Chan v City of Subiaco

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   CHAN -v- CITY OF SUBIACO [2017] WASC 134

CORAM:   PRITCHARD J

HEARD:   25 MAY 2016; SUPPLEMENTARY SUBMISSIONS 24 OCTOBER 2016 & 3 NOVEMBER 2016

DELIVERED          :   19 MAY 2017

FILE NO/S:   GDA 2 of 2016

BETWEEN:   MING CHAN

KEN CHAN
Applicants

AND

CITY OF SUBIACO
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MS D QUINLAN (MEMBER)

Citation  :CHAN and CITY OF SUBIACO [2016] WASAT 3

File No  :CC 377 of 2015

Catchwords:

Leave to appeal - Applicable principles - Turns on own facts

Building Act 2011 (WA) - Interpretation - Section 178(2) - Meaning of 'a building licence that was in effect immediately before commencement' - Whether building licence under Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 (WA) taken to be a building permit under the Building Act

Legislation:

Building Act 2011 (WA), s 3, s 20, s 29, s 32, s 110, s 112, s 122, s 133, s 153, s 177, s 178, s 179, s 180, s 181, s 182A, s 182, s 183, s 184, s 185, s 186, s 187, s 189, s 190, s 191, s 192, s 193, s 194, s 195, s 198, s 199, s 200, s 201, s 202
Building Regulations 1989 (WA), reg 15, reg 16
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 3, s 19, s 37
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 (WA), s 374, s 401A, s 401, s 409A
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27, s 29, s 105

Result:

Leave to amend the grounds of appeal granted
Leave to appeal granted in part
Appeal allowed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicants:     Mr P G McGowan

Respondent:     Mr D P Gillett

Solicitors:

Applicants:     Hotchkin Hanly Lawyers

Respondent:     McLeods Barristers & Solicitors

Cases referred to in judgment:

Allpike v Lang (Unreported, WASC, Library No 9163, 29 November 1991)

Armstrong v Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2014] WASCA 71

Byrne v Owners of Ceresa River Apartments Strata Plan 55597 [2016] WASC 153

Chan and City of Subiaco [2016] WASAT 3

Chin v Legal Practice Board Western Australia [2009] WASCA 117

City of Albany v Cuscuna Nominees Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 91

Field Deployment Solutions Pty Ltd v SC Projects Australia Pty Ltd [2015] WASC 60

Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips [1925] HCA 18; (1925) 36 CLR 60

Lourey v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2012] WASCA 112

Maxwell v Murphy [1957] HCA 7; (1957) 96 CLR 261

Paridis v Settlement Agents Supervisory Board [2007] WASCA 97; (2007) 33 WAR 361

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252

Secretary, Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls [1999] VSCA 117; [1999] 3 VR 331

Stead v State Government Insurance Commission [1986] HCA 54; (1986) 161 CLR 141

Thiess v Collector of Customs [2014] HCA 12; (2014) 250 CLR 664

  1. PRITCHARD J:  Since 1999, Mr Ming Chan…

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Details
Case
[2017] WASC 134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The dispute in Chan v City of Subiaco was between the owners of a building and the City of Subiaco. The City of Subiaco issued a building order under the Building Act 2011 (WA) to the owners of a building, alleging that the owners had failed to comply with the terms of a building licence issued under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 (WA). The dispute was heard and determined by the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) of Western Australia.

The legal issues the court had to decide were whether a building licence issued under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 (WA) should be considered as a building permit under the Building Act 2011 (WA) and whether a building order could be issued to the owners of the building in respect of building work completed years before the commencement of the Building Act 2011 (WA). The court had to consider the meaning of the phrase 'a building licence that was in effect immediately before commencement' in section 178(2) of the Building Act 2011 (WA).

The court concluded that the phrase 'in effect immediately before the commencement' in section 178(2) of the Building Act 2011 (WA) was a phrase of limitation or qualification, and its purpose was to identify a category of building licences from within the broader group of all building licences issued under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1960 (WA). The court held that the phrase was intended to apply only to building licences that provided a continuing source of authority to undertake building work immediately prior to the commencement of the Building Act 2011 (WA). The court also held that the legislative context supported this interpretation of section 178(2). The court found that the building licence in question was not in effect immediately before the commencement of the Building Act 2011 (WA) because the building work authorised by the licence had been completed years before the commencement of the Act.

The final orders made by the court were that the City of Subiaco's application for review be dismissed with costs, and that the decision of the SAT be affirmed. The court held that the City of Subiaco was not entitled to issue a building order to the owners of the building in respect of building work completed years before the commencement of the Building Act 2011 (WA).

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The relevant factual and legislative background In February 2006, the Lessee submitted an application for development approval to convert the existing restaurants and a shop (for which the Building was then used) for use as a restaurant. The application for development approval, which was in evidence before the SAT,[3] was signed by the Owners. [3] Respondent's s 24 Bundle of Documents, Doc No 1. On 4 May 2006, the Council of the City granted approval to the Lessee to commence that development. The approval granted was 'to commence development in accordance with the plans dated 3 April 2006 attached' to the Lessee's application for development approval.[4] On 22 September 2006, the Building Licence was issued to the Lessee's builder, authorising the erection of the alterations to the restaurant 'as per the application, plans and specifications approved by the City of Subiaco'.[5] A copy of what appears to be the Approved Plan referred to in the Building Licence (which is described as 'Locality Sketch and Site Plan') was also before the SAT.[6] The Approved Plan indicated that on the western side of the Building there were to be nine car parking bays, and the most northerly of those bays was designated as a disabled parking bay. On 9 May 2014, an officer of the City wrote to the Owners to advise that it had come to the City's attention that signage indicating the location of the disabled parking bay had been removed, advising that legislation required that 'an owner of a property must ensure ongoing compliance with both planning and building approvals' and requesting the Owners' co‑operation 'in rectifying this situation, by immediately reinstating the line markings and signage delineating the required designated disabled car parking bay as required by your building and planning approvals'.[7] The Owners disputed any obligation on their part to rectify the situation, and correspondence between the Owners and the City failed to resolve the impasse. [7] Respondent's s 24 Bundle of Documents, Doc No 5. The City took the view that it was entitled to issue the Building Order, to stop what was a suspected contravention of the Building Act.[8] The City issued the Building Order on 20 February 2015.[8] Respondent's submissions [3.18]. According to its terms, the Building Order was issued pursuant to s 110 of the Building Act. Section 110 of the Building Act provides that a permit authority (in this case, the City) may make an order, known as a building order, in respect of particular building work, demolition work, or a particular building or incidental structure, whether completed before or after the commencement day for relevant provisions of the Building Act (namely 2 April 2012). ('Building work' is defined in the Building Act and includes the renovation, alteration or improvement of a building or an incidental structure, while a 'building' includes a part thereof, and an 'incidental structure' is a structure attached to or incidental to a building.[9])[9] Building Act 2011 (WA) s 3.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The SAT decision When conducting its review of the City's decision to issue the Building Order, the SAT conducted a hearing de novo,[24] exercised such power as the City had to issue a building order, and its decision was to be regarded as, and given effect as, a decision of the City.[25] The case advanced by the Owners in the SAT was that they did not carry out the development of the Building, were not issued with the Building Licence, had had no dealings with the builders or the architects involved, and knew nothing of the requirements in respect of the parking bays adjacent to the Building until the matter was drawn to their attention by the City. Their submission, therefore, was that they were not responsible for what occurred, and that it would be 'grossly unfair'[26] to issue a building order to them so long after the event. They submitted that the Building Order should be issued to either the Lessee which had obtained development approval, or to the current occupier of the Building.[27][26] Chan and City of Subiaco [2016] WASAT 3 [15].[27] Chan and City of Subiaco [2016] WASAT 3 [15] ‑ [16]. The City's position was that a building order could not be issued to the builder as the Building Licence was no longer in effect, and that it would be an abuse of process to issue a building order to a builder where the builder had no present right of access to the site. The City's position was that the correct and preferable decision for the SAT was to confirm its decision to issue the Owners with a building order because they had authority and control over the Land, they derived benefit from the Land, there was a public interest in ensuring building works were completed in accordance with a building licence - especially where there is a specific public benefit such as a disabled parking bay - and the installation of the disabled parking bay would be inexpensive and relatively easy.[28] The learned Member noted that the Building Licence was issued under the LGMP Act, and considered the operation of the transitional provisions in the Building Act, including s 178(2) of that Act. The learned Member did not give the construction of s 178(2) any detailed consideration, probably because the application of the Building Act was not a matter in dispute between the parties at that stage. Instead, the learned Member summarised the operation of s 178(2) of the Building Act as being that 'a building licence is taken to be a building permit on the conditions applying to the building licence',[29] and thereafter in her reasons she simply equated the Building Licence with a building permit under the Building Act. [29] Chan and City of Subiaco [2016] WASAT 3 [21]. The learned Member then went on to consider whether a building order could issue in this case, on the basis that there had been a contravention of s 29(1) of the Building Act, as the City contended. In considering whether a building order could be issued to the builder in this case, the learned Member considered whether the Building Licence was still in effect.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It is clear that the words 'in effect immediately before the commencement day' are words of limitation or qualification. That is, the purpose of the phrase is to identify a category of building licences from within the broader group of all building licences issued under s 374(1) of the LGMP Act (and which are encompassed by the definition of 'building licence' in s 178(1)). If it had been the intention of the Parliament that s 178(2) should apply to every building licence issued before the commencement of the Building Act, it would have been sufficient simply to refer to a 'building licence' as already defined in s 178(1) of the Building Act. Furthermore, if, as the City contends, it was intended that s 178(2) would apply to all building licences issued under the LGMP Act save for those rendered void because the work authorised by the licence was not substantially commenced within 12 months of the date of the issue of the licence, that criterion could have been expressly stated in s 178(2) of the Building Act. Further, the construction of s 178(2) for which counsel for the City contended would have the result that the words 'that was in effect immediately before commencement day' would be left with little or no work to do. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that the words used in a statute should not be construed so as to leave them without any operation.[61] [61] Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252 [39] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan & Kiefel JJ) (and the authorities there cited). Secondly, the legislative context supports the construction of s 178(2) which I prefer. The context in which the phrase 'in effect immediately before the commencement day' appears within s 178(2) itself supports the conclusion that a building licence would be 'in effect' only while it conferred authority to conduct the building work referred to in the licence. That is because a building licence which is subject to s 178(2) will be taken to be a building permit 'on the conditions applying to the building licence immediately before the commencement day'. Such conditions will ordinarily (and, perhaps, necessarily) apply to the performance of the building work which is authorised by the building licence. For that reason, it is to be expected that once that building work is completed, the conditions applicable to its performance would cease to have any ongoing, practical operation. (Of course, the existence of such conditions would still be relevant evidence in any enforcement proceedings.) Consequently, the reference to the application of the conditions 'applying to the building licence immediately before the commencement day' would have no content in relation to a building licence that authorised building work which was completed years before the commencement day for the Building Act. In my view, s 178(3) of the Building Act also supports the conclusion that s 178(2) was only intended to apply to building licences which, immediately prior to the commencement day, provided a continuing source of authority to undertake building work. The effect of s 178(3) was that if a building licence granted under the LGMP Act was, by virtue of s 178(2), taken to be a building permit under the Building Act, that licence would be of 'no effect' if the building work to which it applies was not substantially commenced within 12 months of its issue (that is, the time period applicable under the LGMP Act and the Building Regulations) rather than the 2‑year period which would otherwise apply under the Building Act.[62] That suggests that the intention of s 178(2) was to bring within the scope of the Building Act only those building licences where the building work was either underway, or yet to be commenced, as at the commencement day. [62] Building Act 2011 (WA) s 32(2).