Cosmetic Equipment Company Pty Ltd v Forrest

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Civil)

COSMETIC EQUIPMENT COMPANY PTY LTD v FORREST

[2008] SASC 144

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

29 May 2008

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - IN GENERAL

EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS, AND WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE - GENERALLY - SUFFICIENCY

EVIDENCE - WITNESSES - CROSS-EXAMINATION - WHEN PERMITTED AND IN GENERAL

Appeal against judgment of magistrate dismissing a claim for moneys alleged to be owed under a contract of sale - magistrate found no contract for sale existed - whether defendant's departure from pleaded case at trial led to a denial of procedural fairness - whether breaches of the rule in Browne v Dunn by the defendant at trial led to a denial of procedural fairness - whether magistrate erred in not entering judgment for the plaintiff following his rejection of the defendant's pleaded case - whether magistrate's findings were open on the evidence - whether magistrate erred in allowing the defendant to adduce evidence alleged to be contrary to an admission made in response to a Notice to Admit - whether trial miscarried such that a re-trial should be ordered.

Held:  appeal dismissed - plaintiff afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the defendant and her witness - departure by the defendant from her pleaded case did not result in procedural unfairness to the plaintiff - breaches by the defendant of the rule in Browne v Dunn did not result in unfairness such that the trial miscarried - magistrate's findings of fact open on the evidence - no error demonstrated in magistrate's approach to admissions made in response to Notice to Admit - no miscarriage demonstrated - no grounds established for interference with judgment of magistrate.

Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992  (SA) s 76; Butterworths, Cross on Evidence:  Australian Edition, vol 1, referred to.
Banque Commerciale SA (In Liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; Gould v Mount Oxide Mines Ltd (In Liq) (1916) 22 CLR 490; Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840, applied.
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, distinguished.
Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67; Williams v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1988) 52 SASR 215; Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner for Taxation (1983) 1 NSWLR 1; Karidis v General Motors-Holdens Pty Ltd [1971] SASR 422; O'Keefe v Australian Trencher Company Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 370, discussed.
Marini v MLH Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd (2004) 237 LSJS 288; Whitlam v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 57 NSWLR 559; Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; Vines v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 62 ACSR; Leotta v Public Transport Commission (NSW) (1976) 50 ALJR 666; Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491; Suvaal v Cessnock City Council (2003) 200 ALR 1; Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88; Crosthwaite v City of…

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Details
Case
[2008] SASC 144
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Cosmetic Equipment Company Pty Ltd (plaintiff) appealed against a judgment of the Magistrates Court of Victoria which dismissed their claim for moneys alleged to be owed under a contract of sale. The magistrate found that no contract for sale existed. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's departure from her pleaded case at trial led to a denial of procedural fairness, that breaches of the rule in Browne v Dunn by the defendant at trial led to a denial of procedural fairness, and that the magistrate erred in not entering judgment for the plaintiff following his rejection of the defendant's pleaded case. The plaintiff also argued that the magistrate's findings were not open on the evidence and that the magistrate erred in allowing the defendant to adduce evidence alleged to be contrary to an admission made in response to a Notice to Admit. The plaintiff further argued that the trial miscarried such that a re-trial should be ordered.

The court held that the plaintiff was afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the defendant and her witness, and that the departure by the defendant from her pleaded case did not result in procedural unfairness to the plaintiff. The court also held that the breaches by the defendant of the rule in Browne v Dunn did not result in unfairness such that the trial miscarried. The court found that the magistrate's findings of fact were open on the evidence and that there was no error demonstrated in the magistrate's approach to admissions made in response to Notice to Admit. The court held that no miscarriage was demonstrated and that no grounds were established for interference with the judgment of the magistrate.

The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Thirdly, in the present case, it was the plaintiff who was seeking relief. The defendant did not seek any relief, instead denying that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief which it sought and, as part of that denial, asserting her own version of the events which had occurred.Further Background In 2005 the plaintiff was known as K.O.C. Pty Ltd. It traded under the name of “Cosmetic Solutions”. Its principal business was the conduct of beauty salons. The trial commenced on 26 March 2007 and continued on the afternoon of the following day. The plaintiff led evidence from two witnesses: Tanya Viscariello and her de facto husband John Viscariello. Mr Viscariello was the sole director of the plaintiff but Ms Viscariello conducted the day to day business of the company. It was Ms Viscariello who had most of the dealings with the defendant. The defendant commenced her evidence on 27 March 2007 but her cross-examination was not completed that day. The trial was then adjourned to 14 August 2007. The adjournment has a significance to which reference will be made later.The Evidence of Mr Viscariello Mr Viscariello’s evidence-in-chief concerning the sale of the iPulse was to the following effect. An iPulse which the plaintiff had purchased for its own purposes was delivered by Mr Moncrieff, the Managing Director of High Tech Laser Australia Pty Ltd (High Tech), to the Norwood salon on 27 June 2005. Ms Viscariello told him that the defendant wished to purchase that iPulse. He then spoke to the defendant himself. The defendant told him that she wished to purchase the iPulse urgently and offered to make a payment directly to High Tech in order to speed things up. He then discussed with the defendant her making an initial payment of $18,000 directly to High Tech, with the balance to be paid on her collection of the iPulse. He told the defendant that he would prepare an invoice in those terms, and did so. He gave it to his wife to give to the defendant. On the plaintiff’s case, an oral contract for the sale and purchase of the iPulse was made in the discussion between Mr Viscariello and the defendant, and the invoice (Exhibit P5) was written evidence of it. Mr Viscariello identified an email from High Tech to Cosmetic Solutions dated 2 July 2005 (Exhibit P1) as recording the terms of a distribution agreement between the two companies in relation to iPulses. He also identified as business records of Cosmetic Solutions a letter dated 29 June 2005 from High Tech received by Cosmetic Solutions in which, amongst other things, Mr Moncrieff provided an invoice and order for the iPulse which he had delivered on 27 June (Exhibit P2), the order form itself (Exhibit P3) and the tax invoice (Exhibit P4). All of these documents were received by Cosmetic Solutions by facsimile transmission on 30 June 2005. As I understand it, the plaintiff tendered these documents in order to prove its own acquisition of the iPulse. On the plaintiff’s case, they evidenced, in effect, its ability to have entered into the contract with the defendant which it alleged.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The defendant commenced her evidence on 27 March 2007 but her cross-examination was not completed that day. The trial was then adjourned to 14 August 2007. The adjournment has a significance to which reference will be made later.The Evidence of Mr Viscariello Mr Viscariello’s evidence-in-chief concerning the sale of the iPulse was to the following effect. An iPulse which the plaintiff had purchased for its own purposes was delivered by Mr Moncrieff, the Managing Director of High Tech Laser Australia Pty Ltd (High Tech), to the Norwood salon on 27 June 2005. Ms Viscariello told him that the defendant wished to purchase that iPulse. He then spoke to the defendant himself. The defendant told him that she wished to purchase the iPulse urgently and offered to make a payment directly to High Tech in order to speed things up. He then discussed with the defendant her making an initial payment of $18,000 directly to High Tech, with the balance to be paid on her collection of the iPulse. He told the defendant that he would prepare an invoice in those terms, and did so. He gave it to his wife to give to the defendant. On the plaintiff’s case, an oral contract for the sale and purchase of the iPulse was made in the discussion between Mr Viscariello and the defendant, and the invoice (Exhibit P5) was written evidence of it. Mr Viscariello identified an email from High Tech to Cosmetic Solutions dated 2 July 2005 (Exhibit P1) as recording the terms of a distribution agreement between the two companies in relation to iPulses. He also identified as business records of Cosmetic Solutions a letter dated 29 June 2005 from High Tech received by Cosmetic Solutions in which, amongst other things, Mr Moncrieff provided an invoice and order for the iPulse which he had delivered on 27 June (Exhibit P2), the order form itself (Exhibit P3) and the tax invoice (Exhibit P4). All of these documents were received by Cosmetic Solutions by facsimile transmission on 30 June 2005. As I understand it, the plaintiff tendered these documents in order to prove its own acquisition of the iPulse. On the plaintiff’s case, they evidenced, in effect, its ability to have entered into the contract with the defendant which it alleged. Mr Viscariello also said that in July-August 2005 he was involved in another company. This was Cosmetic Co Pty Ltd (Cosmetic Co). There were two shareholders of Cosmetic Co holding equal shares. They were the defendant and J & L Developments Pty Ltd. J & L Developments held its share on trust for a family trust of Mr and Ms Viscariello. The shareholders contemplated that Cosmetic Co would engage in the business of importing cosmetic equipment for sale within Australia. In September 2005 a dispute arose between the parties involved in Cosmetic Co. Mr Viscariello told the defendant that the arrangement involving Cosmetic Co would cease forthwith. Three days later the defendant attended at the plaintiff’s Malvern salon, accompanied by the police, and took the iPulse.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the defendant's departure from her pleaded case at trial lead to a denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff?
2. Did breaches of the rule in Browne v Dunn by the defendant at trial lead to a denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff?
3. Did the magistrate err in not entering judgment for the plaintiff following his rejection of the defendant's pleaded case?
4. Were the magistrate's findings open on the evidence presented?
5. Did the magistrate err in allowing the defendant to adduce evidence alleged to be contrary to an admission made in response to a Notice to Admit?
6. Did the trial miscarry such that a re-trial should be ordered?

Held
1. The court concluded that the defendant's departure from her pleaded case at trial did not lead to a denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff. Result: appeal dismissed.
2. The court determined that breaches of the rule in Browne v Dunn by the defendant at trial did not lead to a denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff. Result: appeal dismissed.
3. The court found that the magistrate did not err in not entering judgment for the plaintiff following his rejection of the defendant's pleaded case. Result: appeal dismissed.
4. The court held that the magistrate's findings were open on the evidence presented. Result: appeal dismissed.
5. The court concluded that the magistrate did not err in allowing the defendant to adduce evidence alleged to be contrary to an admission made in response to a Notice to Admit. Result: appeal dismissed.
6. The court held that the trial did not miscarry such that a re-trial should be ordered. Result: appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering whether the defendant's departure from her pleaded case at trial led to a denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff had been afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the defendant and her witness. The plaintiff had ample opportunity to probe the defendant's version of events and challenge the credibility of her evidence. The court emphasised that the trial judge had the discretion to control the conduct of the trial and to ensure that both parties had a fair opportunity to present their cases. The court found that the plaintiff's opportunity to cross-examine the defendant was not compromised by the latter's departure from her pleaded case, as the plaintiff was still able to address the substance of the defendant's evidence.

In addressing whether breaches of the rule in Browne v Dunn by the defendant at trial led to a denial of procedural fairness to the plaintiff, the court held that such breaches did not result in unfairness to the extent that the trial miscarried. The court noted that the trial judge had the discretion to control the conduct of the trial and to ensure that the proceedings were conducted in a manner that was just and fair to both parties. While the defendant's breaches of the rule in Browne v Dunn may have caused some prejudice to the plaintiff, the court found that the trial judge had exercised his discretion appropriately in controlling the trial and ensuring that the proceedings were conducted fairly.

In considering whether the magistrate erred in not entering judgment for the plaintiff following his rejection of the defendant's pleaded case, the court held that the magistrate's findings of fact were open on the evidence presented. The court noted that the magistrate had the discretion to assess the credibility of the evidence and to draw inferences from the facts. The court found that the magistrate's assessment of the evidence was reasonable and that his findings were supported by the evidence.

In considering whether the magistrate erred in allowing the defendant to adduce evidence alleged to be contrary to an admission made in response to a Notice to Admit, the court held that the magistrate had not demonstrated any error in his approach. The court noted that the magistrate had the discretion to control the admissibility of evidence and to ensure that the trial was conducted in a manner that was just and fair to both parties. The court found that the magistrate's decision to allow the defendant to adduce evidence alleged to be contrary to an admission made in response to a Notice to Admit was reasonable and that it did not prejudice the plaintiff's case.

Finally, in considering whether the trial miscarried such that a re-trial should be ordered, the court held that no miscarriage had been demonstrated. The court noted that the trial judge had the discretion to control the conduct of the trial and to ensure that the proceedings were conducted in a manner that was just and fair to both parties. The court found that the trial judge had exercised his discretion appropriately and that no miscarriage had occurred.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the trial judge has broad discretion to control the conduct of the trial and to ensure that the proceedings are conducted in a manner that is just and fair to both parties. The court will not interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion unless it is demonstrated that there has been a miscarriage of justice or a breach of procedural fairness. The court will not substitute its own assessment of the evidence for that of the trial judge, but will instead consider whether the trial judge's findings were open on the evidence presented. The court will also consider whether the trial judge's exercise of discretion was reasonable and whether it resulted in a miscarriage of justice.