SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Coleman v Caesarstone Australia Pty Ltd & Ors [2021] QSC 125
PARTIES:
JAMES EARNEST SHAYNE COLEMAN
(Applicant)
v
CAESARSTONE AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
(ABN 45 121 819 976)
(First Respondent)
and
SMARTSTONE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD
(ABN 19 148 937 008)
(Second Respondent
and
WK MARBLE AND GRANITE PTY LTD
(ABN 29 074 331 981)
(Third Respondent)
and
LAMINEX GROUP PTY LIMITED
(ABN 98 004 093 092)
(Fourth Respondent)
and
COSENTINO AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED
(ABN 66 150 158 277)
(Fifth Respondent)
and
CARSILSTONE PTY LIMITED
(ACN 104 148 389)(Sixth Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
5144/21
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
DELIVERED ON:
31 May 2021
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
19 May 2021
JUDGE:
Bowskill J
ORDERS:
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1. On its proper construction, s 6(3)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) should be read as though it provided that “this Act does not apply to – (b) personal injury that is or results from a dust-related condition”.
2. Accordingly, the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) does not apply to personal injury suffered by the applicant as described in his proposed Claim and Statement of Claim, being exhibit ZPMS-07 to the affidavit of Zach Peter Murray Samuels filed 12 May 2021.
CATCHWORDS:
STATUTES – ACTS OF PARLIAMENT – INTERPRETATION – GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION – SUPPLYING, OMITTING OR SUBSTITUTING WORDS – where the applicant has been diagnosed with accelerated silicosis, alleged to have been caused by his work as a stonemason, and also with a moderately severe adjustment disorder, caused by and secondary to the diagnosis of accelerated silicosis – where s 6(3)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 expressly provides that the Act does not apply to personal injury that is a dust-related condition – where accelerated silicosis is a dust-related condition, as defined, but a psychiatric injury such as an adjustment disorder is not – where the purpose of the provision is to exempt sufferers of dust-related conditions like silicosis, who face a significant reduction in life expectancy, from the procedural requirements of the legislation, to ensure they are not hampered in obtaining an early hearing and resolution of their claims – where a literal interpretation of s 6(3)(b) does not achieve the purpose of the provision, because it would require sufferers of dust-related conditions who also suffer from secondary conditions, to engage in a dual claim process – whether the proper construction of s 6(3)(b) warrants reading words in to the section to give effect to the legislative intention
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 6(3)(b)
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A
Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2017) 263 CLR 551
HFM043 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 359 ALR 176
Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586
R v A2; R v Magennis; R v Vaziri (2019) 373 ALR 214
Taylor v Owners-Strata Plan 11564 (2014) 253 CLR 531
Wentworth Securities v Jones [1980] AC 74COUNSEL: M Grant-Taylor QC…
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- AGLC
- Coleman v Caesarstone Australia Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 125
- Case
- [2021] QSC 125
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the proper construction of section 6(3)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 required reading words into the section to give effect to the legislative intention. The court emphasised that the task of construing a statute is to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used, taking into account the context and purpose of the provision. The court noted that a literal interpretation of the provision would not achieve its purpose, as it would necessitate a dual claim process for sufferers of dust-related conditions who also experienced secondary conditions. The court concluded that a construction promoting the purpose of the statute was to be preferred and that, in this case, the provision should be read as excluding not only primary dust-related conditions but also conditions that result from such conditions.
The court declared that section 6(3)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 should be read as though it provided that "this Act does not apply to – (b) personal injury that is or results from a dust-related condition." Consequently, the act did not apply to the personal injury suffered by the applicant, as described in his proposed Claim and Statement of Claim. This decision ensures that individuals suffering from dust-related conditions and secondary conditions can proceed with their claims without the procedural requirements of the legislation.
Orders
Orders of the court
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1. On its proper construction, s 6(3)(b) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) should be read as though it provided that “this Act does not apply to – (b) personal injury that is or results from a dust-related condition”.
2. Accordingly, the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) does not apply to personal injury suffered by the applicant as described in his proposed Claim and Statement of Claim, being exhibit ZPMS-07 to the affidavit of Zach Peter Murray Samuels filed 12 May 2021.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used, a process which must be undertaken having regard to the context for the provision.[11] In R v A2 (2019) 373 ALR 214, Kiefel CJ and Keane J reiterated that:“[32] The method to be applied in construing a statute to ascertain the intended meaning of the words used is well settled. It commences with a consideration of the words of the provision itself, but it does not end there. A literal approach to construction, which requires the courts to obey the ordinary meaning or usage of the words of a provision, even if the result is improbable, has long been eschewed by this Court. It is now accepted that even words having an apparently clear ordinary or grammatical meaning may be ascribed a different legal meaning after the process of construction is complete.[12] This is because consideration of the context for the provision may point to factors that tend against the ordinary usage of the words of the provision.[13][33] Consideration of the context for the provision is undertaken at the first stage of the process of construction.[14] Context is to be understood in its widest sense. It includes surrounding statutory provisions, what may be drawn from other aspects of the statute and the statute as a whole. It extends to the mischief which it may be seen that the statute is intended to remedy.[15]…” [35] [Their Honours referred to cases, including Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47], emphasising the importance of the text of the provision] …[36] These cases serve to remind that the text of a statute is important, for it contains the words being construed, and that a very general purpose may not detract from the meaning of those words. As always with statutory construction, much depends upon the terms of the particular statute and what may be drawn from the context for and purpose of the provision. [37] None of these cases suggest a return to a literal approach to construction. They do not suggest that the text should not be read in context and by reference to the mischief to which the provision is directed. They do not deny the possibility, adverted to in CIC v Bankstown [at 408], that in a particular case, ‘if the apparently plain words of a provision are read in light of the mischief which the statute was designed to overcome and of the objects of the legislation, they may wear a very different appearance’. When a literal meaning of words in a statute does not conform to the evident purpose or policy of the particular provision, it is entirely appropriate for the courts to depart from the literal meaning. A construction which promotes the purpose of a statute is to be preferred.”[16] [11]R v A2; R v Magennis; R v Vaziri (2019) 373 ALR 214; [2019] HCA 35 at [32]-[33] and [36] per Kiefel CJ and Keane J.[12]Referring to CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408 and Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69].[13]Referring, inter alia, to Project Blue Sky at [78].[14]Referring to CIC Insurance at 408 and Project Blue Sky at [69].[15]Referring to CIC Insurance at 408.[16]Underlining added; references omitted (other than where indicated). See also at [124] per Bell and Gageler JJ, at [148] per Nettle and Gordon JJ (expressing their agreement generally with the reasons of Kiefel CJ and Keane J) and at [163] per Edelman J.