Carrigan v Honourable Senator Michaelia Cash

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Carrigan v Honourable Senator Michaelia Cash [2016] FCA 1466

File number: NTD 14 of 2016
Judge: WHITE J
Date of judgment: 7 December 2016
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to strike out statement of claim because it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action – originating application for judicial review of a report provided to the Minister of Employment – redacted copy of report tabled into Parliament – whether conduct of the author of the report and the Minister constituted “acts done in the course of, or for the purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House [of the Australian Parliament]” within s 16(2) of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) (the PP Act) – whether the report was prepared “for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of [the business of a House of the Australian Parliament]” within s 16(2)(c) of the PP Act.

Held: statement of claim struck out, summary judgement entered for the Respondents.   

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) ss 641, 641A

Fair Work (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 2009 (Cth) Sch 18

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.01(1)(a), 16.21(1)(e)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 78B

Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) ss 16, 17

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 82

Cases cited:

Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 19 FCR 223

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Crane v Gething [2000] FCA 45; (2000) 97 FCR 9

Egan v Willis [1998] HCA 71; (1998) 195 CLR 424

Halden v Marks (1995) 17 WAR 447

Jobbins v Capel Court Corporation Limited (1989) 25 FCR 226

Lambert v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 1064

O’Chee v Rowley (1997) 150 ALR 199

Prebble v Television New Zealand Limited [1995] 1 AC 321

R v Theophanous [2003] VSCA 78; (2003) 141 A Crim R 216

Rann v Olsen [2000] SASC 83; (2000) 76 SASR 450

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118

Stewart v Ronalds [2009] NSWCA 277; (2009) 76 NSWLR 99

Szwarcbord v Gallop [2002] ACTSC 28; (2002) 167 FLR 262

Date of hearing: 31 August 2016
Date of last submissions: 2 September 2016
Registry: Northern Territory
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 79
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First and Third Respondents: Mr T Begbie with Mr P Vermeesch
Solicitor for the First and Third Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice
Table of Corrections
9 December 2016 In the last sentence of paragraph 34, the word “Vice President” is replaced with “Mr”.

ORDERS

NTD 14 of 2016
BETWEEN:

JANE CARRIGAN

Applicant

AND:

THE HONOURABLE SENATOR MICHAELIA CASH IN HER CAPACITY AS MINISTER FOR EMPLOYMENT

First Respondent

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1466
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Carrigan v Honourable Senator Michaelia Cash involved an originating application for judicial review of a report provided to the Minister of Employment by Ms Carrigan, who sought to challenge the conduct of Mr Heerey, the author of the report, and the Minister in relation to her complaints about Vice President Lawler’s conduct during a conference in the Fair Work Commission (FWC). The key issue before the court was whether the conduct of Mr Heerey and the Minister, and the report itself, constituted "acts done in the course of, or for the purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House [of the Australian Parliament]" within section 16(2) of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) (the PP Act), or whether the report was prepared "for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of [the business of a House of the Australian Parliament]" within section 16(2)(c) of the PP Act. The respondents argued that the matters Ms Carrigan wished to agitate fell within the scope of parliamentary privilege and sought the striking out of the whole of the Statement of Claim and summary judgment on the basis that Ms Carrigan had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the action.

The court considered the principles established in Rann v Olsen, which held that the validity of section 16(3) of the PP Act should not be departed from unless it was plainly wrong. The court found that it was not satisfied that the conclusion in Rann v Olsen was plainly wrong and that it was an authoritative determination of the validity of section 16(3). The court held that the impugned conduct of Mr Heerey and the Minister constituted acts done in the course of, or for the purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House, and that the Heerey Report was prepared for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of the business of a House of the Australian Parliament. Consequently, the court held that the Statement of Claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action and struck it out, entering summary judgment for the respondents. The court also ordered that Ms Carrigan pay the costs of the respondents of and incidental to the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) summary judgment be entered for the Respondents and the originating application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the First and Third Respondents of and incidental to the proceedings to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In accordance with established principle, this Court should depart from the conclusion reached in Rann v Olsen only if satisfied that it is plainly wrong. I am not so satisfied. On the contrary, Rann v Olsen is an authoritative determination of the validity of s 16(3). If the correctness of Rann v Olsen is to be considered, it will have to be a higher level in the judicial hierarchy. This makes it unnecessary to consider further Ms Carrigan’s questioning of the validity of s 16(3). Background matters On 27 May 2014 Ms Carrigan participated as an industrial advocate on behalf of a client in a conference in the FWC over which Vice President Lawler presided. She was dissatisfied with aspects of Vice President Lawler’s conduct during that conference and, in particular, by certain of his statements. On 30 May 2014 Ms Carrigan sent to the President of the FWC, Ross P, a formal complaint about Vice President Lawler’s conduct. A long period elapsed without that complaint being finalised, during which correspondence ensued between Ms Carrigan, on the one hand, and Ross P or his chambers, on the other. Ms Carrigan was dissatisfied with this state of affairs. I think it fair to add that the evidence suggests that Vice President Lawler may have been absent on sick leave from the FWC for a lengthy time during this period, making it difficult for Ross P to raise Ms Carrigan’s complaints with him. In any event, being dissatisfied, on 6 July 2015, Ms Carrigan made a formal complaint to Senator Abetz, then Minister for Employment in the Australian Government. Her complaints were of two kinds: first, a complaint about Vice President Lawler’s conduct in the conference; and, secondly, a complaint about the way in which her complaint to the FWC had been addressed. Ms Carrigan concluded this letter with the following:I made my original confidential complaint in good faith. I did so simply because I believed it to be in the public interest that the Vice President’s manner and conduct be thoroughly investigated. Plainly this has not happened. Whatever the reasons, the complaint has been prejudiced by the ongoing delays. Therefore, I now respectfully seek your intervention pursuant to s 641A. The reference to s 641A was to that provision in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act). Sections 641 and 641A of the FW Act concern circumstances in which the appointment of a member of the FWC may be terminated. They provide:S 641 Termination of appointment on grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity The Governor-General may terminate the appointment of an FWC Member if an address praying for the termination, on one of the following grounds, is presented to the Governor-General by each House of the Parliament in the same session: (a)proved misbehaviour; (b)the FWC Member is unable to perform the duties of his or her office because of physical or mental incapacity.S 641A Minister may handle complaints about FWC Members The Minister may handle a complaint about the performance by an FWC Member of his or her duties: (a)for the purpose of considering whether each House of the Parliament should consider whether to present to the Governor-General an address praying for the termination of the appointment of the FWC Member; and (b)for the purpose of considering whether to advise the Governor-General to suspend the FWC Member.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Some of Ms Carrigan’s submissions seemed to have, as an implicit premise, the assumption that Mr Heerey was, at relevant times, an agent of the Minister or was himself exercising the executive power of the Commonwealth. Pleas to that effect are contained in [11] and [12] of Ms Carrigan’s Statement of Claim. I doubt that either is a correct characterisation of Mr Heerey’s position in carrying out the inquiry and report. There is no reasonable basis upon which it could be concluded that Mr Heerey was exercising executive power and, while the Court does not have the contract pursuant to which Mr Heerey was retained to provide his report, it is difficult to discern any indications suggesting that a relationship of principal and agent was created. The strike out/summary judgment application The Respondents contend that the matters which Ms Carrigan wishes to agitate fall within the opening words of s 16(2) of the PP Act, namely, “acts done in the course of, or for the purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House”. In addition, they contend that Ms Carrigan wishes to tender material falling within subparas (b) and (c). The Respondents seek the striking out of the whole of the Statement of Claim pursuant to r 16.21(1)(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the FCR) on the basis that, by reason of s 16(3) of the PP Act, it fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action. The Respondents’ summary judgment application is made under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(a) of the FCR, again on the basis that, by reason of s 16(3) Ms Carrigan has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the action. Thus, the issue on the strike out and summary judgment application is whether the impugned conduct of Mr Heerey and the Minister constituted “acts done in the course of, or for purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House [of the Australian Parliament]” (a parliamentary purpose). In relation to the Heerey Report, the issue is whether it was prepared “for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of [the business of a House of the Australian Parliament]” (s 16(2)(c)). Ms Carrigan emphasised, appropriately, the cautious approach which this Court takes on applications pursuant to s 31A of the FCA Act, particularly in cases involving important questions of public and constitutional law: Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 at [24]-[27]. The Respondents accepted that the power to strike out a pleading should be exercised with caution; that the power is concerned with the allegations actually pleaded and their availability as a matter of law; and that it is not concerned with the strength of an applicant’s case: Lambert v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 1064 at [6]‑[7]. They referred to Jobbins v Capel Court Corporation Limited (1989) 25 FCR 226 as a case in which a cause of action the pursuit of which was barred by statute had been struck out, and to Prebble as a case in which pleadings which would result in an infringement of Parliamentary privilege had been struck out. Mr Heerey’s purpose

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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