Carrigan v Honourable Senator Michaelia Cash

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Carrigan v Honourable Senator Michaelia Cash [2017] FCA 266

File number: NTD 63 of 2016
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 17 March 2017
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – summary judgment entered for the respondents, and the originating application dismissed, pursuant to s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – application for leave to appeal to be heard and determined by a Full Court concurrently with, or immediately before, any appeal – applicant’s interlocutory application for discovery of documents “relevant or related to the originating application for judicial review” – respondents’ interlocutory application for security for costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 31A, 56

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 641A

Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) s 16

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 82

Cases cited:

Carrigan v Honourable Senator Michaelia Cash [2016] FCA 1466

Clack v Collins (No 1) [2010] FCA 513

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744

Lim v Comcare [2016] FCA 1346

Date of hearing: 17 March 2017
Registry: Northern Territory
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First and Third Respondents: Mr T Begbie
Solicitor for the First and Third Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
Table of Corrections
21 March 2017 The file number on the cover and order pages has been corrected.
21 March 2017 In [43] “NRD14/2016” has been replaced with “NTD14/2016”.
24 March 2017 In [36] “r 19.01” has been replaced with “r 36.09”.

ORDERS

NTD 63 of 2016
BETWEEN:

JANE CARRIGAN

Applicant

AND:

THE HONOURABLE SENATOR MICHAELIA CASH IN HER CAPACITY AS MINISTER FOR EMPLOYMENT

First Respondent

THE HONOURABLE MR PETER HEEREY AM QC

Second Respondent

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s interlocutory application for discovery, dated 24 February 2017, be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first and third respondents’ costs of that interlocutory application, as agreed or assessed.

3.The applicant provide security for the costs of the first and third respondents of and incidental to the applicant’s application for leave to appeal and any appeal in the sum of $10,000 in the form of a bank guarantee from an Australian trading bank, or in such other form as the Court deems fit, to be lodged with the Court in a form satisfactory to the Registrar and a copy of which is to be served on the solicitors for the first and third respondents.

4.The bank guarantee required by order 3 be lodged with the Court as soon as practicable and in any event no later than 31 March 2017.

5.The application for leave to appeal and any appeal be stayed if…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 266
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Carrigan v Honourable Senator Michaelia Cash involved an application for summary judgment and dismissal of an originating application for judicial review by Ms Carrigan against the respondents, including Senator Michaelia Cash. The dispute centred on allegations regarding the preparation and publication of a report by Mr Heerey and the subsequent actions of the Minister. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the actions in question were protected by parliamentary privilege under the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1988 (Cth). The court was also required to consider the application for security for costs related to the appeal process.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the conduct of Mr Heerey and the Minister, as well as the publication of the redacted report, constituted "proceedings in Parliament" as defined by the Parliamentary Privileges Act. Furthermore, the court needed to decide if Ms Carrigan's claims were intended to question or rely on the truth or motive of those proceedings, which would be prohibited under the Act. The court concluded that the actions in question were indeed within the scope of parliamentary privilege and that Ms Carrigan's claims would require impermissible questioning of the proceedings in Parliament. Consequently, the court found that Ms Carrigan had no reasonable prospects of success and granted summary judgment in favour of the respondents.

The court further addressed the application for security for costs related to the appeal process. The court noted that the primary concern was the potential costs associated with the appeal rather than the initial proceedings. Considering the financial constraints of the applicant and the significant costs anticipated for the appeal, the court ordered the applicant to provide security for the costs of the appeal in the sum of $10,000. The court also allowed the respondents the liberty to apply to vary the amount of security required if necessary.

In conclusion, the court dismissed Ms Carrigan's application for discovery of documents, ordered her to pay the respondents' costs for the interlocutory applications, and required her to provide security for the costs of the appeal. The appeal was stayed if the security was not provided by the specified date.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s interlocutory application for discovery, dated 24 February 2017, be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first and third respondents’ costs of that interlocutory application, as agreed or assessed.

3. The applicant provide security for the costs of the first and third respondents of and incidental to the applicant’s application for leave to appeal and any appeal in the sum of $10,000 in the form of a bank guarantee from an Australian trading bank, or in such other form as the Court deems fit, to be lodged with the Court in a form satisfactory to the Registrar and a copy of which is to be served on the solicitors for the first and third respondents.

4. The bank guarantee required by order 3 be lodged with the Court as soon as practicable and in any event no later than 31 March 2017.

5. The application for leave to appeal and any appeal be stayed if security for the first and third respondents’ costs is not provided in accordance with orders 3 and 4 of the Court.

6. The first and third respondents have liberty to apply on seven days’ notice to vary the amount of security for costs required to be provided in accordance with the order of the Court.

7. The applicant pay the costs of the first and third respondents’ interlocutory application, dated 24 February 2017, for security for costs, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The key conclusions of the primary judge turned on the Parliamentary Privileges Act, which his Honour referred to as the PP Act, and were as follows:Conclusion on s 16(2)74 I conclude therefore that the conduct of Mr Heerey in preparing and providing the Heerey Report and the conduct of the Minister which Ms Carrigan wishes to impugn in these proceedings are both within the description of “proceedings in Parliament” as that expression is defined in s 16(2) of the PP Act. So also was the action of the Respondents in causing the publication of the redacted report, after its tabling in the Senate.The s 16(3) prohibition75 The second question which arises on the strike out/summary judgment application is whether Ms Carrigan seeks to adduce evidence of the conduct of Mr Heerey and the Minister “by way of, or for the purpose” of a matter specified in s 16(3) of the PP Act.76 The conclusion that Ms Carrigan has such a purpose is inevitable. She intends that the Court should draw inferences or conclusions concerning Mr Heerey’s preparation of his report which would result in it being declared to be void and of no effect. Ms Carrigan intends that the Court should draw inferences or conclusions concerning the tabling of the Heerey Report by the Minister and, as noted earlier, seeks an order from the Court that the Minister correct the records of the Commonwealth and of the Parliament. Plainly, orders to this effect would infringe the principle of non-intervention.77 Accordingly, the prohibition contained in s 16(3) of the PP Act is engaged. In fairness to Ms Carrigan, she recognised that, if the conduct of Mr Heerey and of the Minister which she wishes to impugn is within the term “proceedings in Parliament”, this conclusion would follow.Summary78 For the reasons stated above, I consider that at this stage Ms Carrigan has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the action. She will not be able to adduce evidence of the matters upon which her claims depend. Summary judgment is appropriate. Had it been necessary to do so, I would also have struck out the impugned paragraphs in the Statement of Claim, but the summary dismissal of the action makes that unnecessary. Ms Carrigan’s application for leave to appeal and, if it be reached, the appeal itself is listed for hearing before a Full Court on 22 May 2017. The relevant provisions of the Parliamentary Privileges Act are as follows:16 Parliamentary privilege in court proceedings(1)For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared and enacted that the provisions of article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1688 apply in relation to the Parliament of the Commonwealth and, as so applying, are to be taken to have, in addition to any other operation, the effect of the subsequent provisions of this section.(2)For the purposes of the provisions of article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1688 as applying in relation to the Parliament, and for the purposes of this section, proceedings in Parliament means all words spoken and acts done in the course of, or for purposes of or incidental to, the transacting of the business of a House or of a committee, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes:(a)the giving of evidence before a House or a committee, and evidence so given;(b)the presentation or submission of a document to a House or a committee;(c)the preparation of a document for purposes of or incidental to the transacting of any such business; and(d)the formulation, making or publication of a document, including a report, by or pursuant to an order of a House or a committee and the document so formulated, made or published.(3)In proceedings in any court or tribunal, it is not lawful for evidence to be tendered or received, questions asked or statements, submissions or comments made, concerning proceedings in Parliament, by way of, or for the purpose of:(a)questioning or relying on the truth, motive, intention or good faith of anything forming part of those proceedings in Parliament;(b)otherwise questioning or establishing the credibility, motive, intention or good faith of any person; or(c)drawing, or inviting the drawing of, inferences or conclusions wholly or partly from anything forming part of those proceedings in Parliament.…(6)In relation to a prosecution for an offence against this Act or an Act establishing a committee, neither this section nor the Bill of Rights, 1688 shall be taken to prevent or restrict the admission of evidence, the asking of questions, or the making of statements, submissions or comments, in relation to proceedings in Parliament to which the offence relates.The draft notice of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant submitted it was a matter where it would not be intrinsically unfair or unjust to set aside the respondents’ application for security for costs. Therefore both the application for security for costs and any effort to apply for costs thrown away should be dismissed. The Court should proceed to finalise any orders that may be outstanding for the hearing listed for 22 May 2017. For these reasons, including her anguish and the harm to her reputation, Ms Carrigan submitted that in the circumstances it would be perverse to order security for costs.Consideration Section 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides, so far as relevant:56 Security(1)The Court or a Judge may order an applicant in a proceeding in the Court… to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against him or her.(2)The security shall be of such amount, and given at such time and in such manner and form, as the Court or Judge directs.(3)The Court or a Judge may reduce or increase the amount of security ordered to be given and may vary the time at which, or manner or form in which, the security is to be given.(4)If security, or further security, is not given in accordance with an order under this section, the Court or a Judge may order that the proceeding or appeal be dismissed.(5)This section does not affect the operation of any provision made by or under any other Act or by the Rules of Court for or in relation to the furnishing of security.See also r 36.09 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). It is important to recall the purpose of security for costs. As explained in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744 at [52] by Einstein J, it is a protective jurisdiction to ensure that the primary purpose for having costs orders themselves can be achieved. A respondent is protected against the risk that a costs order obtained at the end of the day may turn out to be of no value by reason of the impecuniosity of the applicant. His Honour said the jurisdiction therefore assisted both the compensation purpose as well as the public interest objective. In the present application it is relevant that the applicant accepts that she would struggle to pay the costs sought by the respondents. In my opinion, the application for security turns not so much on the costs of the first instance hearing, but on the estimate of the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal. I would regard the correspondence about the costs of the proceedings at first instance as by way of background or ‘indicative’. It is also relevant that in relation to security for costs the position on appeal, or on a proposed appeal, is fundamentally different to the position of a claim at first instance: see Clack v Collins (No 1) [2010] FCA 513 per Jagot J at [8]-[13] and the cases there cited, and Lim v Comcare [2016] FCA 1346. In my opinion, in the circumstances the applicant should provide security for the first and third respondents’ costs of the application for leave to appeal and of the appeal in the sum of $10,000. I have also take into account the costs of the two interlocutory applications heard today.