BGT18 v Minister for Home Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 16 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BGT18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 1425

File number: ADG 103 of 2018
Judgment of: JUDGE YOUNG
Date of judgment: 24 June 2021
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to refuse to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa – whether the Authority assessed the criteria in section 473DD(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) before assessing the criterion in section 473DD(a) of the Act – where the Authority's reasons indicate it considered the criterion in section 437DD(b)(i) was met before assessing whether there were exceptional circumstances pursuant to section 473DD(a) – where the new information referred to by the applicant covered the same material already independently obtained by the Authority – no jurisdictional error made out

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to refuse to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa – whether the Authority impermissibly engaged in an assessment of comparative risk of safety in Mazar-e-Sharif and other places in Afghanistan – where the Authority was satisfied that the chance of harm to the applicant in Mazar-e-Sharif was remote – no jurisdictional error made out

MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to refuse to grant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa –whether the Authority undertook the required "fact intensive assessment" in determining that it was reasonable and practicable for the applicant to internally relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif – where the Authority found the applicant to be a single able-bodied man of working age without specific vulnerabilities –where the Authority found the applicant to have a wife and three children –where the Authority failed to consider the particular circumstances of the applicant and his family – jurisdictional error made out – costs reserved

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 473DD
Cases cited:

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration [2020] HCA 37, 94 ALJR 1007

CID15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 780

MZANX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 307

Number of paragraphs: 28
Date of hearing: 20 April 2021
Place: Darwin
Counsel for the Applicant: Dr McBeth
Solicitor for the Applicant: Beena Rezaee Legal & Migration
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr d’Assumpção
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

ADG 103 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BGT18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE YOUNG

DATE OF ORDER:

24 JUNE 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue directed to the Second Respondent quashing the decision of the Second Respondent dated 16 February 2018.

2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Second Respondent requiring it to determine the application made to it for review of the decision of a delegate of the First Respondent dated 10 May 2017.

3.Costs are reserved. The Applicant and First Respondent may file written submissions in relation to costs within fourteen (14) days…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BGT18 v Minister for Home Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 1425
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, BGT18, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Home Affairs to refuse to grant a protection visa. The dispute concerned whether the applicant's fear of persecution was well-founded and whether the Minister's decision had adequately considered all relevant information. The matter came before Young J of the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the Minister's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, specifically whether the delegate's assessment of the applicant's claims for protection was reasonable and whether the delegate had failed to consider relevant information. The Court was required to determine if the delegate's findings regarding the applicant's fear of persecution were supported by the evidence and if the delegate had properly applied the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and the *Migration Regulations 1994* (Cth).

Young J found that the delegate's assessment of the applicant's claims was unreasonable and lacked an evidential basis. The Court held that the delegate had failed to properly consider crucial aspects of the applicant's evidence, including specific details of past persecution and the likely future harm the applicant would face if returned to their country of origin. The reasoning applied was that a decision-maker must engage with and assess all relevant evidence presented, and a failure to do so constitutes jurisdictional error. The Court emphasised the importance of a thorough and evidenced-based assessment when determining claims for protection visas.

The Court ordered that the Minister's decision be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of BGT18 v Minister for Home Affairs concerns the application for a judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse the applicant, a citizen of Afghanistan, a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The applicant arrived in Australia in 2014 and sought refugee status based on his Hazara ethnicity and Shia faith, claiming persecution due to conflict with Kuchi nomads and targeting by the Taliban. The Authority accepted the applicant's employment with a company associated with the foreign presence in Afghanistan and his kidnapping incident but did not find him specifically targeted or at significant risk if he were to relocate within Afghanistan.

The Authority's decision to refuse the visa hinged on several grounds, including whether it correctly assessed the criteria in section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) before determining if there were exceptional circumstances justifying the consideration of new information. The applicant argued that the IAA erred by not considering the criteria in section 473DD(b) before assessing section 473DD(a), contrary to the High Court's decision in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration. The respondent acknowledged the omission but argued that the Authority's reasoning aligned with AUS17, finding no jurisdictional error in this regard. The court found that the IAA's reasoning process was in line with the High Court's decision.

Another contention was whether the IAA impermissibly engaged in a comparative risk assessment of safety in Mazar-e-Sharif and other parts of Afghanistan. The applicant argued that the IAA's language indicated an impermissible comparative assessment, but the respondent maintained that the IAA was satisfied, in absolute terms, that the chance of harm to the applicant in Mazar-e-Sharif was remote. The court accepted the respondent's argument, finding no jurisdictional error in this ground.

The final ground of review concerned whether the IAA undertook a fact-intensive assessment in determining that it was reasonable and practicable for the applicant to internally relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif. The applicant argued that the IAA failed to consider his particular circumstances and those of his family, including his wife and three children. The IAA concluded that the applicant, a single able-bodied man without specific vulnerabilities, could reasonably relocate despite lacking family or tribal links in Mazar-e-Sharif. The court found that the IAA's assessment was too general and did not sufficiently consider the applicant's specific circumstances and those of his family, leading to a jurisdictional error.

BGT18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 1425 was an application for judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) to refuse the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The applicant, a citizen of Afghanistan, had come to Australia in 2014 and applied for a visa based on his claims of persecution due to his Hazara ethnicity and Shia faith. The IAA affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse the visa, finding that the applicant was not at risk of significant harm if he were to relocate from Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. The applicant sought judicial review on the basis of jurisdictional error in the IAA’s assessment of the safety of Mazar-e-Sharif, the authority’s failure to undertake a fact-intensive assessment of the reasonableness of relocation, and the authority's failure to properly consider the criteria under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) before assessing whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information. The matter came before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia as an application for judicial review of the IAA’s decision. The court reviewed the IAA’s decision and assessed the applicant’s grounds of review, including whether the IAA had properly considered the criteria in section 473DD(b) before assessing whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information, and whether the IAA had correctly assessed the safety and reasonableness of relocating to Mazar-e-Sharif. The court found that while the IAA had not expressly referenced the criteria in section 473DD(b), it had implicitly considered them and concluded there were no exceptional circumstances. The court also found that the IAA had not engaged in an impermissible comparative assessment of the safety of Mazar-e-Sharif and other places in Afghanistan. However, the court found a jurisdictional error in the IAA’s assessment of the reasonableness of relocating to Mazar-e-Sharif, as the IAA had not undertaken a fact-intensive assessment of the applicant’s particular circumstances and those of his family. The court quashed the IAA’s decision and ordered the IAA to determine the applicant's visa application afresh. Costs were reserved for further submissions from the parties.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority err in its construction of s 473DD by failing to consider the criteria in s 473DD(b) before determining whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information?
2. Did the Authority engage in an impermissible assessment of comparative risk by considering the relative safety of Mazar-e-Sharif and other places in Afghanistan when determining whether it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate there?
3. Did the Authority undertake the required "fact intensive assessment" in determining that it was reasonable and practicable for the applicant to internally relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif, considering the particular circumstances of the applicant and his family?

Held
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority err in its construction of s 473DD by failing to consider the criteria in s 473DD(b) before determining whether there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering new information?
The court concluded that the Authority did not make a jurisdictional error in its construction of s 473DD. The Authority accepted that the new information provided by the applicant was recent and of significance but concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances for the purpose of s 473DD(a) as the information was covered by other sources. This process of reasoning was found to be in conformity with AUS17 v Minister for Immigration [2020] HCA 37. This ground of review failed.

2. Did the Authority engage in an impermissible assessment of comparative risk by considering the relative safety of Mazar-e-Sharif and other places in Afghanistan when determining whether it was reasonable for the applicant to relocate there?
The court concluded that the Authority did not engage in an impermissible assessment of comparative risk. The Authority was satisfied, in absolute terms, that the chance of harm to the applicant in Mazar-e-Sharif was remote. The use of comparative terminology did not indicate that the Authority engaged in an impermissible comparative assessment of risk. This ground of review failed.

3. Did the Authority undertake the required "fact intensive assessment" in determining that it was reasonable and practicable for the applicant to internally relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif, considering the particular circumstances of the applicant and his family?
The court concluded that the Authority did not undertake the required fact intensive assessment in determining that it was reasonable and practicable for the applicant to internally relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif. The Authority's consideration of the applicant's family circumstances and the impact of relocation on them was found to be inadequate and did not meet the level of detail required. The decision was found to involve jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia in BGT18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] FCCA 1425 considered several critical issues in the context of a visa application review. Firstly, the court examined whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) erred in its interpretation of section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by failing to consider the criteria in section 473DD(b) before determining if there were exceptional circumstances justifying the consideration of new information. The court found that while the IAA did not explicitly reference section 473DD(b), it implicitly accepted the new information provided by the applicant as recent and significant, thereby satisfying the criteria in section 473DD(b)(i). However, because the IAA had independent information from DFAT and EASO covering the same incidents, it concluded there were no exceptional circumstances. The court held that the IAA's reasoning was in conformity with the High Court's decision in AUS17 v Minister for Immigration [2020] HCA 37, which dictates that new information must be assessed against the criteria in section 473DD(b) before determining if there are exceptional circumstances under section 473DD(a).

Secondly, the court scrutinized whether the IAA engaged in an impermissible assessment of comparative risk by considering the relative safety of Mazar-e-Sharif and other areas in Afghanistan when determining the reasonableness of relocating there. The IAA's reasons included statements about Mazar-e-Sharif being "more secure" and "relatively less affected," but the court found that these remarks did not reflect an overall assessment of comparative risk. Instead, the IAA concluded that the risk of harm to the applicant in Mazar-e-Sharif was remote in absolute terms, consistent with the decision in CID15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 780, which holds that comparative risk assessments are impermissible.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the IAA undertook the required "fact-intensive assessment" in determining that it was reasonable and practicable for the applicant to internally relocate to Mazar-e-Sharif. The court noted that the IAA's decision did not sufficiently consider the particular circumstances of the applicant and his family. Although the applicant had a wife and three children, the IAA's reasoning focused on the applicant's ability to find work and support his family without delving into the specifics of how he would manage without family or tribal networks in Mazar-e-Sharif. The court relied on MZANX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 307, which emphasizes the need for a detailed and individualized assessment when considering the practicability and reasonableness of relocation. The court found that the IAA's conclusion was based on generalities rather than a detailed consideration of the applicant's unique circumstances, leading to a jurisdictional error.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that while the IAA's approach to assessing new information and the safety of relocation was largely correct, it erred in failing to conduct a sufficiently detailed and individualized assessment of the applicant's circumstances when determining the reasonableness of internal relocation.