CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 46 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1764

Appeal from:

CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.4) [2018] FCCA 1169

Application for leave to appeal: CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1162;

CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.2) [2018] FCCA 1163 and

CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.3) [2018] FCCA 1164

File number: NSD 961 of 2018
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 14 November 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from judgments of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application that he disqualify himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias – whether primary judge erred in refusing an application that the hearing date be vacated

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – procedure to be adopted where appeal grounds include not only that the primary judge erred in not disqualifying himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias and in refusing an application to vacate the hearing date, but also substantive grounds

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30

Barakat v Goritsas [2012] NSWCA 8

British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; 242 CLR 283

Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; 229 CLR 577

CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 330

House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499

Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; 170 CLR 70

Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342

Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; 229 FCR 301

Date of hearing: 14 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 89
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr JR Young
Solicitor for the Appellants: G&S Law Group
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Laing
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 961 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CPF15

First Appellant

CPG15

Second Appellant

CPH15

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.To the extent necessary, leave is granted to appeal from orders 2, 3 and 4 made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 9 May 2018.

2.The appeal be allowed in part.

3.Order 4 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 9 May 2018 and orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 May 2018 are set aside.

4.The application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be remitted to that Court differently constituted for rehearing and determination according to law.

5.The…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1764
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, CPF15, appealed against judgments of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in a migration matter. They sought to disqualify the primary judge on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias and also applied for a postponement of the hearing date. The applicants argued that the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in dismissing their application for recusal and in refusing their application to vacate the hearing date. The applicants contended that the Federal Circuit Court judge's conduct during the hearing and the refusal of an adjournment resulted in a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court had to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in dismissing the application for recusal and in refusing the application to vacate the hearing date. The court also had to decide on the appropriate procedure to adopt when the appeal grounds included not only the alleged errors in not disqualifying the primary judge and in refusing the application to vacate the hearing date, but also substantive grounds.

The court found that the Federal Circuit Court judge did not err in dismissing the application for recusal. The court held that the judge's conduct in asking whether the applicant required an interpreter did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court also held that the refusal of the adjournment did not effectively deny the applicants an opportunity to be heard. However, the court found that the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in not setting aside the orders made on 17 May 2018. The court allowed the appeal in part, set aside certain orders, and remitted the application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, differently constituted, for rehearing and determination according to law.

The court ordered that leave to appeal from certain orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was granted to the extent necessary. The appeal was allowed in part, and specific orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were set aside. The application was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, differently constituted, for rehearing and determination according to law. The costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were to be paid by the first respondent to the first appellant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. To the extent necessary, leave is granted to appeal from orders 2, 3 and 4 made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 9 May 2018.

2. The appeal be allowed in part.

3. Order 4 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 9 May 2018 and orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 May 2018 are set aside.

4. The application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be remitted to that Court differently constituted for rehearing and determination according to law.

5. The costs of the appeal to this Court be paid by the first respondent to the first appellant, as agreed or assessed.

6. The costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be paid by the first respondent to the first appellant in the agreed amount of $7,328.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicants, CPF15, were involved in an immigration matter which was initially heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary judge, Flick J, had conducted the hearing and made certain decisions, including asking the applicant if she required an interpreter and refusing an adjournment. These decisions were later critiqued in reasons provided by Flick J. Following this, an application was made in the Federal Circuit Court for Judge Street to disqualify himself on the ground of a reasonable apprehension of bias due to Flick J's conduct. This application was dismissed by Judge Street. Additionally, an application was made to vacate the hearing date which was also refused. The applicants subsequently appealed against the decisions of Judge Street.

The matter was initially heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where Flick J conducted the hearing and made decisions that were later critiqued. Following this, the applicants made an application for Judge Street to disqualify himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias, which was dismissed. They also applied to vacate the hearing date, which was refused. The applicants then appealed to the High Court against the decisions of Judge Street. The appeal was heard in the High Court where the applicants were represented by counsel and solicitors.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicants were represented by counsel and solicitors, as they had been before the Federal Court but not before the Federal Circuit Court in July 2017. The first interlocutory judgment In the first judgment Judge Street dismissed the application for recusal. According to the reasons for judgment, and there is no other evidence, the first conduct identified by counsel as a basis for the application was the conduct of the hearing at first instance, Judge Street asking whether the applicant required an interpreter, and the refusal of an adjournment. The second conduct was the order made on 16 April 2018 fixing the matter for hearing on 9 May 2018. The reasons state, at [5], that Flick J gave consideration to the conduct of the hearing by the Federal Circuit Court but no order was made by the Federal Court that the matter be remitted to a differently constituted Federal Circuit Court. Before me, counsel for the appellants accepted that the appellants did not before Flick J seek an order that the matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court differently constituted. At [7], Judge Street said that a finding of appellable error was not of itself, conduct by reason of which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that he, Judge Street, might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits (reasonable apprehension of bias) if it was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for rehearing. Judge Street said:[8]Mr Young of counsel in the present case took the Court first to the criticism that was raised at the commencement of the reasons of the learned Flick J as to the question asked of the applicant at the hearing, whether she needed an interpreter, given that she came to Australia in 2008 on a student visa. The applicant responded yes, and an interpreter was sworn. The application for a protection visa in question 12 at page 2 of the Court Book, of which a fair-minded lay observer would be aware, identified a question: “which languages do you speak, read or write (including English)?[”] In response to the language Nepalese, the applicant ticked speak, read and write and in response to the language English the word “(limited)” was inserted and, speak, read and write was ticked. Judge Street then said, at [9], that a fair-minded lay observer would be aware that the first appellant had filed an affidavit in English which was not the subject of any identification of the use of an interpreter. In these circumstances, his conduct in asking whether the first appellant required an interpreter was not conduct which gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Counsel took Judge Street to the reasons of Flick J and to the conclusion that the refusal of the adjournment effectively denied the appellants an opportunity to be heard. In that regard, Judge Street said that Flick J identified the reasons that had been provided for the refusal of the adjournment, and found those reasons to be inaccurate, and made reference to what occurred at the commencement of the hearing, and to the proposition that the first appellant was having difficulties understanding and making meaningful submissions with respect to her application, and that she wanted to secure the services of a barrister.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the first issue, whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application that he disqualify himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias. The court examined the primary judge's conduct and the reasons provided for the dismissal of the application. The court noted that the appellants did not seek an order that the matter be remitted to a differently constituted Federal Circuit Court. The court concluded that the primary judge's conduct did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias as it was not conduct that a fair-minded lay observer would consider might impair the judge's impartiality. The court applied the principle that the test for reasonable apprehension of bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer, having knowledge of all the material facts, might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits.

The court then considered the second issue, whether the primary judge erred in refusing an application that the hearing date be vacated. The court examined the reasons for the refusal of the adjournment and the impact on the appellants' opportunity to be heard. The court concluded that the primary judge's refusal of the adjournment did not effectively deny the appellants an opportunity to be heard. The court applied the principle that the refusal of an adjournment is not automatically a ground for setting aside a decision, and that the court must consider the circumstances of the case and whether the refusal was justified.

Finally, the court addressed the procedure to be adopted where appeal grounds include both procedural errors and substantive grounds. The court held that the appeal should be considered in stages, with the court first determining the appeal on the procedural grounds before proceeding to the substantive grounds. The court applied the principle that it is generally appropriate to deal with procedural issues first to avoid unnecessary proceedings and to ensure that any substantive issues are considered by a properly constituted tribunal. The court also noted that the costs orders were appropriate given the agreed or assessed costs and the agreed amount for the proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court.