FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1115
Appeal from: CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3067 File number: NSD 2111 of 2018 Judge: ABRAHAM J Date of judgment: 19 July 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – where Immigration Assessment Authority determined that letters provided to it by the appellant were “new information” for the purposes of ss 473DC and 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – failure by the primary judge to give adequate reasons on an aspect of the argument – no practical injustice from primary judge’s failure to address a submission – no jurisdictional error – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD Cases cited: BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958; 254 FCR 221
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 353 ALR 600
AQU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 111
Minister of Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 92 ALJR 713
CIT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 150
Yaacoub v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 39
Date of hearing: 29 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 53 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Kumar Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr J Lambe of HWL Ebsworth Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 2111 of 2018 BETWEEN: CPP18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ABRAHAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 JULY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ABRAHAM J:
The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia, as an unauthorised maritime arrival, on 16 August 2012. The appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) on 3 March 2017. On 5 July 2017, the Minister’s delegate refused the application. On 2 May 2018, the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) affirmed that decision. This is an appeal from an order made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 29 October 2018 dismissing an application for judicial review of that decision of the Authority: see CPP18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2018] FCCA 3067.
Four grounds of appeal were initially pleaded by the appellant in this Court, although the fourth ground was not pressed. The…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1115
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In conclusion, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs, to be agreed or taxed. This decision underscores the importance of properly addressing all aspects of a party's arguments in judicial review proceedings and highlights the stringent requirements for introducing new evidence on appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs to be agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
His Honour also rejected grounds 3, 4 and 5. In relation to grounds 3 and 4, his Honour found that the Authority considered the appellant's claims, to have been shot and to have sustained a gunshot wound, and had genuinely engaged with those claims. These grounds are only relevant to ground 3 in this Court.ConsiderationGround 1: new information This ground, and its predecessor in the Court below, has changed over time. In light of the grounds of appeal, it is necessary to set out the development of this ground. In the appellant’s written submissions filed in the Court below, this ground contained two aspects: (1) that the Further Documents were not “new information” within the meaning of s 473DC of the Migration Act; and (2) in the event that the Further Documents constituted “new information”, the Authority failed to consider whether exceptional circumstances were established to justify considering this information in accordance with s 473DD of the Migration Act. In oral submissions in the Court below, the appellant did not press the argument in so far as it related to the letter from his wife dated 10 February 2014. Moreover, in oral submissions, the appellant’s counsel, in answer to questions from the primary judge, accepted that his contention was that the other three letters were not new information, and they ought not to have been treated as such. The appellant’s counsel, consistent with the first basis of his written submissions, contended that the remaining three letters supported claims that had already been raised before the delegate. The oral submission in the Court below was confined to that first aspect of this ground, referred to above. In this Court, the ground of appeal and written submissions advanced the two aspects relied on in writing below (as outlined above at paragraph [17]). However, during the oral submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded that the Further Documents were new information, and abandoned any submission to the contrary. That is, the argument in this Court was confined to the second aspect of the ground, namely that the Authority failed to consider whether exceptional circumstances were established to justify considering the new information in accordance with s 473DD of the Migration Act. The appellant’s concession that the letters were new information when they were provided to the Authority, is correct. Also, during his oral submission the appellant’s counsel sought to rely on the letter from the appellant’s wife dated 10 February 2014, which had been abandoned below. Counsel explained that the basis for the change in position was that he had not realised there was an English translation of the letter before the Authority as it was not reproduced in the Court Book. This was an oversight. As this is a new particular not argued below to rely on such evidence that was not before the Court below (the English translation), leave is required. The respondent made no submission about the grant of leave except to point out that merit is an important factor. I will consider this letter, together with the others to determine whether there is merit in the grant of leave.