CITATION: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (NSW) v J G [2010] NSWCCA 222
FILE NUMBER(S): 2009/0779
HEARING DATE(S): 12 March 2010
JUDGMENT DATE: 30 September 2010
PARTIES: Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) - Applicant J G - Respondent
JUDGMENT OF: Basten JA Hulme J Schmidt J
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: Supreme Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2009/779
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Buddin J
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 7 October 2009
LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [<i>R v JG</i>] [2009] NSWSC 1053
COUNSEL: P Barrett - Applicant T Game SC - Respondent
SOLICITORS: S Kavanagh, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions - Applicant Giddy & Crittenden - Respondent
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL – criminal – interlocutory appeal – power to take further evidence and make other judgment – appeal by way of rehearing – Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 5F(3A) EVIDENCE – criminal trial – objection to the tender of recorded interviews of child – whether contaminated by suggestion – unfair prejudice – Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 137 EVIDENCE – interview of child – whether affected by later hypnosis sessions – no reliance on post-hypnosis evidence – difficulties for post-hypnosis cross-examination – whether assessed under Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 137 or general law PROCEDURE – criminal – objection to prosecution evidence – pre-trial hearing – Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 192A
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the matter of Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v JG, the Court of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales reviewed an interlocutory appeal concerning the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial. The appellant, the Director of Public Prosecutions, sought to adduce video recordings of interviews conducted with a child witness, who was the daughter of the deceased and alleged victim of sexual abuse. The respondent objected to the admission of the recordings, arguing they were contaminated by suggestion and would unfairly prejudice the respondent. The primary issue before the court was whether the trial judge erred in ruling that the recordings could be admitted as evidence.
The court considered the statutory provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and the common law principles regarding the admissibility of evidence from vulnerable witnesses. The court noted that s 137 of the Evidence Act requires a careful assessment of whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. The court also highlighted the distinction between s 137 and s 135, which provides a general discretion to exclude evidence. The court emphasised that s 137 is not a discretionary provision but rather requires an evaluative judgment based on the evidence's capability to rationally affect the jury's assessment of facts in issue.
In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged the differences in emphasis between the arguments presented at the appeal and those presented to the trial judge. The court noted that the appeal was not a full reconsideration of the issues but allowed for a rehearing where the court could make its own judgment. The court concluded that the trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of the recordings should be set aside and the matter remitted for further consideration, as the ruling did not adequately address the potential prejudicial impact of the evidence on the respondent.
Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal and ordered that the matter be remitted to the trial court for reconsideration of the admissibility of the video recordings. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring that any ruling on the admissibility of evidence from vulnerable witnesses properly balances the probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice to the accused.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Background Two aspects of the family circumstances are of immediate relevance. The first is that, at about the time of the deceased’s disappearance, the family’s financial circumstances were poor and the respondent was proposing that they would need to abandon the matrimonial home and go to live with his father. The second aspect was that there were two children in the home. One, a young boy, was the child of the relationship. The other, a nine-year old girl, was the daughter of the deceased from an earlier marriage. (She will be referred to below as “the daughter”, in order to protect her anonymity.) The evidence proposed to be called at the trial of the respondent was expected to show that the deceased was devoted to, and protective of, her daughter. An available inference was that the deceased would not willingly have left her daughter in circumstances where she had any fear for her safety, but would have taken her daughter with her and, in any event, would not have failed to make contact with her children, if she had been alive and free to do so. The evidence was also expected to show that the deceased and the respondent had argued on the night of the deceased’s disappearance and, according to the respondent, she had left the home following the argument. The cause of the argument was a matter of some importance to the prosecution case. The Director wished to prove that on the evening of 12 January 2002 the deceased’s daughter had confided to her that the respondent’s father had sexually molested her. Such a complaint, it might be inferred, would be capable of causing a serious rift in the relationship between the deceased and the respondent, particularly in circumstances where they expected shortly to have to go live with the respondent’s father. Critical to the present application is the means by which the Director intended to prove the complaint of molestation. On 7 January 2003 (“the first interview”), and again on 10 January 2003 (“the second interview”), the daughter was interviewed at length by a police officer (though a different officer on each occasion). The prosecution intended to play the video-recordings of the interviews to the jury. That evidence was objected to by the respondent and was the subject of the pre-trial ruling the subject of this appeal. The form in which the evidence of the daughter was to be adduced is important. In contrast to the traditional practice with respect to prosecution witnesses, it was not intended that the daughter give evidence in chief in person. Rather, the prosecution proposed to play to the jury the audio-visual recordings of the two lengthy (pre-hypnosis) interviews conducted by police officers. Such a course was available on the basis that the daughter was a “vulnerable person”, in accordance with ss 306M and 306U of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW). Although the hearing of the objection ran over more than 10 days, his Honour’s careful selection of relevant parts of the evidence and submissions, together with a detailed consideration of the authorities, allow this Court to deal with the issues raised within a relatively short compass. The principal complicating factor is that the case put on behalf of the Director on the appeal is different, at least in emphasis, to that which appears to have been presented to the primary judge. That fact requires some consideration of the extent to which the change in emphasis is permissible, given the nature of the appeal. It also explains in part why, despite his Honour’s careful consideration of all the matters raised before him, the challenge to his ruling should be upheld and the appeal allowed.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
A second difficulty arises from the terms of s 137 itself. It is well-established that this provision does not confer a discretionary power, although it may involve an evaluative judgment: see, eg, R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494; 123 A Crim R 506 at [112] (Heydon JA, Bell J agreeing) and [228] (Dowd J); cf THD v The Queen [2010] VSCA 115 at [27]-[30] (Maxwell P, Nettle and Neave JJA agreeing). There is a separate discretionary basis for excluding evidence, in s 135 of the Evidence Act:“135 General discretion to exclude evidenceThe court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party, or(b) be misleading or confusing, or(c) cause or result in undue waste of time.” The differences between the terms of ss 135 and 137 should be acknowledged, but it was not suggested that s 135 had any role in these proceedings. Section 137 is confined to criminal proceedings and unfair prejudice to a defendant: s 135 is not so confined, but as this is a criminal proceeding in which it is the possible prejudice to the defendant which is in issue, nothing turns on those points of difference. The language of s 135(b) and (c) is not to be found in s 137, but in practical terms, in the present circumstances, it is again unlikely that they would be satisfied in a manner which would invoke the exercise of the discretion, absent unfair prejudice to the accused. There is a further minor variation in terminology, s 137 referring to the “danger of unfair prejudice” outweighing the probative value of the evidence, whereas s 135 refers to “the danger that the evidence might … be unfairly prejudicial” as the counterweight to the probative value. It is unlikely that in practical terms anything would turn on that variation in language. Of greater significance is the requirement under s 135 that the probative value be “substantially outweighed”, whereas the word “substantially” is missing from s 137. It is thus unlikely that an accused will be able to invoke s 135 in circumstances where he or she is unsuccessful under s 137. There was no suggestion in the present case that such an alternative approach would have led to the exclusion of the evidence, were it not excluded under s 137. The real significance of s 135 in the present case is that, when taken with ss 136 (permitting an order limiting the use to made of particular evidence) and 137, it is, by implication, inconsistent with some alternative and weaker basis for discretionary exclusion of evidence. Further, this Court has construed s 137 as requiring attention to the capability of the evidence to have a particular effect, rather than its reliability, which is a matter for the jury. The approach to be adopted under s 137, in assessing the probative value of the evidence is to inquire whether, if accepted by the jury, it “could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue”: Dictionary, probative value. That assessment involves an objective test of capability of the evidence to support an inference, rather than an assessment of what the jury is likely to conclude: R v Shamouil [2006] NSWCCA 112 at [61], Spigelman CJ, Simpson and Adams JJ agreeing. As the Chief Justice stated at [64]:“To adopt any other approach would be to usurp for a trial judge critical aspects of the traditional role of a jury. In the case of evidence of critical significance, such a ruling by a trial judge would, in substance, be equivalent to directing a verdict of acquittal on the basis that the trial judge was of the view that a verdict of guilty would be unsafe and unsatisfactory. As the High Court said in that different, but not irrelevant, context in Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 275, this is not a permissible ‘basis for enlarging the powers of a trial judge at the expense of the traditional jury function’. In my opinion, the same is true if a trial judge can determine the weight of evidence when applying s 137.”
Decision
Reasons for decision
The powers of this Court are invoked under s 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act. In considering this question it is important to note that different powers and functions arise in respect of the different kinds of appeal provided for within Part 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). The provisions of present relevance in s 5F are as follows:“5F Appeal against interlocutory judgment or order(1) This section applies to: (a)proceedings … for the prosecution of offenders on indictment in the Supreme Court ….…(3A)The Attorney General or the Director of Public Prosecutions may appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal against any decision or ruling on the admissibility of evidence, but only if the decision or ruling eliminates or substantially weakens the prosecution’s case.(4)An appeal under this section shall, unless the Court of Criminal Appeal gives leave to adduce fresh, additional or substituted evidence, be determined on the evidence (if any) given in the proceedings to which the appeal relates.(5)The Court of Criminal Appeal: (a)may affirm or vacate the judgment, order, decision or ruling appealed against, and(b)if it vacates the judgment, order, decision or ruling, may give or make some other judgment, order, decision or ruling instead of the judgment, order, decision or ruling appealed against.” Under s 5F(3A) an appeal against a ruling on the admissibility of evidence that “eliminates or substantially weakens” the prosecution’s case lies as of right. There was no objection to the competency of the appeal. In Norvenska v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) [2007] NSWCCA 158, the Court considered a suggestion in the judgment of Hunt CJ at CL in BWM (1997) 91 A Crim R 260 at 265 that an appeal pursuant to s 5F “is not by way of rehearing”: at [11]. It was held that his Honour’s comment should be understood as rejecting a submission to the effect that the appeal was a full reconsideration of the issues raised below, albeit without rehearing the evidence. However, because the Court had power to take further evidence and not merely to vacate the judgment below and direct that the matter be heard further according to law, but to make some other judgment, the appeal was, in a technical sense, a rehearing. That is not to say that the Court will not be constrained in circumstances where the order being reviewed is the exercise of a discretionary power, requiring the identification of some error of fact or principle, and, where the facts are in issue, that it will not be constrained in relation to findings of the trial judge relying upon an assessment of witnesses who have not been heard by this Court. The respondent, without referring to BWM, suggested that the appeal, so far as it addressed factual matters, could only be pursued on a limited basis. Reliance was placed on the judgment of Hunt J (with whom Carruthers and Wood JJ agreed) in O’Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397 at 401, where his Honour stated that an appeal to this Court “is no more than the right to have a superior court interpose to redress the error of the court below”, referring to Attorney-General v Sillem (1864) 11 ER 1200 at 1209 and Victorian Stevedoring & General Contracting Co Pty Ltd and Meakes v Dignan [1931] HCA 34; 46 CLR 73 at 109. He continued:“Error may be demonstrated if there is no evidence to support a particular finding, or if the evidence is all one way, or if the judge has misdirected himself. But this Court has no power to substitute its own findings for those of the trial judge.”