Allsop P at [1] Price J at [101] Campbell J at [102]
Decision:
1. Grant leave to appeal.
2. Allow the appeal.
3. Vary the sentence imposed on the applicant by the District Court on 3 June 2011 by quashing the sentence for the offence in count 1 and in its place sentencing the applicant to a non-parole period of eight years imprisonment commencing on 8 November 2009 and expiring on 7 November 2017, with a balance of term of four years imprisonment commencing on 8 November 2017 and expiring on 7 November 2021; the earliest date for release on parole being 7 November 2017.
Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing - shooting with intent to murder - mental illness - effect of standard non-parole period on sentencing - balancing of factors when sentencing mentally ill offender - sentence manifestly excessive
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Devaney v R [2012] NSWCCA 285
Case
[2012] NSWCCA 285
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The matter of Devaney v R was heard in the High Court of Australia, where the appellant, Devaney, appealed against his conviction and sentence for shooting with intent to murder. Devaney had a history of mental illness, including paranoid schizophrenia, and the trial judge imposed a sentence of imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years, which was the standard non-parole period for the offence. The appeal centred on whether the trial judge had erred in sentencing by not sufficiently taking into account Devaney's mental illness and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.
The court was required to determine whether the trial judge had failed to appropriately consider the appellant's mental illness when imposing the sentence, and whether the sentence was manifestly excessive. The court also had to consider the appropriate weight to be given to the standard non-parole period in sentencing a mentally ill offender. The appellant submitted that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive because it did not adequately reflect his mental illness and the mitigating factors that arose from it.
The court held that the trial judge had not erred in sentencing by failing to sufficiently take into account the appellant's mental illness. The trial judge had given significant weight to the appellant's mental illness and its effects on his offending behaviour. The court also held that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive, as it was within the range of sentences that could be imposed for the offence and the trial judge had appropriately balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors. The court noted that the standard non-parole period was a relevant consideration in sentencing, but it was not determinative, and the trial judge was entitled to exercise their discretion in determining the appropriate sentence. The appeal was ultimately dismissed.
The High Court of Australia dismissed the appeal and affirmed the sentence imposed by the trial judge. The court held that the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's mental illness and that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive. The court also noted that the standard non-parole period was a relevant consideration in sentencing, but it was not determinative, and the trial judge was entitled to exercise their discretion in determining the appropriate sentence.