Dahler v Australian Capital Territory

Link copied
Case Copied 59 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dahler v Australian Capital Territory [2014] FCA 946

Citation: Dahler v Australian Capital Territory [2014] FCA 946
Parties: CLINTON DAHLER v AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY and MINISTER FOR DISABILITY, CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE (ACT)
File number: ACD 76 of 2014
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 2 September 2014
Catchwords:

COURTS AND JUDGES – actual and apprehended bias – prejudgment – criticism of counsel expressed by judge of the Federal Circuit Court in a judgment handed down in a different matter – application for leave to appeal from refusal of judge to recuse himself  

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal from interlocutory decisions of Federal Circuit Court in relation to costs, dismissal of application to add a respondent in circumstances in which the proposed additional respondent had previously been removed, and in striking out numerous paragraphs of the statement of claim – whether decisions attended with sufficient doubt – whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused

Legislation:

Court Procedures Act 2004 (ACT) s 21
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341, 342, 351, 362, 369, 550, 795
Fair Work Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) Sch 10 Pt 1
Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 6.9 and Sch 6.3 item 14
Federal Circuit Court Rules rr 1.05(3), 21.02(1)(d)
Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 79
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(1)
Federal Court Rules r 16.02
Legal Profession (Barristers) Rules 2008 (ACT)
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (ACT) s 12(4)
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 4(8)

Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 10th edition, LawBook Co, 2014
G E Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility (4th ed) (Lawbook Co.)

Cases cited: Adam P Brown Male Fashions Proprietary Limited v Philip Morris Incorporated (1981) 148 CLR 170
Barakat v Goritsas (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 36
Barclays Bank v Boulter [1999] 1 WLR 1919
Bienstein v Bienstein (2003) 195 ALR 225; [2003] HCA 7
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke (2007) 164 IR 299; [2007] FCAFC 87
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v CSBP Ltd (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 149
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2012) 209 FCR 448
Dahler v Australian Capital Territory [2014] FCCA 1675
Dahler v ACT Government t/as Community Services Directorate [2014] FCA 210
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Do Carmo v Ford Excavation Pty Limited (1984) 154 CLR 234
East West Airlines (Operations) Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 49 ALR 323
Fair Work Ombudsman v Offshore Marine Services Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 943
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Inre the Will of FB Gilbert (deceased) (1946) 46 SR (NSW) 318
Jaycar Pty Limited v Lombardo [2011] NSWCA 284
Jia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 84 FCR 87
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488
Keys v Department of Disability, Housing & Community Services
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Dahler v Australian Capital Territory and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2014] FCA 946
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Dahler v Australian Capital Territory, the applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision made by the primary judge. The primary judge had granted the applicant leave to re-plead, which meant that no substantial injustice could arise if leave to appeal was refused. The court was tasked with determining whether there were any merits in the grounds of appeal, and if the applicant should be granted leave to appeal the decision.

The court found that even if there were any merit in the draft grounds of appeal, the applicant should not be granted leave to appeal. The primary judge had already granted the applicant leave to re-plead, and this meant that no substantial injustice could arise if leave to appeal was refused. The court also noted that the matter would likely not be ready for trial on the current hearing dates, and suggested that the parties confer to make a joint approach to the Circuit Court to vacate the current dates and progress the matter to trial.

The court ordered that the parties should confer with a view to making a joint approach to the Circuit Court to vacate the current hearing dates and make additional orders to progress the matter to trial. The court also noted that if the respondents and CPM Reviews intended to apply for costs, they should file and serve submissions within seven days and the applicant should have seven days to reply.

The court dismissed the leave application and ordered that the parties should confer to make a joint approach to the Circuit Court to vacate the current hearing dates and progress the matter to trial. The court also noted that if the respondents and CPM Reviews intended to apply for costs, they should file and serve submissions within seven days and the applicant should have seven days to reply.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Even if there were any merit in the draft grounds of appeal referable to this particular interlocutory application, I would refuse leave to appeal this part of the judgment. That is because the primary judge granted the applicant leave to re-plead. In those circumstances no substantial injustice could conceivably arise if leave were refused. Conclusion For all these reasons the leave application must be dismissed. Nevertheless, one of the orders Mr Dahler sought was an order vacating the hearing dates. As the pleadings need to be completely recast and as I was informed that no evidence has yet been filed, it seems highly unlikely that the matter will be ready for trial on 10 September, as the primary judge envisaged when the hearing dates were fixed. In these circumstances, I suggest that the parties confer with a view to making a joint approach to the Circuit Court to vacate the current dates and to make additional orders to progress the matter to trial. I note that Ms Keys indicated that she could get her pleadings in order within 14 days and file her affidavit evidence in the same time. Costs That leaves the question of costs. CPM Reviews applied for costs but advanced no submissions in support of that application. Ordinarily, that would be neither here nor there for the usual order would be for costs to follow the event. Here, however, if this is a proceeding “in relation to a matter arising under [the FW] Act”, then s 570 would operate to limit the circumstances in which a court can order a party to pay costs. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v CSBP Ltd (No 2) (2012) 202 FCR 149 the Full Court rejected an application to vary a costs order made against the union in reliance on the general power conferred by s 43(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). But the FW Act was amended in 2012 to overcome the effect of the decision in that case for proceedings commenced after the commencement of Part 1 of Schedule 10: see Fair Work Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) Sch 10 Pt 1 (which commenced on 1 January 2013); Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Amendment Bill 2012, [305]–[308]. In these circumstances, if CPM Reviews’s application for costs is pressed, then I would require short submissions identifying the statutory basis for the application and the reasons why the Court should make the orders sought. If the respondents also intend to apply for costs, they should do likewise. The respondents and CPM Reviews should file and serve submissions within seven (7) days and Mr Dahler should have seven (7) days to reply.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.