FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CGW18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1104
Appeal from: CGW18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 2964 File number: WAD 600 of 2019 Judge: STEWART J Date of judgment: 3 August 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority engaged in jurisdictional error in concluding that the appellant is not a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where appellant survivor of sexual assault – whether social stigma arising from sexual assault can amount to persecution or serious harm – whether Authority mischaracterised the particular social group by impermissibly splitting into two sub-groups without considering why the appellant might want to keep the sexual assault a secret in relation to persecutory harm – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Pt 7AA; ss 5H, 5J, 36(2)(a) and (aa), 65
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Cases cited: Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; 216 CLR 473
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389
ESD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1716
FTQ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2025
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 257 FCR 111
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45; 254 CLR 317
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola(No 2) [2001] FCA 341; 107 FCR 184
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1
R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator [2005] UKHL 19; [2005] 1 WLR 1063
SYLB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 942; 87 ALD 498
SZVZL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1299
Date of hearing: 22 July 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 73 Counsel for the Appellant: MGS Crowley Solicitor for the Appellant: AUM Legal Counsel for the First Respondent: C Taggart Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 600 of 2019 BETWEEN: CGW18
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
STEWART J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 AUGUST 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 7 November 2019 are set aside and in lieu thereof there be orders that:
(a)A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision of 29 March 2018 under reference IAA18/04148;
(b)A writ of mandamus issue directed to the…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1104
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the IAA appropriately considered the appellant's fear of persecution based on her sexual assault and the social stigma it might cause. The court needed to assess whether the IAA had correctly applied the law in determining the appellant's protection claims, particularly whether the social stigma arising from her sexual assault could constitute persecution or serious harm under the Act. Additionally, the court had to determine if the IAA had mischaracterised the particular social group by splitting it into sub-groups and not adequately considering the appellant's reasons for keeping the sexual assault a secret.
The Federal Court found that the IAA had indeed made a jurisdictional error in its decision. The court held that the IAA had failed to properly consider the social stigma the appellant might face due to her sexual assault and how this could amount to persecution. The court highlighted that the IAA did not sufficiently address why the appellant might want to keep the sexual assault a secret in relation to any persecutory harm. The court concluded that the IAA had mischaracterised the particular social group by not adequately considering the appellant's reasons for maintaining the confidentiality of her assault. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the IAA was quashed. The court ordered that a writ of certiorari be issued to quash the IAA's decision and a writ of mandamus to direct the IAA to conduct a lawful review of the appellant's claim. Furthermore, the Minister for Home Affairs was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dated 7 November 2019 are set aside and in lieu thereof there be orders that:
(a) A writ of certiorari issue directed to the second respondent quashing its decision of 29 March 2018 under reference IAA18/04148;
(b) A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent, differently constituted, to conduct the review according to law;
(c) The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs in an amount fixed in accordance with the prevailing schedule.
3. The first respondent is to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It was in this context that the delegate considered the appellant’s claims in relation to her sexual assault by the CID. The delegate found that at the time of the rape the appellant was single and subjected to reporting conditions. She remained in Sri Lanka for nearly another two years without further incident. The delegate found that there is no reason to believe that the appellant would find herself in circumstances that would make her vulnerable, especially as the appellant and her husband have parents and extensive extended family with whom she could seek shelter and protection. The delegate found that there was only a remote chance of the appellant facing serious harm at the time of the decision or in the reasonably foreseeable future if returned to Sri Lanka. On this basis, the delegate found that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons related to the sexual assault.The Immigration Assessment Authority The decision of the delegate was referred to the Authority for automatic review under Part 7AA of the Act. The Authority (at [7] of its reasons) summarised the appellant’s claims for protection. Relevantly, that summary included the following:•During December 2010, whilst attending the CID office, she was drugged and raped. She later woke in hospital.•Fearing she might suffer from a social stigma as a result of this event, she kept this matter secret. Only her mother and brother are aware. She married her husband in March 2012. She has not told her husband. The Authority accepted that the appellant was raped in December 2010 as she claims. The Authority recorded that the appellant:has outlined that she feels significant humiliation and shame arising from this incident, and that she kept this incident from her husband, since she feared he would not marry her if he knew. She does not feel that she can tell him now, and wishes this matter to be maintained in the strictest confidence. As summarised in the Minister’s written submissions, the Authority reasoned as follows:·a person being of Tamil ethnicity would not of itself warrant international protection and neither would a person who evidences past membership or connection to the LTTE, other than in some inapplicable circumstances;·women in Sri Lanka suffer from a range of disadvantages: sexual harassment and the risk of rape (especially in areas dominated by a strong Sri Lankan military presence, like the Northern Province); domestic violence; a low reporting of violence against women “and a social stigma for those who do report such violence”;·female headed households are particularly vulnerable since the absence of a male presence often indicates a lack of physical security and may reduce economic opportunities since employment for women in Sri Lanka is less common;·there are reports that allegations of sexual assault by members of the security forces persist. However, the assault occurred over 7 years ago and there has been considerable improvement in the security situation in Sri Lanka, and in the Northern Province;·the appellant is married and, if returned to Sri Lanka, she would not be the female head of a household. Rather she would be under the protection of her husband. Her father, brother and brother-in-law also live in Sri Lanka;·there was no claim or evidence that the appellant’s husband had, or would in the future, engage in domestic violence; and·whilst the appellant was fearful of returning to Sri Lanka, the Authority was not satisfied that such a fear was well founded. That was because having regard to the improved security situation in Sri Lanka, the opportune nature of the sexual assault in 2010 and the protection the appellant would receive from her family, the Authority was not satisfied the appellant would face a chance of similar harm (i.e. sexual assault) if she were to return to Sri Lanka.