Degning v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Degning v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1152

File number: NSD 613 of 2018
Judge: ROBERTSON  J
Date of judgment: 7 August 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of Minister’s decision to cancel applicant’s visa on character grounds under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether denial of procedural fairness in relation to illegibility of copies of incoming passenger cards or the use to which the Minister may put the content of those cards in finding that the applicant’s failure to declare his criminal convictions on those cards was indicative of a further disregard for the law – whether legal unreasonableness in Minister concluding there was a risk that the applicant would offend again in a similar way or by imposing a risk threshold that was outside the range reasonably permitted by the statutory discretion – whether denial of procedural fairness in not contacting the applicant’s grandchildren and inviting them to comment on the proposed decision
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501(2)
Cases cited:

Botany Bay City Council v Minister of Transport and Regional Development [1996] FCA 394; 66 FCR 537

City of Botany Bay Council v Minister of State for Transport and Regional Development (1996) 45 ALD 125

Comcare v Post Logistics Australasia Pty Ltd [2012] FCAFC 168; 207 FCR 178

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; 49 FCR 576

Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; 221 CLR 99

Maxwell v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 47; 249 FCR 275

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj [2002] HCA 11; 209 CLR 597

Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; 255 FCR 81

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; 214 CLR 1

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

Date of hearing: 3 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 103
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Knowles
Solicitor for the Applicant: SBA Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr A Markus of the Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 613 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DAVID DEGNING

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON  J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Time is extended to the applicant to lodge an application for review so as to permit the filing of the application on 20 April 2018.

2.To the extent necessary, leave is granted to the applicant to rely on his amended application for review dated 1 June 2018.

3.The application as amended is dismissed.

4.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Degning v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant, Mr Degning, sought a judicial review of the Minister for Home Affairs' decision to cancel his visa on character grounds under section 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court was required to determine whether there was a denial of procedural fairness in relation to illegibility of copies of incoming passenger cards, the use to which the Minister may put the content of those cards, and the Minister's conclusion that there was a risk that Mr Degning would offend again in a similar way. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Minister's risk threshold was outside the range reasonably permitted by the statutory discretion, and if there was a denial of procedural fairness in not contacting Mr Degning's grandchildren and inviting them to comment on the proposed decision.

The court held that the Minister's decision was lawful and the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness and legal unreasonableness were without merit. The court found that the illegibility of the copies of incoming passenger cards did not affect the fairness of the decision-making process, as the Minister was entitled to rely on the content of those cards in making his decision. Furthermore, the court held that the Minister's conclusion that there was a risk that Mr Degning would offend again in a similar way was not legally unreasonable, as it was based on the applicant's lengthy criminal history. The court also found that the Minister's risk threshold was within the range reasonably permitted by the statutory discretion. Lastly, the court held that there was no procedural unfairness in not contacting Mr Degning's grandchildren, as there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant was responsible for the day-to-day care of his grandchildren.

The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs, as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Time is extended to the applicant to lodge an application for review so as to permit the filing of the application on 20 April 2018.

2. To the extent necessary, leave is granted to the applicant to rely on his amended application for review dated 1 June 2018.

3. The application as amended is dismissed.

4. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is worth repeating that on judicial review, it is for the Court to examine the lawfulness of the decision, including matters of procedural fairness, but not the merits of the decision.Procedural background Before the Minister made his decision, by letter dated 29 December 2016 Mr Degning was sent a “Notice of intention to consider cancellation of your visa under s501(2) of the Migration Act 1958”. That letter stated that the Department of Immigration and Border Protection held information about Mr Degning’s criminal history “listed at the end of this notice,” which indicated that he had a substantial criminal record within the meaning of s 501(7) of the Migration Act and that as a result he did not pass the character test by virtue of s 501(6)(a) of the Migration Act. Immediately above the list of enclosed documents was the following:The following documents are also enclosed. The documents consist of information that is held by the department, which the decision-maker may rely on to decide whether you pass the character test; and if not, whether your visa should be cancelled. The letter provided Mr Degning an opportunity to comment or provide information on whether he passed the character test and, should the decision-maker reasonably suspect that he did not, on whether the decision-maker should exercise his or her discretion to cancel Mr Degning’s visa.The Minister’s decision As I have already noted, the Minister said that he reasonably suspected that Mr Degning did not pass the character test and Mr Degning had not satisfied the Minister that he passed the character test. (That Mr Degning did not pass the character test was not in issue in this judicial review application.) The Minister said he had decided to exercise his discretion under s 501(2) of the Migration Act to cancel Mr Degning’s visa. The Minister gave reasons for his decision which I summarise as follows. On 24 July 2013, Mr Degning was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales of sexual intercourse – person with cognitive impairment and sentenced to 17 months imprisonment, suspended upon entering a bond for 17 months. The judge took into account an offence on a Form 1 to the effect that on the same day Mr Degning attempted sexual intercourse with a person who had a cognitive impairment. The Minister noted that, having considered the evidence before him, the judge had accepted that Mr Degning’s sexual offending was “towards the lower end of the criminality within the section.” However, the Minister concurred with the judge when he remarked that the offence is a “very serious offence” and determined that a term of imprisonment was the most appropriate. The Minister found that the sentence Mr Degning received on 24 July 2013 was a further indication of the seriousness of the offending. Dispositions involving incarceration of the offender were the last resort in the sentencing hierarchy and the Minister considered that the court viewed the offending as very serious, notwithstanding the suspended nature of the sentence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The letter provided Mr Degning an opportunity to comment or provide information on whether he passed the character test and, should the decision-maker reasonably suspect that he did not, on whether the decision-maker should exercise his or her discretion to cancel Mr Degning’s visa.The Minister’s decision As I have already noted, the Minister said that he reasonably suspected that Mr Degning did not pass the character test and Mr Degning had not satisfied the Minister that he passed the character test. (That Mr Degning did not pass the character test was not in issue in this judicial review application.) The Minister said he had decided to exercise his discretion under s 501(2) of the Migration Act to cancel Mr Degning’s visa. The Minister gave reasons for his decision which I summarise as follows. On 24 July 2013, Mr Degning was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales of sexual intercourse – person with cognitive impairment and sentenced to 17 months imprisonment, suspended upon entering a bond for 17 months. The judge took into account an offence on a Form 1 to the effect that on the same day Mr Degning attempted sexual intercourse with a person who had a cognitive impairment. The Minister noted that, having considered the evidence before him, the judge had accepted that Mr Degning’s sexual offending was “towards the lower end of the criminality within the section.” However, the Minister concurred with the judge when he remarked that the offence is a “very serious offence” and determined that a term of imprisonment was the most appropriate. The Minister found that the sentence Mr Degning received on 24 July 2013 was a further indication of the seriousness of the offending. Dispositions involving incarceration of the offender were the last resort in the sentencing hierarchy and the Minister considered that the court viewed the offending as very serious, notwithstanding the suspended nature of the sentence. The Minister found that Mr Degning had a lengthy criminal record in Australia. His most recent conviction was on 21 September 2015 for drink driving with a mid-range of prescribed concentration of alcohol. He was sentenced to seven months imprisonment suspended on entering a good behaviour bond for seven months, and a nine month licence disqualification. Mr Degning’s other convictions were prior to 2009 and dated back to 1977, and included offending relating to drugs, stealing, possession of stolen goods, drink driving, and assault. The penalties Mr Degning received varied from fines, licence disqualification, good behaviour bonds and terms of imprisonment of six months (1982) and nine months (1983). The Minister found that Mr Degning’s conviction for “sexual intercourse – person with cognitive impairment” was very serious. The Minister referred to the sentencing remarks of 24 July 2013. At [33] of his reasons, the Minister said:33. I note Mr DEGNING failed to declare his criminal convictions on his Incoming Passenger Cards dated 4 January 2004, 20 April 2004 and 02 March 2006, and I consider this indicative of a further disregard for the law.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Minister submitted, in the present case he accepted that the applicant’s three grandchildren would be adversely affected by a decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Minister gave that consideration “less weight” as there was “no evidence to suggest that [the applicant] is responsible for the day to day care of his grandchildren”. (In fact, there was evidence that the children resided with others.) There was, however, no basis to assert that the grandchildren suffered any practical injustice in the circumstances.Consideration The first matter to consider is the application for an extension of time. The applicant required an extension of time pursuant to s 477A(2) by reason of his failure to commence proceedings within the time prescribed under s 477A(1) of the Migration Act. The “date of the migration decision” was the date of the written notice of the decision, which was 25 January 2018. The last day an application could be made under s 477A(1) was therefore 35 days after 25 January 2018. The proceedings were commenced on 19 April 2018. The application was supported by an affidavit of Ms Elizabeth Steer, affirmed on 19 April 2018 and of the applicant, affirmed 26 June 2018. Ms Steer deposed that the reasons for the applicant’s delay in commencing these proceedings were that:a.The Applicant was notified of the Migration Decision on 25 January 2018. He was detained on that day, and has remained in immigration detention since. This has caused some delays in the Applicant obtaining documents and providing instructions.b.The Applicant’s previous solicitors did not lodge an appeal or application for the Applicant.c.On or about 15 March 2018 the Applicant approached Mr Blanks for advice in relation to this matter.d.Mr Blanks obtained the Applicant’s file from the Applicant’s previous solicitors on 27 March 2018.e. The Applicant's file involves complex questions of fact and law that required detailed analysis before this application could be finalised.f. The Applicant is in immigration detention at Villawood and has been notified by his case officer that he is on the removal pathway. In his affidavit, the applicant gave more detailed evidence to support some of these propositions, in particular his attempts, with the assistance of his daughters, to get legal advice and to file an application in this Court. The Minister did not oppose the extension of time application. In order to grant an application under s 477A(2), the Court needs to be satisfied that “it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice” to make the order extending time: s 477A(2)(b). I am so satisfied. In my opinion, the length of delay is modest given the applicant’s circumstances and the applicant has provided an explanation for the delay. The respondent Minister points to no prejudice, consistently with not opposing the extension of time application. Similarly, the application, assessed on a reasonably impressionistic basis, is arguable. I grant an extension of time to the applicant to lodge an application for review so as to permit the filing of the application on 19 April 2018.