Comcare v The Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Comcare v The Commonwealth of Australia [2010] FCA 1331

Citation: Comcare v The Commonwealth of Australia [2010] FCA 1331
Parties: COMCARE v THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: QUD 310 of 2009
Judge: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 2 December 2010
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – occupational health and safety – determination of quantity of pecuniary penalty – two employees and three members of the public died at sea when vessel commissioned by respondent sank in the Torres Strait – breaches of s 16(1) and s 17 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) admitted by respondent – principles in Comcare v Commonwealth of Australia (2007) 163 FCR 207 relevant to determining quantity of pecuniary penalty – seriousness of breach – consideration of mitigating factors

Held: the respondent pay the maximum allowable pecuniary penalty of $242,000

Legislation: Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) cl 4 Pt 1 of Sch 2, ss 16(1), 172
Cases cited: Australian Opthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560 cited
Comcare v Commonwealth of Australia (2007) 163 FCR 207 applied
Comcare v John Holland Rail Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 771 cited
NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 cited
Date of hearing: 15 November 2010
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Herbert
Solicitor for the Applicant: Dibbs Barker
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr RP Devlin SC with Mr MT Brady
Solicitor for the Respondent: Clayton Utz

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 310 of 2009

BETWEEN:

COMCARE
Applicant

AND:

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 DECEMBER 2010

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

1.On and around 15 October 2005, the Respondent (through the Department of Immigration and Citizenship) contravened subclause 2(1)(a) and subclause 2(1)(b) of Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1991 (Cth) (OHS Act) by reason of the Respondent having breached section 16(1) and section 17 of the OHS Act (the contraventions).

2.The conduct that constituted the contravention was:

(a)the Respondent did not conduct appropriate hazard identification and risk assessments regarding the use and suitability of the immigration response vessel (IRV) known as the Malu Sara as an appropriate vessel to be used by employees of the Respondent in the Torres Strait, in the conditions likely to be encountered by those employees;

(b)the Respondent did not ensure that properly qualified oversight was given to its employees to ensure that the IRVs as constructed met the quality and standards required by the contract with the manufacturer and supplier;

(c)the Respondent did not ensure that sufficient appropriate independent expert advice was sought as to the design and construction of the IRVs;

(d)the Respondent did not have an appropriate system in place to satisfy itself that the tenderers for the construction and supply of the IRVs were…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 1331
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Comcare v The Commonwealth of Australia was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The central dispute revolved around the procurement and operation of six immigration response vessels (IRVs) by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), now known as the Department of Home Affairs. The vessels were intended to patrol the Torres Strait, but the tragedy of the sinking of one such vessel, the Malu Sara, led to multiple fatalities. The case examined whether DIAC had breached its obligations under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 by failing to ensure the safety of its employees and others who might be affected by its actions.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Commonwealth, through DIAC, had contravened specific provisions of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. The court had to determine if the Commonwealth was guilty of the alleged breaches and, if so, to what extent. It was also necessary to assess the seriousness of the breaches and determine an appropriate penalty. The court considered factors such as the degree of negligence, the consequences of the breach, and whether there were any mitigating factors.

The court found that DIAC had indeed contravened the statutory provisions. The Commonwealth had failed to ensure the safety of its employees by not verifying that the IRVs met the required standards and specifications. The court noted the systemic failures within DIAC that contributed to the tragic incident. Despite the Commonwealth's submissions regarding the mitigating factors, the court concluded that the gravity of the consequences and the systemic nature of the failures warranted the imposition of the maximum penalty available under the Act. The court expressed deep sympathy for the families of the victims and emphasized the importance of general deterrence in such cases.

The Federal Circuit Court imposed the maximum penalty of $2,420,000 on the Commonwealth. The court also acknowledged the Commonwealth's efforts in cooperating with the investigation and implementing new safety measures post-incident. The decision underscored the critical importance of stringent compliance with occupational health and safety laws, especially in high-risk environments such as maritime operations.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before turning to the submissions of the parties it is necessary to outline the background of these proceedings.Background The Department of Immigration and Citizenship (“DIAC”) is a Department of the Commonwealth of Australia. At all times relevant to these proceedings prior to 30 January 2007 DIAC was known as the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. DIAC was and remains charged with the responsibility for managing immigration and border control through the Torres Strait. Movement Monitoring Officers (“MMOs”) were recruited by DIAC to assist in patrolling the reefs and islands of the region. The MMOs used immigration response vessels (“IRVs”) to conduct such patrols. Towards the end of 2002 Mr Garry Chaston was appointed as DIAC’s regional manager on Thursday Island. In February 2004 Mr Chaston put a business case to DIAC to replace the existing fleet of vessels with new IRVs. Expenditure for the new IRVs was approved. The procurement of the new IRVs remained the primary responsibility of Mr Chaston but he was assisted by Mr Paul Nemes, DIAC’s senior contract adviser. Mr Chaston also consulted Mr Greg Hellessey who was a qualified marine engineer, the MMOs and a range of other government agencies. After advertising, eight tenders were received. Criteria for assessment of the tenders were settled by Mr Chaston and Mr Nemes, and a team was established to evaluate each tender received. Subsequently, Subsee Explorer Pty Ltd (“Subsee”) was contracted for the supply of the six IRVs. The contract with Subsee contained specific descriptions of the proposed vessels, the equipment to be fitted, the standards of construction, and the certificates required to accompany the vessels. Significantly, the contract stipulated that the vessels be supplied to the certified requirements of the Uniform Shipping Laws Code (“USL Code”), Class 2C, and comply with the Australian Standard (“AS”) 1799 and AS 1665. However as subsequently became clear, a prototype vessel constructed by Subsee did not meet these requirements and this omission was not disclosed or discovered at the time of the sea trials. Further, no reference to the omission was made in the modifications specified. The contract also stipulated that Subsee was to provide six different certificates for each of the IRVs. Only one certificate was provided, a certificate of flotation. The positive flotation statement (issued by a Mr Radke, the principal of Subsee) was a document declaring that the vessel when filled with water would remain afloat in an upright position while carrying its normal operational equipment and six passengers. The other five certificates, including certificates that the vessels were to class 2C survey standard, and confirmation they complied with AS 1799 and AS 1665, were never provided to DIAC. Following acceptance of the prototype trial with specified modifications, the remaining five IRVs were completed by Subsee in early August 2005. These vessels were subsequently delivered to Thursday Island on 21 and 22 August 2005.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Accordingly, the appropriate penalty is the maximum penalty of $242,000.00.Family impact evidence At the hearing of this matter, Mr Herbert for the applicant tendered the victim impact statement of Mr Fred Joe (partner of Ms Flora Enosa and father of Ms Ethena Enosa) and the family impact statement of Mr and Mrs John and Henrietta Saub (parents of Ms Valerie Saub). These statements provide a stark insight into the grief caused by the loss of their family members. The Court extends its regret and sympathy to all of the families and friends of those aboard the Malu Sara who so tragically were lost at sea.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In its submissions, the respondent has brought to the Court’s attention various mitigating factors for its consideration. The following is a summary of these factors:·Due to his inexperience, Mr Chaston acted in co-ordination with a range of people in the acquisition of the marine vessels and the operation of the marine fleets, including:-Mr Paul Nemes, a senior contract advisor in the Contracts Procurement and Advice Unit of DIAC;-Mr Greg Hellessey, a qualified marine engineer employed by the Australian Customs Service in Canberra;- the MMOs;- the Queensland Police Service;- the Royal Australian Navy;- the Army; and-an evaluation team for the tenders received including Mr Bin Juda (a team leader within DIAC in its Thursday Island office), Mr Gordon Munro (a marine engineer from the Australian Army), and Mr Steve Gibson (a marine engineer from the Royal Australian Navy).·Although Mr Chaston did not have the relevant expertise to determine satisfactorily whether the vessels were constructed in compliance with the Subsee contract, the USL Code and AS 1799 and AS 1665, he made two visits to the builder’s yard through the construction process.·The principal of Subsee, Mr Don Radke executed statements and certificates of positive flotation for each of the vessels, including the Malu Sara, certifying that the vessels were able to remain afloat in an upright position when filled with water. These positive flotation statements were false.·DIAC had in place SOPs for the IRVs containing instructions for the MMOs including administrative processes and operational information. The information included limits of operation in terms of area, day of operation, duration, weather, and crew qualifications.·DIAC has acted in an appropriate and responsible manner following the scale back for the search of the vessel and its occupants. Its actions have included:-instigating an investigation into the circumstances of the loss of the vessel and its occupants;-making a number of recommendations including the suspension of the use of the vessels and an examination of the remaining vessels by independent marine experts;-the immediate suspension of the use of the remaining vessels on 15 October 2010;-the implementation of new procurement and contractual management procedures (see para 91 Statement of Agreed Facts filed 15 June 2010);-specific further steps in relation to its Torres Strait operations (see para 92 Statement of Agreed Facts filed 15 June 2010); and- no longer owning and operating vessels used in the Torres Strait;·DIAC co-operated with the applicant from an early stage in its investigation of the circumstances of the incident and in these proceedings generally by indicating it would admit the contraventions; and·DIAC has made formal apologies to the families of the victims, offered financial support for the family members of those lost, and implemented a new MMO development program.Consideration In my view, the seriousness of the respondent’s offending conduct in these circumstances is of the highest degree. It follows that the appropriate order is the imposition of the maximum statutory penalty. I make this finding in light of the systematic failures of the respondent, considerations of general deterrence, and in particular, the extreme gravity of the consequences of the respondent’s conduct.