Commissioner of Taxation v Eichmann

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Taxation v Eichmann [2019] FCA 2155

File number: QUD 206 of 2019
Judge: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 20 December 2019
Catchwords:

TAXATION – CGT concessions – “active asset” – land used for storage of materials used by construction company – land not “used … in the course of carrying on a business”

TAXATION – private rulings – review by Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal found and relied on facts not existing in the scheme the subject of the ruling – findings were inferences from scheme facts

Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), s 152-40(1)

New Business Tax System (Capital Gains Tax) Act 1999 (Cth)

Tax Laws Amendment (Small Business) Act 2007 (Cth)

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth), s 14ZZ

Taxation Laws Amendment Act (No 1) Act 1997 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings (2012) 250 CLR 503

Commissioner of Taxation v McMahon (1997) 79 FCR 127

Commissioner of Taxation v Myer Emporium Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 199

Comptroller-General of Customs v Akai Pty Ltd (1994) 50 FCR 511

Co-operative Bulk Handling Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 79 ATR 582

Co-operative Bulk Handling Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 79 ATR 582

Council of the City of Newcastle v Royal Newcastle Hospital (1957) 96 CLR 493

Council of the City of Newcastle v Royal Newcastle Hospital (1959) 100 CLR 1

Doutch v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2016) 248 FCR 211

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd (2012) 250 CLR 503

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Crown Insurance Services Ltd (2012) 207 FCR 247

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hyteco Hiring Pty Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 502

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Spedley Securities Ltd (1988) 88 ATC 4126

First Provincial Building Society Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 56 FCR 320

Hastie Group Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 172 FCR 496

HFM043 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 92 ALJR 817

Northern Territory v Collins (2008) 235 CLR 619

Re Karapanagiotidis and Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2007) 68 ATR 348

Rosgoe Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCA 1231

Rus v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2018) 108 ATR 212

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252

Victoria Power Networks Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2019] FCA 77

Westfield Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 333

Date of hearing: 29 July 2019
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Taxation
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 80
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms M Brennan QC with Mr R Schulte
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Taxation Office
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr PE Hack QC with Mr PG Bickford
Solicitor for the Respondent: Cleary Hoare

ORDERS

QUD 206 of 2019
BETWEEN:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Applicant

AND:

DAVID EICHMANN

Respondent

JUDGE:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 DECEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 2155
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, where the Commissioner of Taxation sought to challenge a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that a parcel of land owned by Mr Eichmann and his wife qualified as an "active asset" under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). This decision entitled the couple to a concession on capital gains tax (CGT) payable on the sale of the land. The Commissioner had previously issued an unfavourable private ruling stating that the land did not qualify for the small business CGT concessions. The central issue in the case was whether the land could be classified as an "active asset" under the relevant tax legislation, specifically section 152-40(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The AAT had found that the land was used for the storage of materials and tools, and that this use was integral to the operation of the family business.

The Court had to determine whether the AAT had correctly applied the statutory language in concluding that the land was an "active asset." The Commissioner argued that the AAT had exceeded its jurisdiction by making findings of fact not supported by the evidence presented in the private ruling. The Court examined the ordinary meaning of the statutory language and whether the facts found by the AAT necessarily fell within the statutory description. The Court found that the AAT's decision was based on a misinterpretation of the statutory language and that the land did not satisfy the requirements for being an active asset. The Court held that the AAT had incorrectly substituted its own factual findings for those presented in the private ruling, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction.

The Federal Court allowed the appeal, set aside the AAT's decision, and remitted the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration in light of the Court's reasons. The Court emphasized that the AAT should confine its review to the facts as set out in the private ruling and should not make additional factual findings. The Court's decision highlighted the importance of adhering to the statutory language and the limitations of the AAT's jurisdiction in reviewing private rulings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 15 February 2019 be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for determination according to law in accordance with these reasons.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Tribunal substituted a decision allowing the objection of the respondent, Mr Eichmann, in relation to a private ruling of the Commissioner and determined that a parcel of land which Mr Eichmann and his wife had owned was an “active asset” within the meaning of that expression in s 152-40(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA97). The effect of that decision was that Mr Eichmann and his wife would be entitled to a concession in relation to the amount of capital gains tax (CGT) payable on gains made by them on the sale of the land.Background On 15 December 2016, Mr Eichmann, on his and his spouse’s behalf, applied for a private ruling as to whether he was entitled to a small business CGT concession on the sale of certain real property which had been used by the family business. The Commissioner sought further and additional information from Mr Eichmann’s accountant on 31 January and 13 February 2017 which was provided on 9 and 14 February 2017. On 22 March 2017, the Commissioner issued the taxpayer an unfavourable ruling as follows:Are you eligible for the small business concessions in relation to the sale of your property used by the family business? Answer: No. The ruling was based on the description of the scheme set out under the heading “Relevant Facts and Circumstances”, which was as follows:1. You and your spouse (you) have run a business for many years.2. The business is run through [the] Eichmann Family Trust (the Trust).3. Eichmann & Sons Pty Ltd (the trustee company) is the sole trustee of the trust.4. You are the beneficiaries to the trust.5. You are shareholders and directors of the trustee company.6. The trust carries on a business of building, bricklaying and paving.7.During that time you owned a block of land located at 10 Yulunga Place, Mooloolaba QLD 4557 (the property). The property was sold in the 2016-17 income year.8. The property is adjacent to your family home at 8 Yulunga Place, Mooloolaba.9. Both the property and your family home were acquired in 1997.10.The business has been running for longer than your ownership period in the property.11.The property has two 4m x 3m sheds, as well as a 2m high block wall and gate to secure the property.12. The usage of the property involved:(a)The two sheds were used for the storage of work tools, equipment and materials.(b)The open space on the property was used to store materials that did not need to be stored under cover, including bricks, blocks, pavers, mixers, wheel barrows, drums, scaffolding and iron.(c) Work vehicles and trailers were parked on the property.(d) Tools and items were collected on a daily basis.(e)In some cases the property would be visited a number of times a day in between jobs depending on what each job required.13. The property was mainly for storage as work would be done on work sites.14.On occasion, some preparatory work was done at the property in a limited capacity.15. There was no business signage on the property.16. In October 2016, the property was sold for $935,000.17. The business has an aggregated turnover of less than $2 million a year.(The numbering of the facts used in the Commissioner’s submissions has been adopted for the purposes of these reasons.)

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 20 July 2017, the Commissioner made a decision on the objection and affirmed it. Mr Eichmann sought review of the objection decision pursuant to s 14ZZ(1)(a)(i) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA).The Tribunal’s decision In his reasons for decision the learned Deputy President set out the “arrangement” or “scheme” — being the identified facts on which the tax law operates — upon which the Commissioner relied as well as the legislative regime relating to the “active asset” test. He noted (at [17]) the submission advanced by the Commissioner that, to satisfy that test, “there must be more than a mere incidental use of the land and that consideration must be given to what use the asset was put and to what extent those activities could be said to be ‘in the course of carrying on a business’”. The Deputy President also referred to the explanatory memoranda for a number of Bills relating to the provisions concerning CGT relief on the acquisition and disposal of active assets by small businesses, but could find nothing in them which assisted the interpretation of the provisions relevant to the decision. The substantive part of the Tribunal’s reasoning is found in paragraphs [27] to [29] of the reasons:27. In the present case and proceeding only on the facts referred to in the Ruling, the Applicant did not hold the land passively as an investment. His use of the land was not trivial or insignificant. He used the land for the purpose of his business, to store material in the sheds; to store material outside the sheds and to store his tools, all of which were undoubtedly done for the purpose of operating of the business. Tools and items were collected from the site on a daily basis, and work vehicles and trailers were parked on the property. Sometimes the site was visited several times per day between jobs, and occasionally some preparatory work was undertaken on the property. In his evidence he explained that storing the materials and tools on the land contributed to the efficiency of the business. The facts in this case are completely different from those considered in Karapanagioditis.28. The Respondent contended that the phrase “in the course of” requires the use to be integral to the process by which the business is carried on. However, section 152-40(1)(a) only requires the asset to be used “in the course of carrying on a business,” encompassing, necessarily, a fairly wide range of activities. Nothing in the Act, any applicable case authority or Explanatory Memoranda detracts from the ordinary and common sense meaning of the words “used in the course of carrying on a business”. The legislature could easily have used the word “necessary,” “integral” or “essential” in order to further limit the availability of the concession should it so desire. It did not do so.29. I am satisfied that the extent of the use of the land is far from minimal, or incidental to the carrying on of the business, and that the Applicant has shown on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent has erred in determining that the land did not satisfy the requirements for being an active asset.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The above matters are important in the present case where, prima facie, it appears that the Tribunal has sought to add to the factual matrix on which the question was determined.Consideration In the notice of appeal the Commissioner identified what were said to be two questions of law arising from the Tribunal’s decision. They were:1. Whether for the purposes of the “Active Asset Test” in Subdivision 152-A, and on a proper construction of Subdivision 152-40(1) of the ITAA 1997:(a) it is sufficient for the characterisation of the land as an “active asset” to show that the land, owned by the taxpayer, was used for the purposes of a business carried on by an entity connected with the taxpayer in a manner that was no more than non-trivial and not insignificant?;(b) the words “is used, or held ready for use, in the course of carrying on a business” in subsection 152-40(1)(a) of the ITAA 1997 refer to a use that is integral to the process or processes by which the business is carried on?2. Whether the Tribunal, in reviewing the objection decision on a Private Ruling, exceeded its jurisdiction when it made findings of fact that were neither found in, nor inferences necessarily drawn from, the facts constituting the scheme set out in the Private Ruling? Before this Court the parties agree that the central issue concerns the application of the active asset test, it being agreed that Mr Eichmann and his spouse otherwise satisfy the requirements of s 152-35. Are the matters raised “questions of law”? The respondent accepted that the question raised in paragraph 2 of the amended notice of appeal raised a question of law on which an appeal could be founded under s 44 of the AAT Act. However, it was submitted that neither sub-paragraph 1(a) nor 1(b) raise a question of law. He submitted that the words “used or held ready for use in the course of carrying on a business” are words which have their meaning sense, and whether the facts in issue satisfy the ordinary meaning of a word or phrase is a mere question of fact. In support of that submission he relied upon the observations of Lander and Foster JJ in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Crown Insurance Services Ltd (2012) 207 FCR 247 at 256 [39], as follows:When the statute under consideration has no technical meaning, but is understood in its plain ordinary meaning, a question of law will arise if the facts found must necessarily have come within the statutory description, but only a question of fact will arise if the facts found are capable of coming within the statutory description. In that second case, no question of law arises because, as Hill J said at 16 in Sharp Corporation of Australia Pty Ltd v Collector of Customs, the decision ‘will generally involve weight being given to one or other element of the facts and so involve matters of degree’. To put it another way, a choice between two conclusions open on a consideration of the facts is a question of fact. One might add that a question of law will arise in relation to the application of a statutory provision which has its ordinary meaning is where it is alleged that the facts found must necessarily not come within the provision.