Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cadbury Schweppes Pty Limited v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Limited [2009] FCAFC 8

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – apprehended bias – judgment overturned on appeal on  a question of the exclusion of certain evidence – proceeding remitted to and heard by the same trial judge – comments made in the original judgment about the policy of evidence law and relevance of evidence the subject of the appeal – evidence now admitted – same substantive verdict on retrial – whether a properly informed lay observer, looking objectively at the circumstances in which the proceeding was remitted to the primary judge, might reasonably apprehend that the primary judge might not bring an impartial and unbiased mind to the resolution of the dispute between the parties

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 76, 79, 80, 135
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 28
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52, s 53

Australian Woollen Mills Limited v FS Walton & Co Limited (1937) 58 CLR 641
Baulkham Hills Shire Council v Basemount Pty Limited & Anor (2003) 126 LGERA 339
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Limited v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Limited (2006) 228 ALR 719
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Limited v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Limited (2006) 229 ALR 136
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Limited v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Limited (2007) 159 FCR 397
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Limited v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Limited (No 2) [2007] ATPR 42-175
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Limited v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Limited (No 5) (2007) 240 ALR 780
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Limited v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Limited (No. 8) (2008) 75 IPR 557
Concrete Pty Limited v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Limited (2006) 229 CLR 577

Cat Media Pty Limited v Opti‑Healthcare Pty Limited [2003] ASAL 55-103
Domain Names Australia Pty Limited v .au Domain Administration Limited (2004) 139 FCR 215

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

Expectation Pty Limited v PRD Realty Pty Limited & Anor (No. 2) (2006) 151 FCR 160
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488

Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70
Livesey v The New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288

Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT9
R v Turner [1975] QB 834

Southern Equities Corp Limited (in liq) v Bond (2000) 78 SASR 339
Transport Publishing Co Pty Limited v The Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568

Vakauta v Kelly (1988) 13 NSWLR 502

CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LIMITED v DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY LIMITED

VID 284 of 2008

EMMETT, GREENWOOD AND BESANKO JJ

5 FEBRUARY 2009

SYDNEY  (BY VIDEOLINK WITH MELBOURNE)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 284 of 2008

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

CADBURY SCHWEPPES PTY LTD
ACN 004 551 473
Appellant

AND:

DARRELL LEA CHOCOLATE SHOPS PTY…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCAFC 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd, the dispute centred around the use of the colour purple by Darrell Lea, which was argued to be similar to Cadbury’s distinctive "Cadbury purple" associated with their chocolate products. Cadbury sought to rely on expert opinions to substantiate its claims of brand infringement and consumer confusion, which led to objections from Darrell Lea regarding the admissibility of the expert evidence under the Evidence Act. The primary legal issue was whether the expert evidence, particularly from Dr Brian John Gibbs, met the criteria set out in s 79 of the Evidence Act, which allows for opinion evidence based on specialised knowledge. Additionally, Darrell Lea argued that the probative value of the expert evidence was outweighed by the time and resources required to address it, invoking s 135 of the Evidence Act.

The court evaluated the qualifications and expertise of Dr Gibbs, confirming that his specialised knowledge in marketing and behavioural science qualified him to provide opinion evidence. The court also assessed whether Dr Gibbs' opinions were substantially based on his specialised knowledge, a requirement under s 79. The court found that Dr Gibbs' opinions regarding consumer perception and the impact of Darrell Lea's use of purple on Cadbury’s brand were sufficiently grounded in his expertise. Regarding the discretionary exclusion under s 135, the court determined that the probative value of the expert evidence did not warrant exclusion despite the extensive nature of the affidavits. Consequently, the court ruled that the expert evidence was admissible.

The ruling allowed Cadbury to proceed with its reliance on the expert opinions, paving the way for further examination of the infringement claims. The court’s decision underscored the importance of expert evidence in complex commercial disputes involving brand perception and consumer behaviour, affirming the admissibility of such evidence when appropriately substantiated by the expert's specialised knowledge. The primary judge's decision was upheld, ensuring that the expert evidence could be used in the ongoing litigation concerning the alleged brand infringement and consumer confusion.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the trial of the action, Cadbury sought to read and rely upon two affidavits of Dr Brian John Gibbs, an Associate Professor of Marketing and Behavioural Science in the Melbourne Business School at the University of Melbourne. Cadbury also sought to rely upon affidavits from two further experts, Mr Constantino Stavros, a Senior Lecturer in the School of Economics, Finance and Marketing at RMIT University, Melbourne, and Mr Timothy Raymond Riches, the Managing Director of a large marketing services group called FutureBrand. Objection was taken to the tender of the affidavits of Dr Brian Gibbs. The determination of those objections also determined the admissibility of the affidavits of Mr Stavros and Mr Riches. Objection was taken on the ground that the elements of s 79 of the Evidence Act as an exception to the prohibition in s 76 of the Evidence Act on the reception of opinion evidence were not made out. Section 79 contemplates specialised knowledge in the witness based on his or her training, study and experience and the formulation of an opinion that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. Alternatively, Darrell Lea contended that the affidavits of Dr Gibbs ought to be excluded in the exercise of the primary judge’s discretion under s 135 of the Evidence Act as the probative value of the affidavits was said to be substantially outweighed by the time that would be wasted in dealing with and responding to the affidavits. The evidence ruling The primary judge accepted that Dr Gibbs has specialised knowledge (Cadbury Schweppes v Darrell Lea [2006] FCA 363; (2006) 228 ALR 719; 28 ATPR 42‑112 (the “evidence ruling”)). He holds a Doctorate in Behavioural Science and Marketing from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago and has other significant experience within international universities of real standing. The two affidavits of Dr Gibbs comprised 90 pages including exhibits. The evidence was directed to these matters. The colour Cadbury purple is strongly associated with the Cadbury brand. Purple is an activator of Cadbury’s brand equity triggering tangible and intangible brand judgments in the mind of consumers. Darrell Lea’s use of purple is likely to cause four information processing errors to occur among consumers of chocolate confectionary. The four errors are described as misidentification, miscuing, misinference and misassociation. Dr Gibbs described those four errors, relevantly, in these terms:Misidentification is when consumers seeking to buy Cadbury chocolate mistakenly identify a Darrell Lea product as a Cadbury product and therefore buy the Darrell Lea product by mistake. Harm [is caused to Cadbury] due to blame from consumers for the confusing common use of colour and damaged consumer attitudes due to cognitive dissonance [a state of discomfort produced by inconsistencies between simultaneously held beliefs or between beliefs and behaviour] or due to violated expectations. Miscuing is when consumers use purple as a spurious cue in decision‑making and choice; in this capacity the colour can function as a decision‑heuristic [a shorthand rule or “rule of thumb” functioning to reduce decision‑making effort while maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy] cue … Misinference is when consumers in trying to make sense of the common use of purple by Darrell Lea and Cadbury draw mistaken inferences about one or both of the brands.Misassociation is when consumers mistakenly link Cadbury brand association with Darrell Lea and vice versa as a result of the two brands associative networks [a framework for understanding how pieces of semantic information interact in an individual’s memory in which concepts or other information stored in memory are represented by nodes that are inter‑connected in a network of links] having become connected in consumers’ minds through the common use of purple. [emphasis contained within the original quoted paragraphs]

Decision

Reasons for decision

By its notice of appeal, Cadbury relies upon 17 grounds of appeal. On 5 August 2008, the Chief Justice, no doubt mindful of the observations of Kirby and Crennan JJ at [117] in Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2007) 229 CLR 577 (with whom Gummow ACJ expressed agreement ([2]‑[3])) and observations of Callinan J at [172] – [173] in Concrete), made orders that the grounds of appeal going to contentions of apprehended bias (grounds 1 and 2 of the notice of appeal) were to be listed for determination prior to the hearing of the appeal in relation to the remaining grounds 3 to 17. Accordingly, the present appeal is confined to the issues of apprehended bias. The sequence of decisions In order to deal with the various contentions, it is necessary to set out the sequence of decisions and the essential reasoning. Cadbury having commenced and discontinued proceedings in 2003 commenced further proceedings in 2005 (VID555 of 2005). The trial of that proceeding commenced before Heerey J on 20 March 2006. In that action, Cadbury contended that “Cadbury” is regarded by members of the public as synonymous with chocolate confectionary; since 1985 Cadbury has widely marketed itself and its Cadbury chocolate confectionary products by reference to the colour “Cadbury purple”; the colour Cadbury purple is perceived by consumers in eight “pantone” shades of purple identified by particular pantone colour code numbers; Cadbury so marketed itself and its products as to lead consumers to associate Cadbury purple with Cadbury and its confectionary; by 1995, Cadbury had established a valuable exclusive reputation and goodwill in Cadbury purple; since late 2001, Darrell Lea used in the conduct of its chocolate confectionary business a colour purple bearing a striking and obvious likeness to Cadbury purple and thus wrongfully appropriated and converted to its own use Cadbury’s reputation in Cadbury purple; through the use by Darrell Lea of such a colour, Darrell Lea made a series of representations in trade or commerce such as, a representation that use of a similar colour to Cadbury purple occurred under licence from Cadbury or alternatively, Darrell Lea enjoyed a relevant connection with, approval of or sponsorship by, Cadbury. Thus, Cadbury alleged contraventions of ss 52, 53(c) and 53(d) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and passing off. At the trial of the action, Cadbury sought to read and rely upon two affidavits of Dr Brian John Gibbs, an Associate Professor of Marketing and Behavioural Science in the Melbourne Business School at the University of Melbourne. Cadbury also sought to rely upon affidavits from two further experts, Mr Constantino Stavros, a Senior Lecturer in the School of Economics, Finance and Marketing at RMIT University, Melbourne, and Mr Timothy Raymond Riches, the Managing Director of a large marketing services group called FutureBrand. Objection was taken to the tender of the affidavits of Dr Brian Gibbs. The determination of those objections also determined the admissibility of the affidavits of Mr Stavros and Mr Riches. Objection was taken on the ground that the elements of s 79 of the Evidence Act as an exception to the prohibition in s 76 of the Evidence Act on the reception of opinion evidence were not made out. Section 79 contemplates specialised knowledge in the witness based on his or her training, study and experience and the formulation of an opinion that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. Alternatively, Darrell Lea contended that the affidavits of Dr Gibbs ought to be excluded in the exercise of the primary judge’s discretion under s 135 of the Evidence Act as the probative value of the affidavits was said to be substantially outweighed by the time that would be wasted in dealing with and responding to the affidavits. The evidence ruling

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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