In an action brought by the widow of a deceased employee against his employer the plaintiff alleged by the first count of the declaration negligence as to providing proper guards and reasonable precautions for the safe working of a certain machine in the defendant's factory whereby the deceased was injured and killed, and by the second count. based on the Factories and Shops Act 1912 (N.S.W.), that the defendant in contravention of that Act neglected and omitted securely or at all to fence the dangerous parts of the machine whereby the deceased was injured and died. The jury returned a general verdict for the defendant on both counts.

Held. that in the particular circumstances there should be a new trial as to the second count, there having been a misdirection on the question of contributory negligence upon which the jury might have acted.

Quare, whether contributory negligence is a defence to an action to recover damages for injuries caused by a breach of the duty created by sec. 33 of the Factories and Shops Act 1912 (N.S.W.), which requires the occupier of a factory to "securely fence all dangerous parts of the machinery therein."

It is the duty of the occupier of a factory within the meaning of the Factories and Shops Act 1912 (N.S.W.), to make the machinery safe for negligent as well as careful people.

34 CLR 364

Per Isaacs and Rich JJ. The doctrine of Wakelin v. London and South- Western Railway Co., (1886) 12 App. Cas. 41, and that of contributory negligence in relation to statutory protection of machinery, considered.

Decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Full Court) reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

An action was brought by Alice Mary Cofield, as administratrix of the estate of Andrew James Cofield deceased, against the Waterloo Case Co. Ltd. The plaintiff by the first count of her declaration alleged that the defendant was possessed of and had the care, control and management of a certain case factory, and used in such factory a certain machine, namely, a swinging crosscut-saw, driven and put in motion by mechanical power for the purpose of sawing timber: that the said machine when SO driven and put in motion was, as the defendant well knew or ought to have known, dangerous to persons working at and attending it that the deceased was employed by the defendant in the said case factory to work at and attend the said machine: yet the defendant SO negligently conducted itself in and about the possession, care, control and management of the factory, and in and about providing an improper, dangerous and unsafe machine for the purpose of being used as aforesaid, and in and about failing and neglecting…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Cofield v Waterloo Case Co Ltd

Details

AGLC: Cofield v Waterloo Case Co Ltd [1924] HCA 18
Case: [1924] HCA 18
Decision Date: 10 June 1924

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, the widow of a deceased employee, brought an action against the respondent employer. The claim was based on two counts: the first alleged negligence at common law for failing to provide proper guards and precautions for a swinging crosscut-saw, leading to the employee's death; the second alleged a breach of statutory duty under the *Factories and Shops Act 1912* (NSW) for failing to securely fence the dangerous parts of the same machine. A jury returned a general verdict for the defendant employer on both counts, and the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal for a new trial.

The High Court was required to determine whether a new trial should be granted, particularly concerning the second count based on the *Factories and Shops Act*. The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the statutory duty to fence dangerous machinery, the concept of contributory negligence in the context of such statutory duties, and the proper application of the principles of causation in determining liability.

The High Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the second count only. The Court reasoned that the duty imposed by section 33 of the *Factories and Shops Act* to securely fence dangerous machinery is an absolute one, requiring the occupier to make the machinery safe for both careful and negligent workers. The Court found that the trial judge's directions on contributory negligence were unsatisfactory and potentially misleading, particularly in light of the evidence concerning the last cut of timber, which may have compelled the deceased to stand in a position that could be considered dangerous. The Court also considered the principles of causation, noting that a jury is entitled to act on a balance of probabilities and that the connection between a breach of statutory duty and an accident need not be demonstrated with absolute certainty. While the Court did not definitively rule on whether contributory negligence is a defence to a breach of statutory duty under the Act, it considered the issue significant enough to warrant a new trial on the second count to ensure proper findings of fact.

The High Court ordered that the costs of the first trial should abide the result of the new trial on the second count. The appellant was awarded the costs of the new trial motion to the Supreme Court and the costs of the appeal, with certain usual conditions for an *in forma pauperis* appeal.

Orders