CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1115

Appeal from: CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3067
File number: NSD 2111 of 2018
Judge: ABRAHAM J
Date of judgment: 19 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – where Immigration Assessment Authority determined that letters provided to it by the appellant were “new information” for the purposes of ss 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – failure by the primary judge to give adequate reasons on an aspect of the argument – no practical injustice from primary judge’s failure to address a submission – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD
Cases cited:

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958; 254 FCR 221

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 353 ALR 600

AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111

Minister of Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713

CIT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 150

Yaacoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 39

Date of hearing:  29 May 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division:  General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 53
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Kumar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J Lambe of HWL Ebsworth
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 2111 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CPP18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ABRAHAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ABRAHAM J:

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia, as an unauthorised maritime arrival, on 16 August 2012. The appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) on 3 March 2017. On 5 July 2017, the Minister’s delegate refused the application. On 2 May 2018, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) affirmed that decision. This is an appeal from an order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 October 2018 dismissing an application for judicial review of that decision of the Authority: see CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3067.

  2. Four grounds of appeal were initially pleaded by the appellant in this Court, although the fourth ground was not pressed. The…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealed against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant sought to challenge the IAA's determination that certain letters provided to it were "new information" under sections 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, and the appellant now seeks further review in this Court. The central legal issues in this case revolve around the interpretation and application of sections 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act, particularly in relation to whether the letters provided by the appellant constituted "new information" and whether the IAA properly considered whether exceptional circumstances existed to warrant consideration of this information. The Court considered the arguments advanced by both parties and the submissions made during the hearing. The Court found that the primary judge's reasons did not adequately address one aspect of the argument concerning the "new information" claim, but this omission did not result in any practical injustice or jurisdictional error. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal should be dismissed as there was no merit in the grounds of appeal presented. The Court also noted that the appellant's concession that the letters were new information when provided to the IAA, and the abandonment of an argument concerning a letter not before the Federal Circuit Court, did not warrant the grant of leave to rely on this new evidence.

In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs, to be agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the importance of properly addressing all aspects of a party's arguments in judicial review proceedings and highlights the stringent requirements for introducing new evidence on appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons below the appeal is dismissed. Background Given the grounds of appeal it is appropriate to first consider the basis on which the SHEV application was made, and the information that was before the Minister’s delegate and the Authority. As noted above, the appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He is a Tamil of Hindu faith from the Eastern Province. In summary, the appellant’s claim to fear harm was based on his ethnicity and origin, having a brother-in-law who he says is a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) member which, being a young Tamil male and a returned failed asylum seeker, would impute that profile to the appellant. The appellant also claimed that after being shot at in 2001, a deformity in his leg resulted, which causes an irregular walk, and would make him look suspicious to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Sri Lanka. In addition, on 31 July 2017, by email from his registered migration agent, the appellant provided a written submission and further documents, which he asked the Authority to take into account. These further documents were comprised of four letters: a letter dated 24 July 2017 from the appellant’s brother-in-law, a letter dated 22 July 2017 from a member of the Parliament of Sri Lanka, a letter dated 23 July 2017 from the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) and a letter dated 10 February 2014, together with an English translation from the appellant’s wife (collectively, the Further Documents). These Further Documents purported to support the appellant's claims that he had active involvement with the LTTE, and would be at risk of harm upon his return to Sri Lanka.The Authority The Authority was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the Further Documents. The Authority, like the delegate, accepted that the appellant was forced to assist the LTTE to use his boat to transport LTTE personnel and ammunition. It also accepted that the appellant had been shot in the buttock in the course of transporting a LTTE member on a borrowed motorbike. However, the Authority was not satisfied that the entirety of the appellant's claims relating to his LTTE involvement were true. It found that the appellant had embellished and fabricated parts of his evidence about his LTTE connections in order to boost his claims for protection. In particular, it rejected claims that the appellant transported LTTE men and material frequently, and that his brother-in-law was a member of the LTTE. The Authority also did not consider that the extent of the ongoing monitoring and harassment that the appellant claimed to be subjected to by the CID and Sri Lankan authorities, was plausible on the information before it. In light of the appellant’s profile and country information, the Authority found that the appellant did not face a well-founded fear of persecution in Sri Lanka. It also concluded that the appellant was not a refugee by reason of being a returning failed asylum seeker and used these findings as the basis on which to reject the appellant's claim under the complementary protection criteria.The Federal Circuit Court

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This ground is established. As explained above, and accepted by the respondent, the primary judge’s reasons do not address the second basis of the argument in relation to what is now ground 1. The reasons given by the primary judge dismissing that ground are inadequate. Indeed, the inference to be drawn from the reasons is that the primary judge failed to consider one of the bases on which a ground of appeal was argued. Conclusion The respondent submitted that despite the failure of the primary judge described above, the appeal should nonetheless be dismissed because there is no jurisdictional error in relation to grounds 1 or 2. Relying on CIT17 at [93], the respondent submitted that it would therefore be futile to remit the matter in those circumstances. The appellant accepted that if the jurisdictional errors alleged in grounds 1 or 2 were not established, consistent with the reasoning in CIT17, there would be no cause to remit the proceedings to the Federal Circuit Court. As I concluded above, ground 2 has not been established. The failure of the primary judge relates only to ground 1. However, as there is no jurisdictional error by the Authority in relation to that ground, the appellant has not suffered any practical injustice from the primary judge’s failure to address a submission, and in those circumstances, a remittal would be futile: see, for example: CIT17 at [93], [94]; Yaacoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 39 at [31], [33]. Accordingly, the appropriate order is to dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour also rejected grounds 3, 4 and 5. In relation to grounds 3 and 4, his Honour found that the Authority considered the appellant's claims, to have been shot and to have sustained a gunshot wound, and had genuinely engaged with those claims. These grounds are only relevant to ground 3 in this Court.ConsiderationGround 1: new information This ground, and its predecessor in the Court below, has changed over time. In light of the grounds of appeal, it is necessary to set out the development of this ground. In the appellant’s written submissions filed in the Court below, this ground contained two aspects: (1) that the Further Documents were not “new information” within the meaning of s 473DC of the Migration Act; and (2) in the event that the Further Documents constituted “new information”, the Authority failed to consider whether exceptional circumstances were established to justify considering this information in accordance with s 473DD of the Migration Act. In oral submissions in the Court below, the appellant did not press the argument in so far as it related to the letter from his wife dated 10 February 2014. Moreover, in oral submissions, the appellant’s counsel, in answer to questions from the primary judge, accepted that his contention was that the other three letters were not new information, and they ought not to have been treated as such. The appellant’s counsel, consistent with the first basis of his written submissions, contended that the remaining three letters supported claims that had already been raised before the delegate. The oral submission in the Court below was confined to that first aspect of this ground, referred to above. In this Court, the ground of appeal and written submissions advanced the two aspects relied on in writing below (as outlined above at paragraph [17]). However, during the oral submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded that the Further Documents were new information, and abandoned any submission to the contrary. That is, the argument in this Court was confined to the second aspect of the ground, namely that the Authority failed to consider whether exceptional circumstances were established to justify considering the new information in accordance with s 473DD of the Migration Act. The appellant’s concession that the letters were new information when they were provided to the Authority, is correct. Also, during his oral submission the appellant’s counsel sought to rely on the letter from the appellant’s wife dated 10 February 2014, which had been abandoned below. Counsel explained that the basis for the change in position was that he had not realised there was an English translation of the letter before the Authority as it was not reproduced in the Court Book. This was an oversight. As this is a new particular not argued below to rely on such evidence that was not before the Court below (the English translation), leave is required. The respondent made no submission about the grant of leave except to point out that merit is an important factor. I will consider this letter, together with the others to determine whether there is merit in the grant of leave.