CLM18 v Minister for Home Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 70 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CLM18 v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR [2019] FCCA 1106
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of decision to remove Applicant pursuant to s.198(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), further to the Minister’s decision to revoke the lifting of the s.46A bar pursuant to s.46A(2C) of the Act – the Applicant did not lodged a protection visa application prior to deadline – the Department undertook an Informed Referral to Status Resolution (IRSR) Assessment of each “non-lodger” – two relevant IRSR assessments were undertaken in relation to the Applicant – whether the Minister was obliged to and did afford the Applicant procedural fairness before exercising his revocation power – whether the legislative scheme of the Act in s.46A(2C) provided the necessary intendment to displace the implied presumption of procedural fairness – whether the IRSR process was made pursuant to the exercise of a ministerial power and was a reviewable migration decision pursuant to s.476(1) of the Act – whether Minister made a personal procedural decision to consider the exercise of his powers under ss.46A and 195A of the Act – characterisation is a question of fact – no jurisdictional error established in ground 1 – no migration decision, and thus no jurisdiction to review the IRSR process in ground 2.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5(1), 5AA(1), 13, 14, 46A, 189, 195A, 198, 476, 477

Cases cited:

AOA16 v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCA 697
AOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCCA 2748
FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1962) 151 CLR 342
Minister for Immigration v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180

MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Ors [2015] FCA 1391
MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Ors (No 2) [2016] FCAFC 138
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319

Plaintiff M74/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] HCA 24; (2013) 252 CLR 336
Plaintiff M79/2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] HCA 24; (2013) 252 CLR 336
Plaintiff S10/2011 v Minister for Immigration (2012) HCA 31; (2012) 246 CLR 636
SZSSJ and Others v Minister for Immigration and BorderProtection and Others (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 125; (2015) 234 FCR 1

SZTES v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCA 719

Applicant: CLM18
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Second Respondent: INFORMED REFERRAL TO STATUS RESOLUTION OFFICER
File Number: SYG 1337 of 2018
Judgment of: Judge Baird
Hearing date: 7 June 2018
Date of Last Submission: 14 June 2018
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 30 April 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Gormly
Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr S Klotz, Hall & Wilcox
Solicitors for the Respondents: Ms D Watson, Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

THE COURT:

  1. GRANTS LEAVE to the Applicant, by 4pm, 6 May 2019, to file and serve an amended application seeking an extension of time pursuant to s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in respect to the Revocation Decision.

  2. WAIVES any requirement that…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read CLM18 v Minister for Home Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCCA 1106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case concerned an application for judicial review brought by the applicant, CLM18, against the Minister for Home Affairs. The dispute arose from the Minister's decision to revoke a previous decision that had lifted a bar under section 46A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which had allowed the applicant to apply for a Temporary Protection Visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The applicant contended that the revocation decision was unlawful. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia before Judge Baird.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the exercise of the Minister's power to revoke the lifting of the section 46A bar was conditioned by an implied requirement of procedural fairness. If so, the Court also had to determine whether the procedures afforded to the applicant in this instance were sufficient to meet that requirement. The applicant argued that the presumption of procedural fairness, which generally applies to the exercise of statutory powers that affect an individual's interests, was not displaced in this case, unlike in certain "dispensing provisions" previously considered by the High Court.

The Court considered the High Court's explanation in *SZSSJ* that a statute conferring a power apt to affect an individual's interest is presumed to confer that power on the condition that it is exercised with procedural fairness, unless this presumption is clearly displaced by the statutory scheme. The Court noted that the lifting of the section 46A bar created an interest or expectation in the applicant to apply for a visa. The applicant argued that the revocation power under section 46A(2C) did not resemble the "dispensing provisions" discussed in *Plaintiff S10*, which were designed to relax visa system requirements. The Court also examined the Minister's actions in revoking the bar, which involved personal consideration of a ministerial submission and specific directions regarding medical testing. The Court noted that the applicant challenged the second and third Informed Referral of Status Resolution (IRSR) assessments, which concluded that Australia would not breach its non-refoulement obligations if the applicant were returned to Sri Lanka, and that the applicant's claims were "manifestly unfounded."

The Court found that the Minister's submission and the subsequent actions taken demonstrated that the Minister personally considered the matter. The Court also noted that the applicant had not engaged with the Department regarding his claims, and the IRSR assessments, while not assessing protection claims directly, indicated that the applicant's claims were not supported by available country information and did not appear to have substance. The Court ultimately determined that the procedures followed were sufficient to afford procedural fairness to the applicant in the circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Guidelines state (at 5.3.1) that the Minister expects that in most cases the Department will identify cases that meet the Guidelines and refer them to the Minister by way of a ministerial submission for the Minister’s consideration. The Guidelines set out the information that, non-exhaustively, the Minister expects to be included in such a referral.Revocation Decision On 19 September 2017, the Minister personally addressed the recommendations made in the Ministerial submission (set out above at [57]), circling his response, signing and dating the document and, in the section reserved for comments, providing a comment directing that “under paragraph 9 the medical testing must be conducted by a CMO Thanks”. In relation to paragraph 1, the Minister circled the word “agreed”, and signed and dated the instrument at attachment A, and the accompanying statement to Parliament at attachment B, and so agreed to revoke the s.46A bar lift. In relation to paragraph 2, the Minister circled the word “agreed”, and signed and dated the amended Guidelines at attachment C, and so agreed to amend the s.46A Guidelines. In relation to paragraph 3, the Minister circled the word “noted”, and so noted the “arrangements for non-lodgers … and strategies the Department is deploying to mitigate the legal, personal security and community protection risks associated with the implementation of the deadline.” In total three Informed Referral of Status Resolution assessments (IRSR) were undertaken in relation to the Applicant. As I have stated above, the first IRSR was concluded on 18 April 2017, and the second and third IRSR were conducted after the Applicant was placed in detention at Villawood. By the particulars to Ground 2 of his grounds of review, the Applicant challenges the second IRSR and the third IRSR (see below Grounds of review at [78]). No issue is taken with the first IRSR as it was conducted before the Ministerial submission was provided. The IRSR documents each stated that the informed referral was “to assist Status Resolution to determine an appropriate pathway for an IMA who has been invited to apply for a protection visa but has not engaged in the process and has not lodged a protection visa application”. As I have noted in relation to the first IRSR, each of the second and third IRSRs was stated on its face not to be an assessment of any protection claims raised by the person the subject of the IRSR (i.e., the Applicant), but instead a check of the material available to the Department to inform subsequent discussions between the Applicant and an officer. Each IRSR concluded with an assessment, as I have described in relation to the first IRSR above at [36]. Each IRSR concluded that Australia would not breach its non-refoulement obligations if the Applicant was returned to Sri Lanka. In the first IRSR, in the section “Consideration” at section 4 in response to the form question “Based on the above, has the [Applicant] expressed a fear of harm that relates to Australia’s non‑refoulement obligations that that (sic) is plausible and appears to have substance?” the Department officer stated the following:·This person’s claims are manifestly unfounded. This person has not provided any detail to elaborate on his claim that he will be treated in the manner he has claimed upon return to Sri Lanka. I do not consider based on the country information before me that he has expressed a fear of harm that appears to have substance. The country information does not support that persons with this claimed profile would face harm on return.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Alternatively, the Minister submits that if the exercise of power was conditioned by a requirement of procedural fairness, what was done in the circumstances is sufficient to afford procedural fairness to the Applicant. That he did not engage with the Department does not gainsay that the procedure was reasonable in the circumstances.Consideration It may be that the lifting of the s.46A bar to allow the Applicant to apply for a TPV or a SHEV brought into existence an interest or privilege in favour of the Applicant, rather than strictly conferring a statutory right. For a time – so long as the s.46A bar was lifted - the Applicant could apply for a TPV or a SHEV, and he thereby had an interest or expectation in so being able to so apply and have his application considered. Whether characterised as an interest or a statutory right, the Applicant had an interest apt to be adversely affected by the exercise of the revocation power in s.46A(2C): see Plaintiff S10. In SZSSJ, the High Court explained at [75] that:… procedural fairness is implied as a condition of the exercise of a statutory power thorough the application of a common law principle of statutory interpretation … that a statute conferring a power the exercise of which is apt to affect an interest of an individual is presumed to confer that power on condition that the power is exercise in a manner that affords procedural fairness to that individual. The presumption operates unless clearly displaced by the particular statutory scheme. In Plaintiff S10, the High Court termed the non‑compellable powers provisions in ss.48B, 195A and 417 (provisions with which the Court was also concerned subsequently in SZSSJ) and s.351 as “dispensing provisions”: per French CJ and Keifel J at [27], and Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ at, inter alia, [57], [72], whilst Haydon J (at [102]) termed them the “empowering provisions”. As Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ observed at [54], the provisions “confer upon the Minister powers (but not duties) which are to be exercised by the Minister personally and if exercised, dispense with the requirements of the Act.” In Plaintiff S10, where the presumption was displaced, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ (the majority) at [98]-[99] identified statutory criteria that led to the conclusion at [100] that a combination of significant characteristics and language emphatic of both the distinctive nature of the powers conferred upon the Minister by the relevant sections, and of the availability of access to those powers to only certain persons (who had sought or could have sought, but have not established their right to, a visa) revealed the necessary intendment referred to in Plaintiff M61. French CJ and Kiefel J at [28] also identified common features of each of the dispensing provisions affecting the exercise of the power it confers. Mr Gormly contends the presumption of procedural fairness in the exercise of the s.46A(2C) power is not displaced as it is for the exercise of the “dispensing provisions”. He says the exercise of the revocation power under s.46A(2C) does not resemble the operation of the dispensing provisions described in Plaintiff S10 at [69] as: “… to obtain a measure of relaxation of what otherwise would be the operation upon non‑citizens of the visa system; it is the requirements of that system which must be met to lift what otherwise are the prohibitions upon entry and continued presence in Australia.”