Daniels v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation
[2007] SASC 114
•3 April 2007
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Applications Under Various Acts or Rules: Application)
DANIELS v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
[2007] SASC 114
Judgment of The Honourable Justice David
3 April 2007
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - HEARING OF APPEAL - PROCEDURE
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - AS OF RIGHT
PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Interlocutory application to summarily dismiss appeal - appeal as of right - consideration of procedure and powers under r 280, r 281 and r 290 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA).
TAXES AND DUTIES - INCOME TAX AND RELATED LEGISLATION - COLLECTION AND RECOVERY OF TAX - PROCEEDINGS FOR RECOVERY
TAXES AND DUTIES - INCOME TAX AND RELATED LEGISLATION - OBJECTIONS AND APPEALS - IN GENERAL
Appeal against judgment - objection to paying taxation debt - judgment in favour of applicant (Deputy Commissioner of Taxation) - whether any basis for appeal - appeal dismissed.
Act of Settlement 1701 (Imp); Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39(2); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 280, r 281, r 290(1)(h), r 290(3); Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) sch 1 s 255-5, s 260-5, referred to.
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Levick [1999] FCA 1580; (1999) 43 ATR 621; Dooney v Henry [2000] HCA 44; (2000) 74 ALJR 1289; Halliday v Commonwealth of Australia [2000] FCA 950; (2000) 45 ATR 458; Levick v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 674; (2000) 102 FCR 155; Miller v Chapman [2001] FCA 105; (2001) 46 ATR 317; Re Stubberfield's Application (1996) 70 ALJR 646, applied.
DANIELS v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
[2007] SASC 114Civil
DAVID J. This is an interlocutory application to summarily dismiss an appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court against a decision of a judge of the District Court on the basis that the appeal cannot succeed.
The application is brought by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. For the purposes of my judgment, I will refer to that party as the ‘applicant’ and to Mr Graham Daniels as the ‘respondent’, although that does not reflect the position of the parties throughout the history of these proceedings.
History of Proceedings
Background to Proceedings
Between September and November 2000, the respondent informed himself that a percentage of taxation monies collected by the Australian Taxation Office (‘the ATO’), 0.5117 per cent on the respondent’s submissions, is disbursed to Medicare for costs associated with abortion, for want of a better term, an ‘abortion levy’.
The respondent, self-described as ‘a Bible believing Christian and a fourth generation Australian’, submitted being ‘aggrieved’ to discover such a percentage of his taxation contribution was used to, as he describes, ‘fund the slaughter of unborn babies’.
By letter dated 14 March 2001, the respondent contacted the ATO for the purpose of suggesting methods by which he could either make his tax payments in such a way that the abortion levy would not be disbursed to Medicare, or reduce his taxation liability by the amount of the abortion levy (0.5117 per cent).
In May and November 2001, the respondent made payments to the ATO in respect of his tax liabilities, less the total sum of $10.33 to discount the abortion levy. The respondent understood the ATO to have agreed to his deduction as a result of his stipulations in correspondence accompanying his payments to the effect that, should the ATO cash his cheques, the ATO will have agreed to receive the 0.5117 per cent reduced payments in full and final satisfaction of the respondent’s taxation debt. By letter dated 11 February 2002, the ATO informed the respondent this was not the case and the respondent was liable for unpaid taxation liabilities in the amount of $414.26, comprising General Interest Charge.
Following further correspondence between the respondent and the ATO, the respondent took the view that the matter should be taken to the High Court of Australia. The respondent therefore withheld all income tax payments in order to, he submits, ‘force [the ATO] into either honouring their agreement or to enter the court room’.
In June 2005, the applicant instigated proceedings against the respondent in the District Court of South Australia.
Proceedings before Master Bampton (First Instance)
On 2 June 2005, the applicant commenced proceedings in the District Court against the respondent for:
9.1an outstanding income tax debt;
9.2a running balance account deficit debt (RBA deficit debt); and
9.3general interest charge.
On 13 July 2005, the respondent filed a defence and counterclaim. The defence addressed a number of issues, however, its general thrust was that:
10.1financially contributing to abortion was contrary to Christianity, hence the respondent should be afforded the protection provided by s 116 of the Australian Constitution; and
10.2the applicant had breached agreements (contracts) with the respondent to accept taxation payments, less 0.5117 per cent of the total amount claimed, in full and final satisfaction of the respondent’s taxation liability.
The counterclaim was made on the basis that the applicant had disclosed, by letter dated 6 August 2003, personal information relating to the respondent to an ‘unrelated’ third party (a bank at which the respondent did not have an account) in breach of the ATO’s privacy policy and the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and, in and by virtue of the same letter, defamed the respondent.
On 13 September 2005, the applicant filed an application for specific directions seeking:
11.1the respondent’s defence and counterclaim be struck out pursuant to r 46.18 of the District Court Rules 1992 (SA) as no reasonable defence or cause of action is disclosed and the pleadings are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process;
11.2summary judgment pursuant to r 25.03 of the District Court Rules 1992 (SA); and
11.3indemnity costs or, in the alternative, solicitor-client costs.
The application was to be heard by Master Bampton on 20 October 2005.
Respondent’s High Court Application
12.1 On 18 October 2005, the respondent notified the District Court of his application to the High Court of Australia seeking to remove the proceedings before the District Court pursuant to s 40 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
12.2 On 20 October 2005, when the application for specific directions came on for argument before Master Bampton, the respondent made oral application for a stay of proceedings pending the High Court’s determination of his application for removal. The applicant opposed a stay.
12.3 Master Bampton adjourned argument to allow the respondent to provide written submissions in support of his oral application for a stay. The respondent filed an application for a stay of proceedings on 9 November 2005 and an affirmation in support dated 8 November 2005.
Respondent’s Failure to Pay Filing Fee
13.1 On 20 October 2005, the respondent’s filing fee ($518.00) in respect of his counterclaim remained outstanding. By letter dated 1 August 2005, the Registrar had previously informed the respondent of the consequences of failing to pay the fee. Master Bampton also impressed upon the respondent the need to pay the filing fee. The respondent indicated his intention to make application to have the filing fee waived on the basis of the Magna Carta. Master Bampton ordered the respondent to file and serve such application by 10 November 2005.
13.2 On 9 November 2005, the respondent duly filed the application for waiver of the filing fee; on 10 November 2005, the applicant filed submissions that the application was without merit.
13.3 On 7 December 2005, Master Bampton deferred ruling on the respondent’s application for a stay and ordered the respondent to advise the court of the status of his application to the High Court by 31 January 2006. Master Bampton refused the respondent’s application for waiver of the filing fee; noting however that the respondent paid the counterclaim filing fee on 9 November 2005.
On 31 March 2006, having regard to documentation indicating it would be a considerable time before the High Court advised the respondent of its determination regarding his application for removal and also having regard to the grounds and authorities on which the respondent applied for removal, Master Bampton refused the respondent’s application for a stay and ordered the application for specific directions proceed to argument on 18 May 2006.
On 6 October 2006, Master Bampton entered judgment for the applicant in the sum of $89,229.61 plus further general interest charged calculated as per the statutory rate set out in the applicant’s statement of claim. In so ruling, Master Bampton noted the respondent was self represented, however, Her Honour held:
the arguments put forward by the [respondent] are difficult to distil and comprehend. They do not disclose a defence or reasonable cause of action. The defence and counterclaim clearly do not comply with the rules as to pleadings and amount to an abuse of the process of the Court;[1]
The [respondent’s] defence and counterclaim are unclear, confused and demonstrate a misunderstanding of Australian constitutional law and the operation of Australian statutes;[2]
references in the defence to international treaties, international documents, religious documents and biblical references do not respond to the allegations of a taxation debt in the statement of claim and are irrelevant;[3]
The [respondent’s] arguments about the Australian Taxation Office and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation not being legal entities and having no legal standing to bring the proceedings or collect taxes are nonsensical and without merit;[4]
the issuing of the notice the subject of the alleged defamation was a valid exercise of a statutory power and cannot found a claim in defamation;[5]
none of the grounds of the defence or counterclaim have any prospect of success.[6]
[1] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Daniels [2006] SADC 29 (Unreported, Master Bampton, 6 October 2006) [8].
[2] Ibid [7].
[3] Ibid [10].
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid [11].
[6] Ibid [12].
Master Bampton ordered the respondent pay the applicant’s costs on a party/party basis, to be agreed or taxed.[7]
[7] Ibid 3.
Proceedings before Judge Kelly (Second Instance)
On 19 October 2006, the respondent appealed to a single judge of the District Court against the orders of Master Bampton.[8]
[8] District Court Act 1992 (SA) ss 43(2)(a), 44(1); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) rr 280(1)(b), 280(1)(c).
The respondent appealed on 37 grounds, the majority of which are substantially similar to the respondent’s grounds of appeal in the present appeal.
On 15 December 2006, following the applicant filing its response, Judge Kelly delivered judgment in the appeal. Judge Kelly generally observed that most of the grounds of appeal were ‘misconceived’;[9] in particular Her Honour held:
the learned Master did have jurisdiction to strike out the defence and counterclaim and enter judgment as she did for the [applicant];[10]
there was no error in Master Bampton proceeding to hear and determine the application for summary judgment prior to the removal of the [respondent’s] application that the whole action be removed to the High Court;[11]
none of the arguments which were put forward by the [respondent] here or in the proceedings below appear to involve matters which do arise under the Constitution or which would require the High Court to determine a point of interpretation;[12]
a correct use of a statutory power cannot found a claim in defamation … and it could not … amount to a breach of the Crimes Act or any other Act;[13]
the issue of that notice was … done in the proper exercise of statutory powers and as such could never amount to a contravention of any relevant section of the Privacy Act.[14]
[9] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Daniels (Unreported, SADC, Judge Kelly, 6 December 2006) 1.
[10] Ibid 2.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid 3.
[13] Ibid 3-4.
[14] Ibid 4.
Judge Kelly accordingly dismissed the appeal in its entirety, ordering the costs of the appeal to be the applicant’s in any event.
The Present Appeal – Application for Summary Dismissal
The Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA)
On 20 December 2006, the respondent appealed to this Court against the orders of Judge Kelly. The respondent was subsequently, erroneously, informed that he would require leave to appeal from a single judge of this Court. Consequently the respondent filed an amended notice of appeal on 11 January 2007 in which he requested leave to appeal. This was not necessary because, his appeal from the decision of Judge Kelly being lodged on 20 December 2006, the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (‘the 2006 Rules’) apply.[15]
[15] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) rr 2, 6, 7, 8.
Pursuant to rr 280 and 281 of the 2006 Rules, the relevant provisions of which I set out below, the respondent is not required to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, nor is his appeal to be heard by a single judge of this Court.
280—Forum for hearing appellate proceedings
(1) Subject to any statute or rule to the contrary—
(a)[…]
(b)an appellate proceeding arising from a judgment of a court or tribunal constituted of a judicial officer who has, by statute, the status of judge is to be heard and determined by the Full Court
281—Appeals requiring permission
(1) Subject to any statutory provision to the contrary, an appeal to the Court lies by permission of the Court if—
(a)the judgment subject to the appeal is—
(i)an interlocutory judgment of the Court given by a Judge; or
(ii)a judgment given on appeal from an interlocutory judgment; or
(b)the appeal is limited to a question about costs
The judgment entered for the applicant by Master Bampton on 6 October 2006, being judgment for a monetary sum plus interest and costs, was a final judgment. The appeal to Judge Kelly was from a final judgment and therefore the judgment of Judge Kelly was also final in character. Pursuant to r 281 of the 2006 Rules, the respondent does not require permission to appeal to this Court as the judgment of Judge Kelly was not ‘given on appeal from an interlocutory judgment,[16] nor is the appeal ‘limited to a question about costs’.[17] Pursuant to r 280(1)(b) of the 2006 Rules, the respondent is entitled, as of right, to have this appeal heard and determined by the Full Court of the Supreme Court. I note the applicant concedes these points, and I was assisted by counsel’s submissions in respect of the 2006 Rules.
[16] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 281(a)(ii).
[17] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 281(b).
Rule 280(1)(b) of the 2006 Rules, and therefore the respondent’s right to appeal directly to the Full Court, is however ‘subject to any statute or rule to the contrary’.[18] The application presently before me is made pursuant to rr 131 and 290(1)(h) of the 2006 Rules. Rule 131 concerns the procedure to be followed in respect of interlocutory applications. Rule 290 provides:
[18] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 280(1).
290—Powers of Court incidental to appeal or application for permission to appeal
(1) The Court may exercise any of the following powers in relation to an appeal or an application for permission to appeal—
(a)…
(h)the Court may summarily dismiss the appeal if it is obvious that it cannot succeed.
(2) …
(3) The powers conferred by this rule may be exercised on the hearing of the appeal or application or in interlocutory proceedings before a single Judge or a Master.
The applicant applies to have the appeal summarily dismissed on the basis that ‘it is obvious that [the appeal] cannot succeed’.[19] Pursuant to r 290(3) of the 2006 Rules, to which r 280(1)(b) is subject by virtue of r 280(1), it is open to this Court, constituted by a judge sitting alone, to exercise the power conferred by r 290(1)(h) in the present, interlocutory proceeding.[20] The onus is on the applicant to show that it is obvious the appeal cannot succeed. Given the respondent appeals on 62 grounds, it is pertinent to note that if the applicant fails to show that all or any of the grounds of appeal cannot succeed, such that it is not obvious that one or more particular grounds of appeal cannot succeed, an appeal in respect of those particular grounds is to be heard by the Full Court,[21] notwithstanding the summary dismissal of any other grounds of appeal. Again, I note the applicant’s concession of and accedence to these points.
[19] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 290(1)(h).
[20] As to the meaning of interlocutory proceeding, see, Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 4.
[21] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 280(1)(b).
The Grounds of Appeal
As indicated, the respondent raises 62 grounds of appeal, which, although covering a broad range of issues, can be reduced to approximately 12 overarching arguments. The applicant’s ‘general submission’, as put to me in oral argument, is that all the respondent’s grounds of appeal ‘are nonsensical and completely devoid of merit’. In this light, this application is dealt with most effectively and efficiently by addressing, in turn, the respondent’s arguments regarding the merits of his appeal grounds and, as necessary, the applicant’s corresponding, contrary submissions.
Appeal Grounds 1, 2, 5, 6, 32–41, 43, 45–53, 57–62 (Treason)
Without wishing to oversimplify the respondent’s position, these appeal grounds concern allegations that treason and misprisions of treason have been committed by certain judicial and government bodies and officials as a result of administering and enacting, respectively, the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Court and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA). These grounds are based, primarily, on amendments to Western Australian statutes effected by the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Court and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA), namely that the said Act prescribes references to the ‘Crown’ and like monarchical terms in certain Western Australian statutes be substituted with references to the ‘State’ and similar governmental terms.
The applicant submits these grounds are unintelligible in terms of their legal substance and irrelevant to the issue of whether the judge at second instance erred in striking out the defence and counterclaim.
The applicant’s submissions are plainly correct. These grounds of appeal and the accompanying explanations given by the respondent during oral argument indicate no basis for treason or its misprision.
Appeal Grounds 3, 4, 31, 42, 54 and 55 (Absence of Jurisdiction)
These appeal grounds are predicated upon those in respect of treason, the respondent’s position being that the, allegedly, treasonous acts referred to above oust the jurisdiction and/or authority of certain judicial and government bodies. Having found the appeal grounds in respect of treason and its misprision to be without merit, it follows that these grounds cannot succeed.
Appeal Grounds 7, 11, 20, 27 and 44 (Constitutional Issues)
These appeal grounds concern issues purportedly arising under and in relation to the Australian Constitution in the proceedings below that the respondent submits were dealt with incorrectly and/or inappropriately. In particular, the respondent submits questions requiring constitutional interpretation, particularly the effect and meaning to be gleaned from reading s 116 of the Constitution in conjunction with the Constitution’s Preamble and Schedule, were not referred to the High Court; notices were not issued in accordance with s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and issues pertaining to the legal status of the Constitution, national identity and freemasonry were not properly addressed.
In respect of the purported constitutional issues at first instance, the applicant submitted Judge Kelly was correct to hold the respondent’s arguments did not involve matters arising under the Constitution nor involving its interpretation. I note counsel’s reference to the judgment of Sundberg J in Halliday v Commonwealth of Australia,[22] a case concerning the withholding provisions in relation to the collection of GST, His Honour stating:[23]
the essential point, in my view, is that the withholding tax provisions do not prohibit the doing of any act in the practice of religion. The claim that the GST law offends s 116 has no prospect of success.
[22] [2000] FCA 950; (2000) 45 ATR 458.
[23] (2000) 45 ATR 458, 465.
None of these grounds of appeal involve matters sensibly arising under the Constitution or requiring its interpretation by the High Court. For completeness, I note the High Court ordered the respondent’s application for removal be dismissed with costs on 1 March 2007.
Appeal Grounds 8, 9, 17, 18 and 21 (Incompetent Jurisdiction)
The main thrust of these appeal grounds is that the judicial officers at first and second instance, being judicial officers of the District Court, were not in a competent jurisdiction to determine, what the respondent describes as, the ‘inter se’ issues and related constitutional issues purportedly before them as, on the respondent’s submissions, the High Court retains exclusive and original jurisdiction in respect of such issues.
These grounds are predicated on those concerning the nature and substance of the constitutional issues that purportedly arose in the proceedings below; my findings in relation to the latter suffice to show why these grounds, obviously, cannot succeed. In any event, I note s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) which, subject to certain exceptions that do not arise in these proceedings,[24] vests South Australian courts, and thereby the District Court of South Australia, with federal jurisdiction in all matters in which the High Court has original jurisdiction.
[24] Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 38, 39(2)(a)‑39(2)(c).
That being said, I am mindful that appeal grounds 8 and 17 raise points additional to that of incompetent jurisdiction. Ground 8 refers to the illegal use of a statutory power, presumably by the ATO. This point does not afford ground 8 any greater likelihood of success. The additional points raised in ground 17 are dealt with below.
Appeal Grounds 10 and 19 (Removal to the High Court)
As I understand the respondent, these grounds go to his argument that the proceedings below should have been stayed pending the determination of his application for removal to the High Court. I refer to my reasons above and the decision of McHugh J in Re Stubberfield’s Application[25] in holding these grounds, obviously, cannot succeed.
[25] (1996) 70 ALJR 646, 647.
Appeal Ground 12 (Public Interest)
The respondent submits the ‘abortion levy’ has not been, and should be, made known to the electorate; this is not a basis for appeal.
Appeal Grounds 15–17, 22–25 and 30 (Legal Status of ATO and Taxation Legislation)
These grounds go to two arguments the respondent intends to put on appeal.
The first is that the ATO is not a legal entity, indeed, as I understand the respondent’s oral submissions, the ATO is not an entity at all – it does not exist, except in name. The respondent makes similar submissions in respect of the applicant, the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. The respondent’s position is therefore that the applicant had no standing to institute proceedings against him and, concomitantly, the ATO cannot collect, disburse and otherwise deal with taxation monies.
The respondent’s second argument concerns the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (‘the ITAA’). It is the respondent’s submission that the ITAA is ultra vires as it could not have received royal assent due to the absence of a reigning monarch at the time, nor was the ITAA gazetted.
The first argument to be put by the respondent and its associated appeal grounds is not subject to reality. The validity of the ATO, its role, function and power is well established.[26] The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation has power and authority to institute legal proceedings to recover tax-related liabilities.[27]
[26] See, eg, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Levick [1999] FCA 1580; (1999) 43 ATR 621; Levick v Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 674; (2000) 102 FCR 155; Dooney v Henry [2000] HCA 44; (2000) 74 ALJR 1289; Miller v Chapman [2001] FCA 105; (2001) 46 ATR 317.
[27] Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) sch 1 s 255-5.
The respondent’s second argument and its associated appeal grounds obviously cannot succeed. The ITAA received royal assent by virtue of the Act of Settlement 1701 (Imp), which provides for the succession of the royal title, on an heredity basis, upon the death of the monarch.
Appeal Ground 26 (Contract with ATO)
As indicated earlier, the respondent sent cheques to the ATO in 2001 to discharge his taxation liability less the 0.5117 per cent abortion levy; cheques accompanied by correspondence from the respondent to the effect that, should the ATO cash his cheques, the ATO will have agreed to receive the 0.5117 per cent reduced payments in full and final satisfaction of the respondent’s taxation debt. The respondent submits that, upon cashing the cheques, the ATO entered a contract which the ATO subsequently breached in seeking payment of the withheld monies. The respondent says this breach was inadequately addressed in the proceedings below.
I understand the respondent’s position put to me in oral argument that, if the ATO was not willing to accept the respondent’s deductions, the ATO should have returned his cheques with words to the following effect:
We [the ATO] rebut your claim. We will not bank it on the terms of its offer. It has to be banked on our terms or not at all.[28]
[28] Transcript of Proceedings, Daniels v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (SASC, David J, 16 March 2007) 41.
However, as per the letter sent by the ATO to the respondent on 11 February 2002, the ATO is not bound by the terms stipulated in the respondent’s correspondence.[29] The contract alleged by the respondent does not and never has existed.
[29] See, Chapter 7B of the ATO Receivables Policy.
Appeal Grounds 28 and 29 (Defamation and Privacy)
At the outset, I note the respondent’s written submissions conceding these grounds on this application for summary dismissal ‘in light of the more serious issues now presented in this case’. I nevertheless deal with all the respondent’s grounds of appeal for completeness and out of consideration for the time and effort he has devoted to compiling his written submissions.
Appeal ground 28 asserts the judicial officers in the proceedings below failed to enforce s 70(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) in relation to the disclosure of defamatory material about the respondent to a third party. This ground relates to the respondent’s counterclaim at first instance in respect of a notice issued by the ATO pursuant to sch 1 s 260-5 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (‘the TAA’). The notice was issued pursuant to a statutory power; there is no evidence that the notice was issued with any male fides; the notice was complied with as required by the TAA. The valid exercise of a statutory power does not breach the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
Appeal ground 29 asserts the judicial officers in the proceedings below failed to adequately deal with the respondent’s breach of privacy by the applicant, contrary to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and ATO privacy policy, also said to result from the issuing of the notice under the TAA. This ground also relates to the respondent’s counterclaim at first instance. I reiterate that the issuing of the notice was a valid exercise of statutory power and further note the respondent’s inability to identify the particular provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) that have, on his submissions, been breached.
Appeal Ground 56 (Filing Fees)
The respondent submits filing fees breach chapter 29 of the Magna Carta.
As counsel for the applicant submitted, the question of filing fees is not relevant to the fact that summary judgment was entered for the applicant at first instance. Moreover, I find Master Bampton was correct to refuse the respondent’s application for waiver of the filing fees.
Appeal Grounds 13 and 14
In respect of these appeal grounds the respondent is misguided as to the nature and purpose of judicial proceedings and misreads the judgments in the courts below.
Conclusion
To avoid equivocality, if I have not specifically addressed certain points in respect of any particular appeal grounds, I find that the reasons I have given are sufficient to conclude that it is obvious all 62 grounds of appeal cannot succeed.
I note these proceedings, and those below, have arisen due to the respondent’s unfaltering stance that contributing monies to purposes associated with abortion, even if indirectly through taxation, is contrary to his beliefs and faith. I have no reason to doubt the respondent’s submissions that he has generally been a good taxpayer and that he withheld taxation payments purely in a bid to have issues he perceives as fundamental resolved by the courts.
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