FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chhabra v McPherson as Trustee for the McPherson Practice Trust
[2019] FCAFC 228
Appeal from: Chhabra v McPherson as Trustee for the McPherson Practice Trust [2018] FCA 1755; (2018) 138 IPR 1 File numbers: NSD 2266 of 2018 Judges: GREENWOOD, CHARLESWORTH AND BURLEY JJ Date of judgment: 13 December 2019 Catchwords: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – copyright – appeal from orders dismissing an application for damages for infringement of copyright subsisting in a logo – whether first appellant was the sole owner of the copyright – whether, as co-owner, the first appellant could revoke a licence previously granted jointly by the co-owners to the respondents – whether the licence was revocable at will – whether licence previously granted to the respondents was revoked on the facts – no appealable error – appeal dismissed Legislation: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 10, 30, 35, 196, 197
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) s 91
Copyright (International Protection) Regulations 1969 (Cth) reg 4
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 10
Cases cited: Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Microcomputer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 6 FCR 277
Chhabra v McPherson as Trustee for the McPherson Practice Trust [2018] FCA 1755; (2018) 138 IPR 1
Computermate Products (Aust) Pty Ltd v Ozi-Soft Pty Ltd (1988) 20 FCR 46
Patten v Thomas Motors Pty Ltd (1965) 66 SR (NSW) 458
Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd (1975) 29 FLR 59
Robert J Zupanovich Pty Ltd v B & N Beale Nominees Pty Ltd (1995) 59 FCR 49
Seven Network (Operations) Ltd v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (2005) 146 FCR 183
Trumpet Software Pty Ltd v Ozemail Pty Ltd (1996) 34 IPR 481
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
Davies G, Caddick N, Harbottle G, Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (17th ed Sweet & Maxwell 2016) Vol 1
The Laws of Australia (Thomson Reuters subscription service)
Date of hearing: 29 May 2019 Date of last submissions: 29 May 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Copyright and Industrial Designs Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 107 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Green SC with Ms R White Solicitor for the Appellants: MinterEllison Counsel for the Respondents: Mr A Crowe QC with Mr B Gardiner Solicitor for the Respondents: DWF ORDERS
NSD 2266 of 2018 BETWEEN: SUNIL LAL CHHABRA
First Appellant
KIRAN CHANDRA RAMRAKHA
Second Appellant
AND: JAMIE ANGUS JOHN MCPHERSON AS TRUSTEE FOR THE MCPHERSON PRACTICE TRUST
First Respondent
DAMIEN IGNATIUS ARNOLD LAMBERT VAN BRUNSCHOT AS TRUSTEE FOR THE VB PRACTICE TRUST
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
GREENWOOD, CHARLESWORTH AND BURLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
13 December 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
The two respondents, Jamie McPherson and Damien van Brunschot are partners in a law firm…
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- Case
- [2019] FCAFC 228
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge's determination that the email from Hemant Batra to Sunil Lal on 4 August 2010 did not constitute an effective assignment of future copyright, as required by sections 196 and 197 of the Copyright Act, was correct. The email did not explicitly assign the copyright to Sunil Lal, and there was insufficient evidence to conclude that an assignment was intended. Furthermore, the court upheld the finding that the licence granted to the respondents was irrevocable, as it was considered a contractual obligation that bound successors in title. The appeal was dismissed as there was no appealable error found in the primary judge's reasoning and conclusions.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal. This outcome underscores the importance of clear and unequivocal language in agreements concerning the assignment of intellectual property rights, as well as the enforceability of irrevocable licences.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By [3] of their amended notice of appeal the appellants contend that the email from Mr Batra to Mr Lal of 4 August 2010, together with the Confirmatory Deed “meant that Mr Batra assigned his ownership of copyright to Mr Lal effective 29 September 2011”. It is alleged that, when read in conjunction with the minutes of the meeting dated 24 July 2010, “Mr Batra’s intention as to ownership of the Australian copyright is wholly apparent” and that the subsequent emails between Mr Batra and Mr Lal confirmed their respective intentions. The case as put in submissions is that his Honour erred by failing to determine in the appellants favour that by virtue of the 4 August 2010 email, and s 197 of the Copyright Act, the future copyright in the Kaden Boriss logos was placed by Mr Batra in the hands of Mr Lal. Upon the entry into the Confirmatory Deed on 12 January 2017 the automatic effect of the earlier agreement was that Mr Batra assigned his interest in the copyright to Mr Lal. The appellants submitted that the primary judge erred in determining that the 4 August 2010 email did not meet the requirements of s 196 or s 197 of the Copyright Act so as to constitute an effective assignment of future copyright vesting sole ownership in Mr Lal. Sole ownership in Mr Lal is said to have vested as and from 29 September 2011, the date on which the Confirmatory Deed took retrospective effect.Consideration Section 197 of the Copyright Act provides:197 Prospective ownership of copyright(1)Where, by an agreement made in relation to a future copyright and signed by or on behalf of the person who would, apart from this section, be the owner of the copyright on its coming into existence, that person purports to assign the future copyright (wholly or partially) to another person (in this subsection referred to as the assignee), then if, on the coming into existence of the copyright, the assignee or a person claiming under him or her would, apart from this subsection, be entitled as against all other persons to have the copyright vested in him or her (wholly or partially, as the case may be), the copyright, on its coming into existence, vests in the assignee or his or her successor in title by force of this subsection.(2)Where, at the time when a copyright comes into existence, the person who, if he or she were then living, would be entitled to the copyright is dead, the copyright devolves as if it had subsisted immediately before his or her death and he or she had then been the owner of the copyright.(3)A licence granted in respect of a future copyright by the prospective owner of the copyright binds every successor in title to the prospective interest in the copyright of the grantor of the licence to the same extent as the licence was binding on the grantor. The phrase “future copyright” in s 197(1) is defined in s 10(1) to mean “copyright to come into existence at a future time or upon the happening of a future event”. The primary judge rejected the appellants’ argument on two principal bases, each of which was sufficient. The first was that the 4 August 2010 email upon which the appellants relied did not on its terms purport to effect an assignment of copyright. The email, his Honour said, contained general assertions about the right to use a “brand” but said little about the ownership of copyright in an artistic work.