Twomey v Campbell Personnel Pty Ltd
[2024] FedCFamC2G 742
•16 August 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Twomey v Campbell Personnel Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 742
File number: PEG 51 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 16 August 2024 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to strike out a statement of claim – where statement of claim fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action and contains content that is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding – appropriate to strike out statement of claim and give applicant an opportunity to replead. Legislation: Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 340, 341, 343, 344, 346, 348, 351, 352, 355, 357, 368, 369, 370, 375, 386, 551, 554, 727, 728
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 1.06, Sch 1
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.02, 16.21
Cases cited: Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; [1990] HCA 11
Dahler v Australian Capital Territory [2014] FCA 946
Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; [1982] HCA 70
Fair Work Ombudsman v Eastern Colour Pty Ltd (2011) 209 IR 263; [2011] FCA 803
Shelton v National Roads and Motorists Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278; [2004] FCA 1393
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 44 Date of hearing: 22 May 2024 Place: Perth Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms J Kaur Solicitor for the Respondent: Employsure Law Pty Ltd ORDERS
PEG 51 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: RHYS JUNIOR HUIRAU TWOMEY
Applicant
AND: CAMPBELL PERSONNEL PTY LTD
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
16 AUGUST 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The statement of claim filed by the applicant on 24 March 2024 is struck out.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant, Mr Twomey, was employed by the respondent, Campbell Personnel Pty Ltd (Campbell Personnel) as a truck driver for a brief period in September 2023. Campbell Personnel terminated Mr Twomey’s employment on 8 September 2023.
On 27 November 2023 Mr Twomey filed an application in the Federal Court alleging that he was dismissed from his employment in contravention of a general protection under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (Fair Work Act). That application was transferred to this Court and Mr Twomey filed a statement of claim on 24 March 2024. By an application in a proceeding filed on 3 May 2024, Campbell Personnel seeks, amongst other things, that the statement of claim be struck out. It is that application for the statement of claim to be struck out that is presently before the Court.
For the reasons that follow, I have decided to strike out the whole of Mr Twomey’s statement of claim. I do, however, consider it to be appropriate to give Mr Twomey an opportunity to file a new statement of claim. I also reject Campbell Personnel’s application for Mr Twomey to pay its costs on an indemnity basis.
THE STRIKE OUT APPLICATION
Campbell Personnel filed an application in a proceeding on 3 May 2024 seeking the following orders:
1.The Statement of Claim dated 26 March 2024 be struck out pursuant to rule 16.21(1) of the Federal Court Rules.
2.The Applicant pay the Respondent’s costs of this Application on an indemnity basis pursuant to section 570(2)(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).
The strike out application is supported by an affidavit of Joydeep Kaur affirmed on 3 May 2024. Ms Kaur’s affidavit outlines the background to this proceeding and the matters addressed at the listings before the Court. Although the affidavit is in evidence, it is unnecessary to refer to it further in this judgment.
Both parties provided written and oral submissions to the Court, which I address below. Mr Twomey provided his written submissions by way of an affidavit which contains a mix of evidence and submissions.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
As can be seen from the extract of the application in a proceeding at [4] above, Campbell Personnel seeks that the statement of claim be struck out pursuant to r 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR). Rule 1.06(3) and items 11 and 14 of Sch 1 to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) read together provide that rr 16.02(1)(a), (b) and (d) and 16.21 of the FCR, which relate to the content of pleadings and applications to strike out pleadings respectively, apply in this matter.
Rule 16.02(1) of the FCR relevantly provides:
A pleading must:
(a) be divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs, each, as far as practicable, dealing with a separate matter; and
(b) be as brief as the nature of the case permits; and
…
(d)state the material facts on which a party relies that are necessary to give the opposing party fair notice of the case to be made against that party at trial, but not the evidence by which the material facts are to be proved; and…
Rule 16.21(1) of the FCR provides:
A party may apply to the Court for an order that all or part of a pleading be struck out on the ground that the pleading:
(a) contains scandalous material; or
(b) contains frivolous or vexatious material; or
(c) is evasive or ambiguous; or
(d)is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding; or
(e)fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or
(f) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.
The function of pleadings is to define the issues in dispute with sufficient clarity to enable a party to understand and have the opportunity to meet the case against them: Dare v Pulham [1982] HCA 70; (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; Banque Commerciale SA, En Liquidation v Akhil Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 11; (1990) 169 CLR 279 at 286.
THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM
The general format of the statement of claim filed by Mr Twomey can be described as amounting to eight numbered paragraphs or sentences, each of which is accompanied by a series of extracts of provisions of the Fair Work Act, followed by brief comments.
The first numbered paragraph is ‘1. General Protections Involving Dismissal – 386 Meaning of dismissed’. Under this paragraph, Mr Twomey has set out a partial extract of s 386 of the Fair Work Act, which sets out a definition of ‘dismissed’, and then alleges that his ‘employment was terminated on the employer’s initiative and in breach of s 386 (2) (b) (i)’. Mr Twomey has then set out an extract of s 368 of the Fair Work Act, which relates to the Fair Work Commission’s obligation to deal with disputes, and s 375, which requires the Fair Work Commission to advise the parties if it considers that a general protections court application in relation to the dispute would not have a reasonable prospect of success. Mr Twomey then pleads that ss 368(1)(a), (b) and (4) and 375 of the Fair Work Act are relevant provisions regarding the role of the Fair Work Commission and makes assertions about comments made during a conciliation conference, which it is not appropriate to set out in this judgment, and unspecified inaccuracies on the Form 8A that Campbell Personnel provided to the Fair Work Commission.
The second numbered paragraph is ‘2. The employer refused to reinstate at first opportunity during the Fair Work Commission conference’. Mr Twomey has then set out provisions that he asserts are relevant, including ss 369 (dealing with a dismissal dispute by arbitration), 727 (general protections applications to the Fair Work Commission), 370 (taking a dismissal dispute to court), 728 (general protections court applications), 340 (protection) and 341 (meaning of workplace right).
The third numbered paragraph is:
3. s728 (a) Due process to the Federal Courts - 340 (1) (a) (i) (ii) (iii) s341(1) (a) (b) (c) (i) (ii) (2) (a) (b) applicable legislation, after employment termination and for no foreseeable reason.
s343 (1) (a) The employer offered [omitted by Court] during the Fair Work Commission conference on 26 October 2023 as a means forward.
Under this paragraph, Mr Twomey:
(a)extracted part of s 343 of the Fair Work Act, relating to coercion, and asserted that he was verbally dismissed on 8 September 2023, that after a written request he was sent a very brief written confirmation of termination which stated a failure to complete the probation period and that his employment was terminated after he was injured due to ‘exhibited negligence’ by staff of Bis Industries and more ‘exhibited failures’ by the management of Campbell Personnel;
(b)extracted part of s 344 of the Fair Work Act, relating to undue influence or undue pressure and made an assertion about an offer made at a conference before the Fair Work Commission which he considered to contradict the written termination;
(c)extracted parts of s 346 of the Fair Work Act relating to protection from adverse action based on membership or non-membership of an industrial association and s 348 in relation to coercion and asserted that an incident occurred on 3 September 2023 in a lunchroom between himself and staff of Bis Industries which amounted to ridicule and verbal threats based on others objecting to Mr Twomey’s presence at Minara Resources – Murrin Murrin; and
(d)extracted part of s 351 of the Fair Work Act relating to discrimination and asserted that there was negligence by way of physical and verbal intimidation objecting to his presence at Minara Resources – Murrin Murrin on 3 September 2023 and ‘more nonsense’ the following day.
Mr Twomey then extracted s 352 of the Fair Work Act relating to temporary illness due to the absence or injury ahead of numbered paragraph 4, which reads (emphasis in original):
s352 - My injuries became evident on 4 Monday September 2023 after some delay and exhibited negligence on behalf of staff of Bis Industries and made a filled handwritten incident form for the H&S Manager for Bis Industries after which I was sent back to Perth the next day for a proper examination.
On 5 Tuesday September 2024 after returning to Perth I made another handwritten filled incident report for Kyle Reid and was examined by a registered GP at Canning vale Medical Centre who gave time off with a re-examination on 7 Thursday September 2024.
I could not afford to drive to Perth from Narrogin WA 6312 for the due time slot, and after contacting Kyle Reid his instructions were to receive re-examination from the local GP at Parry’s Medical Centre Narrogin who gave clearance to return to employment.
On 8 Friday September 2023 Kyle Reid verbally terminated my employment during a phone conversation.
Mr Twomey then extracted part of s 355 of the Fair Work Act relating to a prohibition on coercing another person to employ or not employ a particular person and asserted that his employment was verbally terminated after exhibited negligence by a named manager and then more negligence exhibited by other persons with ‘late written termination of nonsense’.
Mr Twomey extracted part of s 357 of the Fair Work Act regarding misrepresentation of employment as independent contracting arrangements and asserted, as numbered paragraph 5, that the employer management breach their obligations under s 357.
Mr Twomey extracted part of s 551(2) of the Fair Work Act, which requires a court to apply the rules of evidence and procedure for civil matters when hearing proceedings related to a contravention, ahead of numbered paragraph 6, where he asserts that the statement of claim is ‘evident and obvious with numerous points of legislation applied, factual and at the discretion of the court’.
Mr Twomey then referred to s 554 of the Fair Work Act which provides that criminal proceedings may be commenced against a person for conduct that is substantially the same as conduct constituting a contravention of a civil remedy provision, ahead of numbered paragraph 7, in which he asserts that there is ‘exhibited negligence’ by Bis Industries employees and Campbell Personnel. Examples of ‘exhibited negligence’ by Bis Industries are described as ‘apparent and evident sulphur in container load/unload area’, ‘container hoist not remaining stationary at container load/unload area’ and ‘harassment verbally and physically’. Examples in relation to Campbell Personnel include not providing handwritten incident forms and unspecified ‘exhibited false statements’ referring to the information submitted to the Fair Work Commission in the Form 8A. Mr Twomey asserts that these actions would be construed to be criminal in breach of s 554.
Mr Twomey then sets out an extract from the Australian Law Reform Commission in relation to torts and asserts at numbered paragraph 8:
It is at the courts discretion to ascertain whether a tort is apparent or present and in breach of 17.21 & 17.22 from the statement of claim and if need be, grant Request to leave to Subpoena to produce documents - video footage & statements from relevant witnesses plus Kyle Reid of Campbells Personnel and the Bis Industries H&S Manager to provide the handwritten incident reports.
SHOULD THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM BE STRUCK OUT?
Campbell Personnel submits that the statement of claim should be struck out because it does not comply with the relevant requirements of r 16.02(1) of the FCR and it is ambiguous, embarrassing and an abuse of process because it:
(a)fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action;
(b)fails to set out all (or any) material facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action;
(c)fails to define the issues with sufficient clarity to allow Campbell Personnel to understand and have an opportunity to meet the case; and
(d)simply restates a number of provisions from different pieces of legislation and broadly asserts contraventions.
Campbell Personnel also submitted that the statement of claim failed to comply with r 16.02(1)(c), (e) and (f) of the FCR. These subparagraphs are not expressly adopted by item 11 of Sch 1 to the GFL Rules and in the absence of any explanation by Campbell Personnel as to why Mr Twomey’s statement of claim was required to comply with those subparagraphs, I do not consider them further in this judgment.
In response to the strike out application, Mr Twomey has provided a submission which is, with respect, difficult to understand and which provides some explanation for why he has referred to various provisions and some further facts, but which fails to shed any light on his case in a real and meaningful way or explain why the statement of claim should not be struck out. In his oral submissions, Mr Twomey admitted that some parts of his statement of claim were not relevant and that some sections of the legislation previously referred to were incorrect, and were corrected in the statement of claim and other than that he has tried his best to keep things to a limit and be compassionate in relation to the relief he seeks.
I am satisfied that it is appropriate to strike out the whole of the statement of claim in this matter on the basis that it is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding and that it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action.
Justice Tamberlin explained what it means for a pleading to be embarrassing in Shelton v National Roads and Motorists Association Ltd (2004) 51 ACSR 278; [2004] FCA 1393 at [18]:
… “Embarrassment” in this context refers to a pleading that is susceptible to various meanings, or contains inconsistent allegations, or in which alternatives are confusingly intermixed, or in which irrelevant allegations are made that tend to increase expense. This is not an exhaustive list of situations in which a pleading may be embarrassing: see Bartlett v Swan Television & Radio Broadcasters Pty Limited (1995) ATPR 41-434. An example of an embarrassing pleading is where the pleading simply pleads a conclusion.
A pleading is also embarrassing if it includes defects that result in ‘the pleading being unintelligible, ambiguous, vague or too general, so as to embarrass the opposite party who does not know what is alleged against it’: Fair Work Ombudsman v Eastern Colour Pty Ltd (2011) 209 IR 263; [2011] FCA 803 at [18].
The requirement to state material facts, was explained by Katzman J in Dahler v Australian Capital Territory [2014] FCA 946 at [105]:
The obligation of the pleader is to state the material facts. That does not mean all the facts or all the relevant facts. A fact is material if it is essential to the cause of action. The expression refers to the fact or combination of facts that give rise to a right to sue: Do Carmo v Ford Excavation Pty Limited (1984) 154 CLR 234 at 245 per Wilson J. The applicant’s pleadings did not plead material facts, nor was it as brief as the nature of the case permitted. The statement of claim was discursive. It offended the rule about pleading facts, not evidence. The primary judge was correct to describe it as “replete with detailed matters of evidence”. Numerous paragraphs contained detailed extracts from correspondence. No attempt was made to summarise the effect of the correspondence or to relate it to one of the elements of the cause of action. Nor was any made to plead the material facts. Many of the allegations were peripheral to the cause of action. Where inessential facts are pleaded, they are liable to be struck out as prejudicial and embarrassing to the fair trial of the action: Bernard Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 10th edition, LawBook Co, 2014 (“Cairns”), [6.180]. The observations that Dawson J made in East West Airlines (Operations) Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1983) 49 ALR 323 at 326 (“East West”) could equally have been made in the present case:
[E]ven if the statement of claim discloses a cause of action, it does so only in the course of pleading immaterial facts which at best are merely evidentiary and at worst are not relevant at all. The fair trial of the action would be delayed if the defendants were required to plead to these allegations and if other interlocutory procedures could be directed to them. There are also…matters pleaded which are embarrassing in that they are not susceptible of being pleaded to by the defendants.
Mr Twomey’s statement of claim is, with respect, difficult to understand in any meaningful way. The statement of claim is embarrassing and does not set out the material facts in any way that would enable Campbell Personnel to understand the case against it. It does not disclose any arguable cause of action in its current form. To allow the proceeding to continue on the current articulation of Mr Twomey’s case would be inefficient, prejudicial to Campbell Personnel and would in all likelihood result in Campbell Personnel incurring costs unnecessarily in an attempt to respond to a case that it cannot understand.
The original application was commenced as an application under the Fair Work Act alleging dismissal in contravention of a general protection. The statement of claim does not contain sufficient assertions of material fact to explain why Mr Twomey believes that he was dismissed in contravention of a general protection. For example, Mr Twomey has made an assertion that his employment was terminated on the employer’s initiative and alleges that this was in contravention of s 386(2)(b)(i) of the Fair Work Act. However, s 386 simply provides a definition of the meaning of dismissed and s 386(2)(b)(i) is an exclusion to the definition set out in s 386(1). Reading the statement of claim generously, Mr Twomey has elsewhere asserted that:
(a)his employment was terminated for ‘no foreseeable reason’;
(b)the written confirmation of termination stated he was dismissed for failure to complete a probation period; and
(c)his employment was terminated after he was injured due to exhibited negligence by staff of Bis Industries and more exhibited failures by Campbell Personnel management.
It is not possible for Campbell Personnel to understand from these assertions what general protection Mr Twomey is relying on or why (or even if) he alleges that his employment was terminated in contravention of a general protection.
Mr Twomey has in his statement of claim referred to several of the general protections provisions, however, he has nowhere clearly explained why he believes the provisions were breached. In many instances, the content of the statement of claim that appears after sections of legislation are set out has no correlation to the section of the Fair Work Act that is extracted. For example, after referring to s 340 of the Fair Work Act, which prohibits a person from taking adverse action against another person because the other person has a workplace right, or has or has not exercised a workplace right or proposes or proposes not to exercise a workplace right, and s 341 which sets out the meaning of workplace right, Mr Twomey has referred to ‘Due process to the Federal Courts – 340 (1) (a) (i) (ii) (iii) s341(1) (a) (b) (c) (i) (ii) (2) (a) (b) applicable legislation, after employment termination and for no foreseeable reason’. This does not explain for example which workplace right Mr Twomey asserts that he had, or exercised or proposed to exercise, and asserting that his employment was terminated ‘for no foreseeable reason’ does not amount to an assertion that his employment was terminated for a proscribed reason.
Another example is that Mr Twomey referred to s 343 of the Fair Work Act, which prohibits a person from organising or taking, or threatening to organise or take, any action against another person with the intent to coerce the other person to exercise, or not exercise, or propose to exercise or not exercise, a workplace right or to exercise or propose to exercise a workplace right in a particular way. Mr Twomey then refers to being verbally dismissed on 8 September 2023 and then, after making a written request, being sent a very brief confirmation of termination stating a failure to complete probationary period. It is here that Mr Twomey also asserts that his employment was terminated after being injured due to exhibited negligence by staff of Bis Industries and more exhibited failures by Campbell Personnel management. There is no assertion of coercion and no identification of which particular workplace right was affected that would explain why Mr Twomey is seeking to rely on s 343 of the Fair Work Act.
Mr Twomey has referred to s 346 of the Fair Work Act, which prohibits a person from taking adverse action against another person because the other person is or is not an officer or member of an industrial association. Mr Twomey refers to an altercation in the lunchroom between himself and members of Bis Industries who did not like his presence but does not connect this to membership or non-membership of any industrial association or clearly identify what the alleged adverse action is. It is also not apparent from the statement of claim who Bis Industries is and why Campbell Personnel, which is the only named respondent in this proceeding, is responsible for the actions of staff members of Bis Industries.
The same incident is referred to following Mr Twomey’s reference to s 351 of the Fair Work Act, which prohibits an employer from taking adverse action against an employee because of the employee’s race, colour, sex, sexual orientation, breastfeeding, gender identity, intersex status, age, physical or mental disability, marital status, family or carer’s responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin. Mr Twomey has not identified the adverse action or the protected attribute that he relies on.
Perhaps the closest that Mr Twomey has come to articulating a cause of action is following a reference to s 352 of the Fair Work Act, which prohibits an employer from dismissing an employee because the employee is temporarily absent from work because of illness or injury of a kind prescribed by the regulations. Following this paragraph, Mr Twomey referred to injuries he sustained, and an incident report he completed and examinations by medical practitioners and then asserts that his employment was verbally terminated on 8 September 2023. But even this is insufficient to amount to a clear articulation of a cause of action. There is no assertion that Mr Twomey’s employment was terminated because of his temporary absence.
Mr Twomey’s statement of claim also refers to negligence and tort. It is not possible to understand in any meaningful way the circumstances in which the negligence is said to have arisen and the facts relied on to support a claim of negligence. To the extent that negligence is referred to, the allegation appears to be directed at Bis Industries rather than Campbell Personnel and it is unclear from the statement of claim why Campbell Personnel would be liable. It is also unclear from the statement of claim the basis upon which Mr Twomey asserts that the Court has jurisdiction to hear a claim in tort.
Mr Twomey’s statement of claim contains a lot of irrelevant information and references to additional provisions of the Fair Work Act, the purpose of which is unclear. For example, it is unclear why Mr Twomey is referring to events that happened when the matter was before the Fair Work Commission or why he is referring to the possibility of criminal proceedings. There is also language used in the statement of claim, such ‘exhibited negligence’ and ‘nonsense’ which can only be understood as a subjective opinion of Mr Twomey, rather than a statement of material fact.
There are no parts of the statement of claim that can meaningfully be preserved and it is appropriate that the whole of the statement of claim be struck out.
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A NEW STATEMENT OF CLAIM
Mr Twomey is appearing before the Court as a self-represented litigant. There is no evidence that, prior to the strike out application, there was any clear communications from Campbell Personnel or its lawyers to explain to Mr Twomey the defects in his statement of claim. It is appropriate that Mr Twomey be afforded a further opportunity to file a new statement of claim to remedy the defects in the current statement of claim. I will hear from the parties as to how long the Court should allow Mr Twomey to file a new or substituted statement of claim.
Mr Twomey should be aware that the Court will not provide an unlimited number of opportunities for him to clearly articulate his case. If Mr Twomey continues to be unable to articulate his case in any meaningful way that would enable Campbell Personnel to understand the case it is required to meet, there is a possibility that his application will be summarily dismissed.
COSTS
Campbell Personnel submitted:
… if the Court is minded to allow the Applicant to file an Amended Statement of Claim, the Respondent respectfully requests that pursuant to section 570(2)(b) of the Act, the Court order costs on an indemnity basis as the costs associated with allowing the Applicant to file an Amended Statement of Claim will create an injustice to the Respondent. Costs have been thrown away in relation to defending the matter in the Fair Work Commission, attending the First and Second Appearances and making this Application.
I appreciate that Mr Twomey’s statement of claim is defective and that Campbell Personnel would have incurred costs in relation to the strike out application. The Court may only order a party to pay the other party’s costs in proceedings under the Fair Work Act in certain circumstances. The circumstances relied on by Campbell Personnel is that Mr Twomey’s ‘unreasonable act or omission’ caused it to incur the costs. I would certainly not make any order for costs in relation to attending the directions hearings before the Court and appearing before the Fair Work Commission, as those costs cannot be said to have been incurred because of any unreasonable act or omission by Mr Twomey. Taking into account that Mr Twomey is self-represented, and on the evidence before me at present, I am not prepared to find that his conduct in filing a defective statement of claim, on his first attempt, is unreasonable. I will not make any order for Mr Twomey to pay Campbell Personnel’s costs in relation to this strike out application. However, Mr Twomey should be aware that if, having been given an opportunity to file a new statement of claim, he again files a document that does not disclose any cause of action or sufficiently explain his case, I may receive evidence and hear submissions from the parties as to whether that amounts to an unreasonable act or omission and, if so, there is a possibility that I will make a costs order against Mr Twomey.
It would be prudent for Mr Twomey to seek legal advice before taking any further action in this proceeding. These matters are complicated and it may assist Mr Twomey to engage a lawyer to objectively analyse his case to assess whether he has any arguable cause of action and whether it is worthwhile for him to pursue this proceeding.
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams. Associate:
Dated: 16 August 2024