Commonwealth of Australia v Dutton

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Commonwealth of Australia v Dutton [2000] FCA 1466

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION – extradition proceedings – legal professional privilege.

Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 42
Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) ss 12, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23, 50

Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528 considered
Pasini v Vanstone [1999] FCA 1271 considered
Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 applied

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA v EDWARD I DUTTON

N 576 OF 2000

WILCOX, SPENDER AND MOORE JJ
20 OCTOBER 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 576 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY MR B J MCMAHON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Appellant

AND:

EDWARD I DUTTON
Respondent

JUDGES:

WILCOX, SPENDER AND MOORE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

20 OCTOBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.

2.   The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal with a direction that the documents to which the proceedings relate are not privileged except the following documents which are privileged:

(i)the documents set out in the schedule to this judgment;

(ii)the documents numbered 11, 44, 51 and 52 in schedule B of the affidavit of Ms Jackson of 7 April 2000 which are privileged; and

(iii)any other document that the Tribunal earlier decided was privileged.

3.  The cross-appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N576 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY MR B J MCMAHON, DEPUTY PRESIDENT

BETWEEN:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Appellant

AND:

EDWARD I DUTTON
Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX, SPENDER and MOORE JJ

DATE:

20 OCTOBER 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. WILCOX J:  I have read in draft form the reasons for judgment of Moore J.  I respectfully agree with them and the orders his Honour proposes.

  2. Although other issues were raised at earlier points of time, the only question at the hearing of the appeal was the extent (if any) to which the subject documents were rendered exempt from production to the respondent by s42 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982, read with s50 of the Extradition Act 1988. As Moore J points out, both parties accepted that the concept of legal professional privilege embodied in s42(1) of the Freedom of Information Act is that developed by the common law, not that (called “client legal privilege”) covered by Division 1 of Part 3.10 (ss117 to 126) of the Evidence Act 1995. It seems to me this is correct. That Division 1 is concerned only with the adduction of evidence in legal proceedings is inherent in the approach taken by the High Court of Australia in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67; 168 ALR 123.

  3. The common…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1466
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal is by the Commonwealth from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 4 May 2000 concerning the production of documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act). The appeal is by special leave granted by this Court. The subject of the appeal is the production of documents which the Attorney-General’s Department refused to release under the FOI Act to Mr Edward Dutton. The refusal was based on the claim that the documents were subject to legal professional privilege. Mr Dutton, whose extradition is being sought by the Republic of South Africa, had originally sought copies of the documents which the Attorney-General’s Department held which constituted his file. The legal issues before the Court were whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that the documents were not privileged and therefore should be released under the FOI Act and whether the Tribunal erred in concluding that Mr Dutton was entitled to inspect the documents.

The Court concluded that the Tribunal erred in concluding that the documents were not privileged and should be released under the FOI Act. The Court held that the Tribunal did not have before it sufficient material to make the determination as to whether the documents were privileged. The Court held that the Tribunal erred in concluding that Mr Dutton was entitled to inspect the documents. The Court set aside the decision of the Tribunal and remitted the matter with directions that the documents to which the proceedings related were not privileged except for certain specified documents which were privileged. The Court dismissed the cross-appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal with a direction that the documents to which the proceedings relate are not privileged except the following documents which are privileged:

(i) the documents set out in the schedule to this judgment;

(ii) the documents numbered 11, 44, 51 and 52 in schedule B of the affidavit of Ms Jackson of 7 April 2000 which are privileged; and

(iii) any other document that the Tribunal earlier decided was privileged.

3. The cross-appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 4 May 2000 concerning the production of documents under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (“the FOI Act”). The Tribunal set aside a decision of an officer of the Attorney-General’s Department not to release under the FOI Act certain documents to Mr Edward Dutton and remitted the matter with a direction that Mr Dutton was entitled to access to a considerable number of specified documents. Mr Dutton, whose extradition is being sought by the Republic of South Africa, had originally sought copies “of the documents which you (Attorney-General’s Department) hold which constitute (my) file”.Background It is unnecessary to detail the steps initially taken by the Attorney-General’s Department to deal with Mr Dutton’s request. However by letter dated 4 November 1999 the effective decision concerning release of the requested documents was communicated to Mr Dutton by Ms M Jackson, then the First Assistant Secretary of the Criminal Law Division of the Department. In the letter Ms Jackson identified documents which would be released and those that would not be released or released only in part. She also identified the provisions of the FOI Act relied on in deciding not to release documents in whole or part, including s 42 which relates to documents attracting legal professional privilege. As I will discuss shortly, the claim for legal professional privilege was underpinned by s 50 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Extradition Act”). The request for access under the FOI Act arose against a background in which Mr Dutton had challenged, in various ways, steps taken under the Extradition Act to extradite him to South Africa. The following account is drawn from the decision of the Tribunal which set out extracts of an affidavit of Ms Jackson detailing the litigation concerning Mr Dutton’s extradition. In 1995 the Republic of South Africa requested the provisional arrest of Mr Dutton for the purposes of extraditing him to South Africa (“the initial request”). The initial request was governed by the Extradition Act and the Extradition (Commonwealth Countries) Regulations 1988 (Cth). Mr Dutton was provisionally arrested in November 1995. An extradition hearing under s 19 of the Extradition Act took place before Syme SM in November 1996. On 29 November 1996 Syme SM ordered Mr Dutton’s release under s 19 after having found that he was not eligible to be returned to South Africa. The Republic of South Africa then applied under s 21 for a review in this Court of Syme SM’s decision. The application was heard by Hill J who gave judgment in relation to a number of preliminary issues in June 1997: Republic of South Africa v Dutton (1997) 77 FCR 128. Mr Dutton sought leave to appeal to a Full Court. In January 1998, the Republic of South Africa made another request for Mr Dutton’s extradition (“the second request”). On 21 January 1998 the Minister for Justice, Senator Amanda Vanstone, issued a notice under s 16 directing a magistrate to conduct a s 19 hearing for the purposes of determining Mr Dutton’s eligibility for surrender to South Africa. At this time the application for leave to appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court was still pending.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

WILCOX, SPENDER AND MOORE JJ
It is desirable to set out, in a summary way, the principal steps that can be taken to extradite a person under the Extradition Act. First, a country seeking the extradition of a person applies to a magistrate for the arrest of that person, and the magistrate, if satisfied that the person is extraditable to that country, issues an arrest warrant: s 12. Second, the person is arrested, brought before a magistrate, and remanded in custody or on bail as long as is necessary for proceedings under ss 18 and/or 19 to be conducted: s 15. Third (though this may happen before the person is arrested or remanded), the Attorney-General, having received an extradition request from the country seeking the extradition, may issue a notice to a magistrate stating that the request has been received: s 16. Fourth, a magistrate conducts proceedings to determine whether the person is eligible for surrender in relation to the offence(s) for which extradition is sought to the country seeking extradition: s 19. And fifth, if the magistrate determines that the person is so eligible, the Attorney-General then determines whether the person is to be surrendered: s 22. The proceedings under s 19 are not necessary if the person voluntarily consents to being surrendered in which case the matter is dealt with under s 18 and the magistrate advises the Attorney-General of the offences in respect of which the person has consented to be surrendered. If the Attorney-General determines that the person is to be surrendered, (after the steps in ss 18 or 19 have been taken) the Attorney-General issues a warrant for the person’s surrender to the country seeking extradition: s 23.The Decision of the Tribunal In the affidavit of Ms Jackson before the Tribunal, there was not only a description of the events resulting from the request for the extradition of Mr Dutton but also an explanation of the grounds upon which the release of various classes of documents had been refused. The documents were grouped into nine groups and Groups 1 to 4 were documents for which a claim of privilege was made under s 42. The Tribunal had before it copies of the documents and also a schedule annexed to the affidavit of Ms Jackson identifying the relevant documents, a description of the documents and the grounds upon which release of each of the documents was resisted. As these proceedings ultimately only concern documents in respect of which legal professional privilege was claimed, it is unnecessary to detail the approach taken by the Tribunal to other documents whose release was resisted on other grounds. At the time the Tribunal considered the matter, there were 146 documents said to be exempted under s 42. In its reasons the Tribunal observed that s 42 concerned legal professional privilege which was not, for the Tribunal’s purposes, to be treated as the same as client legal privilege arising under ss 117-126 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The Tribunal went on to say that the relevant privilege was common law legal professional privilege where regard was had to the purpose for which the documents were brought into existence. The Tribunal noted the approach of the majority of the High Court in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 that the sole purpose test was the applicable test. It also noted the revision of this approach in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 168 ALR 123 and that now the test is whether the documents contain communications made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance, or for use in legal proceedings. There has been no suggestion in these proceedings that the Tribunal erred in adopting this approach.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WILCOX, SPENDER AND MOORE JJ

Full text does not contain this section.