Haughton v Roder - [2019] SASC 199

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
HAUGHTON v RODER
[2019] SASC 199
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kelly
22 November 2019
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - ADJOURNMENT, STAY OF PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER RESTRAINING PROCEEDINGS - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS - ABUSE OF PROCESS
Appeal against dismissal of Magistrates Court Information.
Where the appellant was the private informant on an Information and Summons filed in the Magistrates Court alleging the respondent had committed common law fraud - where the Information was deemed defective and the alleged particulars to have no basis of law and to amount to an abuse of process - where the Information was dismissed by the Magistrate.
Whether the Magistrate erred in dismissing the Information - whether the Magistrate had the power to dismiss the Information - whether the appeal should be summarily dismissed.
Held: It is obvious the appeal cannot succeed. The appeal is summarily dismissed.
Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 181(2)(b); Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 295(1)(h); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 110C(1); Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 9, referred to.
Ryan v Doudle & Ors [2019] SASC 155; R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 54; 98 ER 529; D'Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; Wunsch v South Australian Police (1995) 64 SASR 203; Gray v Police (2003) 85 SASR 1, applied.
Haughton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2019] SASC 198, discussed.
Glew v Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Shaw [2007] VSC 148; Daniels v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] SASC 114, considered.

HAUGHTON v RODER
[2019] SASC 199
Magistrates Appeal: Criminal
KELLY J.
Introduction

The appellant, Peter Scott Haughton, appeals the decision of a Magistrate on 12 September 2019 to dismiss an Information and Summons filed on 13 August 2019 alleging that the respondent, Steve Roder, an Auxiliary Master of the Supreme Court of South Australia, had committed the criminal offence of “common law fraud”.
The matter was first listed in the Christies Beach Magistrates Court on 12 September 2019 at 2.15 pm. On that date, the Magistrate dismissed the Information, stating as follows:
Mr Haughton, these proceedings today are being recorded. Today is the first of two Information’s that you have recently filed in this court and this court, this Magistrate, has formed a very strong view in relation to both of them and I want you to know what that view is and how I intend to proceed today.
I note your attendance in relation to file MCCHB-19-3867 where you are the private Informant. The non-attendance of the defendant and/or anyone on his behalf is excused. Having considered the contents of the Information, this court is firmly of the view that the Information is defective and the alleged particulars have no basis at law and amount to an abuse of process. Accordingly, the Information is dismissed.
Previously, in his capacity as an Auxiliary Master of the Supreme Court, the respondent had published reasons for making an order for possession of a property owned by the appellant in proceedings brought by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd against Mr Haughton. That decision is the subject of the appellant’s appeal on Supreme Court file number SCCIV-19-107 in respect of which I have also this day published a judgment.[1]
[1] Haughton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2019] SASC 198.
Appeal grounds
The respondent was represented by the Crown Solicitor on the hearing of this appeal.
The appellant has filed numerous grounds of appeal, in respect of which he asserts an appeal lies as of right due to “the agreement and Jurisdiction in the original form between the Crown/ Monarch with the subject”.
The appellant lists four grounds in his notice of appeal under the heading “Offences Subject of appeal.” as follows (‘the First List’):
A.Magistrate Harrop did commit the major indictable offence of” Misprision of Treason” in that the magistrate did conceal the principle and primary offence of” Treason” with fill knowledge that the Crown and Queen had been removed from established law within the Commonwealth.
B.Magistrate Harrop did commit the major indictable offence of in a Judicial Office and alleged capacity with a personal interest, a criminal offence set out at.
Section 34 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
C.Magistrate Harrop did commit the major indictable offence of compounding offences by failing to permit the prosecution.
Section 44 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)
D.Magistrate Harrop did commit a major indictable offence of oppressively when exercising Federal Jurisdiction
Section 34 of the Crimes Act 1914
The appellant then goes on to list nine further grounds of appeal under the heading “The following grounds of appeal. when no permission is required.” as follows (‘the Second List’):
A.Coram Non Judice.
The Magistrate erred in both and law and fact in relation to the Coram Non Judice & “Law of Trespass” source- Case of the Marshal Sea 10 CO 68 Terry V Huntington.
HARDRES 60
Where Courts of special and limited jurisdiction exceed their powers, the Whole proceeding is Coram non Judice and all concerned in such proceedings are held to “be liable for trespass”.
B)    The Bias Rule
The Magistrate erred in both law and fact by demonstrating extreme bias.
C.    Closed Court
The magistrate did breach section 18 of the magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) such section specifies an open court.
D.    Steve Roder.
Magistrate Harrop had no judicial power to dismiss the case as the defendant the natural person Steve Roder was not present in the court at the return date.
E.    Vicky Chapman
Magistrate Harrop had no Judicial power to dismiss the case as the defendant Vicky Chapman was not present in the court. But magistrate Harrop moved the return date forward to 19 September 2019 to dismiss this particular, but the defendant was not present in the court.
F.    United Nations Universal Declarations of Human rights.
The Magistrate did breach the United nations Universal declarations of Human Rights 1948 consisting of 30 Articles.
G.    Articles 4, 7, 11, 12, 17.
The Magistrate did breach the Universal Declarations of Human Rights Articles 4, 7, 11, 12, 17.
H.    United Nations Trustee for the mandated Territory of Australia
The Magistrate/Court in particular failed to discover the United nations Trustee for the mandated Territories of Australia.by closing the court.
I.     Citizen Act 1948 (Cth)
The Magistrate did fail to declare his off-shore Jurisdiction in the United Nations Trusteeship, as revealed in the Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth)
Grounds A and B in the First List and grounds E, F, G, H and I in the Second List are of no relevance to any issue on this appeal.
The thrust of the remaining complaints appears to be that the Magistrate erred in dismissing the Information, that the orders made by him are “void” and should be set aside, and that the matter should sent back to the Magistrates Court for rehearing.
The power of the Court to dismiss proceedings
Although his Honour did not expressly identify the source of the power which he exercised to dismiss the Information, there is no doubt that he had the power to do so pursuant to s 181(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) which provides as follows:
181—Charges
…
(2)A court may—
(a) amend an information to cure a defect of substance or form (but if the defendant has been substantially prejudiced by the defect, no amendment may be made); or
(b) dismiss an information if the defect cannot appropriately be cured by amendment.
Upon finding that the Information was defective and that the particulars alleged by the appellant had no basis at law, and thus amounted to an abuse of process, the Magistrate had the power to dismiss the Information. There was no error in so doing.
Even if the statutory power in s 181(2)(b) was not available to the Magistrate, it has been held that s 9 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) carries with it an implied power to ensure that the Court’s processes are not abused.[2]
[2] Wunsch v South Australian Police (1995) 64 SASR 203, 210 (Olsson J); Gray v Police (2003) 85 SASR 1, 7 (Gray J).
On this appeal, the respondent relied on r 295 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SCR):
295—Powers of Court incidental to appeal or proceeding for permission to appeal
(1)The Court may exercise any of the following powers in relation to an appeal or an application for permission to appeal—
(a)     the Court may extend the time for commencing the appeal or making the application or taking any step in the appeal;
(b)     the Court may permit a party to amend an appeal notice or other document filed in the Court in relation to the appeal;
(c)     the Court may make, vary or reverse interlocutory orders in relation to the appeal or application for permission to appeal, or vary or reverse interlocutory orders of the court or tribunal from which the appeal arises;
(d)     the Court may direct that notice of the appeal or application be given to a nominated person;
(e)     if an appeal arises from the judgment of another court or a tribunal, the Court may request the court or tribunal, or a judge, magistrate or other officer of the court or tribunal, to provide a report on questions relevant to the appeal or application;
(f)    the Court may direct a party to prepare and file in the Court a written statement of its case prepared in accordance with the Court's directions and to give copies of the statement of case to the other parties to the appeal or application;
(g)     the Court may order that security be given for the costs of an appeal;
(h)     the Court may summarily dismiss the appeal if it is obvious that it cannot succeed.
…
The respondent relied in particular on r 295(1)(h). I accept the respondent’s submission.
It would have been an abuse of process if the Magistrate had allowed the proceedings to continue.
The rationale for the power to stay proceedings of the kind instituted by the appellant lies in the public interest in the due administration of justice, and the maintenance of public confidence in the same. Those objectives will be undermined if the processes of the criminal law are permitted to be used in a manner that is productive of oppression or injustice.[3]
[3] Ryan v Doudle & Ors [2019] SASC 155, [30].
A judicial officer is immune both civilly and criminally for words spoken in office.[4] Section 110C(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) provides that a master has the same privileges and immunities from liability as a judge.
[4] R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 54, 56; 98 ER 529, 530; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12, [42].
The appellant also complains that the Magistrate had no power to dismiss the Information as the respondent was not present in court at the first hearing of the matter on 12 September 2019. The appellant made a similar complaint on the hearing of the appeal. The respondent was not required to be physically present either at the hearing when the Information was dismissed or on the hearing of the appeal. In any event, the Magistrate excused the non-attendance of the respondent on 12 September 2019.
The Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA), which features repeatedly in the documents filed by the appellant, is not relevant to this appeal. Insofar as it might be relevant, that act has been found to be validly enacted. There is no merit in any argument that Auxiliary Master Roder committed any kind of fraud or concealment at common law or otherwise in relation to any aspect of the enactment of a publicly enacted valid act or of the act itself. Proceedings of the same or similar nature brought in this State or elsewhere in Australia have been unsuccessful.[5]
[5] Glew v Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Shaw [2007] VSC 148; Daniels v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] SASC 114.
The proceedings brought by the appellant against the respondent were, in the main, incoherent. Insofar as I could understand the grounds articulated by the appellant, they were also frivolous, vexatious and oppressive. There was no prospect of those proceedings succeeding and the Magistrate was right to dismiss them. The Magistrate committed no offence by dismissing the Information filed on 13 August 2019.
As it is plainly obvious that this appeal cannot succeed, the appeal is summarily dismissed pursuant to r 295(1)(h) of the SCR.
I would add that it would be appropriate for the Magistrates Court to strike from the record any action brought by this appellant against Mr Roder, including the action MCCHB-19-3867. The courts should be vigilant to preserve the integrity of the court processes. In this regard, I note that pending the disposition of this appeal the Court received a request from the Central Assessment Unit of the Department for Human Services (DHS) to inspect the Magistrates Court file relating to the appellant’s action against Mr Roder in the Christies Beach Magistrates Court. That request was purportedly made under s 37 and s 38 of the Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 (SA) which obliges public sector agencies and other persons to provide information relating to persons who are the subject of a working with children check.
Consequent on the appellant’s filing of the Magistrates Court action against the respondent, the South Australian Police notified the Central Assessment Unit that the respondent may present a risk of harm to children which could impact a clearance status potentially issued by DHS.
I have gone into detail about this request as it is obvious that the unfounded, abusive, vexatious and frivolous proceedings brought by the appellant in the Christies Beach Magistrates Court have resulted in such a request being made which could have potentially serious effects on the personal and business lives of not just the current respondent, but any respondent unfortunate enough to be named in proceedings by the appellant.
For these reasons, I consider that an order should be made, and insofar as I am empowered to do so, that these proceedings be struck from the record.
The appeal is summarily dismissed.