CID15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CID15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 780

Appeal from: CID15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 3076
File number: VID 1467 of 2016
Judge: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 12 July 2017
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Protection (Class XA) visa – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal found that the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm as a result of his Shia religious identity and imputed political opinion if he returned to his home area – where Tribunal, in the course of considering whether it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate, reasoned that other areas in the country were “relatively free” from sectarian violence and provided “relative safety” – whether Tribunal adopted a relative rather than objective approach in applying the ‘real chance’ test in the context of relocation – appeal allowed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36
Cases cited:

Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2 AC 426

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA (2014) 254 CLR 317

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZVJE & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 594

Date of hearing: 10 May 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Hosking
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1467 of 2016
BETWEEN:

CID15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOSHINSKY J

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JULY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 30 November 2016 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the Court orders that:

(a)There be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 23 October 2015.

(b)There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the first respondent to refuse the protection visa sought by the appellant.

(c)The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant before the Federal Circuit Court, to be taxed if not agreed.

3.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOSHINSKY…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 780
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In CID15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a national of Pakistan, sought a Protection (Class XA) visa. The dispute centred on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's (AAT) assessment of whether the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm due to his Shia religious identity and imputed political opinion if he returned to his home area in Pakistan. The AAT found that other areas in Pakistan were relatively free from sectarian violence and provided relative safety, which led to the appellant's appeal against the Federal Circuit Court's decision to dismiss his challenge to the AAT's decision.

The central legal issue was whether the AAT had adopted a relative rather than an objective approach in applying the 'real chance' test when considering the appellant's potential relocation within Pakistan. The court had to determine if the AAT correctly applied the objective test for determining a real chance of serious harm and whether the AAT's use of terms such as 'relatively' indicated a departure from this objective standard.

The court concluded that the AAT had correctly applied the objective 'real chance' test when assessing the appellant's risk of harm in urban centres like Islamabad and Rawalpindi. The AAT's reasons indicated a consideration of the objective likelihood of harm, rather than merely comparing risks across different locations. The court held that the AAT's use of the term 'relatively' could be interpreted to mean 'mostly, albeit not absolutely', acknowledging that these urban areas were not entirely free from danger. Therefore, the AAT's decision should be understood as applying the correct test throughout.

The appeal was allowed, and the Federal Circuit Court's orders were set aside. The court issued an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the AAT's decision and an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the AAT to review the delegate's decision according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs before the Federal Circuit Court and the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 30 November 2016 be set aside and, in lieu thereof, the Court orders that:

(a) There be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 23 October 2015.

(b) There be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate of the first respondent to refuse the protection visa sought by the appellant.

(c) The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant before the Federal Circuit Court, to be taxed if not agreed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, a national of Pakistan, applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa. He claimed that he faced a real chance of serious harm due to his Shia religious identity and imputed political opinion if he returned to his home area in Pakistan. The appellant argued that returning to Parachinar, Kurram Agency, would expose him to harm from the Taliban and other militant groups because of his ethnicity, religion, and political opinion. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) found that the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm in his home area. However, in the course of considering whether it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Pakistan, the Tribunal reasoned that other areas in the country were "relatively free" from sectarian violence and provided "relative safety". The Tribunal concluded that the appellant did not face a real chance of serious harm in urban centres such as Islamabad or Rawalpindi, and did not face a real chance of serious harm because of his Shia, Bangash, Pashtun and Parachinar background, or his imputed political opinion in those urban centres.

The appellant's application for a Protection (Class XA) visa was initially refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant appealed the decision to the AAT, which affirmed the delegate's decision. The appellant then appealed the AAT's decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal. The appellant subsequently appealed to the High Court, which allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the AAT for reconsideration.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, the appeal is to be allowed. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court are to be set aside and, in lieu thereof, there will be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Tribunal and an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision of the delegate.The Tribunal decision It is necessary to examine the Tribunal’s decision in some detail given the issue raised by the appeal. At [6] of the Tribunal’s reasons, the Tribunal identified the issues in the review as being: whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted for one or more of the five reasons set out in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York on 31 January 1967 (together, the Refugees Convention or the Convention); and, if not, whether there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being removed from Australia to his receiving country of Pakistan, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. A summary of the relevant law was attached to the Tribunal’s reasons. No issue is taken regarding that summary. The Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant is a national of Pakistan (at [8]). The Tribunal accepted that the appellant’s ethnicity is Pashtun, he is a member of the Bangash tribe, and he follows the Shia religion (at [9]). The Tribunal stated that the appellant’s identity documents indicate that he originates from Parachinar, Kurram Agency (at [9]). It noted that independent sources indicated that Kurram Agency is one of seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the north-west of Pakistan, bordered on the north and west by Afghanistan (at [9]). The Tribunal accepted the appellant’s evidence about his family composition, employment and education history (at [11]). The next section of the Tribunal’s reasons is headed “Refugee assessment” and contains the Tribunal’s consideration of the criteria in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). This section is structured under the following sub-headings:(a)Claims in relation to Kurram Agency;(b)Real chance of persecution on return to Kurram Agency;(c)Availability of state protection in Kurram Agency; and(d)Relocation within Pakistan. In the part headed “Claims in relation to Kurram Agency”, the Tribunal noted that it had been submitted on behalf of the appellant that he feared harm on return to Pakistan from the Taliban and other militant groups for reasons of his ethnicity (Pashtun of the Bangash tribe), his religion (Shia Muslim) and his associated (anti-Taliban) political opinion (at [12]). Having referred to the appellant’s oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing, the Tribunal stated that it accepted that the appellant had “experienced problems” in the past while living in Parachinar and when working transporting goods from Parachinar to Peshawar (and vice versa), but it did not accept that he was specifically targeted by the Taliban as a Shia or for any other reason (at [21]). Although the Tribunal accepted the appellant’s evidence regarding certain past incidents, it found remote the chance that he would be targeted by the Taliban on return to the Parachinar area in relation to those incidents (at [21]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, also relevant to the present appeal are the principles discussed by the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259. In that case, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ considered the proper role of a reviewing court at 271–272. Their Honours noted that, on the face of the delegate’s assessment of the first respondent’s claims, the delegate had correctly directed herself to the test which she had to apply. After setting out a passage from the Full Court’s reasons, their Honours observed that the delegate had started and finished with the correct test, and that it was only some phraseology in between that provided the basis for a conclusion that she had slipped from an assessment of real chance to an assessment of balance of probabilities. Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ then said (at 271–272):When the Full Court referred to “beneficial construction”, it sought to adopt an approach mandated by a long series of cases, the best exemplar of which is Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic. In that case, a Full Court of the Federal Court (Neaves, French and Cooper JJ) collected authorities for various propositions as to the practical restraints on judicial review. It was said that a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language … nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker. The Court continued: “The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.”These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision.(Footnotes omitted.)Consideration The Minister submits that the primary judge was correct to conclude that, when the Tribunal’s decision is “read fairly as a whole”, it shows that the Tribunal did consider whether the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm in urban centres such as Islamabad or Rawalpindi; and not merely whether the risk of harm in those places was lower than in other places in Pakistan. The Minister’s submissions may be summarised as follows:(a)The Tribunal expressed a specific conclusion about whether the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm in urban centres. At [51] of the Tribunal’s reasons, the Tribunal said that it was “not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm … within the entirety of Pakistan”, and specifically found that the applicant “would not face a real chance of serious harm because of his Shia, Bangash, Pashtun and Parachinar background, or his imputed political opinion” in an urban centre such as Islamabad or Rawalpindi. While the Minister accepts that the fact that the Tribunal expressed its conclusion in terms of the correct test is not determinative (see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 595), it does help to demonstrate that the Tribunal applied the correct test.(b)The reasons that the Tribunal gave for this finding indicate that it did not base the finding solely on evidence that the risk of harm in urban centres like Islamabad and Rawalpindi was lower than in other places. Rather, there was material before the Tribunal from which it was open for the Tribunal to conclude that the risk that the appellant would face serious harm in those areas was remote: see, in particular, [42] and [50] of the Tribunal’s reasons. Taken together, these passages clearly indicate that, in determining whether the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm in urban centres like Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the Tribunal turned its mind to the objective likelihood that the appellant would face serious harm in those places, and not just whether the risk of harm in those places was lower than in other places.(c)The Tribunal considered the question whether the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm (or a real risk of significant harm) in a number of different contexts in its reasons, not just in relation to the question of internal relocation: see, in particular, [21], [30]–[31], [38] and [68] of the Tribunal’s reasons. The appellant does not suggest that the Tribunal erred in applying the ‘real chance’ test at either [21] or [30]–[31]. It is highly improbable that the Tribunal would adopt the correct, objective approach to determining whether the appellant faced a real chance of serious harm at these two points in its reasons, only to adopt a different and erroneous approach to applying the same legal test at a different point in its reasons. When [21] and [30]–[31] are read together with [38] and [68], it is clear that the Tribunal was aware that the ‘real chance’ test is an objective test, which required it to form a state of satisfaction about whether the chance that the appellant would face serious harm in urban centres such as Islamabad or Rawalpindi was ‘real’, in the sense that it was appreciable and not remote.(d)As the Tribunal plainly understood that the ‘real chance’ test (and the ‘real risk’ test) is objective, the primary judge was correct to find that a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons – and the preferable reading of those reasons – was that the Tribunal correctly applied that test throughout its decision, including in relation to the issue of internal relocation. For the reasons given above, that reading of the Tribunal’s reasons was open to the Federal Circuit Court, and the Federal Circuit Court was required to give the Tribunal’s reasons a beneficial construction where possible.(e)The primary judge’s finding concerning the Tribunal’s “use of phrasing including ‘relative’” (at [28]) is best understood as a finding that, where the Tribunal used words such as “relative” or “relatively” in connection with its application of the ‘real chance’ test (at [48]–[51]), those words can be explained on the basis that the Tribunal was recognising that urban areas in Pakistan were not absolutely safe, in the sense of being entirely free from danger. The Federal Circuit Court’s finding was not expressed as applying to every use of the word “relatively” in the Tribunal’s reasons, and should not be understood in that way.(f)It is open to read the word “relatively” in [48] of the Tribunal’s reasons as meaning “mostly, albeit not absolutely”, rather than as indicating that the Tribunal was comparing Islamabad to a specific other place. The Tribunal explicitly acknowledged that Islamabad and Rawalpindi were not entirely immune from security incidents. Other uses of the word “relative” following this paragraph are open to a similar interpretation.