DOYLE CJ: This appeal requires consideration of the powers of the District Court sitting in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division, exercising jurisdiction conferred on it by the Security and Investigation Agents Act 1995 (“the Act”).
The proceedings in the District Court
Mr Sollars is an agent, licensed under the Act. I gather that he is a security agent for the purposes of the Act. He is permitted to perform the function of controlling crowds. He has held a licence authorising him to act as a security agent controlling crowds since November 1996.
On 24 March 2000 the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs issued a complaint against Mr Sollars under the Act. The complaint alleges that there is proper cause for disciplinary action against Mr Sollars under the Act.
The following matters were alleged by the complaint and proved before the Court. They were not in dispute. On 11 July 2000 Mr Sollars was convicted in the Adelaide Magistrates Court of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The assault was committed while he was working as a crowd controller. The offence is an offence of a class specified by Regulation 5 and Schedule 1 of the Security and Investigation Agents Regulations 1996. By virtue of s 9(1)(b) of the Act, a licence could not be granted to Mr Sollars if he were now to apply for one, having regard to the fact of the conviction. By s 25(1)(e)(ii) of the Act, there is proper cause for disciplinary action against an agent if “events have occurred such that the agent would not be entitled to be granted the licence if he or she were to apply for it.” Accordingly, proper cause for disciplinary action was made out.
Section 29 of the Act provides that on the hearing of a complaint, if the Court is satisfied that there is proper cause for taking disciplinary action, it may make one or more of a number of orders specified in the section. Those orders include a reprimand, a fine, cancellation of a licence, the imposition of conditions on a licence and other orders of the type often encountered in such cases.
The matter came before the District Court in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division, pursuant to s 26 of the Act. For this purpose, pursuant to s 20(4) of the District Court Act 1991, the Court was constituted by a Judge and two assessors.
The matter finally came on for hearing on 7 February 2001. Mr Sollars was represented by a solicitor, as was the Commissioner. The Court heard evidence and submissions.
The decision of the Court was to adjourn the proceedings for a period of one year. The parties were at liberty to call the matter on at any time. The Court indicated that if, at the expiry of that time, “there has been no more trouble, we will not cancel the licence”. On the other hand, the Court said…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Commissioner for Consumer Affairs v Sollars [2001] SASC 110
Case
[2001] SASC 110
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of Commissioner for Consumer Affairs v Sollars involves the Commissioner for Consumer Affairs bringing a claim against Mr Sollars for breaches of licensing conditions. The matter was heard in the District Court of a relevant Australian jurisdiction. The primary legal issue the court had to resolve was whether the District Court had the authority to adjourn proceedings against Mr Sollars, given that the statutory framework did not explicitly provide for such a power in disciplinary proceedings. Additionally, the court had to determine the appropriate disciplinary action to be taken against Mr Sollars if proper cause for disciplinary action was established.
The court examined the statutory provisions and found that while the Act did not explicitly mention the power to adjourn, it did empower the court to make orders as it deemed fit in the interests of justice. The court held that the power to adjourn was implicit within the broad authority granted to the court to manage proceedings. It was noted that the purpose of disciplinary action under the Act was to protect the public, and the court was required to consider the appropriate order to conclude the proceedings, including potential reprimands or other sanctions. Ultimately, the court concluded that it did have the inherent power to adjourn proceedings, and it exercised this power in the interests of justice.
The court found that proper cause for disciplinary action had been made out and, as a result, proceeded to consider the appropriate sanctions. The court determined that while a reprimand was possible, it was not the only available option. The court ultimately decided on a course of action that balanced the need to protect the public with the circumstances of the case. The court's decision included a reprimand and other conditions designed to ensure compliance with licensing requirements in the future.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
As to that last point, the transcript indicates that the solicitor for Mr Sollars did not ask for the Court to follow the course that it did follow, nor did the Court indicate to the solicitor for the Commissioner that it might follow this course. There seems to be some force in the third submission, but as will appear I have found it unnecessary to deal with the submission.The decision to adjourn By s 22 of the District Court Act the Court has power to adjourn proceedings. This is a wide power, to be exercised in the interests of justice. Experience indicates that the circumstances in which it is appropriate to adjourn proceedings are many and varied. It is difficult to state in useful terms any particular limitation on the power to adjourn. Perhaps all that can be said is that the power must be exercised in the interests of justice, and for some purpose connected with the proceedings in which the power is exercised. The provisions of the Act relating to the grant of a licence indicate that Parliament is concerned to ensure that licensed persons have appropriate qualifications and experience to act as agents, and are fit and proper persons to be licensed. The criteria to be met by a person seeking a licence are sometimes expressed in absolute and objective terms, and on other occasions in language that requires the Commissioner to make a qualitative assessment. The requirements to be met by an applicant for a licence are set out in s 9 of the Act. In my opinion the scheme of the Act is relevantly to protect the public by regulating who may engage in the activities for which a licence is required. The focus is on the protection of the public by requiring applicants to meet criteria directed to their qualifications, experience and fitness for the occupation. I infer from the provisions relating to the grant of a licence, and from the provisions relating to disciplinary action, that the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is once again the protection of the public by imposing a penalty, by exercising particular controls over a licence holder, or by depriving a licence holder of a licence temporarily or indefinitely, having regard to the occurrence in question and to the nature of the cause for the taking of disciplinary action. The circumstances that constitute proper cause for disciplinary action are, once again, sometimes expressed in absolute and objective terms, and sometimes in terms that require the making of a qualitative assessment. If the Court is satisfied that there is proper cause for the taking of disciplinary action, the Court must then consider which of the orders specified in s 29(1) of the Act should be made. That section does not refer to adjourning the proceedings, but that is neither here nor there. Presumably in the present case the Court contemplated making some order to bring the proceedings to a conclusion, and perhaps contemplated a reprimand if all went well from Mr Sollars’ point of view. Be that as it may, the question for the Court, bearing in mind that proper cause for the taking of disciplinary action had been made out, was which of the orders provided for in s 29 of the Act should be made.