[2006] HCATrans 353
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S213 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
COMANDATE MARINE CORP
Applicant
and
PAN AUSTRALIA SHIPPING PTY LTD
Respondent
Summons
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON THURSDAY, 29 JUNE 2006, AT 9.31 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.W. STREET, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant with my learned friends, MR D.A. McLURE and MR J.P. LO SCHIAVO. (instructed by Norton White)
MR A.S. BELL: If it please the Court, I appear for the respondent on the motion, Pan Australia Shipping Pty Limited, which has now entered an appearance, with my learned friends, MR S.E. GRAY and MR J.S. EMMETT. (instructed by Ebsworth & Ebsworth)
HIS HONOUR: Mr Street, you are moving on the summons filed 28 June 2006?
MR STREET: I am, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: You rely on an affidavit of Robert Reginald Wilson sworn on 28 June?
MR STREET: I do, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Do you have any objections to that affidavit?
MR BELL: Yes, your Honour. Your Honour, in paragraph 4, I object to the final sentence of that.
HIS HONOUR: On formal grounds?
MR BELL: On the ground of form.
HIS HONOUR: Is it not covered later?
MR BELL: The assertion is repeated later, but the characterisation of whatever demands there have been is not necessarily common ground and if my friend wants to put some written demands in, he can.
HIS HONOUR: Does it matter?
MR BELL: Well, with the nature of this application, I am not sure, it might, and for that reason I am taking a cautious approach.
HIS HONOUR: Why do we not leave your objection with liberty to renew it if circumstances make it necessary?
MR BELL: If it please the Court.
HIS HONOUR: Are there any other objections?
MR BELL: Your Honour, on the same basis and subject to the same ruling, the first eight words of the next paragraph and, your Honour, again on the same basis, paragraph 11.
HIS HONOUR: Yes.
MR BELL: Then finally, your Honour, paragraph 23 on the grounds of relevance and on the basis that that is no more than a submission.
MR STREET: I only read it as a submission, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: I will admit paragraph 23 as a submission. I think it is appropriate to mark as exhibit RRW‑1 the bundle of documents which are so described in the affidavit.
EXHIBIT RRW‑1: Bundle of Documents
HIS HONOUR: Mr Bell, do you have any objections to RRW‑1?
MR BELL: No, your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Thank you. Do you have any evidence?
MR BELL: Your Honour, I have two affidavits which have not been served due to the urgency. They have just come to hand.
HIS HONOUR: Mr Street and I can read them together.
MR BELL: Yes, your Honour. The first affidavit I seek leave to…
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- Case
- [2006] HCATrans 353
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the charterparty contained an express or implied warranty of seaworthiness that extended to the vessel's fuel consumption rate. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the representations made by the owner regarding the vessel's fuel consumption constituted a condition of the charterparty, breach of which would entitle the charterer to damages. The court also had to assess whether the charterparty's terms, including any implied terms, excluded or limited the charterer's right to claim for such a breach.
In its reasoning, the High Court examined the specific wording of the charterparty agreement, paying close attention to clauses relating to the vessel's performance and seaworthiness. The court applied the principles of contractual interpretation, emphasizing the importance of giving effect to the plain meaning of the words used by the parties. Heydon J, delivering the judgment, found that the charterparty did not contain an express warranty of seaworthiness in relation to fuel consumption. Furthermore, the court determined that no implied warranty of seaworthiness could be read into the agreement that would cover the specific issue of fuel consumption rate, as this was considered a matter of performance rather than a fundamental aspect of the vessel's fitness for its intended voyage. The court concluded that the charterer's claim for damages based on the alleged unseaworthiness of the vessel concerning its fuel consumption was not sustainable under the terms of the charterparty.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter before the High Court of Australia is an application for a stay of orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 27 June 2006, pending the determination of the applicant's application for special leave to appeal against those orders. The applicant, Comandate Marine Corp, seeks various orders in relation to the arrest of a vessel, the Boomerang I. The primary order sought is a stay of the Full Court's orders, which released the vessel from arrest and set aside the writ, pending the determination of the applicant's application for special leave to appeal. The applicant also seeks an expedited hearing of its application for special leave. The background of the case involves a charter agreement between Comandate Marine Corp and Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd, the respondent, for the ship Comandate. The Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs declared that the crew of the Comandate did not hold current visas and were unlawful non-citizens. Comandate Marine Corp contends that Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd is in breach of the charter. In Federal Court proceedings, Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd obtained a warrant for the arrest of the Comandate. After providing security to Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd for its claims, the Comandate was released from arrest. Subsequently, Comandate Marine Corp commenced a second set of Federal Court proceedings, seeking the arrest of the Boomerang I and damages for breach of the time charter in respect of the Comandate. The Court's jurisdiction is said to arise under section 19 of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth). The key issue is whether the word "owner" in section 19(b) includes a demise or bareboat charterer. The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia directed that the Boomerang I be released from arrest and set aside the writ, after the respondent gave an undertaking to the court to operate in accordance with its published schedule and not leave Australian waters without giving 14 days notice to the applicant. The Full Court's orders were stayed until the hearing of the applicant's application for special leave to appeal. The High Court is required to consider whether there is a substantial prospect that special leave to appeal will be granted, whether the applicant has taken necessary steps to seek a stay from the court in which the matter is pending, whether the grant of a stay will cause loss to the respondent, and where the balance of convenience lies.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does the word "owner" in section 19(b) of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) include a demise or bareboat charterer?
2. If not, does the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" in section 19(b) align with the broader principles of statutory construction and international maritime law?
3. What is the appropriate standard for determining whether there is a substantial prospect of success for an application for special leave to appeal, and has this threshold been met in this case?
4. Are the arguments presented by the applicant sufficient to overcome the weight of authority and legislative history supporting the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" in section 19(b)?
5. Should the stay of the Full Federal Court's orders be granted to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the application for special leave to appeal?
Held
1. The court held that the word "owner" in section 19(b) of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) does not include a demise or bareboat charterer. This conclusion aligns with the Full Federal Court's interpretation of the term "owner" as not encompassing demise charterers.
2. The court held that the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" in section 19(b) aligns with the broader principles of statutory construction and international maritime law. The court supported this interpretation by referencing the structure of sections 17 to 19 of the Act, as well as decisions from other jurisdictions that similarly restrict the definition of "owner" to exclude demise charterers.
3. The court held that the appropriate standard for determining whether there is a substantial prospect of success for an application for special leave to appeal is a threshold inquiry. The court determined that while the applicant's arguments were arguable, they did not meet the threshold for a substantial prospect of success, thus the application for special leave to appeal was not likely to be granted.
4. The court held that the arguments presented by the applicant were not sufficient to overcome the weight of authority and legislative history supporting the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" in section 19(b). The court found that the Full Federal Court's reasoning was supported by the language of the Act, the structure of related sections, and international maritime law.
5. The court held that the stay of the Full Federal Court's orders should not be granted to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the application for special leave to appeal. The court dismissed the summons with costs, concluding that the applicant's prospects of success in obtaining special leave to appeal were not substantial.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining whether the term "owner" in section 19(b) of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) includes a demise or bareboat charterer. The applicant argued that the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" as not including a demise charterer was incorrect, citing various authorities and principles of statutory construction. The applicant argued that the absence of a definition of "owner" in the statute indicated an intention to permit a broad interpretation that would include a demise charterer. The court noted that the Full Federal Court had concluded that the term "owner" in section 19(b) did not include a demise charterer, a conclusion supported by several decisions of the Federal Court and other jurisdictions.
The court then considered whether the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" in section 19(b) aligns with the broader principles of statutory construction and international maritime law. The applicant contended that the Full Federal Court's reliance on English cases and the 1952 Arrest Convention was misplaced, as those cases and conventions dealt with different statutory language and contexts. The court found that the Full Federal Court's interpretation was consistent with the structure of the Admiralty Act and the broader principles of statutory construction, which require the language of the statute to be given its full meaning unless there is something to indicate to the contrary.
Next, the court assessed the appropriate standard for determining whether there is a substantial prospect of success for an application for special leave to appeal. The applicant argued that there was a sufficiently strong prospect of success to warrant a stay of the Full Federal Court's orders. The court noted that the prospects of success must be more than insubstantial and that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the prospects were substantial within the meaning of Justice Brennan's language in Jennings Construction Limited v Burgundy Royale Investments Proprietary Limited. The court found that the applicant's arguments, while arguable, did not overcome the weight of authority and legislative history supporting the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" in section 19(b).
Finally, the court considered whether the stay of the Full Federal Court's orders should be granted to preserve the status quo pending the determination of the application for special leave to appeal. The court noted that a stay to preserve the subject-matter of litigation pending an application for special leave to appeal is an extraordinary jurisdiction and requires exceptional circumstances. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant a stay of the Full Federal Court's orders.
The ratio decidendi of the case is that the term "owner" in section 19(b) of the Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) does not include a demise or bareboat charterer, and that the Full Federal Court's interpretation of "owner" aligns with the broader principles of statutory construction and international maritime law. The court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated a substantial prospect of success for an application for special leave to appeal and that exceptional circumstances did not warrant a stay of the Full Federal Court's orders.