Campos v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 43 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Campos v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1791

Appeal from: Campos v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 420
File number: WAD 133 of 2019
Judge: MCKERRACHER J
Date of judgment: 1 November 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the appellant a partner visa – where challenges made to the Tribunal’s fact finding

Held:  appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5F, 5F(2), 5F(2)(c)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A(3), 1.15A(3)(a), 1.15A(3)(a)(i), 1.15A(3)(a)(ii), 1.15(3)(a)(iii), 1.15A(3)(a)(iv), 1.15A(3)(a)(v), 1.15(3)(b), 1.15A(3)(b)(i), 1.15A(3)(c), 1.15A(3)(d)

Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109

He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 41

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2016] FCCA 114

Date of hearing: 14 August 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr DV Blades
Solicitor for the Appellant: Rothstein Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A Ladhams
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs

ORDERS

WAD 133 of 2019
BETWEEN:

INGRID JANETH TOLOZA CAMPOS

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 NOVEMBER 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.Cost be fixed at $3,000. 

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MCKERRACHER J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant is a Columbian citizen, born in 1987.  She arrived in Australia in February 2012 on a student visa, at which time she was married to a citizen of Columbia, namely Mr Miller Jose Mora Flechas.  The appellant and Mr Flechas were divorced in 2014.  In the following year, the appellant met Mr Dempsey William Blake in Perth, Western Australia.  Mr Blake is a United Kingdom citizen and was born in 1992.  He arrived in Australia in 2005 and became an Australian citizen by grant.  Mr Blake has a daughter from a previous relationship, born in 2013. 

  2. Shortly after their first meeting, the appellant and Mr Blake commenced a relationship and were married in Perth on 4 July 2015.  Less than a month after being married, the appellant lodged an application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820)/Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa, sponsored by Mr Blake (the sponsor).  On the visa application form, the appellant and the sponsor stated that they had not lived separately and apart since they committed to…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Campos v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1791
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Campos v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, Campos, challenging the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to affirm the decision of the Minister to refuse Campos a partner visa. The AAT had concluded that Campos and his sponsor had not been in a genuine and continuing married relationship at the time of the visa application. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia heard the appeal from the AAT's decision, and the appeal was ultimately dismissed.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide involved the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the AAT, the Tribunal's approach to fact-finding, and whether the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error in its decision-making process. The court examined whether the AAT had properly considered the evidence and applied the relevant criteria under the Migration Regulations 1994. The appellant argued that the AAT had failed to consider certain evidence and had made illogical findings, but the court found that the AAT had adequately considered the evidence and that its findings were rational and based on the evidence presented.

The court's reasoning focused on the sufficiency and relevance of the evidence presented to the AAT, the Tribunal's approach to fact-finding, and the application of the relevant legal criteria. The court found that the AAT had given proper consideration to the evidence and had not erred in its fact-finding process. The court also found that the AAT had correctly applied the criteria in the Migration Regulations and had not made a jurisdictional error in its decision. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was lawful and that the appeal should be dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that costs be fixed at $3,000. The decision reinforces the importance of the AAT's role in reviewing visa decisions and the court's role in ensuring that the AAT's decisions are legally sound and based on proper consideration of the evidence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. Cost be fixed at $3,000.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, Mr Campos, was refused a partner visa by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. Mr Campos appealed this decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which affirmed the decision to refuse the visa. The appellant further appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which was subsequently reviewed by the High Court of Australia. The central issue in the case revolves around whether the AAT erred in its fact-finding process when affirming the decision to refuse the visa. The appellant contends that the AAT did not adequately consider certain evidence and made illogical findings.

Key facts include that Mr Campos and his sponsor were introduced by mutual friends in late 2013 and eventually married in July 2015. The appellant's witness, Ms M, testified that she had limited interaction with the couple, seeing them together only a few times before and after the marriage. She expressed concern that the relationship appeared to be moving too quickly and was surprised to learn about the sponsor's violent conduct towards Mr Campos, which she only became aware of after the marriage. The AAT gave minimal weight to Ms M's testimony due to the limited number of times she spent with the couple together.

The AAT concluded that the evidence did not satisfy it that family and friends recognised Mr Campos and his sponsor's relationship as a genuine and continuing married relationship. The AAT specifically noted that it was not convinced that the relationship was seen as genuine and continuing by the appellant's family and friends. The AAT also examined the tenancy agreement that limited occupancy to one person, deeming it implausible for Mr Campos to be added as a co-tenant, and thus rejecting this aspect of the appellant's evidence.

Mr Campos initially appealed the visa refusal decision to the AAT, which affirmed the Minister's decision. Dissatisfied with the AAT's decision, Mr Campos then appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, leading to Mr Campos further appealing to the High Court of Australia. The High Court reviewed the case focusing on the AAT's fact-finding process and whether it contained jurisdictional errors.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal then considered the evidence of the appellant’s witness (at [39]-[47]):Oral evidence from Ms M… B…39.The witness told the Tribunal that she has been a permanent resident of Australia for about one year. 40.She first met the [appellant] in late 2013 as they had friends in common. 41.She could not recall when she first met the sponsor but it was at a dinner at the house in Balcatta where the [appellant] lived with the sponsor. It was early on in their relationship. 42.She spent time with the couple 3 or 4 times before their marriage and she attended their wedding in July. 43.Because the [appellant] and the sponsor married so quickly, she said she was worried, but on seeing them together, her impression was they were “in love” and had a “pretty good relationship.” 44.After the wedding she thinks she saw them together only once. Then, in September, the [appellant] told her that the sponsor had hit her. Mrs B… said she was surprised to learn the sponsor had been violent towards the [appellant] because that seemed out of character. 45.In her opinion the sponsor changed after marriage and treated the [appellant] as his possession. She said that is her perception and has not been said. 46.The [appellant] has lived with her and her husband since the relationship broke down and is recovering from the effects of the sponsor’s conduct. 47.The Tribunal can gives [sic] minimal weight to Ms B…’s oral evidence because she only appears to have spent time with the parties together on 4 or 5 occasions including only once after their marriage in late July 2015. Importantly, the Tribunal concluded on the social aspects of the relationship (at [48]):The evidence before the Tribunal as outlined above fails to satisfy it that family and friends recognised the [appellant] and the sponsor’s relationship as a genuine and continuing married relationship. There is little doubt that findings, albeit adverse, were in fact made. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant’s family and friends recognised the relationship was genuine and continuing. Without descending to the minute detail of the record, there has been a close examination of all the aspects the Tribunal is required to consider in such a claim. There is no scope for a complaint of a lack of an active intellectual process. Nor can it be doubted that the ultimate view reached was capable of being reached based on the evidence before the Tribunal. Findings on all of the factors in reg 1.15A(3) are at least implied if not explicit. This ground cannot succeed. Ground 4 and ground 5 Here the appellant complains of a failure to take into account relevant evidence and illogicality, with particular focus on the Tribunal’s statement (at [30]). There the Tribunal records:… the tenancy agreement states no more than one person may ordinarily live at the premises (Tribunal file, folio 173). On that basis it appears implausible that a property manager would have added the [appellant] as a co-tenant.In other words, this is a rejection of the evidence for the appellant to that effect.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, in relation to the other ground about this aspect of the evidence, it cannot be said that the finding was one which no logical or rational decision-maker might have arrived at on the evidence before the Tribunal in accordance with the requirement in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (at [135]). It certainly cannot be said that there is extreme illogicality or irrationality in the Tribunal’s decision. Illogicality or irrationality can extend, not only to the end result, but also the fact finding leading to the end result: ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109 (at [47]). The decisions have all emphasised the question will always be whether there is jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision: see, for example, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99. Where Robertson J said (at [150]-[151]):150 Must it always be the case, as submitted by the Minister, that illogicality or irrationality are to be considered only in relation to the end result, the decision itself?151 The Minister referred for this contention to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS at [130]-[131]. But in my opinion the reasons of Crennan and Bell JJ do not support a focus limited to the end result, albeit the overarching question is whether the decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Similarly, I do not read the reasons for judgment of the third member of the majority, Heydon J, as limiting the enquiry to the end result.(Emphasis added.) The inquiry at this part of the Tribunal’s reasons was into the nature of the household shared by the appellant and the sponsor. The fundamental point is that the Tribunal was still satisfied that the appellant and the sponsor lived together at the relevant time, albeit with a few separations. Even if the appellant’s account about the tenancy agreement was correct, contrary to the Tribunal’s findings, that would not have affected the Tribunal’s conclusion in favour of the appellant that in fact the appellant and the sponsor did live together, albeit with a few separations. Ground 4 and ground 5 cannot be established. Ground 6 The appellant argues the Tribunal failed to consider under reg 1.15A(3)(d)(iv) whether, at the time of the lodgment of the visa application, the appellant and the sponsor saw the relationship as being long term. Even though the parties had separated by the time of the Tribunal’s decision, the Tribunal was still required to consider the question for the purposes of determining whether the parties were in a genuine and continuing married relationship at the time of lodgment of the visa application. It is argued that by failing to consider this question, the Tribunal made jurisdictional error. Consideration The primary judge rejected this argument (at [42]-[43]) where his Honour said:42.In relation to ground 8, Mr Blades submitted that the Tribunal had erred by failing to make a finding or to take into consideration the requirement under r 1.15A(3)(d)(iv) of the Regulations. The Tribunal’s reasons are not to be read with a keen eye for error and must be read as a whole. It is apparent that the Tribunal considered the nature of the commitment of the parties to each other in the context of a duration that lasted only six weeks after the filing of the application.43.The Tribunal referred to the [appellant’s] statutory declaration and the notional commitment as well as the instability of the relationship. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to make an express finding referring to the relationship being a long term one. Based on the material before the Court, the Court accepts that the Tribunal took into account each of the subparagraph considerations under r 1.15(3)(d) of the Regulations in considering the nature of the [appellant’s] and sponsor’s commitment to each other. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to make express findings on each subparagraph. The Court finds there was real and meaningful consideration given to r 1.15A(3)(d)(iv) of the Regulations, in particular the relevant referral to the duration of six weeks after filing and 6 months in total. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 8 is made out.(Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant argues the same error has been made in this instance. The Tribunal assumed, because the relationship between the parties had featured arguments and instability, that the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor could not be a genuine relationship. The appellant argues this was jurisdictional error.Consideration It is unnecessary to comment on Singh as, in my view, the circumstances in this instance are distinguishable. The primary judge was correct to conclude the Tribunal did not misdirect itself. It addressed the question of whether the appellant was a spouse of the sponsor within the meaning in s 5F of the Act. It had to consider the criteria in s 5F(2) of the Act by having regard to the matters in reg 1.15A(3) of the Regulations. The Tribunal’s reasons make it clear that it understood its task. The parts to which the appellant draws attention appear in the context of the Tribunal’s consideration of the nature of the commitment for the purposes of reg 1.15A(3)(d) of the Regulations. This required the Tribunal to consider:(a)the duration of the relationship;(b)the length of time during which the appellant and the sponsor had lived together;(c)the degree of companionship and emotional support each drew from one another; and(d)whether they each saw the relationship as a long-term one. It cannot be said that questions raised and conclusions reached about the stability of the relationship and the emotional support provided by the sponsor were irrelevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of the factors in reg 1.15A(3)(d) of the Regulations. The questions and findings complained of by the appellant need to be viewed in the context of the evidence as a whole, which included evidence and findings that the relationship, which lasted only six months, ‘stopped and started again a number of times’ and that the appellant ‘left the house a couple of times even before their marriage’. The Tribunal was correct to consider this evidence and was entitled to draw the conclusion that the emotional support provided by the sponsor was not commensurate with a genuine spousal relationship as defined by the Act and Regulations. Those factors are capable of going to the question of whether there was a ‘mutual commitment’. In relation to the arguments for the appellant, this finding does not suggest, as argued, that the Tribunal took the view that an unstable relationship could not also be a genuine relationship. Assuming that Singh was correctly decided, the facts and the approach taken in this instance are distinguishable. Ground 3 The appellant relies on the Full Court decision in He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 41, in which the Full Court (Siopis, Kerr and Rangiah JJ) said (at [76]):In our opinion, the requirement that the Tribunal “consider” the circumstances in reg 1.15A(3) means that the Tribunal is required to make findings upon each of the prescribed matters numbered with Roman numerals. The nature of these specific matters is such that each of them poses, in effect, a question or questions for the Tribunal. For example, in respect of “the nature of the household”, the Tribunal must ask:(i)whether there are children and whether there is any joint responsibility for their care and support;(ii) what the living arrangements of the persons are; and(iii)whether and to what extent there is sharing of the responsibility for housework.The regulation poses these questions in order to ensure that the Tribunal takes into account particular circumstances of the marriage as part of the active mental process involved in giving proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the prescribed matters. The legislative intention must be that these questions will be answered, not merely thought about. They must be answered so that the circumstances identified by the answers are included in the evaluation of whether there is a “married relationship”. In some cases, the Tribunal’s answer may be that there is no material, or insufficient material, to be able to form a conclusion on a prescribed matter: cf Paerau at [27], [69] and [119]. However, there must be an answer, or, in other words, a finding, even if the finding is that no conclusion can be reached upon the matter.(Emphasis added.)