Campos v Minister for Immigration - [2019] FCCA 420

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CAMPOS v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2019] FCCA 420

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa – whether the Tribunal considered the relevant law – whether the Tribunal had a real and genuine engagement with the applicant’s evidence and claims – whether the Tribunal misdirected itself as to the nature of the relationship – whether the adverse findings of the Tribunal lack an evident and intelligible justification. – whether the Tribunal failed to take into account all of the evidence – no jurisdictional error made out – further amended application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5F, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), r.1.15A & cl. 820.211, 820.221

Cases cited:
Sing v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 114

Applicant:

INGIRD JANETH TOLOZA CAMPOS

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent:

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number:

PEG 77 of 2017

Judgment of:

Judge Street

Hearing date:

22 February 2019

Date of Last Submission:

22 February 2019

Delivered at:

Perth

Delivered on:

22 February 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

Mr D Blades

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Rothstein Lawyers

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Mr A Gerrard
Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

Grant leave to the applicant to rely upon the further amended application filed 11 January 2019.
The further amended application is dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $6,000.00.

DATE OF ORDER: 22 February 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PERTH

PEG 77 of 2017

INGIRD JANETH TOLOZA CAMPOS

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Background

This is an application for a Constitutional writ within the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 12 January 2017, affirming a decision of a delegate not to grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.
The applicant applied for the visa on 28 July 2015 on the basis of a relationship with a sponsor. On 22 September 2015, the delegate found the applicant failed to meet the criteria for the grant of the visa.
The applicant applied for a review on 5 October 2015. By letter dated 17 August 2015, 5he applicant was invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 15 September 2016. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on that date to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal identified the background to the visa application and in particular the requirements of the primary criteria in cl 820.211 and cl 820.221 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) which require, at the time of application and decision, the applicant to be the spouse or de facto partner of the sponsor, unless the relationship has ceased and certain circumstances exist
The Tribunal noted that the delegate had found that the applicant did not meet the criteria under cl 820.211 of the Regulations because the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant was the spouse of the sponsor at the time of application.
The Tribunal identified the applicant’s appearance before the Tribunal and that the applicant is a citizen of Colombia and that at the date of the review, the relationship with the sponsor had ceased and that she had been the victim of family violence.
The Tribunal expressly referred to a statutory declaration dated 6 September 2016, in respect of the history of the relationship with the sponsor and that it concerned information concerning the nature of the commitment between her and the sponsor, the nature of the household with the sponsor, the financial and social aspects of the relationship, and details with respect to incidents of family violence.
The statutory declaration of the applicant to which the Tribunal referred identified, under the heading ‘Overview of the relationship’, identified the applicant living with the sponsor in a committed relationship from late March 2015 to September 2015. The statement expressly addressed the heading ‘Factors of Genuineness’ and referred to the nature of the mutual commitment to each other. The statement in that regard referred to not expecting a proposal for marriage but having accepted the proposal and that the relationship moved very fast.
The statement referred to the applicant’s plans to complete certain studies and the unwellness of the applicant, and steps taken to try and obtain the attendance of family members at the wedding and that they could not afford a honeymoon but were planning to go on honeymoon but had agreed to apply for an onshore partner visa, Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (Subclass 820). Reference is made to texts capturing expressions of:
…our love and care for each other and our family and friends.
Under the heading ‘Nature of our household’, the statutory declaration addressed where the applicant and sponsor lived and attached what was said to be the lease agreement that notates the applicant’s addition to the lease agreement. The statement asserted that the notation was made by the property manager. The statement refers to the sponsor having a daughter with a previous partner and making plans to travel to South America.
Under the heading ‘Social aspects of our relationship’, the applicant identified certain friends in respect of which the applicant contended the applicant and sponsor were said to be a couple in love and were looking forward to a life together. Reference was also made to screenshots.
Under the heading ‘Financial aspects of our relationship’, reference was made to both parties having purchased things for our house and particular items were identified. There was a reference to two joint bank accounts but not being able to deposit money into these bank accounts. There is an assertion of sharing the rent by reason of the applicant giving the sponsor cash or purchasing food and paying for bills. Reference was made to the applicant being happy to share her finances with the sponsor in the context of which observation was made as to if the sponsor did take money from her account it was for betting at the TAB rather than shopping the groceries or paying for bills. The statement identified the parties having discussions and sometimes arguments about how to manage their joint finances, and then that the sponsor would agree to stick to their agreement and he would for a period of time.
Reference was then made to the breakdown of the relationship and family violence, on the first and second incidents and the judicial evidence of family violence.
The Tribunal then turned to the consideration of the documentary evidence and the oral evidence in respect of the requirements of r 1.15A(3) of the Regulations, having found that the applicant and sponsor were married on 4 July 2015. The Tribunal’s reasons expressly refer to attaching a copy of the Regulations to the reasons.
It was of concern to the Tribunal that there is no documentary evidence showing how the sponsor may have contributed to daily expenses. The Tribunal made again a summary of the applicant’s oral evidence in relation to finances and from when she and sponsor started living together and sharing expenses and that he paid the rent and the utility costs and she paid for food, costs of their cat, petrol for a car and cleaning equipment.
The Tribunal referred to the applicant having provided her bank statements to demonstrate her spending as an annexure to her statutory declaration and that the bank statements indicate regular debits for supermarket shopping, petrol and hotel expenses, alcohol and meat purchases. The Tribunal noted the applicant said her salary was paid into the bank account and the sponsor’s wages were paid into his bank account. The Tribunal identified the sponsor as being a welder who paid child support direct to the mother of his child.
The Tribunal noted that when asking the applicant to provide evidence of their joint bank accounts, the applicant referred to a statutory declaration and referred to items that the applicant alleged the sponsor purchased.
The Tribunal made further reference in paragraph 25 to the applicant’s statutory declaration in respect of the assertions of the applicant’s payments for certain things. It was in that context that the Tribunal observed it was satisfied on the evidence that the applicant paid some of the relationship’s daily living costs between April and August 2015. The Tribunal, however, found there was no documentary evidence of the sponsor’s contribution to the relationship.
The Tribunal’s reasons are not to be read with a keen eye for error. The reference to no documentary evidence in respect of financial contributions in the relationship was clearly in the context of the evidence that had been given by the applicant as to what was said to have been paid by the sponsor. The Tribunal found the total period of the relationship under review was less than six months and was not surprised that the parties had not purchased major assets or entered into legal obligations with each other given the limited duration of the relationship.
The Tribunal referred to the nature of the household and again referred to the applicant’s statutory declaration as to where the parties lived and referred to the copy of the tenancy agreement and the applicant’s name having been added in handwriting to the sponsor’s name which was typed on the agreement. The Tribunal identified that the agreement was for a period of one year and referred to the applicant claiming that the property manager had made a notation adding her as a tenant.
The Tribunal observed that the tenancy agreement states no more than one person may ordinarily live in the premises. It was in those circumstances the Tribunal found it implausible that the property manager would have added the applicant as a co-tenant.
The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s statement about sharing cleaning responsibilities on weekends and that she did most of the cooking and washing, and referred to the sponsor having his daughter at least once a fortnight and that the applicant supported with the care of the child.
The Tribunal referred to the social aspects of the relationship and referred to the statutory declarations received by the Tribunal in support of the relationship and made express reference to the applicant acknowledging the relationship developed very quickly. The Tribunal referred to the particular statutory declarations and also the photographic evidence and referred to the evidence concerning the socialising.
The Tribunal then turned to the oral evidence of a particular witness referring to the applicant living with the sponsor at the time of their first meeting. Reference was made to the applicant and sponsor marrying so quickly and the sponsor treated the applicant as his possession after their marriage. The Tribunal found that it was not satisfied that the family and friends recognised the applicant’s sponsored relationship was genuine and a continuing married relationship.
The Tribunal turned to the issue of commitment and that the applicant had been divorced from her husband in March 2014 and referred to the content of the statutory declaration by the applicant, as well as reference to the text messages. The Tribunal referred to the applicant agreeing that the relationship developed very quickly from the first meeting in March 2015 to marriage in July 2015. The Tribunal referred to asking the applicant to explain the rush to marriage and referred to the applicant’s evidence that the sponsor was loving and affectionate and that they had talked about wanting children and that she felt happy with the sponsor.
The Tribunal referred to the text messages and the applicant’s evidence that they had highs and lows. The Tribunal put to the applicant that the text messages show their relationship stopped and started on a number of times. The applicant in that context conceded that she and the sponsor argued and that she left the house a couple of times even before their marriage and that each time the sponsor apologised to her.
The Tribunal sought to explore with the applicant why she went ahead with the marriage given the instability of the relationship and noted the applicant said it was because they love each other very much and she got used to arguing and that she had not been physically harmed until after their marriage.
The Tribunal referred to raising with the applicant the emotional support she received from the sponsor and her answer, which the Tribunal found did not satisfy the Tribunal, that the sponsor provided her with emotional support commensurate with that of a genuine spousal relationship. The Tribunal did accept that the applicant and sponsor had lived together under the same roof for a period of six months but that during that period they separated on a number of occasions as documented by the texts and as conceded by the applicant at the hearing.
The Tribunal found from the time of application of the visa until their final separation in mid-September, the parties’ relationship was of six weeks duration. It was in those circumstances that the Tribunal found the evidence fell well short of demonstrating a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife, to the exclusion of all others, which is an essential criterion under s 5F(2)(b) of the Act.
The Tribunal referred to not being satisfied the applicant was sponsoring a genuine, continuing married relationship. The Tribunal referred to the relationship not meeting the definition of married relationship in s 5F of the Act.
The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant would meet the requirements of cl 820.211(2), 5 or 6 of the Regulations, except that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring partner had ceased.
The Tribunal found the applicant did not meet the requirements of cl 820.221 of the Regulations and did not satisfy the criteria for the grant of a visa and affirmed the decision under review.

Before this court

Mr Blades of counsel, who appeared on behalf of the applicant, relied on the following grounds in the further amended application:
2. The Tribunal misdirected itself about the question it had to answer. The Tribunal erroneously took the view that an unstable relationship could not simultaneously be a relationship in which the parties have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others.
Particulars
a) The Tribunal stated that it asked the applicant: “to explain why she went ahead with marrying the sponsor given the instability of their relationship” and it recorded the applicant’s responses: “She said they married because they loved each other very much and she “got used to arguing”. She said the sponsor did not physically harm her until after their marriage.”(At CB 514, [56])
b) The Tribunal also asked the applicant: “to describe the emotional support she received from the sponsor.” The Tribunal recorded the applicant’s response: “he was “lovely and charming” until he became aggressive.” (At CB 514, [57])
c) The Tribunal stated that the applicant’s above response “does not satisfy the Tribunal that the sponsor provided her with emotional support commensurate with that in a genuine spouse relationship.” (At CB 514, [57])
d) The Tribunal erroneously took the view that an unstable relationship could not simultaneously be a relationship in which the parties have a mutual commitment to a shared life as husband and wife to the exclusion of all others.
4. The Tribunal failed to engage in an active intellectual process of considering the Applicant’s and Sponsor’s evidence, failed to make findings on the relevant matters prescribed under reg. 1.15A(3)(a) to (d) of the Migration Regulations 1994, and failed to give reasons for its failure to be satisfied that the Applicant and Sponsor were not in a genuine and continuing married relationship.
Particulars
(a) The Tribunal set out the oral and documentary evidence before it regarding the matters set out in reg. 1.15A(3)(a) to (d), namely the financial aspects of the relationship, nature of the household, social aspects of the relationship and nature of the persons’ commitment to each other.
(b) However, in reaching its ultimate conclusion at [61] that the Applicant and Sponsor were not in a genuine and continuing married relationship, the Tribunal failed to make findings on material questions of fact, namely whether the above matters individually and cumulatively supported the existence of a married relationship.
5. The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by failing to take into account relevant considerations material or documentary evidence in coming to the conclusion that it was implausible that a property manager added the Applicant as a co-tenant to the Sponsor’s tenancy agreement.
Particulars
(a) The Tribunal based its conclusion on the existence of a clause that no more than one person may ordinarily live at the premises (CB 380, 512).
(b) The tenancy agreement contained a provision allowing for the property to be sub-let with the lessor’s consent (CB 381).
(c) The tenancy agreement was initially signed on 11 February 2015 (CB 394), around 2 months before the Applicant met the Sponsor (CB 264).
(d) On the signature page of the tenancy agreement the Applicant’s name and signature appears in the field designated for the tenant, besides which appears the name and signature of the lessor’s agent, Stephanie Mack, in the field designated for the witness (CB 394).
(e) Adjacent to where the Applicant’s name is added to the tenancy agreement are the initials of 3 people, the uppermost of which appears to read ‘SM’ (CB 379).
(f) The Applicant and the Sponsor in a joint email to the Department wrote ‘Tenancy Agreement – as the real state (sic) has just included Ingrid on the contract’ (CB 154).
(g) The Sponsor in his email to the Department revoking the Applicant’s sponsorship mentioned he was “in the process of removing her from the lease” (CB 175).
(h) The Tribunal failed to take into account the above in concluding that it was implausible that a property manager added the Applicant as a co-tenant to the Sponsor’s tenancy agreement.
5A. Further or in the alternative, the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by irrationally or illogically coming to the conclusion that it was implausible that a property manager added the Applicant as a co-tenant to the Sponsor’s tenancy agreement in circumstances where that conclusion was not open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it.
Particulars
Particulars above at Ground 5, paragraphs (a)-(h) are repeated.
8. The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider a matter that it was required to consider in considering all of the circumstances of the relationship between the Applicant and the Sponsor pursuant to reg. 1.15A(2) and reg. 1.15A(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994.
Particulars
a. Subregulation 1.15A(3)(d)(iv) required the Tribunal, in considering the nature of the persons’ commitment to each other, to consider whether, at the time of lodgement of the visa application, the Applicant and the Sponsor saw the relationship as a long term one.
b. The Tribunal failed to consider whether the Applicant and the Sponsor saw the relationship as a long term one at the required time.
9. The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider a matter that it was required to consider in considering all of the circumstances of the relationship between the Applicant and the Sponsor pursuant to reg. 1.15A(2) and reg. 1.15A(3) of the Migration Regulations 1994.
Particulars
a. Subregulation 1.15A(3)(d)(iii) required the Tribunal, in considering the nature of the persons’ commitment to each other, to consider “the degree of companionship and emotional support that the persons draw from each other”.
b. The Applicant and the Sponsor provided documentary evidence as to the degree of companionship and emotional support that they drew from each other in statutory declarations and other statements (CB 157-160; CB 161-164; CB 175; CB 264-271) and in text messages (CB 306-378, including text messages sent after the relationship started to deteriorate between 30 August 2015 to 11 September 2015 (CB 269 at [86], Attachment IJTC016 at CB 444-479);
c. The Tribunal asked the Applicant to describe the “emotional support” she received from the Sponsor (CB 514 at [57]).
d. However, the Tribunal failed to consider the degree of companionship that the persons draw from each other.
e. The Tribunal also failed to consider the degree of companionship and emotional support that the Sponsor drew from the Applicant.
10. The Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by overlooking relevant material in its consideration of the financial aspects of the relationship pursuant to reg. 1.15A(2) and reg. 1.15A(3)(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (“Regulations”).
a. At paragraph 16 of its statement of reasons, the Tribunal “expressed its concern that there is no documentary evidence showing how the sponsor may have contributed to daily expenses.” (CB 511).
b. At paragraph 26 of its statement of reasons, the Tribunal stated that it “is satisfied on the evidence that the applicant paid some of the relationship’s daily living costs between April and August 2015 but there is no documentary evidence of the sponsor’s financial contribution to the relationship.”
c. There was documentary evidence of the sponsor’s financial contribution to the relationship through the tenancy agreement over the property at 343b Wanneroo Road, Balcatta which provided for rent payments, an agreement that sponsor as well as the applicant had signed (CB 379-397).
d. The Tribunal overlooked this documentary evidence and made a jurisdictional error.

Ground 2

In relation to ground 2, I do not accept that the Tribunal misdirected itself in taking into account the nature of the relationship. Mr Blades’ reference to the relationship being unstable and not being able to simultaneously be in a relationship in which the parties have a mutual commitment to a shared life was not the reasoning of the Tribunal and does not reflect any error by the Tribunal of the kind that was identified in Sing v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 114. It was relevant to the Tribunal to take into account what had occurred in the relationship that only lasted six weeks after the application for the visa. No jurisdictional error in relation to ground 2 is made out.

Ground 4

In relation to ground 4, Mr Blades submitted that the Tribunal had failed to give proper reasons to satisfy each of the requirements under r 1.15A(3)(a) to (d) of the Regulations. Section 5F(2) of the Act provides as follows:
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), persons are in a married relationship if:
(a) they are married to each other under a marriage that is valid for the purposes of this Act; and
(b) they have a mutual commitment to a shared life as a married couple to the exclusion of all others; and
(c) the relationship between them is genuine and continuing; and

(d) they:
(i) live together; or
(ii) do not live separately and apart on a permanent basis.

Regulation 1.15A of the Regulations relevantly provides as follows:
(1) For subsection 5F(3) of the Act, this regulation sets out arrangements for the purpose of determining whether 1 or more of the conditions in paragraphs 5F(2)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Act exist.
(2) If the Minister is considering an application for:
(a) a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) visa; or
(b) a Partner (Provisional) (Class UF) visa; or
(c) a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa; or
(d) a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa;
the Minister must consider all of the circumstances of the relationship, including the matters set out in subregulation (3).
(3) The matters for subregulation (2) are:
(a) the financial aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) any joint ownership of real estate or other major assets; and
(ii) any joint liabilities; and
(iii) the extent of any pooling of financial resources, especially in relation to major financial commitments; and
(iv) whether one person in the relationship owes any legal obligation in respect of the other; and
(v) the basis of any sharing of day-to-day household expenses; and
(b) the nature of the household, including:
(i) any joint responsibility for the care and support of children; and
(ii) the living arrangements of the persons; and
(iii) any sharing of the responsibility for housework; and
(c) the social aspects of the relationship, including:
(i) whether the persons represent themselves to other people as being married to each other; and
(ii) the opinion of the persons' friends and acquaintances about the nature of the relationship; and
(iii) any basis on which the persons plan and undertake joint social activities; and
(d) the nature of the persons' commitment to each other, including:
(i) the duration of the relationship; and
(ii) the length of time during which the persons have lived together; and
(iii) the degree of companionship and emotional support that the persons draw from each other; and
(iv) whether the persons see the relationship as a long-term one.
The Authority’s reasons addressed each of the topics identified in r 1.15A(3) of the Regulations. On the face of the Authority’s reasons, the Authority engaged in a thoughtful process in respect of each of those mandatory considerations as summarised above. It was not necessary for the Authority to make determinative findings in respect of each of the subparagraphs to paragraphs (a) to (d) of r 1.15A(3) of the Regulations.
The Tribunal’s reasons on a fair reading of the reasons as a whole reflect a real and genuine consideration of the whole of r 1.15A(3) of the Regulations and an active intellectual process engaging with the whole of r 1.15A(3) of the Regulations in determining whether or not the parties were in a genuine and continuing married relationship within the meaning of the Act. The Tribunal’s reasons as summarised above reflect taking into account each of the factors identified under r 1.15A(3)(a) to (d) of the Regulations. No jurisdictional error as mentioned in ground 4 is made out.

Ground 5

In relation to ground 5, Mr Blades submitted that the Tribunal should have taken into account other provisions in the tenancy agreement, as well as signatures and communications to the Department. The Court was taken to the tenancy agreement, which on its face was not a copy of the registered agreement and had handwriting additions by reason of which the observation of implausibility about the handwritten additions was clearly open.
The Court is not satisfied that the observation about the handwritten additions was in any way material to the Tribunal’s reasoning in relation to whether or not the relationship was genuine. Even if there was an error being the subject of implausibility as to whether the applicant was a party to the lease agreement, there was a not a material factual error that could give rise to any jurisdictional error.
On the face of the material before the Court, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that the Tribunal failed to take into account the other provisions or the communications that were referred to. The reasoning in respect of implausibility was open to the Tribunal and does not reveal any error. No jurisdictional error is made out by ground 5.

Ground 5A

In so as far as ground 5A seeks to advance the issue in ground 4, the Tribunal identified a logical and rational basis for the concern as to implausibility given the handwritten addition to the lease. The adverse finding of implausibility was open to the Tribunal and cannot be said to lack an evident and intelligible justification. Further, even if there was any such error, it is not of a kind that would give rise to any jurisdictional error as the Court does not accept that that reason was material to the reasoning of the Tribunal. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 5A is made out.

Ground 8

In relation to ground 8, Mr Blades submitted that the Tribunal had erred by failing to make a finding or to take into consideration the requirement under r 1.15A(3)(d)(iv) of the Regulations. The Tribunal’s reasons are not to be read with a keen eye for error and must be read as a whole. It is apparent that the Tribunal considered the nature of the commitment of the parties to each other in the context of a duration that lasted only six weeks after the filing of the application.
The Tribunal referred to the applicant’s statutory declaration and the notional commitment as well as the instability of the relationship. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to make an express finding referring to the relationship being a long term one. Based on the material before the Court, the Court accepts that the Tribunal took into account each of the subparagraph considerations under r 1.15(3)(d) of the Regulations in considering the nature of the applicant’s and sponsor’s commitment to each other. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to make express findings on each subparagraph. The Court finds there was real and meaningful consideration given to r 1.15A(3)(d)(iv) of the Regulations, in particular the relevant referral to the duration of six weeks after filing and 6 months in total. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 8 is made out.

Ground 9

In relation to ground 9, Mr Blades submitted that there had been a failure to take into account and make a finding in relation to the companionship that the persons draw from each other under r 1.15A(3)(d)(iii) of the Regulations. The Authority’s reasons are not to be read with a keen eye for error. The reference in the course of the Authority’s reasons to emotional support and duration of six weeks after filing the application and 6 months in total clearly included the commitment to each other in the context of the relationship and the requirements of subparagraph (d) of r 1.15A(3) of the Regulations.
The reference to duration of the relationship being in whole of six months and there being only six weeks duration after the filing of the application and the friction in the relationship identified by the Tribunal are all consistent with the Tribunal taking into account the companionship and emotional support. No jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 9 is made out.

Ground 10

In relation to ground 10, Mr Blades submitted that the reference in paragraph 26 of the Tribunal’s reasons to there being no documentary evidence of the sponsor’s financial contribution to the relationship reflected an overlooking by the Tribunal of relevant material and that there was evidence that the sponsor had paid the rent and in that regard referred to the provisions of the rental agreement, as well as the statutory declarations.
It is apparent on the face of the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal took into account the statutory declarations and also the tenancy agreement. In the context of paragraph 26, the Tribunal was referring to the absence of documentary evidence in respect of the alleged contributions identified by the applicant, by the sponsor. I do not accept on a fair reading that the Tribunal had failed to take into account the evidence in respect of the rent or that the Tribunal was seeking to refer to the rent in the context of the absence of documentary evidence, given the reference to the household items of the kinds immediately referred to beforehand.
On a fair reading, the Tribunal’s reasons do not support the contention that the Tribunal overlooked any relevant evidence. The Court is not satisfied that the Tribunal made any jurisdictional error as alleged in ground 10.

Conclusion

As the further amended application fails to make out any jurisdictional error, the further amended application is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Date: 29 March 2019