FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cetinkaya v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2012] FCA 611
Citation: Cetinkaya v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2012] FCA 611 Appeal from: Cetinkaya v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2011] FMCA 288 Parties: RECEP CETINKAYA and BAHAR CETINKAYA v OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF RECEP CETINKAYA AND BAHAR CETINKAYA and METIN UNAL File number: VID 528 of 2011 Judge: BROMBERG J Date of judgment: 13 June 2012 Catchwords: COSTS – appeal – where continuance of proceedings futile – where proceeding discontinued – whether
r 36.73(4) of the Federal Court Rules is determinative on the question of costs where notice of discontinuance is filed – whether adverse costs order is justified because of unreasonable conduct of a partyLegislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 58, 77C, 121, 178
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43
Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 26.12, 36.73Cases cited: Cetinkaya v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2011] FMCA 288
Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) (2011) 115 FCR 229
Mineralogy Pty Ltd v National Native Title Tribunal & Ors [1998] FCA 1700
Christodoulou v Disney Enterprises Inc [2006] FCA 902
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex Parte Lai Qin (1997) 186 CLR 622
Akiba and Another v Queensland (2010) 184 FCR 406
Ann Street Mezzanine Pty Ltd v KPMG [2011] FCA 453
Rickus v Motor Trades Association of Australia Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd (2010) 265 ALR 112Date of hearing: 9 November 2011 and 3 May 2012 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 38 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr T Sowden Solicitor for the Appellants: Law 554 Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Gobbo (9 November 2011)
Mr T Connard (3 May 2012)Solicitor for the First Respondent: Piper Alderman Lawyers (9 November 2011)
Australian Government Solicitor (3 May 2012)Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr T Elder Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Tony Hargreaves & Partners
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 528 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: RECEP CETINKAYA
First AppellantBAHAR CETINKAYA
Second AppellantAND: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF RECEP CETINKAYA AND BAHAR CETINKAYA
First RespondentMETIN UNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 JUNE 2012
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 528 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: RECEP CETINKAYA
First AppellantBAHAR CETINKAYA
Second AppellantAND: OFFICIAL TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS TRUSTEE OF THE BANKRUPT ESTATE OF RECEP CETINKAYA AND BAHAR CETINKAYA
First RespondentMETIN UNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMBERG J
DATE:
13 JUNE 2012
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
There is only one issue that remains in…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 611
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether rule 36.73(4) of the Federal Court Rules should determine the costs in this case, given that notice of discontinuance was filed. Additionally, the court had to decide if an adverse costs order was justified due to the unreasonable conduct of a party. The court examined whether the Cetinkayas' appeal was unreasonably commenced or whether any party acted unreasonably in the conduct of the appeal.
The court held that no order as to costs should be made. The strict application of rule 36.73(4) would result in injustice, as the consent orders impliedly granted the Cetinkayas leave to withdraw and reserved the question of costs if they did. Despite the terms of the rule, the question of costs falls to be considered in accordance with the court's discretion. The court found that the appeal had become futile and that no party sought its continuance. Furthermore, there was no basis for an order that the Cetinkayas pay the costs of the appeal to either Unal or the Official Trustee. The court was not satisfied that the appeal was unreasonably commenced, and there was no allegation of unreasonable conduct by the Cetinkayas.
ORDERS:
1. There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether r 36.73(4) of the Federal Court Rules is determinative on the question of costs where notice of discontinuance is filed.
2. Whether an adverse costs order is justified because of unreasonable conduct of a party.
Held
1. The court concluded that no order as to costs should be made in the appeal.
2. The court determined that there was no justification for an adverse costs order based on unreasonable conduct by any party.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The second category relates to cases where one of the parties has acted “so unreasonably” that the other party should obtain the costs of the action. The unreasonableness of the conduct of a party may be examined by reference to the commencement of, and the conduct of, the proceeding.CONSIDERATION In this case, the consent orders made on 20 March 2012 impliedly granted to the Cetinkayas leave to withdraw should they choose to do so by 23 March 2011 and effectively reserved the question of costs if they did. In that context, the strict application of r 36.73(4) would result in injustice. If it had been necessary, I would have utilised r 1.34 to dispense with the requirement imposed by that sub-rule. However, as I have earlier observed, despite the terms of r 36.73(4), the question of costs falls to be considered in accordance with the Court’s discretion. Turning then to the question of how the Court’s discretion should be exercised, it is apparent that this is a case where the prosecution of the proceeding has become futile. No party seeks the continuance of this appeal. It is clear that, in the context of the Official Trustee’s position that it will not assign the County Court claim, the continuance of the appeal has been rendered futile. No party suggested a different conclusion and each may be taken to have agreed that discontinuance was the only sensible course. This is not a case of the Cetinkayas surrendering their claim for relief. Nor am I able to confidently say that their appeal would have failed. In those circumstances, I should next consider whether a costs order may be supported by reason of the unreasonable conduct of one or more of the parties. Unal’s claim for Cetinkaya to pay its costs is based upon the operation of r 36.73(4). For reasons already explained, I do not consider that the question of costs should be resolved by the operation of that rule. No criticism is made by Unal of the conduct of the Cetinkayas in commencing the proceeding or in its conduct. The Official Trustee has criticised the Cetinkayas for the commencement of both the proceeding below and the appeal. No basis is given for the contention that the proceeding lacks legal foundation and was incompetent and no such basis is apparent. I am not satisfied that the appeal was unreasonably commenced, and there is no allegation that the Cetinkayas have acted unreasonably in the conduct of the appeal, including by affecting its discontinuance. There is therefore no basis for an order that the Cetinkayas pay the costs of the appeal incurred by either Unal or the Official Trustee. The basis for the application of both the Cetinkayas and Unal, that the Official Trustee pay their costs, is the Official Trustee’s change of position. They say that they were induced to commence and/or participate in the proceeding by the initial course embarked upon by the Official Trustee, that it would consider an assignment to one or other of them and, by inference, that the Official Trustee did not intend to pursue proceedings pursuant to s 121 of the Bankruptcy Act in relation to the Brunswick property.