R v Diallo & Ors (No 17) (Sentence) - [2024] NSWSC 1650

Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: R v Diallo & Ors (No 17) (Sentence) [2024] NSWSC 1650
Hearing dates: 29 November, 11 and 19 December 2024
Date of orders: 20 December 2024
Decision date: 20 December 2024
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Hamill J
Decision:
(1) AD is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 years with a single non-parole period of 5 years.
(2) Panashe Karise is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 10 years with a single non-parole period of 7½ years.
(3) Panashe Karise is convicted with no further penalty of four traffic offences. The automatic licence disqualification for 12 months applies.
(4) Ibrahima Diallo is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 7½ years with a single non-parole period of 5 years.
(5) AG is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 6½ years with a single non-parole period of 4 years.
(6) YA is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 6 years and 9 months with a single non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months.
(7) Pursuant to ss 19(1) and 19(4) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), the sentences of AD, AG and YA are to be served as juvenile offenders up until the offenders attain the age of 21.

Catchwords:
CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – offences of violence – violent melee in a suburban street – six people stabbed – one child killed – manslaughter – attempted murder – wound with intent – animosity between groups of young men – an art form known as drill rap music – where offenders’ group initiated violence by attending with knives – where victims’ group emerged from house and attacked – zombie knife and golf clubs – where jury rejects proposition that joint criminal enterprise abandoned – dispute over content of joint criminal enterprise – relevance of self-defence – fact finding on sentence – finding that subjective component established but objective component rejected – relevance of extent to which conduct exceeded what was reasonable – different findings in relation to each offence – devastating impact on victims – eloquent and moving victim impact statement – subjective circumstances of offenders – requirement for stern punishment – balancing competing considerations – a place for leniency – assessment of moral culpability – different findings in each case – where one offender contended subjective factors fed into assessment of moral culpability – application of cases – submission rejected – parity and proportionality in sentencing co-offenders – different considerations – varying assessment of objective criminality – individualised justice – application for direction that three offenders serve sentences as juvenile offenders – Prosecutor chooses to oppose – direction made – special circumstances

Legislation Cited:
Bail Act 2013 (NSW), s 22B
Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), ss 3, 19, 19(1), 19(2), 19(3), 19(4), 25
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 24, 27, 33, 33(1)(a)
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A(2)(i), 21A(3), 44, 44(2B), 47, 53A, 54D, 54D(3)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 166
Jury Act 1977 (NSW), ss 53C, 55G

Cases Cited:
Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2
BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 159; (2010) 201 A Crim R 379
Britton v R [2024] NSWCCA 138
Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37
Camilleri v R [2023] NSWCCA 106
Carr v R [2024] NSWCCA 103
Devaney v R [2012] NSWCCA 285
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194
DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156
Ghamraoui v R [2009] NSWCCA 111
Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49
Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297; (2014) 246 A Crim R 528
Lloyd v R [2022] NSWCCA 18
Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39
Newburn v R [2022] NSWCCA 139
PG v R [2017] NSWCCA 179; (2017) 268 A Crim R 61
Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [1997] HCA 26
R v Amati [2019] NSWCCA 193; (2019) 279 A Crim R 73
R v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337
R v Borja [2024] NSWSC 44
R v Butler [2024] NSWCCA 133
R v Da-Pra; Da-Pra v R [2014] NSWCCA 211
R v Diallo & Ors (No 1) [2024] NSWSC 852
R v Diallo & Ors (No 14) [2024] NSWSC 1101
R v Diallo & Ors (No 15) [2024] NSWSC 1114
R v Diallo & Ors (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 853
R v Diallo & Ors (No 3) [2024] NSWSC 877
R v Diallo & Ors (No 4) [2024] NSWSC 882
R v Diallo & Ors (No 5) [2024] NSWSC 914
R v Diallo & Ors (No 6) [2024] NSWSC 917
R v Diallo & Ors (No 7) [2024] NSWSC 978
R v Diallo & Ors (No 9) [2024] NSWSC 1084
R v Doan [2003] NSWSC 345
R v Donald William Reeves [2017] NSWSC 813
R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125
R v James Henry Sargeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74
R v Jay William Cook [2012] NSWSC 480
R v JM (sentence) [2024] NSWSC 1345
R v Lattouf (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 12 December 1996, unrep)
R v MAK; R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381; (2006) 167 A Crim R 159
R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2
R v MR; JB and CS (young persons)(No 5) [2024] NSWSC 912
R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 173
R v Quinlin [2021] NSWCCA 284; (2021) 293 A Crim R 253
R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353
R v Smith [2012] NSWSC 38
R v Stanley (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 74
R v Thew (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 25 August 1998, unrep)
R v YA [2024] NSWSC 1445
R v Zegura [2006] NSWCCA 230
Shine v R [2016] NSWCCA 149; (2016) 260 A Crim R 534
Smith v R [2015] NSWCCA 193
Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247; (2018) 275 A Crim R 233
The Queen v Osenkowksi (1982) 30 SASR 212; (1982) 5 A Crim R 394
TM v R [2023] NSWCCA 185
Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3

Texts Cited:
N/A

Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Rex (Prosecution)
Ibrahima Diallo (Defendant)
AG (Defendant)
YA (Defendant)
AD (Defendant)
Panashe Morgan Ryan Karise (Defendant)
Representation:
Counsel:
E Balodis (Rex)
R Wilson SC (Diallo)
M Avenell SC (AG)
W Terracini SC KC and P Kondich (YA)
B Robinson (AD)
M Smith (Karise)
Solicitors:
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Rex)
Crimcorp Defence Lawyers (Diallo)
Sydney Criminal Law Specialists (AG)
King & York Lawyers (YA)
Wiltshire & Wroughton Legal (AD)
McGirr & Associates (Karise)

File Number(s): 2022/00052005; 2022/00051961; 2022/00052010; 2022/00052239; 2022/00091174
Publication restriction: Statutory prohibition on the publication of the names of the juvenile accused and any material that might identify them. See s 15A Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW).

JUDGMENT

On 1 September 2021, there was a violent rolling melee between two groups of young men which traversed three suburban streets in Blacktown. One of the young men was killed and two others were seriously wounded. Each of the offenders is before the Court to be sentenced for offences they committed during that tragic and senseless incident.
The incident started when five members of a group calling itself “MOB”, an acronym for Money Over Bitches, attended outside the home of men associated with groups known variously as “QSB” (Queen Street Boys), “RFA” (Ready for Anything), and “Murda” or “Murda60”. Most, or all, of the five members of MOB came armed with knives. By the time the actual violence started, members of both groups were armed with dangerous weapons, including knives, machetes and golf clubs. Six men – three from each group – received stab wounds. One of those men, Oliver Coleman, died of a single stab wound. His brother (EC) and a friend (EO) were also stabbed and suffered serious injuries during the incident. EO would have died but for the prompt and heroic intervention of paramedics and doctors.
The five men associated with MOB – AD, Panashe Karise, Ibrahima Diallo, AG and YA – were arrested by police on 22 February 2022 for their role in the offences. Some had been picked up on the night of the incident in or near the streets adjacent to the scene of the stabbings. Each of the offenders has been in custody since 22 February 2022 except for YA who was granted bail on 21 April 2023 and Mr Diallo who had bail from 11 July 2022 until 28 March 2023.
The offenders were jointly charged with the murder of Oliver Coleman (count 1) and the wounding of EO and EC with intent to murder (counts 2 and 4). As to the attempted murder charges, there were alternative counts of wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm (counts 3 and 5). Their joint trial was listed for hearing in Parramatta on 1 July 2024 and commenced with a cumbersome pre-trial hearing requiring many legal and evidentiary rulings and the calling of several witnesses on a Basha inquiry. [1] On 29 July 2024, I directed that YA be tried separately and his case was adjourned to be heard after the trial of his four co-offenders: R v Diallo & Ors (No 6) [2024] NSWSC 917.
1. R v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337, and see R v Diallo & Ors (No 1) [2024] NSWSC 852, R v Diallo & Ors (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 853, R v Diallo & Ors (No 3) [2024] NSWSC 877, R v Diallo & Ors (No 4) [2024] NSWSC 882, R v Diallo & Ors (No 5) [2024] NSWSC 914, R v Diallo & Ors (No 6) [2024] NSWSC 917 and R v Diallo & Ors (No 7) [2024] NSWSC 978.

The joint trial and verdicts

On 31 July 2024, an “expanded jury” of 15 was empanelled in the joint trial of AD, AG and Messrs Karise and Diallo. It was necessary to discharge two of the jurors in the course of the trial and, on both occasions, I made an order under s 53C of the Jury Act 1977 (NSW) that the trial continue with a reduced number of jurors. [2] On Tuesday 17 September 2024 a ballot was conducted in accordance with s 55G and the “verdict jury” of twelve retired to consider its verdicts immediately thereafter at 12:29 pm on that day.
2. The reasons for the discharge of the second juror is explained in R v Diallo & Ors (No 9) [2024] NSWSC 1084.
At 11:29am on Monday 23 September 2024 the jury returned the following unanimous verdicts in respect of each of the four men on trial:

Count 1 (the murder of Oliver Coleman) – not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

Count 2 (the attempted murder of EO) – guilty.

Count 4 (the attempted murder of EC) – not guilty.

Count 5 (the wounding of EC with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm) – guilty.

The sentencing proceedings of the four offenders proceeded on 29 November 2024. A substantial amount of evidentiary material and written submissions were provided in advance.

YA’s plea and detention application

YA’s trial was listed to commence on 4 or 11 November 2024, depending on counsels’ availability. However, at a pre-trial mention on Friday 1 November 2024 the parties asked for YA to be arraigned on an indictment containing three counts. YA then entered pleas of guilty to the following offences:

Count 1 - the unlawful killing (manslaughter) of Oliver Coleman.

Count 2 – the wounding of EO with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.

Count 3 – the wounding of EC with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.

YA’s pleas to counts 1 and 3 reflect the verdicts returned in the joint trial on counts 1 and 5. Count 2 relates to the wounding of EO and was the alternative to count 2 at the joint trial and upon which the jury was not called upon to return a verdict after it convicted the four co-offenders on the count alleging the wounding of EO with intent to murder. Because of the content of specific intention alleged (to kill rather than inflict grievous bodily harm), it is on its face a less serious charge. However, it attracts the same maximum penalty.
The prosecution notified that it intended to make a detention application, relying on the provision in s 22B of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW). That application was heard on Monday 4 November 2024. The detention application was refused, bail was continued on the same conditions and YA’s sentence proceedings were adjourned until Wednesday 11 December 2024. [3]
3. R v YA [2024] NSWSC 1445.
The sentencing hearing for YA proceeded on 11 December 2024. Material provided in advance was formally received and counsel supplemented their written submissions with brief oral arguments.

Approach to the separate sentencing proceedings and separate bodies of evidence

Because YA’s trial was separated and his pleas of guilty were not entered for some time after the verdicts were returned in the joint trial, it was not possible to hear his sentencing proceedings at the same time as his co-offenders. This was largely because Youth Justice was unable to prepare a background report under s 25 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) in time for the joint sentencing hearing for the offenders who were convicted at trial.
In reaching the agreement as to YA’s plea, the parties agreed that the trial transcript and exhibits from the trial would be tendered as part of the evidence on YA’s sentence. As a result, most of the issues surrounding the facts of the offences were the same. However, some of the evidence tendered in YA’s case – including a statement he made which caused the trials to be separated – was not in evidence in the co-offenders’ case(s). Further, and as with the other offenders, a body of subjective material was tendered on behalf of YA that was not admitted in the case of the others. In addition to his statement, YA also read an affidavit providing further details of his involvement with his co-offenders and commission of the offences. A paragraph of that affidavit which asserted the statement was true was not pressed.
In reaching findings in the cases of AD, Mr Karise, AG and Mr Diallo I have disregarded the evidence in YA’s case. None of those offenders had the opportunity to cross-examine YA on his statement or his affidavit. Similarly, insofar as there is any conflict in the submissions of counsel, I have not taken into account submissions made in the absence of the other offenders in each individual’s case. Finally, in sentencing the other offenders, I have ignored any suggestion by YA that he has been, or feels, threatened by any or all of his co-offenders. An exception to that last proposition is where there was evidence in the case against the particular offender of such a threat. An example is AG’s utterance that he would “smoke” YA if he spoke to police. That threat was made in the presence of AD in a police van and was recorded by a listening device and formed (over AG’s objection) part of the evidence at trial (Ex 53).

Applicable maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods

Each of the offenders is to be sentenced for the manslaughter of Oliver Coleman. The maximum penalty for manslaughter is imprisonment for 25 years: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 24. There is no applicable standard non-parole period.
AD, AG, Mr Karise and Mr Diallo are to be sentenced for the attempted murder of EO. The maximum penalty for wounding with intent to murder is 25 years: Crimes Act, s 27. In the case of Mr Diallo and Mr Karise there is a standard non-parole period of 10 years: see Item 3 of the table following s 54D of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (“Sentencing Act”). The standard non-parole period does not apply to AD and AG because each of those men was under 18 years old at the time of the offences: Sentencing Act, s 54D(3).
YA is to be sentenced for wounding EO with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. He is exposed to a maximum penalty of 25 years: Crimes Act, s 33(1)(a). There is no applicable standard non-parole period because of YA’s age at the time he committed the offences.
Each offender is to be sentenced for the wounding of EC with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Again, the maximum penalty is 25 years imprisonment: Crimes Act, s 33(1)(a). In the case of the offenders who were adults at the time the offences were committed, that is Mr Karise and Mr Diallo, there is a standard non-parole period of 7 years: Item 4 of the table following s 54D of the Sentencing Act.

Structure of this judgment on sentence

These remarks will speak first to the impact of the offences on the victims and the community before turning to my factual findings which must be consistent with, and apt to reconcile, the jury’s verdicts. I will identify and attempt to resolve the factual disputes between the parties and make an assessment of the objective gravity of the offending in each case. Where possible I will distinguish between the role and criminality of each of the offenders.
I will then summarise the personal circumstances of the offenders and identify any mitigating circumstances that apply to each. There are some common threads between the cases but each must receive individualised justice. There are some moving aspects in the personal history of each of these young men, but those matters cannot distract or overwhelm the seriousness of their offending.
I will move on to identify the relevant sentencing principles that guide my judgment as to the appropriate length of the sentence. Nobody suggested, nor could they seriously have done so, that any penalty other than full-time imprisonment was appropriate in view of the objective gravity of the offences.
I will impose an aggregate sentence on each offender. I will announce the indicative sentences for each offender and each offence taking into account any sentencing discount to which they are entitled. I will then impose the aggregate sentence for each offender. In each case, the parties have agreed upon the commencement date of the sentence based on the amount of pre-sentence custody referable to these offences.

The victims and the impact of the offences

Lee Coleman: a secondary victim of homicide

It is difficult in cases of homicide to describe in words the pain, grief and devastation caused by the offenders’ criminal behaviour. However, Lee Coleman – who is Oliver’s and EC’s father – spoke eloquently and from the heart when he read his victim impact statement to the Court. He also shared some photographs of Oliver and a poem composed by Oliver’s maternal grandmother.
Mr Coleman was present on the night his son was killed and gave evidence in the trial during which he acknowledged that he provided weapons (golf clubs) to the boys inside the premises at 51 William Street Blacktown. There was CCTV footage of him at the scene lagging a little behind the group of younger men and, it seems, looking for Oliver. His presence and peripheral involvement must complicate his grief and make it more potent. His anger and frustration while giving evidence at the trial was understandable. Mr Coleman spoke of the intense guilt he feels because “as a dad it was my job to keep Oliver safe”.
In his victim impact statement, Mr Coleman described the anguish he has suffered since he realised Oliver was missing on the night of his death. He spoke of the trauma of having to identify his son’s body, which was difficult during the height of COVID, and the ghastly details (which I will not repeat today) of seeing his body sometime later. He had an emotional response then which has not really subsided. He was extremely emotional when he read his statement on both occasions, [4] a matter for which he made an unnecessary apology. His physical health has deteriorated since September 2021, and he said he has lost 34kg since Oliver was killed.
4. Because YA’s sentencing hearing was heard separately, Mr Coleman read his victim impact statement twice.
Mr Coleman’s grief was compounded when Oliver’s mother died in a car accident eight weeks afterwards. The emotional toll has also resulted in him having difficulty with important relationships, including his relationship with his other son, EC, who lost his older brother that night and was badly wounded himself.
Mr Coleman spoke of his joy at Oliver’s conception and at his birth. He spoke of his love of travel, football and music which he passed on to, and shared with, Oliver. He related with pride some of Oliver’s achievements and his dreams for the future; like wanting to build a granny flat, having his own kids, going further in his career as a bricklayer and continuing with his music. When he died, Oliver was in a positive relationship with a young woman and his future seemed bright.

All of that was ripped away on 1 September 2021. Lee Coleman is left to miss sitting with his son on the porch of their home and sharing so many important things. Mr Coleman speaks plainly and says he has become a “grumpy old prick”.
Mr Coleman, I doubt your grief will ever really pass. As you said, fathers should not have to bury their children; should not have to live with the feeling that they could have done more to look after them and keep them safe.
Mr Coleman, I appreciate it means little or nothing, but you have the Court’s deepest sympathy for your loss and my best wishes as you try to soldier on in the future. You are a true character and a man of stoicism and dignity. You know that I can do or say nothing that will help. Certainly, any sentence that can be imposed for manslaughter will seem inadequate to you. And no matter how long that sentence may be, it will never be commensurate to your loss and your grief and your pain.
I once again thank you for sharing these very personal feelings with the Court.

EO and EC

Both EO and EC suffered significant injuries which I will recount in more detail shortly. EC – as I have said – also lost his brother and, as his father told us, must also grapple with this never-ending grief.
While no victim impact statement was read by either EO or EC, there seems little doubt that there would be some psychological impact of being the victim of such serious crimes. Luckily, each seems to have achieved a good physical recovery from their wounds.

Impact on sentencing

The law recognises the suffering of these victims – both primary and secondary – in setting the maximum penalties for the offences. The nature of the injuries and the fact of Oliver’s death means the offenders are to be sentenced for some of the most serious offences known to the law. There is no suggestion that the offences are aggravated in a technical legal way by the nature of the injuries. In the case of manslaughter, the law recognises the sanctity of human life but also recognises that all life is equally sacred.

The impact on the community

One of the features of these offences was that they were committed in a quiet suburban neighbourhood. Several local residents gave evidence of what they saw from their own homes taking place in the neighbourhood where they lived with their families. This kind of lawlessness must be met with stern punishment. People are entitled to feel safe in their homes and in their communities. Offences like these undermine that sense of security and safety. It was not suggested that the offences were aggravated because they were committed “without regard for public safety”: Sentencing Act, s 21A(2)(i).

The facts of the offences

The incident on 1 September 2021 appeared to be the culmination of what was, from an outsider’s point of view, an inexplicable hostility between two groups of young men. On some of the material, much of which was inadmissible, the enmity between the groups may have arisen over their competitiveness around an art form know as drill rap music.
There was some lawyerly sparring from the first mention back in May until the end of the sentencing hearing as to whether this was a conflict between “gangs”. There is no evidence that MOB were involved in any gangland activity of the kind that features in the more serious cases that come before this Court. There was some evidence of very low-level drug dealing on the part of those connected with QSB or Murda and some pictures were shown to a witness or two and questions asked about whether they were depicted flashing “gang signs”. In the end, the nomenclature is unimportant. The offenders will be sentenced for what they did and the serious consequences of their actions. Whatever language I employ in this judgment, the sentences will not be aggravated by virtue of this being gangland activity even though, it might be thought, that turning up as a group armed with knives and goading the “opposition” to come outside, might entitle an observer to describe the group as a gang. However, I am not dealing here with the Cosa Nostra, Hells Angels or even the Brothers For Life.

Background and the events of 31 August 2021

There were communications tendered demonstrating animosity in the weeks and months beforehand particularly on the part of AD directed to Oliver Coleman, MM, and a social media account of QSB. There was taunting and mocking of the other side’s music. It is tolerably clear that those responsible for the taunting were members of, or associated with, MOB.
On 31 August 2021 AD, YA and Mr Karise attended William Street in the area of Oliver Coleman’s home. There were social media posts afterwards bragging about what had occurred and there is CCTV footage taken from a house down the road which showed part of the incident. There were also short video clips (on AD’s telephone) showing that he was armed with a knife as he and the others drove through various suburbs towards Blacktown.
EC gave evidence about the incident in which he may have exaggerated slightly the number of people present. Oliver Coleman made a Snapchat recording of what happened that night. I accept the Prosecutor’s submission that Oliver’s account can be accepted as a generally accurate description of what occurred on the night of 31 August 2021. He said:

“Hey look, real shit, this what happened. Nigga, some random ass nigga hit me up for dugu, ah for those dugu lollies. I was like ‘eetswa’. Hey, shut up EC. Niggas were walking down, it was red hot so I said ‘ay MM come out with me’. It was at the, you know the dead end of my street where the park is, they were parked facing us like to drive off. Like ‘what the fuck’. We were walking, and this is when you texted me saying ‘Ollie I miss you this that’ in the QSB group chat. I looked down and as soon as I look back up, the guy turned the key on, ignition, revved the fuck out of the car. I jumped on the side like on the footpath, you know. I was like ‘what the fuck’. They tried ramming us and MM jumped out of the way. They drove a little bit up the street and then 2 niggas jumped out. Me and MM hit legs into the park and we were looking for sticks and what not, you know? We walked back and then 2 niggas, ah, started hitting legs. Nigga, I was wearing slides and that so me and MM hit legs. We just running, running, running around to the park, turned left, ran. I caught niggas, smurk and that. Smurk, Jmoney, EC and AK at the crib, they ran out the front of the crib. As they ran out the front of the crib, there was a nigga. There was a nigga, he fucking, like, you know? Did a uturn, same car, flashed them. they got out of the car and they started fighting, this, that, this, that, this, that. Yeah, this, that, this, that. And then, you know, niggas were fighting. They came into my house and they just dipped, niggas dipped. And you know, old mate got sliced by his (inaudible).”

Joshua Okot received a small cut or graze that night and there is a suggestion that “AK” was also injured although he denied it in evidence. A recording made by YA shows him boasting that he stabbed “that fat cunt AK”. I am unable to determine – certainly not to the criminal standard – that he stabbed anybody that night and he is not to be sentenced for that event. However, the recording is potent evidence of YA’s state of mind which I accept continued until the following evening. I also accept that his behaviour was motivated by a sad attempt to be accepted by others associated with MOB.
There was a great deal of chatter online after that event although it was not all admissible in the case of each accused. Certainly, based on their own communications AG was “gassed” about what had occurred, YA was boastful, and Mr Karise seemed pleased with himself and the outcome of the visit.
I will consider this body of evidence in a little more detail in the context of resolving a factual dispute concerning the nature of the joint criminal enterprise and whether the offenders (or any of them) should be sentenced on the basis that they joined and participated in a joint criminal enterprise to inflict grievous bodily harm (as contended for by the Prosecutor). The alternative basis of liability (extended joint criminal enterprise) and one of the bases upon which the jury may have convicted of manslaughter (unlawful and dangerous act) required proof of an agreement to commit an armed assault.
At around 10:41pm that night AD sent a message to AG, YA and Mr Diallo saying:

“Round 2 tmr”.

So commenced the planning of the events that led to Oliver Coleman’s death and the serious wounding of EO and EC.

The factual dispute as to the joint criminal enterprise

The message from AD at 10:41pm appears to be the germination of the joint criminal enterprise which formed the foundation of the offences committed by each of the offenders. There is a dispute on sentence as to the precise content of that enterprise or that agreement. There was an abundance of communications over the course of the next 20 hours – admissible against some or all of the offenders – and each party placed some reliance on the contents of those communications, as well as many other relevant pieces of evidence, in making its submissions as to the nature of the joint criminal enterprise.
The case was put to the jury on alternative bases:

First, and primarily, the prosecution put that there was an agreement to inflict grievous bodily harm (or even death) on members of Oliver Coleman’s group. The stabbings of Oliver Coleman, EO and EC gave effect to that criminal agreement. The acts of the stabbers were attributed to each participant in the joint criminal enterprise and the mental element was established (directly) by the entry into the agreement.

Secondly, and in the alternative, it was put that the agreement was to commit an armed assault or assaults and that the individual accused contemplated the possibility that somebody may go beyond the scope of that enterprise and commit the more serious crimes (murder, attempted murder or wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm). Under this alternative formulation of the case, which was identified as a case based on “extended joint criminal enterprise”, both the act(s) and the state of mind of the stabber were attributed to the other participants. That is, the liability was “derivative”.

Self-defence was also put to the jury in relation to each count. In summary, and leaving aside the distinction between direct and derivative liability and the precise formulation based on the onus and standard of proof, the jury was instructed:

In relation to each count, and each alternative, self-defence could constitute a complete defence if the prosecution did not establish that (i) the accused did not believe the conduct was necessary and/or (ii) the conduct was not a reasonable one in the circumstances as the accused perceived them.

In relation to murder (count 1), the jury was instructed that murder would be reduced to manslaughter if the evidence did not exclude (i) but did exclude (ii), that being on the basis that all other elements of murder were established.

In relation to counts 2-5, the jury was directed that self-defence would be eliminated if the prosecution excluded either (i) or (ii).

The jury was also instructed that if the requisite intention for murder was not established (either in the person who did the stabbing or by the terms of the joint criminal enterprise), a verdict of manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act was available. Again, self-defence could be eliminated if the prosecution disproved either (i) the subjective component of self-defence or (ii) the objective component of self-defence.
The preceding paragraphs over-simplify the directions provided in the summing up but suffice to show that the jury may have reached its verdicts on either of the alternative formulations of the joint criminal enterprise (basic or extended) upon which the prosecution relied. In other words, the verdicts do not resolve the factual dispute that arises on sentence. The jury may have reached its verdict on count 1 either because it was not satisfied that the specific intention for murder was established or by a conclusion that the murderous intention was established but that the crime was reduced to manslaughter by excessive self-defence. Similarly, the jury could have reached its verdicts on count 2 and 5 either because it accepted that the joint criminal enterprise involved the infliction of death or really serious injury or, having doubt about that question, it accepted the accused contemplated the possibility that a member of the group would commit the more serious offence.
The following matters are clear from the verdicts:

As to self-defence, the jury rejected in each case and beyond reasonable doubt, that the conduct was objectively reasonable in the circumstances as (either the stabber or the particular accused) [5] perceived them to be, and

The jury rejected (beyond reasonable doubt) defence submissions that any joint criminal enterprise in which AD, AG, YA, Mr Karise and Mr Diallo were engaged was abandoned when the armed group ran out of 51 William Street or any time thereafter.

Similarly, it rejected any suggestion that any member of the group withdrew from the enterprise at that time or later.

The jury distinguished between the stabbings of EO and EC and the obvious explanation for this lies in the evidence of the nature and number of stab wounds inflicted on the respective victims. The injuries to EO were far more serious and extensive. Accordingly, the jury found each of the four offenders guilty of the more serious offence (count 2) requiring proof of an intention to murder whereas it acquitted the offenders of the attempted murder of EC (count 4).
5. Again, this turns on whether the jury was considering the case through the lens of basic joint criminal enterprise or extended joint criminal enterprise.

It is necessary to give effect to those findings and to ensure that the facts upon which the offenders are sentenced are consistent with the verdicts.
I will return to resolve what I will describe as “the main controversy between the parties”. An abundance of controversy was litigated in the sentencing submissions, but the issue of the content of the joint criminal enterprise is the most significant. First, I will set out, as briefly as possible, the events of 1 September 2021.

The possession of knives and weapons and the events of 1 September 2021

Knives and weapons

An important feature of the prosecution case at trial related to the number of knives available to the offenders. The opening portion of the Prosecutor’s closing address to the jury was dedicated to this issue and was presented with a PowerPoint display cutting between relevant parts of the evidence. It was compelling.
There was evidence that two Scanpan branded knives were missing from a knife block in Mr Karise’s rented flat, evidence that Mr Karise purchased a Mint brand cook’s knife on 28 August 2021 and that the police found empty knife packets in and outside of Mr Karise’s car which was left at the scene. Several broken knife blades and handles were present at the scene. These were scattered from around 51 William Street to a fair distance along Norfolk Street. Forensic findings (DNA and fingerprint) can connect most of those knives with particular offenders or particular stabbings or both.
I accept the prosecution’s contention that there were (at least) six knives available to the offenders when they attended William Street on the evening of the events. There was evidence from those who came out of 51 William Street that some, most or all the offenders were presenting their weapons. I accept Ms Avenell’s submission that the evidence does not allow for a finding, beyond reasonable doubt, that AG was doing so at that time. I note however, that he certainly had a knife in his hand ten or twenty minutes later after the stabbing had occurred and he was attempting to decamp the scene. I do not accept that whether or not AG had a knife in his hand at the outset has much impact on his objective criminality given that these young men were so obviously acting in concert.
As to those who came out of 51 William Street, the evidence is overwhelming that most were armed with golf clubs which were distributed to the group by Lee Coleman. Further, I am satisfied that Oliver Coleman came from the house with a large “zombie” knife and that another man emerged with a large machete. Again, clubs, broken and intact, were scattered about the scene, the zombie knife – which is a terrifying weapon – was located where Oliver Coleman fell and the machete was found in a culvert or drain near to the arrest of MM (a member of the Coleman group). Forensic findings, along with the location of these knives and some of the witness testimony, allows for certain conclusions to be drawn.
One thing of which I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities is that the group that emerged from William Street intended to use their weapons to inflict harm on their antagonists. In fact, I have no doubt that was the intention of the group. Having said that, such conduct would not have occurred had the MOB group not been there and had they – and in particular AG – not goaded Oliver and his mates to come outside.

The sequence of events up to the stabbing of Oliver Coleman

Just after 9.30pm, Mr Karise’s Corolla was captured by CCTV on Richmond Road (the main thoroughfare to the north and east of the three streets where the event unfolded). It proceeded to William Street, drove past the residence at number 51 and turned around at a canal which breaks William Street into two parts. The car was parked, probably in Suffolk or Norfolk Street, and the group of AG, AD, Mr Karise, Mr Diallo and YA were in and around 51 William Street for a few minutes. They were heard to yell out “come out” from the car and were caught on CCTV moving around in the vicinity of the Coleman home. EO, EC and Oliver and Lee Coleman came outside and remained in the front yard. EO said he saw three or four men standing near the fence and one was armed with a knife. EC said there were “roughly five males”. He heard his father telling the group to leave, although no doubt the exact language was more colourful and cast in the imperative. Mr Coleman gave evidence that he told the group to “fuck off” and “piss off”. A local resident (Ms McFarland) made some audio recordings that were tendered at the trial. These recorded shouting between the groups although what was said is not clear.
The MOB group then left and drove to a spot near the canal on William Street. They were there from about 9:50 until 10:00pm. During that time, AG engaged in communications with Oliver Coleman in the following terms:

At 9:52pm AG started a video chat with Oliver which lasted 00:00:16. AG then messaged Oliver:
“Come out boy”

At 9:52pm AG started a second video chat with Oliver which lasted 00:00:49. AG then started a third video chat with Oliver which ended at 9:53pm.
At 9:53pm AG messaged Oliver:
“6-2 you ain’t coming out”

At 9:54pm AG messaged Oliver:
“Your a Fkn bitch”

At 9:54pm AG started a video chat with Oliver which lasted 00:00:05. AG then messaged Oliver:
“Yous ain’t on piss”

At 9:55pm AG messaged Oliver:
“Mothers”
“Come out your crib”

At 9:55pm AG started a video chat with Oliver which lasted 00:00:05.
At 9:55pm Oliver messaged AG:
“Pussy”

At 9:55pm AG started a video chat with Oliver which lasted 00:00:12.
At 9:56pm AG sent Oliver an audio message:
“Cuz, my nigga. You’re fucking bitch cuz. Nigga, six niggas at the crib, my nigga cos You niggas are standing at the door bro. Fucking door cuz, you aint come out of your crib. Had a nigga, had your dad calling niggas out, telling them stay there. Telling the dog come out. My Nigga you’re a bitch bro, you’re fucking bitch cuz. You’re white yute. Put your shirt back on. Put your fucking shirt back on. You aint got no body my nigga. Put your fucking shirt back on my nigga”

At 9:57pm Oliver sent AG an audio message:
“Cuz, go fucking enjoy your ride home you little pussy”

At 9:59pm AG sent Oliver an audio message:
“Aye, listen my nigga. You didn’t come out your crib cuz. You had your dad telling us to fuck off my nigga. Come out your crib my nigga. Come out your crib cuz. We’ll come back to your crib right now. Post up bitch. Show me what your on cuz. You’re telling me oh I aint with it cuz. MOB aint this nigga. Two days we rid cuz. Come back for your boys. GBG my nigga”

At 10:00pm the MOB group moved in Mr Karise’s car to the location on William Street where the Toyota was located the next day. The five offenders then approached 51 William on foot and stood just outside the fence to that property. They were wearing balaclavas or other face coverings and all or most of them were brandishing kitchen knives. By that time, the men inside were armed with various weapons. EO gave evidence that Oliver Coleman said, “get the guys outside”. A minute or two later, all hell broke loose.
Putting aside the account of Lee Coleman, which I do not accept on this issue, the evidence was clear that the MOB group did not cross the threshold of the curtilage of 51 William Street (or try to stab the dog, Max).
A group of young men, along with Lee Coleman, emerged brandishing golf clubs and other weapons (including the zombie knife and machete) and attacked the MOB group. The latter retreated up William Street toward Suffolk Street and the Coleman group followed them. The pursuit continued into Suffolk Street and around the corner and some distance further down Norfolk Street. As I have said, the jury rejected the proposition that the retreat indicated that the joint criminal enterprise was implicitly abandoned at that point. I expect that factual finding was based on the evidence that they did not simply run away and keep running. Rather, there was physical engagement between the groups both in William Street, Suffolk Street and Norfolk Street. This was established by CCTV footage and the evidence of local residents.
In Suffolk Street, Oliver Coleman suffered the single stab wound that caused his death. At the trial, AD did not contest that he inflicted that stab wound. DNA and other evidence was capable of establishing that fact in any event. Oliver then staggered back into William Street and collapsed on the street.
An issue that pre-occupied the parties at trial, and on sentence, was precisely where in Suffolk Street the stabbing occurred. The Prosecutor relied on the forensic and crime scene evidence to argue that Mr Coleman was stabbed in the area around 7 Suffolk Street. The offenders relied on the description given by EO and EC which suggested it occurred near a corrugated iron fence on the corner of Suffolk and Norfolk Streets. I do not accept that the precise location of the stabbing either increases or diminishes the gravity of the manslaughter offence. The Prosecutor argued that it increased the gravity of the offending because:

“It was not committed while the offenders had been chased all the way down Suffolk Street. It was part of the initial phase of the brawl, at a time proximate to when, it is submitted each side must have been still attempting to achieve dominance over the others.”

I reject this proposition, but that rejection is of no assistance to the offenders. I act on the jury’s finding that the joint criminal enterprise subsisted at the time Oliver Coleman was stabbed and, indeed, continued for some few minutes thereafter, by which time the two groups had made their way quite a distance down to 21 Norfolk Street where EO and EC were stabbed.
I am inclined to the view that the stabbing happened at or near 7 Suffolk Street, and could probably accept that fact on balance, but the evidence does not establish the fact beyond reasonable doubt. The pathologist gave evidence that undermined part of the prosecution theory on this issue, which was based on the commencement of a trail of blood drops. In cross-examination, Dr Du Plessis could not say how long it may have taken the wound to start to leave a blood trail.
Despite the chaos, the darkness, and the generally tendentious approach taken by the parties from beginning to end, the circumstances of Oliver Coleman’s stabbing are reasonably clear. The MOB group had stopped, probably to re-engage in the fracas, but were outnumbered. They were more or less surrounded on three sides, when Oliver Coleman ran around behind them and then came at AD carrying the large zombie knife. He started to fall or stumble forward while AD held his knife out in front of him or thrusted it in Oliver’s direction. The knife penetrated his chest, perforating part of the sternum and surrounding soft tissue. It entered his diaphragm and the right ventricle of his heart. Dr Du Plessis observed other recent injuries on post-mortem examination, but she could not attribute these to the events surrounding his unlawful killing.
The foregoing account generally reflects the evidence of EO and EC. It does not reflect the evidence of Lee Coleman which was not really consistent with the other evidence in the case.
I should add that EC gave some evidence that somebody attempted to stab Lee Coleman, who himself (according to EC) was armed with a golf club. Lee Coleman also gave an account of somebody attempting to stab him. I am unable to accept this evidence. The two versions were not completely consistent, and neither was supported by any other evidence in the case, including the evidence of EO. EC recalled someone swinging at the back of his father’s neck whereas Lee Coleman said that someone swung a butcher’s knife at his ribcage. Lee Coleman said when this occurred, he “hit the deck” while EC could not recall whether his father moved at all or remained stationary. Lee Coleman said he could hear EC saying, “fuck they’re killing my Dad” and the other boys, in an “absolute panic for my safety”, ran after the other boys whereas EC did not give evidence of saying anything at the time. As noted, EO – who I assessed as the most reliable witness of those who participated in the events and co-operated – gave no evidence of any such incident. Further, there is no charge relating to the event. I do not reject the evidence out of hand, and accept both witnesses may have been doing their best to tell the truth, but I am not convinced that this event formed part of what actually happened.

The events after Oliver Coleman received the fatal stab wound

After Oliver was stabbed, the CCTV shows the two groups moving in a generally easterly direction down Norfolk Street. EO gave evidence that he thought he was the only person who was chasing “the guy that [he] thought just stabbed Oliver”. In cross-examination, he acknowledged he was not really sure if he was alone and was focused on the chase. He made a recording of events on his telephone. The audio part of the recording shows he was behaving aggressively and in a very provocative way. [6]
6. To borrow from the Prosecutor’s written submission: “He was obviously excited and dismissive of the martial prowess of the offenders. He was soon to learn otherwise.”
It seems around this time, YA became afraid and went somewhere to hide. The Prosecutor submits that “the precise reason” he was not with the group does not need to be determined. But I am satisfied that he was scared. By his plea of guilty to the stabbings of EO and EC, he accepts the joint criminal enterprise continued and that he had not withdrawn from it.
The CCTV evidence shows the MOB group, excluding YA, running down the road towards 21 Norfolk Street at about 10:05pm. The CCTV shows members of the 51 William Street group following not very far behind, walking at first and then breaking into a trot. Lee Coleman followed, with his distinctive gait, a minute or so later.
AD ran to the front door of 21 Norfolk Street and was banging on the door and crying for help. He was confronted by several men and tried to escape but was caught on the front porch where there were some pot plants. He threw one of the pots at his assailants. EC, EO, Joshua Okot and another member of the Coleman group, Monzir Komei, were present and there may have been others. Mr Komei, like EO, recorded part of the incident on his telephone. Both EC and EO provided evidence generally consistent with what I have just described, and it is not inconsistent with the CCTV footage, the telephone videos and the evidence of some local residents. For example:

Ms Brotherton lived at 21 Norfolk Street. She could not remember anybody knocking at her door but said she was upstairs and may not have heard it.

Jahpeth and Darren Gonzales lived at 1/21A Norfolk Street and gave evidence that they could hear people yelling “kill him, kill him, kill him” from the front of 21 Norfolk. Each said they could see three or four men in the front yard of 21 Norfolk Street. Their view was somewhat obscured.

Komalben Patel lived at 1/40-44 Norfolk Street and saw about 10 boys stopping a few houses down from her house and starting to fight.

Sonya Ghadia was living in Norfolk Street and saw 5-10 people, one of whom said “you’re going to die” and “kill him.”

I am satisfied that by that point in the incident AD was in significant peril. Mr Okot swung a golf club at AD with sufficient force to snap the club. EC punched and kicked AD while he was cowering and wedged between some garbage bins.
I am prepared to accept that part of the CCTV footage (as submitted by Mr Smith, as he then was) [7] depicts Mr Karise effectively leaping into the front yard of 21 Norfolk Street. I am satisfied he did this to defend AD. Mr Karise did not dispute that he stabbed EO. There is no clear evidence that he was the only one who did so, but there is no evidence identifying anybody else as stabbing EO. I am satisfied that Mr Karise did what he believed was necessary but agree with, and must act on, the jury’s determination that his conduct exceeded that which was objectively reasonable in the circumstance as Mr Karise perceived them. In view of one of the arguments developed at the sentence hearing, I should record that I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Karise’s actions went well beyond what was objectively reasonable: Smith v R [2015] NSWCCA 193 at [45], R v Donald William Reeves [2017] NSWSC 813 at [28] and Newburn v R [2022] NSWCCA 139 at [52]. I also accept that his conduct went well beyond the scope of the joint criminal enterprise.
7. On Monday this week, after appearing in the sentencing hearing a few weeks earlier, counsel was sworn in as a Judge of the District Court.
Because of the lack of cooperation on the part of some of the prosecution witnesses, and conflicts in the evidence of the two witness who provided a version of events, it is difficult to come to a firm opinion on the mechanics and physical interaction that led to EO’s near-fatal injuries. It is worth, first, recording what those injuries were.
EO was stabbed 10 times. He received wounds to his abdomen, the left part of his chest wall, on his back over the scapula and to his shoulder and clavicle. He was stabbed twice at the back of the neck where the shoulder and arm meet, twice on the back of the neck, above the clavicle, twice on the left upper arm and on the base of the left thumb. The paramedics who attended on EO at the scene said he was critically unwell. En route to hospital, he had no brachial pulse, very low oxygen saturations, and needed multiple blood transfusions through a drill in his shoulder. On arrival at Blacktown Hospital, he had no radial pulse indicating low blood pressure and one of his lungs was functioning poorly and required decompression by placing a needle in the left side of his chest. The most life-threatening injury was the stab wound to the chest wall, which resulted in a total blood loss of 2.4 litres. That injury required immediate surgical intervention to repair damage to the pulmonary vein, which is responsible for supplying blood to the heart. Without treatment there is little doubt that EO would have died.
EO agreed that AD was screaming for help and said that he attacked the two men who jumped over a fence and that he swung a broken golf club at them. He agreed in cross-examination that that weapon may have looked like a knife from their perspective. He denied that he was wrestling with Mr Karise when he was stabbed.
EC agreed that AD was cornered by the bins and hurled a pot in his direction. The pot missed and EC followed AD and punched and kicked him. He said that Mr Okot joined the fray and struck the man on the ground with a golf club. He said he was 100% sure of this. He said he helped Mr Okot and then saw a man [which inferentially must have been Mr Karise] with his arms around EO. The inference was that EO was stabbed at this time although EC said he did not see the stabbing.
The evidence on the precise details of the stabbing leaves little room for certainty as to precisely what happened. I find it difficult to reconcile the versions given by the two eyewitnesses. I do not think either is lying. Rather the circumstances were extreme, things happened quickly, both men were themselves full of adrenaline and behaving violently and a lot happened in a very short space of time.
What is clear is that shortly after Mr Karise stabbed EO, somebody stabbed EC. The prosecution went to the jury on the basis that the identity of that person was unknown but that he was a participant in the joint criminal enterprise, that is, one of the five men who turned up outside 51 William Street. On sentence, an attempt was made to narrow this down to two of the participants (AG and Mr Karise). Each offender will be sentenced on the basis that the identity of the stabber is not known but that each is responsible for the acts of that person in stabbing EC.
EC suffered three stab wounds and was assessed by paramedics as requiring less urgent assistance than EO. EC was taken to hospital where he was found to be in pain, with rapid breathing, but was hemodynamically stable, meaning he was not immediately at risk of dying. EC had a 3-4cm long wound to the left upper thorax which pierced his lung, a 7cm long wound to his right flank with contained bleeding in the liver, and a 10cm long wound to his left triceps which was penetrated to the humerus but caused no active arterial bleeding. He required surgical washout and the closing of his wounds, with specialist assistance from the orthopaedics and plastics team for treatment of the arm wound. Photographs of his injuries were tendered on sentence. These were serious stab wounds.

The arrival of emergency services, the offenders’ movements and conduct after the stabbings and the injuries the offenders sustained

Several local residents contacted emergency services while these events were unfolding. Police and ambulance officers were on the scene promptly. Some of the offenders decamped or attempted to do so, some were taken into custody at or near the scene, and some had been injured.
YA was found by police hiding in the carport of 6 Suffolk Street. The occupant of those premises, Mr Fisk, had contacted the police. YA was found and spoken to by police and then arrested. The things he said to police on arrest were held to be inadmissible at his trial. [8]
8. R v Diallo & Ors (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 853.
Mr Diallo’s movements after the incident were well documented. CCTV footage showed that he caught a bus on Richmond Road near the intersection of William Street at 10:11pm. He travelled to the Blacktown railway and bus interchange. At 10:24pm he caught a train from Blacktown to Lidcombe alighting at 10:49pm where he changed trains, arriving at Chester Hill at 11:31pm.
CCTV footage from the Richmond Road and the eastern end of Norfolk Street showed AD, AG and Mr Karise attempting furtively to make their escape from the scene. Mr Karise managed to make his way across the park and was arrested near 37 Dan Street. AG and AD went down William Street where they were seen from a police helicopter. There was also some CCTV footage taken from a driveway at 15 Norfolk Street Blacktown showing AD and AG under the carport. By that time, AG was carrying a knife and AD was carrying a broken golf club. AD was found hiding in a tree at 15 William Street and AG was found hiding in the yard of number 15. They were both arrested.
On arrest, three of the offenders had injuries:

AD suffered a puncture wound to his right forearm which was 0.5 to 1cm in diameter and whose depth could not be assessed due to constant oozing. His wound was washed and dressed, and he was referred to “plastics” for further management.

Mr Karise had a deep laceration to his left triceps and a superficial laceration to his right bicep. An X-ray of his left arm also revealed a small incomplete fracture due to the stab injury.

AG suffered a deep 5cm laceration to his left thumb, exposing the tendon. The wound was initially cleaned and dressed, and the following day AG underwent a surgical washout and repair of the tendon.

Post offence conduct and arrest

As observed earlier each of the offenders was arrested and ultimately charged with the murder of Oliver Coleman. As part of the police investigation which was conducted between 1 September 2021 and the day each of the offenders was arrested (22 February 2022), the police conducted covert electronic surveillance.
Three of the offenders (AG, YA and, a while later, AD) were left together in the back of a police truck on the day of their arrest. Investigators had provided them with some information, no doubt to promote conversation between the three offenders. Their conversations were recorded by a listening device over several hours. There was a dispute as to the admissibility of the evidence, largely resolved in favour of the accused, but a few parts of the recordings were admitted over objection. [9] One of the more significant pieces of evidence was AG threatening to “smoke” YA if he spoke to police. Later in the trial, an attempt to tender a dictionary definition of that verb was rejected. [10]
9. R v Diallo & Ors (No 5) [2024] NSWCCA 914.
10. R v Diallo & Ors (No 15) [2024] NSWSC 1114.
Telephone intercepts were also deployed and, again, there were disputes as to the admissibility of parts of the evidence. One dispute concerned a conversation between Mr Karise and a man called Phillip Nkpolukwu in which Mr Karise ruminated on the fact that somebody had died in the incident and said either “I dig it” or “I deep it”. The words used were disputed. I determined that what was said and the significance of the comment was a question for the tribunal of fact and the evidence was admitted over objection. [11]
11. R v Diallo & Ors (No 14) [2024] NSWSC 1101.
These and other aspects of the post offence conduct of each offender went to the issue of “consciousness of guilt” on the part of the offender to whom the evidence related. The evidence may also play a role in the determination of the basis of liability to which I now return.

Finding as to the content of the joint criminal enterprise and the basis of criminal liability

As I have said the main controversy between the parties concerns the conflicting submissions as to the basis of each offender’s criminal liability. This will turn on my finding as to the nature of the joint criminal enterprise into which each man entered. I will first summarise, as best as I can, the position of the parties.
As to the manslaughter of Oliver Coleman:

The case against AD was put on the basis that he was the principal in the first degree.

The prosecution submits that AD stabbed Oliver Coleman with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm and in conformity with a joint criminal enterprise to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on Mr Coleman. His liability for manslaughter (rather than murder) arises because he believed his actions were necessary to defend himself but his action was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he perceived them.

AD submits that he should be sentenced on the basis that his act was unlawful and dangerous and that the jury rejected the objective aspect of self-defence.

The case against each of the other offenders on count 1 (murder) was based on joint criminal enterprise. There were two paths to the verdict of manslaughter. First, if the jury did not accept the joint enterprise was to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm, it could convict on the basis that the participants in the joint criminal enterprise agreed to commit an unlawful and dangerous act (for example, to commit an assault using weapons). Secondly, it could have accepted that the agreement was to inflict death or grievous bodily harm but determined that the offence was reduced to manslaughter based on excessive self-defence.

The prosecution submitted that the agreement was to inflict (at least) grievous bodily harm and that each of the offenders should be sentenced on the basis that this proved a murderous intention but that their liability was reduced to manslaughter by excessive self-defence.

Mr Wilson SC, on behalf of Mr Diallo, submitted that his client should be sentenced on the basis that “the joint criminal enterprise was to assault an occupant or occupants of 51 William Street Blacktown while armed with a knife”, that AD stabbed Oliver Coleman without a murderous intent and that the jury rejected the objective component of self-defence.

Ms Avenell SC, on behalf of AG, adopted this approach tailored to the position of her client.

Counsel for Mr Karise submitted in writing “it is not in dispute that the basis of the manslaughter conviction is ‘manslaughter by excessive self-defence.’” From this, I assume the intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm was accepted.

Mr Terracini SC and Mr Kondich, on behalf of YA, submitted in writing “the liability for and objective seriousness of this offence are to be submitted to the Court orally”. However, no such submissions were advanced.

As to count 2, the attempted murder of EO:

The case against Mr Karise at trial was that he inflicted the wounds and did so with the intention to kill. The prosecution submitted he should be sentenced on that basis and Mr Smith made no submission to the contrary. However, he submitted that the evidence did not eliminate a belief in Mr Karise that it was necessary to do what he did in self-defence and/or defence of AD.

The case against the remaining accused was based on their complicity by way of the joint criminal enterprise.

The Prosecutor submitted each should be sentenced on the basis that the criminal agreement was to inflict grievous bodily harm and that they were liable for attempted murder because they contemplated the possibility that a member of the group would commit the more serious offence by forming an intention to kill.

AD, AG and Mr Diallo submitted that the joint criminal enterprise was to commit an assault using weapons and that they were guilty of count 2 on the basis that they contemplated that one of the group might stab somebody while having an intention to kill them.

As to self-defence, the Prosecutor submitted that both the subjective and the objective components were eliminated. That is, none of the accused held an actual subjective believe that it was necessary for Mr Karise to do what he did in self-defence or to defend AD. The accused submitted that the possibility that Mr Karise held such a subjective believe could not be excluded. Because liability was derivative (via an extended joint criminal enterprise), each was to be sentenced on that basis.

As to the offence of wounding EC with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (count 5 on the trial indictment and count 3 of YA’s separate indictment), the person who stabbed EC cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt but I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, and there is no issue, that it was one of the participants in the joint criminal enterprise. The dispute on these counts is similar to that which pervades the case:

The Prosecutor submits that the joint criminal enterprise was to inflict grievous bodily harm and the stabbing of EC fell within the scope of that agreement and that both aspects of self-defence was disproved.

The offenders maintain that the joint criminal enterprise was to commit an armed assault but the possibility of somebody acting beyond the scope of that agreement, and wounding somebody with intent to do them really serious injury, was within their contemplation as a possible consequence of the execution of the joint criminal enterprise. The offenders submit there was a subjective belief that the conduct was necessary but the jury accepted that the actions were not objectively reasonable.

The Prosecutor placed reliance on a number of circumstances which, it was submitted, considered together, established beyond reasonable doubt that the joint criminal enterprise was to inflict grievous bodily harm. Particular reliance was placed on the basic circumstance that the five men acquired six knives before their attendance at 51 William Street and the contents of communications in the 24-hour period before the stabbings. Reliance was also placed on some of the post offence conduct which was said to speak to a more serious enterprise than merely to intimidate or to assault. The offenders submitted that a less grave criminal enterprise could not be excluded. It was submitted that many of the communications were no more than the bravado and boasts of silly young men. These reasons will not do justice to the careful submissions made by both sides and the time available makes it impossible for me to set out all of the evidence. However, I have considered all of the submissions on both sides carefully and have reviewed the evidence closely before reaching a conclusion. I have also been careful to recall that many of the communications are only admissible in the case of one or more of the individual offenders. The final column in Ex 27 states the offender against whom each of the 889 items was tendered. Similarly, the different table tendered in YA’s sentencing hearing is admissible in his case only.
Without being close to comprehensive some of the more incriminating items in the communications schedules include:

YA’s boasting of stabbing AK and AG’s reaction to that (“I’m so gassed”). This evidence goes to the state of mind of each of those offenders the following night.

Observations about the possibility of MOB members being killed. For example, AD said “… if y’all die in this beef I’ll laugh” and “what if the opps kill u.”

AD’s observation about [getting/attacking] “the white kid first”. I accept this was a reference to Oliver Coleman.

AG’s participation in a group chat which included another man saying “Cuz make sure … One of these … Niggas …In the ground” and “The Chinging … Aint even take em … To hospo”.

AG’s response to those messages: “put one of niggaz in ⚰️”.

AD saying the group should “run thru it tmr cuz … Get a few niggas on our blade Nd rob them”.

AD telling MM “lol watch nigga y’all gone drop in your graves.”

Multiple reference as to whether the group had “blades”.

Pictures circulated on social media showing Oliver Coleman, suggesting that he was a particular target.

An observation by Mr Karise to Philip Nkpolukwu (after the event) that [Oliver Coleman’s] age was not bar on him being “dipped”: “if the nigga’s dipping, he can get dipped too.”

That surview only scratches the surface of the flurry of communications that preceded the events from 9:00pm on 1 September 2021. It is also necessary to consider closely the goading by AG of Oliver Coleman while the group were down near the canal before the first and second attendance that night. That interaction is admissible against all of the offenders and is set out above at [60].
While I accept the force of the Prosecutor’s submissions, I accept the submission made by Mr Wilson and Ms Avenell (which are relevant to each of the offenders). They relied on a number of the features of the evidence to contend that the evidence does not exclude (beyond reasonable doubt) the possibility that the offenders’ common design was to intimidate and if the occasion arose assault the “opps” while being armed with knives. The first matter is that no serious harm was occasioned during the incident on 31 August 2021 despite YA’s boast about what he had done to “AK”. Everybody in the group knew this. The second thing is that many of the communications have the hallmarks of silly boasts full of bravado. For example, there were suggestions of the MOB group running through the “crib” and making the opposition strip naked and get on their knees, interspersed with chatter about drill rap lyrics, artists and music. [12] While there was talk of “chinging” and “dipping” which, depending on context, may be a reference to stabbing, there was no discussions of an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm (in those terms or otherwise).
12. There was evidence of this in AG’s case.
Taking the coffin emoji [⚰️] and references to putting people in the ground as an example, even the Prosecutor did not submit that these could be interpreted literally but, rather, said they evinced an intention to inflict really serious injury rather than death. The natural inference, if these things were being said in earnest or were to be taken literally, was that they demonstrated an intention to kill somebody.
Further, the actions of the group on the night was not consistent – to the exclusion of other inferences – with a common design to inflict really serious injury. The group remained outside the fence albeit while goading and brandishing knives. When the other group emerged from 51 William Street, the MOB group retreated, at least to some degree. They ran like “pussies” as their antagonists put it.
I accept that one available inference is that the group, or some members of the group, joined and participated in a joint enterprise to inflict really serious injury on the occupants of 51 William Street (and Oliver Coleman in particular), but I am unable – on the whole of the evidence – to exclude the alternative proposition that they were there in furtherance of an agreement to intimidate and humiliate and assault, while armed with knives, the occupants of that home. In making that assessment I have taken into account the post offence conduct, all of which I find to be consistent with either scenario and am unable to distinguish between them. In relation to the “deep it” controversy with Mr Karise I would also note his reaction to being told someone had died, in his police interview. I thought this was telling and not consistent with him being a participant, or that he was, at least it was hinted, celebrating the death of Oliver Coleman in later conversation.
Accordingly, the offenders are to be sentenced on the basis that they committed manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act and did not form the intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm.
On count 2, AD, Mr Diallo and AG will be sentenced on the basis of the less grave joint criminal enterprise, but on the basis that each was aware of the possibility that one of the participants would stab somebody with intent to kill them. In other words, the basis of liability lies in what is generally referred to as extended joint criminal enterprise.
In relation to YA on count 2 (of his separate indictment) and all offenders on count 5 (count 3 for YA), the sentence will be imposed based on a finding of extended joint criminal enterprise.
While the parties expended a lot of energy and delivered themselves of many words on this issue, and while I accept that the finding has some impact on an assessment of the objective gravity of the offending, I am not convinced that it is as significant as might be thought. Taking counts 2 and 5 as examples, once an offender has contemplated the possibility that one of their group might go beyond the scope of an agreement to commit an armed assault, and might form and act on an intention to kill somebody or gravely injury them, and decides to go ahead and participate in the enterprise anyway, that person has decided to commit a very serious crime indeed.

Self-defence

I accept the submissions of the offenders that there was a subjective element of self-defence in each of the offences. I act on the jury’s rejection of any suggestion that the response was reasonable in the circumstances that the offenders perceived them to be. I also note that these five offenders were the initial aggressors in the sense that they arrived at a suburban home armed with dangerous weapons and goaded the occupants to come outside for what was always going to be, and was intended to be, a physical confrontation.
I put little store in AD’s message about “the white kid first”. There is no doubt on the evidence that Oliver Coleman ran at AD and did so while wielding a terrifying looking “zombie” knife. Based on the nature of the wound and the pathologist’s concessions, there was an element of the deceased falling onto the knife. However, it is reasonably clear that AD presented the knife and was moving it towards his victim even as his victim ran at him. As Dr Du Plessis explained, the dynamics of such a situation are difficult to assess. However, the jury obviously found that AD’s actions went beyond what was objectively reasonable. That conclusion could not be supported by merely standing there holding the knife in front of him. AD deliberately stabbed Oliver Coleman in the area of the chest, an act that was both dangerous and unlawful (because it was not a reasonable response to the circumstances). Because it was a single stab wound and because of the nature of the weapon with which he was being assailed, the degree to which AD’s action exceeded what was reasonable is relatively slight.
As to the attempted murder of EO, I find that Mr Karise and the others present believed in the extremely urgent circumstances that prevailed that both they and AD were in grave danger. The videos taken on the telephones of Mr Komei and EO himself, show that the victims’ group were behaving with extreme aggression having quickly gained the upper hand in the conflict. They were hitting the MOB members with such force that golf clubs were broken and EO acknowledged that his broken club may have looked like a large knife. However, once the bear hug came to an end, Mr Karise’s infliction of so many stab wounds exceeded by a large margin a reasonable response to the circumstances.
As to the wounding with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on EC, that incident seemed to follow very shortly upon the stabbing of EO. The circumstances remained urgent and, I accept that the offenders (and whoever inflicted the stab wounds) believed they needed to act in self-defence. However, as the verdicts show, the conduct went beyond that which was necessary in the circumstances. I would assess the degree to which the conduct was unreasonably disproportionate to the threat to be substantial.
I have made those findings as to the degree to which the conduct went beyond what was objectively reasonable because they are, as the authorities show, relevant to an assessment of the objective gravity of each offence.

Objective gravity

Each of the offences is very serious. It is necessary to explain why and, for the purpose of the standard non-parole period that applies to Mr Diallo and Mr Karise for the offences of attempted murder of EO (count 2) and the wounding with intent of EC (count 5), it is appropriate to place that seriousness on a putative scale relative to all offences caught by the statutory provisions creating those offences.

Manslaughter of Oliver Coleman

Manslaughter arises in a very wide range of circumstances. As in all such offences, human life has been taken away. The victim was still a child and had a long and promising future in front of him. The present offence did not involve an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm, but it was an offence of violence, involved the use of weapons and was committed in company in a public street. There was an element of (subjective) self-defence but thrusting or presenting the knife in the chest area was (objectively) disproportionate to the threat and, it must be remembered, the occasion for self-defence only occurred because the offenders attempted to intimidate and assault the occupants of 51 William Street for reasons which remain unfathomable. There was some planning involved – knives were purchased and obtained from Mr Karise’s rented flat, face coverings and balaclavas were worn (noting it was during a period of COVID where masks were commonplace) and there was an attempt (apparently failed) to obtain a car that could not be traced to the offenders. When the initial opportunity to withdraw arose, the offenders instead regrouped and then proceeded to the scene as a group. The events unfolded in a suburban street.
I consider AD’s objective criminality for the manslaughter to be more significant than his co-offenders because it was he who wielded the knife and there is more evidence of his personal animosity toward the victim. However, each of the offenders are responsible for AD’s actions at law and all agreed to commit the unlawful and dangerous act that led to Oliver Coleman’s death. There was a degree of random luck as to which of the offenders, all of whom were in close proximity to each other, actually struck the fatal blow with a knife. AG’s conduct in goading Oliver to come out places his conduct at a significant level of seriousness.
This was a serious offence of manslaughter although it was very far from the most serious. Considered in the very wide range of offences of unlawful killings it lies in the lower part of the spectrum. That assessment should not detract from the fact that this was a very serious criminal offence.

The wounding of EO

The offence to which YA pleaded guilty is less serious than that to which the other four men were found guilty by the jury. While the maximum penalty is the same, an intention to kill is a more serious mental element than an intention to inflict really serious injury. Further, while YA acknowledged by his plea of guilty that he remained a part of the joint criminal enterprise and played his role early on, he was not in the immediate vicinity when EO was stabbed many times.
Mr Karise’s role was the most significant – there is no evidence that anybody else inflicted any of the stab wounds that almost killed EO. The stabbing was repeated and vicious and appeared to have been inflicted in a frenzy. I accept that there was an occasion to act in defence of AD and other members of the group and that the victim’s group were, by that time, well and truly on the attack and acting without restraint. I accept Mr Karise believed it was necessary to do what he did. However, his response was utterly disproportionate to the circumstances. The events unfolded quickly and would not have occurred had the men from 51 William Street not continued their pursuit after Oliver Coleman was stabbed. That action was motivated by anger and revenge, those men having quickly gained the upper hand in the physical confrontation. I assess Mr Karise’s objective criminality as high approaching the mid-point of objective seriousness.
As with the manslaughter offence, there was planning in the lead up to the fracas and the whole escapade exhibited a wanton lawlessness inherent in the conduct. While the injuries were life threatening, EO appears to have made a good recovery.
Insofar as it is a meaningful description, Mr Karise’s criminality falls in the lower part of a supposed mid-range of objective seriousness relative to all offences of wounding with intent to murder.
AG, AD and Mr Diallo are responsible for the physical actions of Mr Karise and his mental state is imputed (derivatively) to them. None can be established to have stabbed EO but neither did any of them make any attempt to stop the stabbing. By that stage, AD had killed Oliver Coleman (although none of those involved on either side would have known that) and AD had been calling for help and had been beaten. The criminality of those three offenders is less serious than that of Mr Karise.

While AD, AG and YA are each to be sentenced “at law” various provisions of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act remain relevant. There are also decisions to be made, based on the terms of s 19, as to where the offenders should serve their sentence up until the age of 21 years and, depending on the length of the non-parole period, beyond that.

Aggregate sentencing, totality and notional accumulation

Section 53A of the Sentencing Act allows a sentencing judge to impose an aggregate sentence when sentencing an offender for a number of offences. The provision was subject to authoritative comment by RA Hulme J in JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297; (2014) 246 A Crim R 528. His Honour’s list of propositions at [39]-[40] is often quoted and I will apply those principles in this case. For the sake of transparency, the section requires the sentencing Judge to indicate the individual sentences that would have been imposed if an aggregate sentence was not imposed. Where an offence carries a standard non-parole period, the Judge must also state an indicative non-parole period. If an offender receives a sentencing discount (for their plea of guilty or for assistance to authorities), that should be applied to the indicative sentences and not to the aggregate sentence: PG v R [2017] NSWCCA 179; (2017) 268 A Crim R 61.
The imposition of an aggregate sentence does not relieve the Court from applying the principle of totality and considering the extent of any notional accumulation and concurrency. That principle requires the Court to stand back after settling on the appropriate sentence to ensure that the total sentence is not crushing. In R v MAK; R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381; (2006) 167 A Crim R 159 the Court observed at [16]:

“The severity of a sentence is not simply the product of a linear relationship. That is to say severity may increase at a greater rate than an increase in the length of a sentence.”

On the other hand, a sentencing court must “take care when applying the totality principle” and ensure there is no suggestion that an offender is receiving “some kind of discount for multiple offending”: R v MAK; R v MSK at [18]. Put another way, the totality principle is to be applied hand in glove with the requirement that the total (or aggregate) sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the whole of the offending.
In the present case each of the offences was committed over a very short period, around five or ten minutes based on the CCTV footage. While the plan, such as it was, was formulated over about a day, the three stabbings all occurred within a very short time frame. That fact militates in favour of a substantial (if notional) concurrence between the sentences.
On the other hand, there were three distinct victims and that demands a degree of notional accumulation to ensure that the individual dignity of each victim is vindicated in the sentencing process and in the punishment imposed. That approach is also calculated to ensure there is no erosion of “public confidence” of the kind referred to by the Court in R v MAK; R v MSK at [18].
From a comparison between the indicative sentences I will announce and the aggregate sentences I will impose, it will be seen that there is a substantial concurrence but also a degree of notional accumulation.

Individual justice – consistency in sentencing – parity and proportionality of sentences imposed on co-offenders

The notion of equal justice is fundamental to the law, including the law of sentencing. In sentencing co-offenders, the Court must strive to achieve equal justice: see, for example, Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46, Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [1997] HCA 26 and Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49. When all things are equal, the sentences should be the same. However, the sentences must reflect relevant differences. As Dawson and Gaudron JJ said in Postiglione v the Queen:

“Discrepancy or disparity is not simply a question of the imposition of different sentences for the same offence. Rather, it is a question of due proportion between those sentences, that being a matter to be determined having regard to the different circumstances of the co-offenders in question and their different degrees of criminality.”

An equally important and fundamental principle is that justice must be individual and must discriminate between cases. As Mahoney ACJ famously said in R v Lattouf (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 12 December 1996, unrep):

“A sentencing process which is seen by the public merely as draconian and not just will lose the support of those whom it is designed to protect. If a sentencing process does not achieve justice, it should be put aside. As I have elsewhere said, if justice is not individual, it is nothing.
“But, in addition, a sentencing process must be capable of discriminating between cases. There is, as I have said, a public interest in punishment. But if the desire to punish results in a person who would otherwise not become a confirmed criminal becoming such, that sentencing process is inconsistent with the public interest.”

In the present case, the differences between the individual cases lies not only in the different assessments of the objective gravity of each offender’s conduct but also in the diminution of their moral culpability, which in some cases is substantial, and also in their criminal histories and their prospects of rehabilitation.
The sentences I will announce attempt to distinguish between the cases while, at the same time, not leaving any of the offenders wearing the “badge of unfairness” of which Mason J (as he then was) spoke in his important dissenting judgment in Lowe v The Queen.
The sentences must also reflect the seriousness of the offences as reflected by the applicable maximum penalty provided by the legislature in relation to each offence (that is, 25 years) and, within the confines of the requirement for individual justice, strive to foster consistency in sentencing. To that end, I have surveyed the outcomes of other cases and statistics maintained by the NSW Judicial Commission.

AG’s personal circumstances and his objective criminality

Senior Counsel for AG sought to rely on the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247; (2018) 275 A Crim R 233 (“Tepania”) to argue that AG’s objective criminality – as distinct from his moral culpability – is reduced as a result of the peculiar combination of circumstances personal to him. The parties provided notes on this issue after the hearing. Reference was made to several authorities decided after the decision in Tepania, the more significant of which appear to be DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156, Britton v R [2024] NSWCCA 138 and R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125.
A lively debate continued as to the relevance of the briefing letter provided to Dr Dornan and I allowed that document to be tendered after the evidence closed because it appeared that the Prosecutor’s position may have unwittingly misstated the effect of the report upon which AG relied.
I accept Ms Avenell’s submission that her client’s particular history and personal circumstances made him more vulnerable to being involved in this kind of group offending, to be influenced by others and to join the criminal enterprise. Equally, it is clear that AG did not personally commit either of the stabbings in which the stabber has been identified. However, he did – at least later in the night, and possibly earlier – have possession of a knife and he was close enough to the fray to receive a wound to his hand. He was responsible for the goading of Oliver Coleman to come out.
I do not accept that these matters, however important they may otherwise be to the appropriate sentence, reduce AG’s objective criminality. I am unable to accept that the facts of this case fit within the kind of matters contemplated by Johnson J in Tepania at [112]. When his Honour referred to “motive” I expect he had in mind the kind of distinction that might be drawn, in an assessment of objective seriousness, between a person motivated by greed and one who is desperate for money. The distinction may be considered to be a fine one, but I am of the view that it is tolerably clear.
Having said all of that, the factual matters which form the foundation of this submission diminish substantially AG’s moral culpability and, in turn, have a large impact on the sentence to be imposed on him: cf, for example, Camilleri v R [2023] NSWCCA 106.

Moral culpability – youth – deprivation – psychological issues

The individual backgrounds and personal circumstances of the offenders raise complex and sometimes interrelated issues. The youth of the offenders, their difficult backgrounds and in some instances their psychological make-up are each capable of impacting upon their moral culpability. In making assessments as to those matters, I am conscious of what Yehia J said in TM v R (supra) at [64]-[65] concerning the need for such matters to receive separate consideration. While the language of this judgment may appear at times to conflate these issues, I have given separate consideration both to the youth of the offenders and, where relevant, to the evidence of their deprived backgrounds or psychological issues. I have not fallen into the error of conflating those issues.

Punishment v rehabilitation

While each of these offenders must be punished sternly for these serious offences, I remain conscious of the words of King CJ written in South Australia in 1982:

“There must be a place for the exercise of mercy where a judge’s sympathies are reasonably excited by the circumstance of the case. There must be a place for the leniency which has traditionally been extended even to offenders with bad records when the judge forms the view, almost intuitively in the case of experienced judges, that leniency at that particular stage of the offender’s life might lead to reform”

See The Queen v Osenkowksi (1982) 30 SASR 212 at 212-213; (1982) 5 A Crim R 394 and to similar effect R v James Henry Sargeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74 at 77-78.

Section 19 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act

Another area of dispute between the parties concerned the application of s 19 of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act. That section allows a court which sentences a person under the age of 21 to direct that the offender remain in a juvenile detention facility “for the whole or any part of the term of the sentence”: s 19(1). Such an order does not apply once the person attains the age of 21 years unless the sentence or non-parole period will expire within six months of the person turning 21: s 19(2). Where, as here, the offender is sentenced for a “serious children’s indictable offence” [15] the person cannot serve the sentence as a juvenile offender after they turn 18 unless (relevantly) the court finds there are “special circumstances justifying detention of the person as a juvenile offender”: s 19(3).
15. A “serious children’s indictable offence” includes homicide and offences carrying a maximum sentence of 25 years: Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), s 3.
However, a person cannot serve their sentence “as a juvenile offender” after the person turns 21 unless the sentence or non-parole period will expire within six months of their 21^st birthday: s 19(2).
Each of AD, AG and YA argued that a direction under s 19 should be made in their favour. [16] In each case, the Prosecutor chose to resist the making of such a direction.
16. AD written submissions, paragraph 83 relying on the report of Ms Hawil at [74]-[75]; AG written submissions, paragraphs 12-15; YA written submissions, paragraphs 58-60.
Sub-section 19(4) provides that a finding of special circumstances can only be made on one of the following grounds:

(a) that the person is vulnerable on account of illness or disability (within the meaning of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977),
(b) that the only available educational, vocational training or therapeutic programs that are suitable to the person’s needs are those available in detention centres,
(c) that, if the person were committed to a correctional centre, there would be an unacceptable risk of the person suffering physical or psychological harm, whether due to the nature of the person’s offence, any assistance given by the person in the prosecution of other persons or otherwise.

While there is no evidence as to what might be available by way of programmes and the like in an adult gaol, the evidence shows that both AD and AG have responded well to courses and programmes available to them in “detention centres” and, based on my knowledge of both systems of incarceration, I would find special circumstance on the basis of subpar (b) in the case of AD and subpars (a) and (b) in the case of AG. I am satisfied that AG’s psychological conditions means he is “vulnerable on account of illness”.
YA relied on subpar (c) by reference to the statement he made and provided to police. While that statement was not used in the case against the co-offenders, it implicated each of them and, before his trial was separated, it was to be tendered and would have become evidence against the others if (as was indicated) he gave evidence at the trial. Taking a flexible or liberal view of the provision, I find special circumstances in YA’s case under subpar (c).
I have not found “special circumstances” in any of the cases based on the youth of the offender alone: s 19(4A). AD has had real behavioural difficulties and has, more recently, showed promising signs as a result of the programmes available at Cobham YJC. AG has manifest and ongoing psychological issues that make him vulnerable and there is a real concern that transfer to an adult gaol might interrupt his extremely promising progress towards rehabilitation. YA has been subject to threats which were drawn to my attention by the Prosecutor the first time this case was mentioned and security issues were raised during the pre-trial phase. While there may be risks to YA whether he is in juvenile detention or an adult prison, experience suggests the risk is less if he serves his sentence as a “juvenile offender” for as long as possible.
Each of these three offenders will turn 21 in January and May next year and the direction under s 19 will not have a major impact on their experience of incarceration. Until then they should continue to serve their sentence as juvenile offenders. A submission that seemed to suggest that I should tailor the non-parole period of AG to ensure he could remain in juvenile detention until he was 21 years and 6 months and then be released was not really pressed. [17] The submission could not have been accepted, despite the compelling aspects of AG’s case and that, on any sensible view of the world, it may be better to leave AG where he is to continue his rehabilitation and to mentor younger offenders. However, the statute does not allow it unless the sentence imposed is manifestly below what the circumstances demand.
17. AG written submissions, paragraph 15.

Sentencing discounts

The Sentencing Act provides a prescriptive regime of sentencing discounts where an adult offender pleads, or offers to plead, guilty depending on the timing of the plea or the offer. The common law also requires the utilitarian value of a plea of guilty to be recognised by a meaningful reduction in a sentence imposed after a plea of guilty is entered. The relevant factors are the complexity and length of the trial and the timing of the plea. Based on those provisions, the parties agree:

Each of the offenders offered to plead guilty to manslaughter in the Local Court and each is entitled to a 25% sentencing discount for that offence.

AD and Mr Karise are each entitled to a similar (25%) discount from the sentence to be imposed for count 5 (that is, the wounding of EC with intent to cause grievous bodily harm).

YA offered to plead guilty to the two counts under s 33 of the Crimes Act less than two weeks before the re-scheduled trial date. The plea was very late but it saved about a month or so of court time. YA will receive, as his counsel submitted he should, a discount of 5% from the sentence to be imposed.

Commencement dates

Section 47 of the Sentencing Act provides for the commencement date of the sentences. Based on the amount of pre-sentence custody, the parties have agreed upon the commencement date in each instance. The basis of those dates, which I have not questioned, is set out in a “note” that was marked MFI 15 yesterday. The relevant dates are:

AD – 9 February 2022.

Mr Karise – 1 November 2022.

Mr Diallo – 8 November 2022.

AG – 19 February 2022.

YA – 17 October 2023.

Special circumstances under s 44 of the Sentencing Act

In each case I have considered whether to make an adjustment to the proportion of the non-parole period relative to the total aggregate sentence: Sentencing Act, s 44(2B). The question is whether there are “special circumstances” for the period of the sentence to be served after the expiration of the non-parole period to be more than one third of the non-parole period. In all but Mr Karise’s case, I have concluded that there are special circumstances under s 44, and some adjustment will be made to what is often referred to as the statutory ratio whereby the non-parole period is 75% of the total aggregate sentence. In each case, the extent of the adjustment is considered and designed to meet the demands of the case.
In reducing the non-parole periods below 75% of the aggregate sentence, I have kept in mind that, like the total sentence and the indicative sentences, the minimum period of actual gaol time to be served by the offender must reflect the objective gravity of the criminality. I am also conscious to avoid so called “double counting” although most matters are relevant to both components of the sentence while some will be entitled to greater weight in determining the non-parole period.

Statutory guideposts and comparable cases

I have earlier referred to both the maximum penalties which apply to all of the offenders, and the standard non-parole periods which apply to Mr Karise and Mr Diallo. Each represents an important statutory guidepost. The former must be kept in mind from beginning to end of the sentencing process although the maximum penalty itself is rarely imposed and is reserved for the worst cases and for offenders with little by way of mitigation. None of the offences and none of these offenders come close to fitting those descriptions. The High Court explained in Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 the way in which the standard non-parole period is to used in sentencing.
The parties provided me with various tables, statistics and summaries of past sentencing cases said to be comparable and I also reviewed tables that are available on the NSW Public Defenders’ web-site. Each of those resources was useful and I am grateful to counsel for their diligence. However, I must treat the survey of these cases with appropriate circumspection. Results in past cases provide a guide as to what has happened in other cases but they do not establish “a range” within which the sentences to be imposed on a particular offender, or group of offenders, must fall. The observations of Simpson J (as her Honour then was) in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 are important and have been endorsed by the High Court: [18]

“303 A history of sentencing can establish a range of sentences that have in fact been imposed. Such a history does not establish that that range is the correct range, nor that either the upper or the lower limit is the correct upper and lower limit. Sentencing patterns are, of course, of considerable significance in that they result from the application of the accumulated experience and wisdom of first instance judges and of appellate courts.

304 But it would be a mistake to regard an established range as fixing the boundaries within which future judges must, or even ought, to sentence. To take that attitude would be, de facto, to substitute judicial selection of sentences in individual cases for the boundaries of sentencing for a particular offence laid down by Parliament. In this case, that range is from 0 to 25 years. Of course, it is well established that the maximum sentence is reserved for the most serious cases. It is equally well established that it would be an extraordinary proposition that a person convicted of an offence of importing prohibited drugs would escape any custodial penalty. The point I am making is that the ranges of sentences actually imposed, while illuminating, are no more than historical statements of what has happened in the past. They can, and should, provide guidance to sentencing judges, and to appellate courts, and stand as a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence. But it is only by examination of the whole of the circumstances that have given rise to the sentence that ‘unifying principles’ may be discerned: Wong and Leung, at [59].
305 In the end, the sentencing discretion is individual: it must be exercised by the individual judge, in respect of the individual offender.”
18. See Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [54] and Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2 at [41].

None of the cases I have surveyed has the same combination of objective circumstances and subjective features that exist in the present case. This case has some unusual features that distinguish it from many of the cases I have considered and make it difficult to slip into some supposed “pattern”. Even so, consistency in sentencing is important and I have ensured, having intuitively arrived at certain numbers, to review those numbers in the light of the survey I have undertaken.
There are few, if any, cases where a group of offenders has been sentenced for a manslaughter offence and an attempted murder offence which occurred during the same incident. Further, while certainly not unique, this case involves three offenders who were under 18 at the time of the offences and two who were not much older than that. AG, YA and Mr Diallo have presented, in different ways, subjective cases of a quite compelling nature. In considering other cases of attempted murder, I have kept in mind that three of the four offenders here are being sentenced on the basis of Mr Karise’s acts and mental state which went well beyond the scope of the criminal enterprise in which they participated although each contemplated the possibility that one of the group would commit this offence. Another unusual feature of the present case concerns the conduct of the other group. By the time of Mr Karise’s stabbing of EO and the stabbing of EC, the other group had the upper hand in the violent melee and AD was crying out for help and under serious attack. The telephone videos of Mr Komei and EO himself provided cogent evidence of the extent of the aggression then being exhibited by the young men who emerged from Mr Coleman’s home. None of that is to forget that it was this group of five offenders who initiated this entire incident by attending at somebody’s home, armed with knives, and goading Oliver to come outside.
I have found the cases of R v Amati [2019] NSWCCA 193; (2019) 279 A Crim R 73, R v Da-Pra; Da-Pra v R [2014] NSWCCA 211 and Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3 to be of assistance in considering the appropriate indicative sentences for the attempted murder sentence, not so much for the raw numbers in cases where the facts were manifestly different to the present, but for the analyses of sentencing patterns for offences under s 27. In terms of outcomes in individual sentencing decisions, I considered cases such as R v Thew (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 25 August 1998, unrep), R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 173, R v Doan [2003] NSWSC 345, R v Zegura [2006] NSWCCA 230, Shine v R [2016] NSWCCA 149; (2016) 260 A Crim R 534 and Hitchcock v R [2016] NSWCCA 226. However, there really are very few truly comparable factual circumstances particularly in relation to the offenders whose liability arose by way of extended joint criminal enterprise.
In terms of the statistics, there are only 20 cases relating to attempted murder on the data base. When one narrows that down to offenders aged between 14 and 20, there are only two cases and both offenders received a sentence of 6 years. Statistics based on such a limited sample size adds very little to an understanding of sentencing patterns for wounding with intent to murder, although it confirms that the lowest sentences tend to be imposed on the youngest offenders.
As to the manslaughter offences, the following cases have some similarities to the present: R v Jay William Cook [2012] NSWSC 480, R v Smith [2012] NSWSC 38, and, relatively recently, R v Stanley (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 74, R v Borja [2024] NSWSC 44, R v MR; JB and CS (young persons)(No 5) [2024] NSWSC 912 and R v JM (sentence) [2024] NSWSC 1345. Most cases where self-defence was an issue, the sentence was on the basis of liability via excessive self-defence rather than unlawful and dangerous act. In other words, the offender had formed a murderous intention.
There are about 140 cases on the statistical data base but the spread of sentences (from bonds in two cases to gaol terms of 2 to 18 years) reflects the incredibly diverse range of cases that are caught by s 24 of the Crimes Act.

Indicative sentences

I will now inform the offenders and those present or listening online of the aggregate sentences that will be imposed after nominating the indicative sentences on each count. In the case of the adult offenders, I will also indicate the putative non-parole periods in accordance with s 54B(4) of the Sentencing Act. I will then formally impose the sentences on each offender.

In the case of AD, following the application of a 25% sentencing discount for counts 1 and 5, I indicate the following sentences for the purpose of s 53A(2)(b):

Count 1 – 6 years.

Count 2 – 5 years.

Count 5 – 3 years.

There will be an aggregate sentence of 8 years with a non-parole period of 5 years. I have found special circumstances based on AD’s youth, recent improvements in his response to counselling and the like, but mainly to ensure he has a lengthy period of supervised parole on release.

Panashe Karise

In Mr Karise’s case, following the application of the 25% discount for counts 1 and 5, the indicative sentences are:

Count 1 – 4½ years.

Count 2 – 8 years with a non-parole period of 6 years.

Count 5 – 3 years and 9 months with a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months.

There will be an aggregate sentence of 10 years with a non-parole period of 7½ years. I have not found special circumstances in Mr Karise’s case.

Ibrahima Diallo

In Mr Diallo’s case, following application of the 25% discount on count 1, the indicative sentences are:

Count 1 – 3 years and 9 months.

Count 2 – 6 years with a non-parole period of 3 years and 9 months.

Count 5 – 3 years with a non-parole period of 2 years.

There will be an aggregate sentence of 7½ years with a non-parole period of 5 years. I have found special circumstances based on Mr Diallo’s progress to this point, his psychological needs arising out a childhood of dysfunction and deprivation, and the desirability of him having assistance when he is released to parole to foster his ongoing rehabilitation. The adjustment to the non-parole period is relatively small and the 2 years and 6 months he will have on parole should be sufficient to foster his re-integration into the community.

In AG’s case, following the application of the 25% discount on count 1, the indicative sentences are:

Count 1 – 3 years.

Count 2 – 4½ years.

Count 3 – 2 years.

There will be an aggregate sentence of 6½ years with a non-parole period of 4 years. I have found special circumstances based on the desirability for AG to continue his excellent progress towards rehabilitation. I record that my intention is to impose the most lenient sentence that I could, consistent with the need not to infringe the other purposes of punishment and the need to impose a sentence and minimum period of incarceration which are proportionate to the gravity of the offending.

In YA’s case, following the application of the 25% discount on count 1 and the 5% discounts on counts 2 and 3, the indicative sentences are:

Count 1 – 3 years and 9 months.

Count 2 – 4 years and 9 months.

Count 3 – 2 years and 4 months.

The aggregate sentence will be 6 years and 9 months with a non-parole period of 4 year and 3 months. Again, there is a relatively small adjustment for special circumstances. The finding is based on YA’s progress towards rehabilitation, the possibility his time in custody will be more onerous and the desirability that he have assistance on re-entering the community.

Expression of gratitude to the lawyers

This case has occupied a great deal of court time and has been litigated by the parties seriously and with diligence. I have received great assistance from counsel and I have observed from a little distance the work of their instructing solicitors. It would be remiss of me to not express my sincere gratitude for the assistance I have received from all solicitors and barristers involved in the case from the first mention back in May until yesterday’s final skirmishes.

Formal orders and directions

I now turn formally to impose sentence on each of the offenders.
I am required to advise each one of you that the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) applies to you and to the crimes for which you are about to be sentenced. This means at the end of your sentence or parole period you may be subject to orders for continuing detention or extended supervision. I direct your legal representatives to explain the possible implications of that Act to you.
AD, for the unlawful killing of Oliver Coleman, the attempted murder of EO and the wounding of EC with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on 1 September 2021, you are convicted and sentenced as follows:

You are sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 years commencing on 9 February 2022 and expiring on 8 February 2030.

There will be a single non-parole period of 5 years commencing on 9 February 2022 and expiring on 8 February 2027.

Pursuant to ss 19(1) and 19(4) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), I direct that the sentence be served as a juvenile offender up until the offender attains the age of 21.

The offences listed on the certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), sequence numbers H86926262/4, H86926262/5, H86926262/6, H86926262/7, H86926262/8 are withdrawn and dismissed.

Panashe Karise, for the unlawful killing of Oliver Coleman, the attempted murder of EO and the wounding of EC with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on 1 September 2021, you are convicted and sentenced as follows:

You are sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 10 years commencing on 1 November 2022 and expiring on 31 October 2032.

There will be a single non-parole period of 7½ years commencing on 1 November 2022 and expiring on 30 April 2030.

The offences listed on the certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), sequence numbers H87948308/4, H87948308/5, H87948308/6, H82751236/1 and H82751236/2 are withdrawn and dismissed.

Panashe Karise, for the four related traffic offences on 1 September 2021, you are convicted and sentenced as follows:

For not disclosing the identity of a driver/passenger, you are convicted with no other penalty under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

For driving a motor vehicle while your licence was suspended, you are convicted with no other penalty under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW). You are also disqualified from driving for a period of 12 months from the date you are admitted to parole or, if not so admitted, from the date of your release from custody.

For using an unregistered registrable Class A motor vehicle on the road, you are convicted with no other penalty under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

For using an uninsured motor vehicle, you are convicted with no other penalty under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW).

Ibrahima Diallo, for the unlawful killing of Oliver Coleman, the attempted murder of EO and the wounding of EC with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on 1 September 2021, you are convicted and sentenced as follows:

You are sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 7½ years commencing on 8 November 2022 and expiring on 7 May 2030.

There will be a single non-parole period of 5 years commencing on 8 November 2022 and expiring on 7 November 2027.

The offences listed on the certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), sequence numbers H336914796/4, H336914796/5, H336914796/6, H336914796/7 and H336914796/8 are withdrawn and dismissed.

AG, for the unlawful killing of Oliver Coleman, the attempted murder of EO and the wounding of EC with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on 1 September 2021, you are convicted and sentenced as follows:

You are sentenced to an aggregate sentence 6½ years commencing on 19 February 2022 and expiring on 18 August 2028.

There will be a single non-parole period of 4 years commencing on 19 February 2022 and expiring on 18 February 2026.

Pursuant to ss 19(1) and 19(4) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) I direct that you are to remain in a juvenile detention institution until the age of 21.

The offences listed on the certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), sequence numbers H86258344/4, H86258344/5, H86258344/6, H86258344/7 and H86258344/8 are withdrawn and dismissed.

YA, for the unlawful killing of Oliver Coleman, the wounding of EO with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and the wounding of EC with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on 1 September 2021, you are convicted and sentenced as follows:

You are sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 6 years and 9 months commencing on 17 October 2023 and expiring on 16 July 2030.

There will be a single non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months commencing on 17 October 2023 and expiring on 16 January 2028.

Pursuant to ss 19(1) and 19(4) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) I direct that you are to remain in a juvenile detention institution until the age of 21.

The offences listed on the certificate under s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), sequence numbers H86416032/4, H86416032/5, H86416032/6, H86416032/7 and H86416032/8 are withdrawn and dismissed.

**********

Endnotes

Decision last updated: 20 December 2024

Medium Neutral Citation:	R v Diallo & Ors (No 17) (Sentence) [2024] NSWSC 1650
Hearing dates:	29 November, 11 and 19 December 2024
Date of orders:	20 December 2024
Decision date:	20 December 2024
Jurisdiction:	Common Law
Before:	Hamill J
Decision:	(1) AD is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 8 years with a single non-parole period of 5 years. (2) Panashe Karise is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 10 years with a single non-parole period of 7½ years. (3) Panashe Karise is convicted with no further penalty of four traffic offences. The automatic licence disqualification for 12 months applies. (4) Ibrahima Diallo is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 7½ years with a single non-parole period of 5 years. (5) AG is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 6½ years with a single non-parole period of 4 years. (6) YA is sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 6 years and 9 months with a single non-parole period of 4 years and 3 months. (7) Pursuant to ss 19(1) and 19(4) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), the sentences of AD, AG and YA are to be served as juvenile offenders up until the offenders attain the age of 21.
Catchwords:	CRIMINAL LAW – sentencing – offences of violence – violent melee in a suburban street – six people stabbed – one child killed – manslaughter – attempted murder – wound with intent – animosity between groups of young men – an art form known as drill rap music – where offenders’ group initiated violence by attending with knives – where victims’ group emerged from house and attacked – zombie knife and golf clubs – where jury rejects proposition that joint criminal enterprise abandoned – dispute over content of joint criminal enterprise – relevance of self-defence – fact finding on sentence – finding that subjective component established but objective component rejected – relevance of extent to which conduct exceeded what was reasonable – different findings in relation to each offence – devastating impact on victims – eloquent and moving victim impact statement – subjective circumstances of offenders – requirement for stern punishment – balancing competing considerations – a place for leniency – assessment of moral culpability – different findings in each case – where one offender contended subjective factors fed into assessment of moral culpability – application of cases – submission rejected – parity and proportionality in sentencing co-offenders – different considerations – varying assessment of objective criminality – individualised justice – application for direction that three offenders serve sentences as juvenile offenders – Prosecutor chooses to oppose – direction made – special circumstances
Legislation Cited:	Bail Act 2013 (NSW), s 22B Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW), ss 3, 19, 19(1), 19(2), 19(3), 19(4), 25 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 24, 27, 33, 33(1)(a) Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), ss 3A, 21A(2)(i), 21A(3), 44, 44(2B), 47, 53A, 54D, 54D(3) Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 166 Jury Act 1977 (NSW), ss 53C, 55G
Cases Cited:	Barbaro v The Queen; Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58; [2014] HCA 2 BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 159; (2010) 201 A Crim R 379 Britton v R [2024] NSWCCA 138 Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37 Camilleri v R [2023] NSWCCA 106 Carr v R [2024] NSWCCA 103 Devaney v R [2012] NSWCCA 285 Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156 Ghamraoui v R [2009] NSWCCA 111 Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 462; [2011] HCA 49 Hili v The Queen; Jones v The Queen (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 JM v R [2014] NSWCCA 297; (2014) 246 A Crim R 528 Lloyd v R [2022] NSWCCA 18 Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606; [1984] HCA 46 Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 Newburn v R [2022] NSWCCA 139 PG v R [2017] NSWCCA 179; (2017) 268 A Crim R 61 Postiglione v The Queen (1997) 189 CLR 295; [1997] HCA 26 R v Amati [2019] NSWCCA 193; (2019) 279 A Crim R 73 R v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337 R v Borja [2024] NSWSC 44 R v Butler [2024] NSWCCA 133 R v Da-Pra; Da-Pra v R [2014] NSWCCA 211 R v Diallo & Ors (No 1) [2024] NSWSC 852 R v Diallo & Ors (No 14) [2024] NSWSC 1101 R v Diallo & Ors (No 15) [2024] NSWSC 1114 R v Diallo & Ors (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 853 R v Diallo & Ors (No 3) [2024] NSWSC 877 R v Diallo & Ors (No 4) [2024] NSWSC 882 R v Diallo & Ors (No 5) [2024] NSWSC 914 R v Diallo & Ors (No 6) [2024] NSWSC 917 R v Diallo & Ors (No 7) [2024] NSWSC 978 R v Diallo & Ors (No 9) [2024] NSWSC 1084 R v Doan [2003] NSWSC 345 R v Donald William Reeves [2017] NSWSC 813 R v Eaton [2023] NSWCCA 125 R v James Henry Sargeant (1974) 60 Cr App R 74 R v Jay William Cook [2012] NSWSC 480 R v JM (sentence) [2024] NSWSC 1345 R v Lattouf (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 12 December 1996, unrep) R v MAK; R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381; (2006) 167 A Crim R 159 R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2 R v MR; JB and CS (young persons)(No 5) [2024] NSWSC 912 R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 173 R v Quinlin [2021] NSWCCA 284; (2021) 293 A Crim R 253 R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353 R v Smith [2012] NSWSC 38 R v Stanley (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 74 R v Thew (Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW), 25 August 1998, unrep) R v YA [2024] NSWSC 1445 R v Zegura [2006] NSWCCA 230 Shine v R [2016] NSWCCA 149; (2016) 260 A Crim R 534 Smith v R [2015] NSWCCA 193 Tepania v R [2018] NSWCCA 247; (2018) 275 A Crim R 233 The Queen v Osenkowksi (1982) 30 SASR 212; (1982) 5 A Crim R 394 TM v R [2023] NSWCCA 185 Vaughan v R [2020] NSWCCA 3
Texts Cited:	N/A
Category:	Principal judgment
Parties:	Rex (Prosecution) Ibrahima Diallo (Defendant) AG (Defendant) YA (Defendant) AD (Defendant) Panashe Morgan Ryan Karise (Defendant)
Representation:	Counsel: E Balodis (Rex) R Wilson SC (Diallo) M Avenell SC (AG) W Terracini SC KC and P Kondich (YA) B Robinson (AD) M Smith (Karise) Solicitors: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Rex) Crimcorp Defence Lawyers (Diallo) Sydney Criminal Law Specialists (AG) King & York Lawyers (YA) Wiltshire & Wroughton Legal (AD) McGirr & Associates (Karise)
File Number(s):	2022/00052005; 2022/00051961; 2022/00052010; 2022/00052239; 2022/00091174
Publication restriction:	Statutory prohibition on the publication of the names of the juvenile accused and any material that might identify them. See s 15A Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW).