FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Campos v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 1791
Appeal from: Campos v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 420 File number: WAD 133 of 2019 Judge: MCKERRACHER J Date of judgment: 1 November 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the appellant a partner visa – where challenges made to the Tribunal’s fact finding
Held: appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5F, 5F(2), 5F(2)(c)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A(3), 1.15A(3)(a), 1.15A(3)(a)(i), 1.15A(3)(a)(ii), 1.15(3)(a)(iii), 1.15A(3)(a)(iv), 1.15A(3)(a)(v), 1.15(3)(b), 1.15A(3)(b)(i), 1.15A(3)(c), 1.15A(3)(d)
Cases cited: ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 250 FCR 109
He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 41
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99
Date of hearing: 14 August 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 66 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr DV Blades Solicitor for the Appellant: Rothstein Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A Ladhams Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs ORDERS
WAD 133 of 2019 BETWEEN: INGRID JANETH TOLOZA CAMPOS
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MCKERRACHER J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 NOVEMBER 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.Cost be fixed at $3,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCKERRACHER J:
INTRODUCTION
The appellant is a Columbian citizen, born in 1987. She arrived in Australia in February 2012 on a student visa, at which time she was married to a citizen of Columbia, namely Mr Miller Jose Mora Flechas. The appellant and Mr Flechas were divorced in 2014. In the following year, the appellant met Mr Dempsey William Blake in Perth, Western Australia. Mr Blake is a United Kingdom citizen and was born in 1992. He arrived in Australia in 2005 and became an Australian citizen by grant. Mr Blake has a daughter from a previous relationship, born in 2013.
Shortly after their first meeting, the appellant and Mr Blake commenced a relationship and were married in Perth on 4 July 2015. Less than a month after being married, the appellant lodged an application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820)/Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa, sponsored by Mr Blake (the sponsor). On the visa application form, the appellant and the sponsor stated that they had not lived separately and apart since they committed to…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1791
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court was required to decide involved the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the AAT, the Tribunal's approach to fact-finding, and whether the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error in its decision-making process. The court examined whether the AAT had properly considered the evidence and applied the relevant criteria under the Migration Regulations 1994. The appellant argued that the AAT had failed to consider certain evidence and had made illogical findings, but the court found that the AAT had adequately considered the evidence and that its findings were rational and based on the evidence presented.
The court's reasoning focused on the sufficiency and relevance of the evidence presented to the AAT, the Tribunal's approach to fact-finding, and the application of the relevant legal criteria. The court found that the AAT had given proper consideration to the evidence and had not erred in its fact-finding process. The court also found that the AAT had correctly applied the criteria in the Migration Regulations and had not made a jurisdictional error in its decision. The court concluded that the AAT's decision was lawful and that the appeal should be dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that costs be fixed at $3,000. The decision reinforces the importance of the AAT's role in reviewing visa decisions and the court's role in ensuring that the AAT's decisions are legally sound and based on proper consideration of the evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. Cost be fixed at $3,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Key facts include that Mr Campos and his sponsor were introduced by mutual friends in late 2013 and eventually married in July 2015. The appellant's witness, Ms M, testified that she had limited interaction with the couple, seeing them together only a few times before and after the marriage. She expressed concern that the relationship appeared to be moving too quickly and was surprised to learn about the sponsor's violent conduct towards Mr Campos, which she only became aware of after the marriage. The AAT gave minimal weight to Ms M's testimony due to the limited number of times she spent with the couple together.
The AAT concluded that the evidence did not satisfy it that family and friends recognised Mr Campos and his sponsor's relationship as a genuine and continuing married relationship. The AAT specifically noted that it was not convinced that the relationship was seen as genuine and continuing by the appellant's family and friends. The AAT also examined the tenancy agreement that limited occupancy to one person, deeming it implausible for Mr Campos to be added as a co-tenant, and thus rejecting this aspect of the appellant's evidence.
Mr Campos initially appealed the visa refusal decision to the AAT, which affirmed the Minister's decision. Dissatisfied with the AAT's decision, Mr Campos then appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, leading to Mr Campos further appealing to the High Court of Australia. The High Court reviewed the case focusing on the AAT's fact-finding process and whether it contained jurisdictional errors.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant argues the same error has been made in this instance. The Tribunal assumed, because the relationship between the parties had featured arguments and instability, that the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor could not be a genuine relationship. The appellant argues this was jurisdictional error.Consideration It is unnecessary to comment on Singh as, in my view, the circumstances in this instance are distinguishable. The primary judge was correct to conclude the Tribunal did not misdirect itself. It addressed the question of whether the appellant was a spouse of the sponsor within the meaning in s 5F of the Act. It had to consider the criteria in s 5F(2) of the Act by having regard to the matters in reg 1.15A(3) of the Regulations. The Tribunal’s reasons make it clear that it understood its task. The parts to which the appellant draws attention appear in the context of the Tribunal’s consideration of the nature of the commitment for the purposes of reg 1.15A(3)(d) of the Regulations. This required the Tribunal to consider:(a)the duration of the relationship;(b)the length of time during which the appellant and the sponsor had lived together;(c)the degree of companionship and emotional support each drew from one another; and(d)whether they each saw the relationship as a long-term one. It cannot be said that questions raised and conclusions reached about the stability of the relationship and the emotional support provided by the sponsor were irrelevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of the factors in reg 1.15A(3)(d) of the Regulations. The questions and findings complained of by the appellant need to be viewed in the context of the evidence as a whole, which included evidence and findings that the relationship, which lasted only six months, ‘stopped and started again a number of times’ and that the appellant ‘left the house a couple of times even before their marriage’. The Tribunal was correct to consider this evidence and was entitled to draw the conclusion that the emotional support provided by the sponsor was not commensurate with a genuine spousal relationship as defined by the Act and Regulations. Those factors are capable of going to the question of whether there was a ‘mutual commitment’. In relation to the arguments for the appellant, this finding does not suggest, as argued, that the Tribunal took the view that an unstable relationship could not also be a genuine relationship. Assuming that Singh was correctly decided, the facts and the approach taken in this instance are distinguishable. Ground 3 The appellant relies on the Full Court decision in He v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 41, in which the Full Court (Siopis, Kerr and Rangiah JJ) said (at [76]):In our opinion, the requirement that the Tribunal “consider” the circumstances in reg 1.15A(3) means that the Tribunal is required to make findings upon each of the prescribed matters numbered with Roman numerals. The nature of these specific matters is such that each of them poses, in effect, a question or questions for the Tribunal. For example, in respect of “the nature of the household”, the Tribunal must ask:(i)whether there are children and whether there is any joint responsibility for their care and support;(ii) what the living arrangements of the persons are; and(iii)whether and to what extent there is sharing of the responsibility for housework.The regulation poses these questions in order to ensure that the Tribunal takes into account particular circumstances of the marriage as part of the active mental process involved in giving proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the prescribed matters. The legislative intention must be that these questions will be answered, not merely thought about. They must be answered so that the circumstances identified by the answers are included in the evaluation of whether there is a “married relationship”. In some cases, the Tribunal’s answer may be that there is no material, or insufficient material, to be able to form a conclusion on a prescribed matter: cf Paerau at [27], [69] and [119]. However, there must be an answer, or, in other words, a finding, even if the finding is that no conclusion can be reached upon the matter.(Emphasis added.)