Thaler v Commissioner of Patents

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Thaler v Commissioner of Patents [2021] FCA 879

Review of: Stephen L. Thaler [2021] APO 5
File number: VID 108 of 2021
Judgment of: BEACH J
Date of judgment: 30 July 2021
Catchwords: PATENTS – artificial intelligence – machine learning – artificial neural networks – invention produced by a computer – semi-autonomous systems – concept of inventor – whether a machine can be an inventor – whether only a human can invent – device for the autonomous boot-strapping of unified sentience (DABUS) – invention created by DABUS in the form of containers, devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention – patent application – nature of inventor as distinct from patent applicant – concept of “inventor” under Patents Act 1990 (Cth) – validity of patent application where inventor a machine – relevance of human-ness of inventor to patent grant – whether decision to reject patent application valid
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 2C

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 2A, 3, 7, 18, 15, 29, 29A, 40, 45, 59, 64, 101B, 101E, 113, 138, 142, 172, 182, 185, 208; sch 1

21 Ja 1 c 3 (Statute of Monopolies) 1623 (Imp) s 6

Intellectual Property Legislation Amendment (Raising the Bar) Regulation 2013 (No. 1) (Cth)

Intellectual Property Legislation Amendment (TRIPS Protocol and Other Measures) Regulation 2015 (Cth)

Patents Regulations 1991 (Cth) regs 3.1A, 3.2A, 3.2B, 3.2C, 3.18

Patent Cooperation Treaty (Washington, 19 June 1970) arts 4, 9, 27, 58

Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (Washington, 19 June 1970) rr 4, 51bis

Cases cited:

Atlantis Corp Pty Ltd v Schindler (1997) 39 IPR 29

Brent v Commission of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 418

D’Arcy v Myriad Genetics Inc (2015) 258 CLR 334

Dodson v Grew (1767) Wilm 272; 97 ER 106

Dunlop v Cooper (1908) 7 CLR 146

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 246

House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 498

JMVB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Camoflag Pty Ltd (2006) 154 FCR 348

Martin v Scribal Pty Ltd (1954) 92 CLR 17

Martin v Scribal Pty Ltd (1956) 95 CLR 213

Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 2) (2016) 120 IPR 431

PMT Partners Pty Ltd (in liq) v Australian National Parks & Wildlife Service (1995) 184 CLR 301

Preston Erection Pty Ltd v Speedy Gantry Hire Pty Ltd (1998) 43 IPR 74

Provincial Insurance Australia Pty Ltd v Consolidated Wood Products Pty Ltd (1991) 25 NSWLR 541

Russell v Wilson (1923) 33 CLR 538

Speedy Gantry Hire Pty Ltd v Preston Erection Pty Ltd (1998) 40 IPR 543

Stack v Davies Shephard Pty Ltd (2001) 108 FCR 422

Tate v Haskins (1935) 53 CLR 594

Towne v Eisner, 245 US 418 (1918)

University of British Columbia v Conor Medsystems Inc (2006) 155 FCR 391

William Blackstone Esq., Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 879
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Thaler v Commissioner of Patents, the dispute centred on whether an artificial intelligence system, DABUS, could be recognised as the inventor of a patentable invention. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the Commissioner of Patents was correct in his interpretation that only human beings could be recognised as inventors under the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the associated regulations. The court was required to decide whether DABUS, an artificial intelligence system created by Dr Stephen Thaler, could be recognised as an inventor, and if so, whether Dr Thaler could proceed with his patent application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).

The court examined the language of the relevant provisions of the Act and the regulations, specifically section 15 and regulation 3.2C(2)(aa), to determine the eligibility of DABUS as an inventor. The court held that the term "inventor" in the Act does not necessarily exclude non-human entities, and thus, an artificial intelligence system could be recognised as an inventor. However, the court also clarified that while an artificial intelligence system could be recognised as an inventor, it could not be an applicant for a patent or a grantee of a patent, as these roles are reserved for human beings. The court found that the Commissioner’s interpretation of the regulation was too restrictive and ordered that the matter be reconsidered in light of these findings.

The court set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s determinations and remitted the matter back to the Commissioner for reconsideration, in line with the court’s reasoning. The court emphasised that its decision was consistent with promoting innovation and recognised the evolving nature of patentable inventions and their creators. The parties had previously agreed that there would be no order for costs, regardless of the outcome. The court also granted liberty to apply for formal declarations if any party considered them necessary.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Fourth, much of the Commissioner’s argument descended into dictionary definitions of “inventor”. But more is required of me than mere resort to old millennium usages of that word. If words are only “pictures of ideas upon paper” (Dodson v Grew (1767) Wilm 272 at 278; 97 ER 106 at 108 per Wilmot CJ) and if, as Holmes J described it, they are not “crystal[s], transparent and unchanged, [but] the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which [they] are used” (Towne v Eisner, 245 US 418, 425 (1918)), I need to grapple with the underlying idea, recognising the evolving nature of patentable inventions and their creators. We are both created and create. Why cannot our own creations also create?Background I should first deal with some background technical matters concerning artificial neural networks generally and DABUS particularly. I will then say something about the use of artificial intelligence in pharmaceutical research to exemplify where the science is and where it is going in terms of patentable inventions involving artificial intelligence. I do this to demonstrate that unless the Act demands it, outmoded notions of the agent that may invent and the subject matter of a patentable invention are not controlling. And if the concept of “invention” in terms of manner of manufacture evolves, as it must, why not the concept of “inventor”? I should say at the outset that I do not propose to offer any definition of “artificial intelligence”. Discussion of the Turing Test, the Chinese Room thought experiment, functionalism and so on can be left to others. Of course I am dealing with more than a brute force computational tool. And perhaps one could apply the label of “artificial intelligence” to a system that has the capacity for deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning and pattern recognition, leaving to one side any possible embodiment of awareness, consciousness or sense of self. But whatever be the position, I am prepared for the moment to equate DABUS with artificial intelligence if it operates in the fashion that Dr Thaler has represented, but without anthropomorphising its algorithms. I should also say that I do not need to discuss the concept of autonomy in terms of autonomous systems, semi-autonomous systems or non-autonomous systems. But I will make two points here. First, there is a distinction between automation and autonomy, which I will return to later. Second, as DABUS has been described to me, I would only consider it to be semi-autonomous, as opposed to Dr Thaler’s more ambitious label, although its output in terms of the operation of the artificial neural networks could be said in one sense to be autonomously generated. Let me turn then to artificial neural networks.Artificial neural networks Artificial intelligence systems may incorporate, or be constituted by, artificial neural networks. Such artificial neural networks may be implemented within machines and self-organise to simulate the way in which the human brain processes and generates information.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Second, I should say that apart from the PCT and the PCT Regulations I have not discussed foreign legislative instruments or decisions made under them. Whether they require or have held that an inventor must be a person cannot assist me. And if they have so required or held, that is just a function of the text and context of such instruments, construed in the light of their applicable extrinsic material. Perhaps on their proper construction this was expressly required. Or perhaps they are silent on the question, but because the possibility was discussed in the extrinsic material but then omitted before the relevant instrument was promulgated, they have been construed so as to not include the possibility. Whatever be the position, this is not a voyage of discovery that I need embark on.Conclusion As I have said, s 15 concerns who may be granted the patent. The Commissioner is not being asked to decide that question now. The question is whether a valid PCT application has been presently lodged. The only impediment it would seem is reg 3.2C(2)(aa) and the Commissioner’s interpretation of that requirement. First, in my view the name of the inventor can be a non-human. The Commissioner is incorrect in saying that you cannot have a non-human inventor. Second, if the Commissioner would have it that reg 3.2C(2)(aa) requires the name of a human inventor, that is not what the Act mandates. Accordingly, if the Commissioner is correct, I would read down the regulation to avoid it being ultra vires, so that in effect it reads “the name of a human inventor (if applicable)”. Third, the Deputy Commissioner ought not to have used subordinate legislation to summarily rule out a substantive consideration and examination of Dr Thaler’s application in circumstances where:(a)Dr Thaler was a valid applicant;(b)prima facie his application is not said not to disclose a patentable invention;(c)no other difficulties with his application have been identified;(d)the question of grant is some years away; and(e)it cannot be said now that Dr Thaler could not later bring himself within s 15(1)(b) and / or s 15(1)(c) in terms of being entitled to a grant. On this aspect, and if it is necessary to say so, I also agree with Dr Thaler’s procedural point that I referred to earlier. In summary, in my view, an inventor as recognised under the Act can be an artificial intelligence system or device. But such a non-human inventor can neither be an applicant for a patent nor a grantee of a patent. So to hold is consistent with the reality of the current technology. It is consistent with the Act. And it is consistent with promoting innovation. I will set aside the Deputy Commissioner’s determinations and remit the matter for reconsideration in accordance with these reasons. The parties have already agreed that given the significance of the issue there should be no order for costs, whoever wins. If any party considers that formal declarations are required, I will grant liberty to apply for that purpose, although whether they are necessary is another matter.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established