FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CPF15 & ORS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1162 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application in a case for recusal – whether the Court’s conduct in respect of the hearing at first instance and the fixing of the matter for hearing on 16 April 2018 amounted to conduct by which a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on the merits – application in a case dismissed. |
| Legislation: Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001, r.15.27 |
| Cases cited: CPF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 330 |
| First Applicant: | CPF15 |
| Second Applicant: | CPG15 |
| Third Applicant: | CPH15 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 3293 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Street |
| Hearing date: | 9 May 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 9 May 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 9 May 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr J Young |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | G&S Law |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Ms N Laing |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The application for recusal under ground 1 of the application in a case is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3293 of 2015
| CPF15 |
First Applicant
| CPG15 |
Second Applicant
| CPH15 |
Third Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application in a case for the Court to recuse itself based on two identified aspects of conduct. The first conduct identified by Mr Young of counsel was the conduct of the hearing at first instance. The second conduct identified by Mr Young was the order made on 16 April 2018 fixing the matter for hearing today.
In relation to the history of the matter the proceedings were commenced on 3 December 2015 seeking a Constitutional writ in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 10 November 2015 affirming the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicants protection visas. The first applicant is the mother of the third applicant, and the wife of the second applicant.
On 11 February 2016 orders were made by a Registrar of the Court appointing the first applicant as the litigation guardian of the third applicant, and providing the applicants with an opportunity to file affidavit evidence and an amended application by 17 March 2016. The matter was listed for callover on 13 October 2016 and orders were made in a form that provided for written submissions and a list of authorities to be filed 14 days before the hearing by the applicants, and seven days before the hearing by the first respondent. A general order was made granting liberty to apply. That liberty to apply order has not been vacated by any order made by thep Court.
On 10 October 2016 a Registrar made further orders setting the matter down…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 1162
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister's decisions to refuse protection visas were vitiated by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the applicants contended that the Minister failed to consider relevant considerations and took into account irrelevant considerations when assessing their claims for protection, thereby breaching the requirements of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and the *Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977* (Cth).
Judge Street found that the Minister's delegate had failed to properly consider the applicants' claims for protection in accordance with the relevant legislative framework. The delegate had, in part, relied on information that was not before the Minister at the time of the decision and had failed to adequately assess the credibility of the applicants' claims. This failure constituted a jurisdictional error, rendering the decisions unlawful. The Court quashed the decisions of the Minister and remitted the applications for protection visas to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter in CPF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on an application for recusal. The applicants, CPF15, CPG15, and CPH15, sought for the Court to recuse itself due to perceived bias or unfairness in the handling of their case. The case originated from a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 10 November 2015, which was affirmed by the Minister for Immigration & Border Protection. The applicants filed a writ in the Federal Circuit Court on 3 December 2015 seeking judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. After several procedural steps including amendments to the application, the matter was initially heard by the Federal Circuit Court on 21 July 2017, resulting in an order dismissing the application. This decision was subsequently appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. On 26 February 2018, Flick J allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the Federal Circuit Court for reconsideration. The applicants then filed an application for recusal in the Federal Circuit Court, which was heard and dismissed on 9 May 2018. The applicants argued that the conduct of the initial hearing and the subsequent fixing of the matter for hearing amounted to bias, but the Court found that these actions did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the conduct of the hearing at first instance amounted to conduct by which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits.
2. Whether the order made on 16 April 2018 fixing the matter for hearing amounted to conduct by which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits.
Held
1. Whether the conduct of the hearing at first instance amounted to conduct by which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits. The Court concluded that the conduct of the hearing did not amount to such apprehension; hence, the application for recusal based on this ground was dismissed.
2. Whether the order made on 16 April 2018 fixing the matter for hearing amounted to conduct by which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits. The Court concluded that the order did not amount to such apprehension; hence, the application for recusal based on this ground was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the conduct of the hearing at first instance amounted to conduct by which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Court might not bring an independent and impartial mind to the determination of the matter on its merits. The Court noted that the hearing had been conducted with a duty to ensure procedural fairness and that there was no evidence suggesting that the conduct of the hearing was such that it would lead a fair-minded lay observer to doubt the impartiality of the Court. The Court relied on the fact that it provided reasons for its decisions and that the findings of procedural errors were not inherently indicative of bias. Instead, the Court considered the reasons provided by Flick J in the appeal decision and concluded that the procedural errors did not constitute bias. The Court's reasoning was grounded in the understanding that procedural errors, while significant, do not necessarily imply a lack of impartiality if the Court's reasoning process remains transparent and fair.
The Court then turned to the second issue of whether the order made on 16 April 2018, which fixed the matter for hearing, amounted to conduct that might lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend bias. Here, the Court emphasized that it had a duty to comply with orders from superior courts and that the fixing of the matter for hearing was done promptly after the appellate decision. The Court reasoned that the order was made in the context of existing liberty to apply provisions and did not reflect any entrenched bias. The Court further noted that the matter had been listed for hearing within a reasonable time frame, which aligns with the Court's duty to efficiently handle cases, particularly those involving liberty. The Court concluded that the expeditious nature of the hearing scheduling did not suggest bias on its part.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that procedural errors and the expeditious scheduling of hearings, in the context of existing liberty to apply provisions and transparent judicial reasoning, do not amount to conduct that would lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend bias in the Court. The Court distinguished the present case from prior authority by focusing on the specific circumstances of the case and the nature of the errors identified, which did not inherently suggest bias but rather procedural missteps. The Court followed the principle that the existence of procedural errors alone does not justify a finding of bias if the Court's conduct remains transparent and fair.