.

Both offences occurred on or from 10 June 2021.

2․The maximum penalty for each is 20 years’ imprisonment or a fine of 2000 penalty units, or both.

Facts

3․The facts upon which the pleas of guilty are based are set out in a Statement of Facts dated 2 February 2024 and are agreed by the offender.

4․Glenn Walewicz died as a result of a gunshot wound received on the evening of 10 June 2021. As I noted when sentencing some of the co-offenders, the circumstances in which the victim of the offending died are particularly tragic because he was not the intended target of the burglary and was killed because the intending burglars went to the wrong house.

5․A summary of the agreed facts is as follows. In addition to the offender, the following people were involved in the events that led to the death of Mr Walewicz:

(a)Jayden Williams, the son of the offender, who was 18 at the time of the offending;

(b)a 17-year-old whom I will refer to as Kieran Rowntree, the pseudonym given to him in the sentencing reasons related to him;

(c)Gary Taylor, who was 23 at the time of the offending;

(d)a 12-year-old boy who will simply be referred to as “the 12‑year‑old”; and

(e)Reatile Ncube, who was 18 years old at the time of the offending.

6․The offender was a regular consumer of methamphetamine and cannabis. In the weeks leading up to the murder, Mr Taylor and the 12-year-old were staying at the offender’s premises in Holt. Mr Taylor and the 12-year-old did not know each other before meeting at the offender’s house. The offender introduced the 12-year-old to Mr Taylor. The offender regularly provided methamphetamine and cannabis to children staying at her premises, including the 12-year-old.

7․A .22 calibre pump‑action rifle had been left at the premises by someone who had previously stayed there. The offender had placed the firearm under her bed and was attempting to sell it.

8․Using her son as an intermediary, the offender arranged with Mr Taylor and Mr Rowntree to become involved with committing an aggravated burglary in the nature of a home invasion on two identified persons, whom I will refer to as Ms W and Mr D. On the evening of 10 June 2021, Mr Williams sent a text message to the offender about doing the home invasion that evening.

9․Mr Rowntree, Mr Ncube, the 12-year-old and the offender met at the offender’s house. She introduced Mr Rowntree to Mr Taylor and the 12‑year‑old. She told them to do a “run through” of the house of Ms W and Mr D because those persons owed her money. She instructed them to take any drugs and money found at the premises.

10․The proceeds of the home invasion were intended to go to the offender. The offender provided Mr Rowntree with the .22 calibre pump‑action rifle for the purposes of the home invasion. The offender told Mr Taylor and Mr Rowntree that she believed that Mr D might be in possession of a firearm and might shoot at them. There was a dispute as to whether the agreed facts proved beyond reasonable doubt that the weapon was loaded when the offender provided it to Mr Rowntree. In my view, the agreed facts are not sufficient to establish that fact, but are sufficient to establish that the offender, when providing the weapon, intended that it be loaded and hence able to be used as a firearm when the aggravated burglary was carried out.

11․The offender promised to provide Mr Taylor with some of the methamphetamine that she expected them to find at the premises. She also placed a crack pipe in the 12‑year‑old’s mouth, lit the pipe and told him to inhale. This was the first time the 12‑year‑old had ever consumed methamphetamine.

12․Mr Walewicz was at his home with his girlfriend in a multi‑unit development in Phillip. Mr Rowntree, Mr Taylor and the 12‑year‑old approached the front door of the unit with their faces covered. They had been driven to the unit complex by Mr Ncube, who waited in the car. They intended to commit an aggravated burglary in the nature of a home invasion on the pre‑selected target, the residence of Ms W and Mr D. The intention was to steal any money and/or drugs found on the premises. However, they went to the wrong unit. The deceased and his premises were not the intended targets. One of the offenders knocked on the front door. Mr Walewicz opened the door and was shot in the neck by Mr Rowntree. He died shortly thereafter. An autopsy report identified the cause of death as a gunshot wound to the neck and chest.

13․Mr Rowntree, Mr Taylor and the 12-year-old ran back to the car. Mr Ncube drove them back to the offender’s house in Holt.

14․The offender was told by the 12-year-old that “they just shot someone in the face”. The offender screamed at the 12-year-old and said if he told anyone, the same would happen to him. The 12-year-old and Mr Taylor asked the offender why someone had been shot. She said, “if I had told that something was going to happen, youse wouldn’t have gone around there”.

15․The 12-year-old continued to stay at the offender’s premises and was told repeatedly by the offender not to talk about the incident with anyone.

16․Mr Rowntree remained in possession of the weapon. On 20 October 2021, the offender messaged her son saying that he should tell Mr Rowntree to hide or dispose of the firearm. The same day, the offender was attempting to sell the firearm.

17․In late 2021, four males, who said that they were acting on the instructions of the offender, visited Mr Taylor, gave him a box containing the murder weapon and told him that he was to hide it or he would be bashed. Having regard to the agreement as to what the males said, I draw the inference beyond reasonable doubt that they were in fact acting on the instructions of the offender.

18․On 6 June 2022, the offender made an arrangement with her son to book a train ticket for her out of the ACT as she was worried the police knew about her involvement in the murder. She said she would make “one of these other kids” say that Mr Taylor and the 12-year-old were responsible for the murder. The offender said, “I’m gunna make out I don’t know a damn thing. Cause as soon as I slip up and say that I was even knowin’ any of it, I’m locked up too”. Police arrested the offender at Kingston Station on 7 June 2022.

The basis for liability

19․The statutory provisions pursuant to which the offender was liable were agreed. While the particulars of the offending were not expressly agreed, counsel for the offender made no submissions that any of the particularised aspects of the offences were not established by the agreed facts, and I accept that each of the offences arose in the manner which I will now describe.

20․The offender is liable for the offence of aggravated burglary contrary to s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), arising under s 45 of the Criminal Code because the offender was “knowingly concerned” in the offending insofar as:

(a)she identified the targets for the attempted aggravated burglary;

(b)she put Mr Taylor in contact with Mr Williams with a directive to recruit Mr Rowntree for the attempted aggravated burglary;

(c)she provided them with a firearm to be used in the aggravated burglary;

(d)she directed Mr Rowntree, Mr Taylor and the 12‑year‑old to commit the aggravated burglary, intending that they would do so; and

(e)the attempted aggravated burglary was committed for her benefit because she was to receive any drugs and money that were appropriated.

21․The count of being an accessory after the fact to murder (contrary to s 12 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)) is based upon s 717 of the Criminal Code, which imposes liability where the accessory assists the principal offender—

(a)knowing the principal offender committed the offence; or

(b)believing the principal offender committed the offence or a related offence.

22․The particulars of the assistance provided were:

(a)threatening the 12-year-old that, if he told anyone what happened during the attempted home invasion, he would be shot;

(b)repeatedly telling the 12-year-old to keep quiet and not to speak of the incident to anyone in the days after the murder;

(c)making arrangements to dispose of and conceal the firearm used during the murder by—

(i)arranging for the firearm to be sold; and

(ii)sending people to direct Mr Taylor to take the murder weapon and conceal it.

23․At the time of threatening the 12-year-old, the offender believed that Mr Rowntree had committed “related offences” involved in the burglary and the discharge of the weapon, as well as knowing that Mr Rowntree had committed the murder.

Victim Impact

24․A victim impact statement was read on behalf of Mr Walewicz’s mother, Jenny Walewicz. The statement was prepared in September 2022. She described that her son was a friend and she spent most weekends “hanging out with him”. She described the way in which her life was in limbo awaiting the outcome of the judicial process. She described feeling alone, crying, feeling guilt. She described becoming obsessed with the progress of the case. She described that she will never be the same again and that she feels like her son’s murder has stolen from her the best years of her life with her adult son.

25․A victim impact statement of Eileen Walewicz was read. She is Mr Walewicz’s widow. They were married but had been separated for some time. They had reconnected and discussed plans to reconcile. She described her fragile physical and mental health as being affected when she was told by her mother-in-law that Mr Walewicz had died. At the time, she was lying in a hospital bed recovering from major spinal surgery. Her statement described her feelings of loss, her understandable thoughts of “why” and “what if”, and her overwhelming sadness at the loss of someone whom she truly loved.

26․Undoubtedly, the sense of loss and the impact of Mr Walewicz’s death upon the authors of the victim impact statement, and others, is enhanced by the fact that his death was a terrible mistake.

Objective seriousness

27․The range of culpability involved in being “knowingly concerned” in an offence varies widely. The matters particularised as demonstrating the offender was knowingly concerned in the attempted aggravated burglary indicate that this is a serious example of a person being knowingly concerned. Similarly, attempts may vary widely in their objective seriousness because of the varied extent to which the offence has been attempted.

28․Once again, in the present case, what occurred was a serious attempt because it was carried through to the point of an attempted entry, albeit to the wrong premises, which was only stopped because Mr Walewicz had been shot.

29․Finally, aggravated burglaries may vary significantly in their objective seriousness depending upon the premises burgled, the time of day, and what aggravating features are present. In the present case, the aggravated burglary that was to be attempted related to domestic premises, were premises where people were expected to be present, was to occur at night, and was to be aggravated by both the presence of numerous people as well as a firearm. When all these features are considered as a whole, the offence committed is clearly a serious one because of the level of involvement, the seriousness of the attempt and the gravity of the aggravated burglary attempted.

30․So far as the offence of being an accessory after the fact to murder is concerned, it is also the case that the level of assistance provided to the murderers can vary greatly in practical significance and moral culpability. The present circumstances involve the covering‑up of what had occurred. This was done through intimidating the 12-year-old in an attempt to stop him disclosing what had happened, and also seeking to dispose of or hide the murder weapon. These acts were significant, but more remote from the immediate aftermath of the murder. They included getting Mr Taylor to hide the weapon months after the murder had occurred. I would characterise the conduct as a mid-range rather than high‑range example of the offence.

Subjective circumstances

31․The offender’s subjective circumstances are described in pre-sentence reports, an intensive correction order assessment report, the report of a psychologist, Tabitha Frew, and the report of a psychiatrist, Dr Joey Le. Some further documentary material was also tendered on behalf of the offender.

Personal circumstances

32․The offender is almost 41. She is Aboriginal. She was born in Tumut, NSW. Her parents separated prior to her birth. She had five half‑siblings from her mother’s side and approximately seven half‑siblings from her father’s side. She had what she described as a rough upbringing. She witnessed substance use and family violence. She was subjected to sexual abuse by a family member for a prolonged period. She completed schooling to year eight. She left home at the age of 14 until she was invited to reside with her cousin in Yass. At about that time, she met her long-term partner, with whom she stayed in a relationship for over 20 years. She is the mother of five children and two stillborn children. She separated from her ex-partner a few months prior to going into custody in June 2022. Their relationship was volatile and marred by severe domestic violence. An example is provided by the offences the subject of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Connors [2022] ACTSC 279 and Director of Public Prosecutions v Connors (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 280.

33․Her children range in age from seven to 21 years. They all reside interstate. All of her children currently live with her mother. [Redacted]. She remains close to four of her children. She also has two grandchildren.

34․She lives in a public housing property, and that property remains available to her. She has no employment history, attributing this to the controlling relationship with her ex‑partner and her illicit substance use.

35․Although she stated that, prior to her incarceration, she had no social life with the exception of her family, that appears to be inconsistent with the admitted facts which demonstrate contact with an antisocial group of people.

36․She commenced using cannabis at the age of 14. She had been using methamphetamine for three years prior to her incarceration. She told the author of the pre‑sentence report that, during the first year, her ex-partner had been adding it to her cannabis cones without her knowledge. She acknowledged that she required treatment for her drug use. She has completed a 10‑week alcohol and other drug program delivered by Toora Women Inc while in custody.

37․So far as her attitude to the offending is concerned, the pre-sentence report dated 30 August 2024 records:

The offender offered no explanation for her role in the offences and denied any involvement or her guilt. When requested to comment on the evidence of her text message correspondence in the Statement of Facts, she claimed her phone had been used by a number of people, and that she had not composed those messages.

38․An undated letter written by the offender explained the importance of her children to her and the manner in which she suffered during the “extremely violent relationship” with her ex-partner. She also expressed her condolences to the parents, family and friends of Mr Walewicz.

39․A letter dated 21 February 2025 apologises to the parents, family and friends of Mr Walewicz and says she is finally “prepared to accept the punishment of the court”. It appears that the offender has now accepted her involvement in the offending. It is difficult to place significant weight on the expression of remorse in circumstances where it has come so late and where the offender did not give evidence on oath or affirmation.

40․The author of the pre-sentence report identified that she presents with several risk factors, including illicit substance use, lack of prosocial influences, unemployment, mental health and attitudes to offending. The author also identified that she will require further support to prevent her from relapsing into drug use. She was assessed as suitable for a medium level of intervention by ACT Corrective Services. She was assessed as suitable for a community service work condition. She was also assessed as suitable for an intensive correction order in a report dated 30 August 2024. That assessment was valid only for three months from the then‑listed hearing date of 10 September 2024. No submission was made that such a disposition would be appropriate.

Medical opinion evidence

41․The offender relied upon a report of Tabitha Frew, a clinical psychologist. The Director relied upon a report of Dr Joey Le, a forensic psychiatrist. Both reports related to the offender’s mental health. It was common ground that, at the time of the offending, the offender was affected by:

(a)post-traumatic stress disorder;

(b)cannabis use disorder; and

(c)stimulant use disorder.

42․Ms Frew also added diagnoses of major depressive disorder and opioid use disorder, and a provisional diagnosis of a traumatic brain injury.

43․Ms Frew expressed the opinion that, at the time of the offending, the offender had an impaired ability to exercise appropriate judgment and an impaired ability to make calm and rational choices or think clearly, that her mental conditions had a disinhibiting effect upon her, and that she had an impaired ability to appreciate the wrongfulness and seriousness of her conduct. She said: “Ms Williams’ mental health conditions and the potential traumatic brain injury were direct causal contributors to the commission of the offences”.

44․So far as the potential of a traumatic brain injury was concerned, following Ms Frew’s report, further investigations were undertaken and, at the sentencing hearing, senior counsel for the offender said that the offender accepted that there was no evidence of a traumatic brain injury.

45․In oral evidence, Ms Frew maintained her opinions notwithstanding the acceptance by the offender that there was no evidence of a traumatic brain injury. She characterised the conduct of the offender as being in genuine fear of her life because of the potential for a domestic homicide committed by her ex‑partner. This was despite the fact that her report did not set out any version of events given to her by the offender or any explanation of the offender’s perception of what was occurring at the time. The opinion was given in circumstances where the limit of the recollection of the incident recorded by Ms Frew was that the offender had said she was “out of it and couldn’t remember a lot of details”.

46․Dr Le accepted the offender suffered from major depressive disorder at the time that he saw her, but did not identify that as having been suffered by her at the time of the offending. Dr Le did not consider there was any significant evidence to support an opioid use disorder but said that this was a minor issue. He disagreed with the provisional diagnosis of a traumatic brain injury, concluding that, although there were possible deficits in executive functioning, they were likely to be mild. He disagreed with Ms Frew’s conclusions about a reduction in moral culpability due to impairments of the offender’s ability to exercise appropriate judgment, make calm or rational choices and appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct. These were described by Dr Le as “highly speculative” and reliant upon symptoms that are not supported by any subjective account of symptoms at the time of the offending or any contemporaneous evidence. He expressed agreement with the Verdins considerations relating to post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder and substance use disorder. The cross‑examination of Dr Le by senior counsel for the offender tended to demonstrate the reliability of Dr Le’s opinion.

47․Overall, I prefer the evidence of Dr Le to that of Ms Frew. Dr Le’s evidence appeared to me to be more carefully tied to the established facts than the evidence of Ms Frew. I agree with Dr Le’s characterisation of Ms Frew’s conclusions as to a causal link between mental health conditions and the offending as being speculative. I do not consider it possible to reach those conclusions in circumstances where there were no relevant instructions about the circumstances of the offending, the level of drug use or state of intoxication during the period of the offending, or the motivation for the conduct. The opinions expressed in her report appeared to rely upon the likelihood that the offender had a traumatic brain injury, but those opinions were undermined by the acceptance by the offender, as a result of further testing, that there was no evidence of such a traumatic brain injury.

48․I consider that the imminent domestic homicide theory advanced by Ms Frew in oral evidence was not justified by the known circumstances. Further, the imminent domestic homicide theory would not provide an explanation for the goal-directed conduct engaged in by the offender in organising a group of young people to carry out a home invasion on her behalf. Ms Frew’s evidence about this avoided the simpler and more likely explanation that the offender, being addicted to methamphetamine, was motivated to obtain drugs or money to support her significant methamphetamine habit. The offender was also sophisticated enough to arrange for others to perform the home invasion. I accept the submission made on behalf of the Director that the opinions expressed in Ms Frew’s report reflected a most favourable interpretation of the circumstances for the offender, in circumstances where the factual basis for that interpretation was not established.

49․In relation to the impact upon the offender of being held in custody, I accept that there will be some greater impact upon her than a person who is not suffering from post‑traumatic stress disorder or major depressive disorder.

50․I do not accept Ms Frew’s opinion that the offender is subject to “inadequate healthcare”. Leaving aside the statutory obligations of the Director‑General under the Corrections Management Act 2007 (ACT), the evidence does not demonstrate that her healthcare is inadequate. The likelihood is that, because of the controls upon her conduct in the confines of the prison, she has better access to healthcare and other mental health supports than she would have if living in the community.

Other documentary evidence

51․The offender tendered medical records showing that she had attended hospital alleging assault by her ex-partner on 9 February 2021 and on 6 June 2021. This was in addition to the offending that occurred on 6 March 2021 described in Connors. She also tendered a variety of support letters and certificates relating to her time in custody. These include for the 10‑week alcohol and other drug program run by Toora Women Inc. Those were consistent with her making the most of the opportunities available to her for education within the prison and having available to her various support services in prison and upon release.

52․She has also received 14 sessions of counselling from a psychologist employed by Winnunga Nimmityjah medical service, which have dealt with trauma, coping with incarceration and managing risks of reoffending.

53․Since September 2023, the offender has been working in the Alexander Maconochie Centre bakery and in October was promoted to the position of leading hand. She has continued in that role to date, completing a Certificate II in baking. In November 2024, she took on an additional employment role as a cleaner in the Women’s Correctional Centre gym. In February 2025, she gave up that role to take on a role as a barista in the visits area of the AMC on weekends, with the effect that she works in the bakery during the week and as a barista on the weekends. The reports of her participation in employment in the prison, and the acquisition of new skills, indicate positive steps towards rehabilitation for the purposes of her ultimate return to the community.

Criminal history

54․The offender has a limited criminal history, with only one very minor conviction in the ACT. In NSW, she has a number of convictions for stalking or intimidating, contravention of an apprehended violence order, common assault, shoplifting, using a prohibited weapon, and having goods in custody suspected of being stolen. The NSW offending all occurred in 2021. Overall, the criminal history is a limited one.

Plea of guilty

55․The plea of guilty was entered about two weeks before the start of the trial on 4 September 2023. The trial had been listed with an estimate of three weeks. The plea of guilty had significant utilitarian value. A reduction in sentence of approximately 10 percent is appropriate in the circumstances.

Time in custody

56․The offender has been in custody on remand since 7 June 2022. This is a total of 997 days up to and including 27 February 2025 (two years, eight months and 21 days).

Sentences of co-offenders

57․Mr Ncube was the driver of the motor vehicle that drove the home invaders to the scene of the crime. He pleaded guilty to one count of being an accessory to the murder of Mr Walewicz. He had no criminal history. He had been in custody for 187 days prior to the date he was sentenced. On 3 February 2023, Berman AJ sentenced him to imprisonment for two years, the balance of which was suspended: DPP v Ncube [2023] ACTSC 16.

58․Mr Taylor pleaded guilty to a charge of murder. This was a charge established by joint commission pursuant to s 45A of the Criminal Code. He was aged 23 at the time of the offending. On 8 March 2023, he was sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years and three months, with a non-parole period of five years and six months: DPP v Taylor [2023] ACTSC 39.

59․Mr Rowntree, who was 17 and six months at the time of the offending, pleaded guilty to a charge of murder. On 20 May 2024, I sentenced him to imprisonment for 13 years, which was suspended after having served seven years and nine months’ imprisonment: DPP v Rowntree (a pseudonym) [2024] ACTSC 155.

60․Jayden Williams pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting aggravated burglary. That was particularised as knowing that his mother wanted Mr Rowntree to commit an aggravated burglary on her behalf. He made contact with Mr Rowntree and requested he attend the offender’s property. In contacting Mr Rowntree, he intended that he would engage in conduct that was more than merely preparatory to the aggravated burglary. On 14 August 2023, Loukas‑Karlsson J sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment, reduced from two years and six months on account of the plea of guilty: DPP v Williams [2023] ACTSC 224. He had been in custody for 410 days by the time the sentence was suspended.

Other comparable cases

61․The Director provided tables summarising cases involving attempted aggravated burglaries and persons who were an accessory after the fact to murder. The cases involving attempted aggravated burglary varied in objective and subjective factors. Insofar as they disclosed any current sentencing practice, the sentences imposed were relatively modest ones compared to the overall maximum penalty. That is not unusual having regard to the approach taken to charges of aggravated burglary. Only one comparable case was identified involving a charge of being an accessory after the fact to murder. That was R v Sikounnabouth [2019] ACTSC 119. That involved the offender driving his co‑offenders who had committed murder from the scene of the crime. He was sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment, reduced from five years, on the charge of being an accessory after the fact to murder.

Consideration

62․Nothing will undo the injustice done to Mr Walewicz, his friends and his family. The friends and family of Mr Walewicz will live with this permanent and unjust loss for the rest of their lives. The methodical application of the law to those responsible for the crimes related to his death is likely to be of limited solace in the circumstances.

63․Each of the purposes of sentencing set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is relevant to the sentencing of the offender. Specifically, denunciation of the conduct, recognition of the harm done to the victim and the community, holding the offender accountable, deterrence and rehabilitation are all significant issues.

64․It is important to recognise the offender’s significant role in setting up the aggravated burglary that went so wrong, and thereby recognise the harm done to the victim of the attempted burglary. It is important to denounce that conduct and the conduct after the murder had occurred. Not only must general deterrence inevitably be important but, having regard to the guarded prospects for the offender’s rehabilitation, specific deterrence must also play a part.

65․As indicated earlier, I do not consider that the offender’s moral culpability in relation to the offending is reduced to any significant extent by her psychological conditions. The dysfunctional nature of her childhood and relationship with her ex‑partner are matters that have undoubtedly shaped who she is. As pointed out in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 at [44], those are factors which help understand her lack of a well‑established moral framework — and that must be taken into account — but they also increase the significance of specific deterrence and protection of the community.

66․Although the offender had a very difficult background as a child and a dysfunctional relationship with her ex-partner, it is her involvement with the use of methamphetamine during the three years prior to her offending that has got her into trouble with the law.

67․Three features of the evidence indicate that there are some prospects for rehabilitation. First, the fact that her use of methamphetamine has been interrupted and there are services available to her which will give her some hope of remaining free of that drug when she returns to the community. Second, although the evidence was limited, she appears to have escaped from her ex‑partner whose conduct in relation to her has been adverse, has contributed to her post-traumatic stress disorder, drug use and antisocial associations. Third, her history of employment while in custody gives some prospect that she can develop skills which will mean that she is employable outside the prison environment.

68․However, the picture remains a mixed one. She did not give evidence at the sentencing hearing, and the other evidence available does not present a clear picture of someone motivated to and capable of rehabilitation. Although for the purposes of the sentencing hearing the facts were agreed, the extract from the pre-sentence report quoted earlier tends to indicate a lack of significant remorse at that time, such remorse providing the foundation for rehabilitation.

69․In my view, only substantial terms of full‑time imprisonment are appropriate to meet the purposes of sentencing in the present case. An unfortunate consequence of this is the ongoing separation of the offender from her children. On the attempted aggravated burglary charge, the starting‑point is a sentence of five years’ imprisonment, reduced to four years and six months on account of the plea of guilty. On the charge of being an accessory after the fact to the murder of Mr Walewicz, the starting‑point is a sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment, reduced to four years on account of the plea of guilty. A degree of concurrency is warranted, having regard to the connected nature of the offending and totality. The sentence for being an accessory after the fact will be cumulative as to two and a half years upon the earlier sentence. This gives an aggregate sentence of seven years. In my view, a non-parole period of four years and two months is appropriate. This is 60 percent of the head sentence. The sentence will be backdated to the date upon which the offender went into custody, namely 7 June 2022. The last day of the non-parole period will be 6 August 2026. The head sentence will end on 6 June 2029.

Orders

70․The orders of the Court are:

(1)On the charge of attempted aggravated burglary (SC CAN 12/2023) the offender is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for four years and six months commencing on 7 June 2022 and ending on 6 December 2026.

(2)On the charge of being an accessory after the fact to murder (CAN 5539/2022) the offender is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for four years commencing on 7 June 2025 and ending on 6 June 2029.

(3)The non-parole period commences on 7 June 2022 and ends on 6 August 2026.

I certify that the preceding seventy [70] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Mossop.

Associate:

Date: