Commissioner of Patents v Thaler

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Commissioner of Patents v Thaler [2022] FCAFC 62

Appeal from: Thaler v Commissioner of Patents [2021] FCA 879
File number: VID 496 of 2021
Judgment of: ALLSOP CJ, NICHOLAS, YATES, MOSHINSKY AND BURLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 13 April 2022
Catchwords: PATENTS – artificial intelligence – where Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) require name of the inventor to be provided in application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty – where patent application named DABUS, an artificial intelligence machine, as inventor – where parties agreed that the invention described in the patent application was the output of the process undertaken by DABUS – where Deputy Commissioner of Patents determined that patent application did not comply with Patents Regulations – where primary judge set aside decision of Deputy Commissioner – concept of “inventor” under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – whether inventor must be a natural person – relationship between inventor and person entitled to be granted a patent – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Constitution s 51(xviii)

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) ss 2(1), 2C, 15AA

Patents Act 1903 (Cth) s32(2)

Patents Act 1952 (Cth) s 34(1)

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 2A, 13, 14, 15, 29, 29A, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 45, 49, 59, 64(2)(a), 101B(2), 101E(1) 113, 138, 172, 182, 188, sch 1

Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) reg 3.1A, 3.2C, 3.2C(2)(aa), 3.18(2)(a)(i), 3.18(2)(f)

Statute of Monopolies 1624 (21 Jac c 3) s 6

Blackstone’s Commentaries of the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, Book 2, 1766)

Explanatory Memorandum, Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Productivity Commission Response Part 2 and other Measures) Bill 2019 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum, Patents Bill 1989 (Cth)

Explanatory Statement, Select Legislative Instrument No. 88, 2015

Hindmarch, The Law Relating to Patents (1846)

Industrial Property Advisory Committee (1984) Patents, Innovation and Competition in Australia: a report to the Hon. Barry O. Jones, MP, Minister for Science and Technology, 29 August 1984

Terrell, T, Terrell C, Jones JR, Terrell on the Law of Patents (8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1934)

Cases cited:

Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (Northern Territory) [2009] HCA 41; 239 CLR 27

Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCA 42; 254 CLR 247

Atlantis Corporation v Schindler [1997] FCA 1105; 39 IPR 29

D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc [2015] HCA 35; 258 CLR 334

Deal v Father Pius Kodakkathanath [2016] HCA 31; 258 CLR 281

Dunlop v Cooper [1908] HCA 67; 7 CLR 146

JMVB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Camoflag Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 1474; 67 IPR 68

JMVB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Camoflag Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 141; 154 FCR 348

Kafataris v Davis [2016] FCAFC 134; 120 IPR 206

Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Arico Trading International Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 8; 207 CLR 1

Marsden v The Saville Street Foundry and Engineering Co Ltd (1878) 3 Ex D 203

Miller v Miller [2011] HCA 9; 242 CLR 446

National Resource Development Corporation v Commissioner…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Commissioner of Patents v Thaler involved a dispute over the eligibility of an invention created by an artificial intelligence machine, DABUS, to be patented in Australia. The Commissioner of Patents, acting under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth), rejected the patent application because DABUS, the inventor, was not a natural person. Dr. Stephen Thaler, the owner of DABUS, contested this decision. The central legal issue was whether the term "inventor" in the Patents Act could encompass an artificial intelligence entity.

The Court of Appeal had to determine the meaning of "inventor" under the Patents Act and whether the statutory provisions could accommodate an artificial intelligence as an inventor. The Deputy Commissioner of Patents had ruled that an artificial intelligence could not be an inventor, leading to the rejection of the patent application. Dr. Thaler appealed this decision, arguing that the ordinary meaning of "inventor" should be interpreted broadly to include non-human agents. The primary judge set aside the Deputy Commissioner's decision, finding that the term "inventor" could indeed include an artificial intelligence, aligning with the object of the Patents Act to promote technological innovation.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge erred in his interpretation of the term "inventor". They held that the ordinary meaning of "inventor" under the Patents Act must be a natural person, and this interpretation was consistent with the statutory language and legislative intent. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's decision and reinstating the Deputy Commissioner's ruling that the patent application did not comply with the Patents Regulations because DABUS was not a natural person. Consequently, the patent application lapsed. The Court of Appeal did not order costs for either party.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. Orders 1, 2 and 3 of the orders made on 30 July 2021 be set aside.

3. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, we find that the appeal must be allowed. 2. AGREED FACTS The following facts were agreed between the parties for the purpose of the present proceedings:(1)Artificial intelligence systems are implemented within machines and are programmed to simulate specific thought processes and actions of humans. Artificial neural networks are implemented within machines and self-organise to simulate the way in which the human brain processes and generates information. Artificial intelligence systems may incorporate, or be constituted by, artificial neural networks. (2)DABUS is an artificial intelligence system that incorporates artificial neural networks.(3)The output of DABUS is an alleged invention the subject of the application.(4)DABUS is not a natural or a legal person(5)Dr Thaler is the owner of the copyright in the DABUS source code, the owner of the computer on which DABUS operates, and is responsible for the maintenance and running costs of DABUS and the computer on which it operates.(6)Dr Thaler is not the inventor of the alleged invention the subject of the application.3. RELEVANT LEGISLATION The parties agreed that the relevant form of the Patents Act is compilation No. 49 and the form of the Regulations is compilation No. 72, both of which are dated 26 August 2021. Section 2A of the Patents Act provides:Object of this ActThe object of this Act is to provide a patent system in Australia that promotes economic wellbeing through technological innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology. In doing so, the patent system balances over time the interests of producers, owners and users of technology and the public. Chapter 2 of the Patents Act is entitled “[p]atent rights, ownership and validity”. Within Part 1 of Chapter 2 is s 13(1), which provides that the exclusive rights given by a patent to the patentee are “to exploit the invention and to authorise another person to exploit the invention”. Section 13(2) provides that the exclusive rights are personal property and are capable of assignment and of devolution by law. Section 14(1) provides that an assignment of a patent must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the assignor and assignee. Within Part 2 of Chapter 2 is s 15, which is central to this appeal. It provides:15 Who may be granted a patent?(1)Subject to this Act, a patent for an invention may only be granted to a person who:(a)is the inventor; or(b)would, on the grant of a patent for the invention, be entitled to have the patent assigned to the person; or(c)derives title to the invention from the inventor or a person mentioned in paragraph (b); or(d)is the legal representative of a deceased person mentioned in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).(2)A patent may be granted to a person whether or not he or she is an Australian citizen. Chapter 3 is entitled “[f]rom application to acceptance” and concerns the process of making an application for a patent, the examination of such an application and the acceptance of a patent application by the Commissioner.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Deputy Commissioner concluded that s 15(1) is not capable of sensible operation in the situation where an inventor would be an artificial intelligence machine, as it is not possible to identify a person who could be granted a patent. He considered that it was not necessary to consider the operation of the objects stated in s 2A because the relevant provisions of the Patents Act are not ambiguous. 5. THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge considered that the Deputy Commissioner fell into error for the following reasons (at J[10]):First, an inventor is an agent noun; an agent can be a person or thing that invents. Second, so to hold reflects the reality in terms of many otherwise patentable inventions where it cannot sensibly be said that a human is the inventor. Third, nothing in the Act dictates the contrary conclusion. The primary judge considered that the Commissioner’s position on review confused the question of ownership and control of a patentable invention with the question of who can be an inventor. Whilst he accepted that only a human or other legal person could be an owner, controller or patentee, he considered that it was a fallacy to argue from this starting point that an inventor can only be human. He considered that nothing in the Patents Act justified the result, which was that, in the absence of a human inventor, an otherwise patentable invention would be precluded from the grant of a patent. This was, he considered, the antithesis of the object set out in s 2A of the Patents Act. In so concluding, he considered that the Commissioner’s approach read limitations and qualifications into the statutory term “inventor” and resorted to outdated definitions of the word “inventor”, failing to grapple with the idea underlying the term and the evolving nature of patentable inventions and their creators. In the background section of his reasons the primary judge supplied several pages of information addressing what he characterised as background technical matters concerning artificial neural networks. It is not in dispute that none of this, except for J[19], was in evidence. The primary judge then described DABUS, primarily (but not exclusively) by reference to the agreed facts. He found that DABUS “in one sense can be said to mimic aspects of human brain function” and accepted for the purposes of the proceedings Dr Thaler’s assertion that:DABUS, and its underlying neural paradigm, represents a paradigm shift in machine learning since it is based upon the transient chaining topologies formed among associative memories, rather than activation patterns of individual neurons appearing within static architectures. From an engineering perspective, the use of network resonances to drive the formation of chaining topologies, spares programmers the ordeal of matching the output nodes of one [artificial neural network] with the input nodes of others, as in deep learning schemes. In effect, complex neural architectures autonomously wire themselves together using only scalar resonances.Reinforcement or weakening of such chains takes place when they appropriate special hot button nets containing memories of salient consequences. Therefore, instead of following error gradients, as in traditional artificial neural net training, conceptual chains are reinforced in proportion to the numbers and significances of advantages offered. Classification is not in terms of human defined categories, but via the consequence chains branching organically from any given concept, effectively providing functional definitions of it. Ideas form as islands of neural modules aggregate through simple learning rules, the semantic portions thereof, being human readable as pidgin language.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Dr Thaler concludes by submitting that the ordinary meaning of “inventor” is an agent noun, where the inventor is the agent, whether person or machine, who invents. The meaning of “inventor”, as contended for by Dr Thaler, is open and is consistent with the object of the Patents Act.7. CONSIDERATION The immediate cause of the present dispute arises from the Commissioner’s application of reg 3.2C(2)(aa), which requires an applicant to provide the name of the inventor of the invention to which a patent application relates. The Commissioner determined, in effect, that it was a legal impossibility that an artificial intelligence machine could be such an inventor, with the consequence that the application lapsed in accordance with reg 3.2C(5). The primary judge took a different view. Reg 3.2C(2)(aa) imposes an obligation upon the applicant, and reg 3.2C(4) empowers the Commissioner to direct an applicant to, inter alia, provide the name of the inventor of the invention to which the application relates. Where the applicant has not complied with such a direction within two months of the date of that direction, the application will lapse: reg 3.2C(5). The purpose of reg 3.2C(2)(aa) is set out in the Explanatory Statement which provides that the name of the inventor of the invention “is required to ensure that the entitlement of the applicant to be granted a patent is clear”. The path to entitlement to the grant of a patent may be traced in the Patents Act and Regulations from the filing of an application onwards. Under s 29(1), a person may apply for an invention by filing, in accordance with the regulations, a patent request and such other documents as are prescribed: s 29(1). Section 29(4A) sets out the requirements for a patent request in relation to a complete application. Section 29A(1) provides that a PCT application is to be treated as a complete application. The person who is identified in a patent request as the person to whom the patent is to be granted, whether for a complete application or a PCT application, is defined as the “nominated person”: Patents Act sch 1; Regulations reg 3.1A(2). After an application has been filed, the Commissioner must, if requested to do so, examine it and report on whether, to the best of her knowledge, the patent request and specification complies with inter alia, s 15 and, for a PCT application, regs 3.2C(2) and (3): Patents Act s 45; Regulations regs 3.18(2)(a)(i) and 3.18(2)(f). The Commissioner must accept a patent request if she is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, as to the matters prescribed, and then notify the applicant of acceptance and publish a notice of acceptance in the Official Journal: ss 49(1) and (5). Thereafter, any person may oppose the grant of the patent on the grounds set out in s 59 which relevantly include that the nominated person is not entitled to a grant of a patent for the invention: ss 59(a) and 33. Separately, pursuant to s 36, the Commissioner may, if satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the nominated person is not an eligible person, but that one or more applicants who have applied under that section are eligible persons, make a declaration to that effect: s 36(1)(c)(i). Such a declaration may be made whether or not the patent application lapses or is withdrawn: s 36(2).