FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CHANCELLOR & MCCOY | [2016] FamCAFC 256 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY SETTLEMENT – De facto – Appeal against an order dismissing an application for property settlement on the basis that it was not just and equitable to make an order adjusting property interests – The trial judge did not hold the parties to a “higher or different standard than other de facto couples” – The trial judge did not err by misapplying Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 and Fielding and Nichol [2014] FCWA 77 – The trial judge did not fail to give adequate consideration to the factors in s 90SM(4)(b) to (e) – An error of fact made by the trial judge was not material – The result was not manifestly unjust – The trial judge did not err in finding that the parties had agreed to keep their financial affairs separate – Appeal dismissed – Order for the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – s 79, s 90SM |
| Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545 Edwards v Noble (1971) 125 CLR 296 Chapman & Chapman (2014) FLC 93-592 Fielding and Nichol [2014] FCWA 77 Stanford v Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 77 ALJR 1598 |
| APPELLANT: | Ms Chancellor |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms McCoy |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 1650 | of | 2013 |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | NA | 10 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 2 December 2016 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Perth |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Bryant CJ, Thackray & Strickland JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 7 November 2016 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Federal Circuit Court of Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 25 January 2016 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2016] FCCA 53 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: | Mr Jordan |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT: | Burchill & Horsey Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Page QC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Feeney Family Law |
Orders
The appeal be dismissed.
The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed and in default of agreement, as assessed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Chancellor & McCoy has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
Appeal Number: NA 10 of 2016
File Number: BRC 1650 of 2013
| Ms Chancellor |
Appellant
And
| Ms McCoy |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The appellant and the respondent lived in a same-sex de facto marriage for 27 years. Although in a committed relationship, they kept their financial affairs almost entirely separate. By the time they separated, the…
Continue reading Chancellor & McCoy
Sign in free to access the full text
Details
- AGLC
- Chancellor & McCoy [2016] FamCAFC 256
- Case
- [2016] FamCAFC 256
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The matter of Chancellor & McCoy involved the appellant, seeking to challenge the decision of the lower court regarding property interests between her and the respondent. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the lower court's evaluation of the evidence regarding the contributions made by the appellant to the properties in question was appropriate and if the court had correctly assessed the financial and non-financial contributions in determining whether it was "just and equitable" to interfere with the existing property interests. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the appellant's failure to provide receipts, bank statements, or affidavits adequately demonstrated her contributions and their impact on the property values.
The court examined the evidence presented by the appellant, noting the absence of receipts, bank statements, or affidavits to substantiate her claims regarding contributions to the properties. The court clarified that while it was acknowledged that such evidence might not be typical in a committed relationship, the lack of such documentation was still pertinent in the context of a legal assessment of property contributions. The court held that the lower court was justified in drawing attention to the absence of such evidence and did not consider this to be an error on the part of the trial judge. The court also observed that the lower court had adequately considered the contributions made by the appellant alongside other factors in determining the overall property interests.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, holding that the lower court had appropriately assessed the evidence and contributions made by the appellant. The court further ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed or assessed if no agreement could be reached.
The court examined the evidence presented by the appellant, noting the absence of receipts, bank statements, or affidavits to substantiate her claims regarding contributions to the properties. The court clarified that while it was acknowledged that such evidence might not be typical in a committed relationship, the lack of such documentation was still pertinent in the context of a legal assessment of property contributions. The court held that the lower court was justified in drawing attention to the absence of such evidence and did not consider this to be an error on the part of the trial judge. The court also observed that the lower court had adequately considered the contributions made by the appellant alongside other factors in determining the overall property interests.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal, holding that the lower court had appropriately assessed the evidence and contributions made by the appellant. The court further ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed or assessed if no agreement could be reached.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The appeal be dismissed.
2.
The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed and in default of agreement, as assessed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
The appellant next complained about what her Honour said at [57] of her reasons (original emphasis):57. Lack of evidencea)There was lack of evidence from [the appellant] as to the alleged contributions made by [the appellant] to the [Suburb M] and [Suburb A] property, with no receipts for work done, no bank statements showing withdrawals and no affidavits by friends or family members as to work performed on these properties.b)There was lack of evidence as to whether the financial and non-financial contributions made by [the appellant] to the [Suburb M] and [Suburb A] property increased the value of the properties. … It was argued that her Honour was critical of the appellant for not having retained receipts for work done to the respondent’s properties and also for her failure to obtain evidence to show whether the contributions she made to the properties had increased their value. It was submitted that it was unsurprising in a committed relationship that a party might not keep receipts to prove how monies were spent. It was also argued that it would be “completely unlikely” that evidence would be provided as to whether contributions made to the properties had increased their value. In advancing this argument, counsel for the appellant drew attention to the fact that the trial judge had found that the appellant had done “all the domestic chores to enable [the respondent] to do labour” on the Suburb A property (at [51]), and that her Honour had fallen into error by expecting that there could be evidence of how the value of domestic work had improved the value of the properties. Again, we do not dispute the premise of these propositions, but we do not perceive her Honour to have done more than point out the paucity of the evidence advanced by the appellant. It must be borne firmly in mind that her Honour was only exploring the issue of whether it was “just and equitable” to interfere with existing property interests. Had the appellant led evidence that the work she undertook around the respondent’s properties had increased their value to any greater extent than the work the respondent did around the appellant’s property, this would arguably have been a material matter for her Honour to have taken into account. In the circumstances, it was open to her Honour to draw attention to the absence of such evidence. It is also important to record that among the 10 groups of matters that her Honour took into account were the direct and indirect financial contributions each party made to the other’s real property. It was not submitted on behalf of the appellant that her Honour had misstated the extent of these or had overlooked any contribution of the appellant. Accordingly, even though the trial judge commented on the lack of specificity in the appellant’s evidence, and the absence of corroborating documents or witnesses, it can be seen that her Honour did have regard to the respective contributions, which were weighed with all of the other matters she took into account.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.