FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1764
Appeal from: CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.4) [2018] FCCA 1169
Application for leave to appeal: CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1162;
CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.2) [2018] FCCA 1163 and
CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.3) [2018] FCCA 1164
File number: NSD 961 of 2018 Judge: ROBERTSON J Date of judgment: 14 November 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from judgments of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in dismissing application that he disqualify himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias – whether primary judge erred in refusing an application that the hearing date be vacated
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – procedure to be adopted where appeal grounds include not only that the primary judge erred in not disqualifying himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias and in refusing an application to vacate the hearing date, but also substantive grounds
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: ALA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30
Barakat v Goritsas [2012] NSWCA 8
British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2011] HCA 2; 242 CLR 283
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design and Developments Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 55; 229 CLR 577
CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 330
House v The King [1936] HCA 40; 55 CLR 499
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal [1990] HCA 31; 170 CLR 70
Re JRL; ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; 161 CLR 342
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; 229 FCR 301
Date of hearing: 14 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 89 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr JR Young Solicitor for the Appellants: G&S Law Group Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms N Laing Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 961 of 2018 BETWEEN: CPF15
First Appellant
CPG15
Second Appellant
CPH15
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ROBERTSON J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.To the extent necessary, leave is granted to appeal from orders 2, 3 and 4 made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 9 May 2018.
2.The appeal be allowed in part.
3.Order 4 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 9 May 2018 and orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 May 2018 are set aside.
4.The application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be remitted to that Court differently constituted for rehearing and determination according to law.
5.The…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1764
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in dismissing the application for recusal and in refusing the application to vacate the hearing date. The court also had to decide on the appropriate procedure to adopt when the appeal grounds included not only the alleged errors in not disqualifying the primary judge and in refusing the application to vacate the hearing date, but also substantive grounds.
The court found that the Federal Circuit Court judge did not err in dismissing the application for recusal. The court held that the judge's conduct in asking whether the applicant required an interpreter did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court also held that the refusal of the adjournment did not effectively deny the applicants an opportunity to be heard. However, the court found that the Federal Circuit Court judge erred in not setting aside the orders made on 17 May 2018. The court allowed the appeal in part, set aside certain orders, and remitted the application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, differently constituted, for rehearing and determination according to law.
The court ordered that leave to appeal from certain orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was granted to the extent necessary. The appeal was allowed in part, and specific orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were set aside. The application was remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, differently constituted, for rehearing and determination according to law. The costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia were to be paid by the first respondent to the first appellant.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. To the extent necessary, leave is granted to appeal from orders 2, 3 and 4 made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 9 May 2018.
2. The appeal be allowed in part.
3. Order 4 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 9 May 2018 and orders 1 and 2 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 17 May 2018 are set aside.
4. The application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be remitted to that Court differently constituted for rehearing and determination according to law.
5. The costs of the appeal to this Court be paid by the first respondent to the first appellant, as agreed or assessed.
6. The costs of the proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia be paid by the first respondent to the first appellant in the agreed amount of $7,328.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was initially heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where Flick J conducted the hearing and made decisions that were later critiqued. Following this, the applicants made an application for Judge Street to disqualify himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias, which was dismissed. They also applied to vacate the hearing date, which was refused. The applicants then appealed to the High Court against the decisions of Judge Street. The appeal was heard in the High Court where the applicants were represented by counsel and solicitors.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the first issue, whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application that he disqualify himself on the ground of reasonable apprehension of bias. The court examined the primary judge's conduct and the reasons provided for the dismissal of the application. The court noted that the appellants did not seek an order that the matter be remitted to a differently constituted Federal Circuit Court. The court concluded that the primary judge's conduct did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias as it was not conduct that a fair-minded lay observer would consider might impair the judge's impartiality. The court applied the principle that the test for reasonable apprehension of bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer, having knowledge of all the material facts, might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits.
The court then considered the second issue, whether the primary judge erred in refusing an application that the hearing date be vacated. The court examined the reasons for the refusal of the adjournment and the impact on the appellants' opportunity to be heard. The court concluded that the primary judge's refusal of the adjournment did not effectively deny the appellants an opportunity to be heard. The court applied the principle that the refusal of an adjournment is not automatically a ground for setting aside a decision, and that the court must consider the circumstances of the case and whether the refusal was justified.
Finally, the court addressed the procedure to be adopted where appeal grounds include both procedural errors and substantive grounds. The court held that the appeal should be considered in stages, with the court first determining the appeal on the procedural grounds before proceeding to the substantive grounds. The court applied the principle that it is generally appropriate to deal with procedural issues first to avoid unnecessary proceedings and to ensure that any substantive issues are considered by a properly constituted tribunal. The court also noted that the costs orders were appropriate given the agreed or assessed costs and the agreed amount for the proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court.