FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BYF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 774
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: BYF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 75 File number: NSD 142 of 2016 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 1 July 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal decision of Federal Circuit Court not to set aside earlier decision summarily dismissing judicial review proceedings and reinstate the proceedings under r 16.05(2) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to take into account medical condition of fourth applicant - where appeal would not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant grant of leave - application dismissed.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – duties of the Court to ensure an unrepresented litigant is aware of procedural and evidential rules.
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.03C, 16.05(2), 44.12
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.12
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 417, 425
Cases cited: AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68
Baig v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 855
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375
MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235
SZHBX v Minister for Immigration Citizenship [2008] HCASL 131
SZHSY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 793
SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158
Date of hearing: 16 May 2016 Date of last submissions: 30 May 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms N Maddocks, solicitor of DLA Piper Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs. ORDERS
NSD 142 of 2016 BETWEEN: BYF15
First Applicant
BYG15
Second Applicant
BYH15
Third Applicant
BYI15
Fourth Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
1 JULY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The first and second applicants are to the pay the Minister’s costs of the application as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
1 INTRODUCTION
[1]
2 BACKGROUND
[7]
2.1 The first visa application
[7]
2.2 The second visa application
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 774
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The primary judge concluded that there was no reasonable excuse for the applicants' failure to appear at the hearing on 4 December 2015, and that there was no sufficiently arguable case of jurisdictional error to warrant setting aside the earlier judgment in the interests of the administration of justice. The primary judge also considered that the applicants did not have a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. The court noted that the exercise of the power under rule 16.05(2) of the FCC Rules was discretionary, and that the applicants needed to demonstrate that the primary judge made an error of the kind identified in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 in the exercise of discretion. The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated such an error.
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed. The first and second applicants are to pay the Minister’s costs of the application as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The first and second applicants are to the pay the Minister’s costs of the application as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The primary judge dismissed the application in a case. First, the primary judge found that he was not satisfied that the medical certificate or anything said by the first applicant at the hearing satisfactorily explained the applicants’ failure to appear at the hearing on 4 December 2015. He stated that he would refuse the application on that ground alone. Secondly, his Honour found that he was not satisfied that there was any sufficiently arguable case of jurisdictional error to warrant setting aside the earlier judgment in the interests of the administration of justice.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles As the Minister submitted, in determining whether or not to grant leave to appeal, relevant factors include whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and, if it is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397. In this regard, the power exercised by the Federal Circuit Court in dismissing the reinstatement application under r 16.05(2) of the FCC Rules was discretionary. As such, it would be necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that the primary judge made an error of the kind identified in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 in the exercise of discretion, namely that the primary judge acted upon a wrong principle, was guided by extraneous or irrelevant matters, ignored relevant or matters, made a mistake of fact, or that the discretionary decision is unreasonable or plainly unjust. In this regard the principles which govern the exercise of power under rule 16.05(2) of the FCC Rules were identified by Ryan J in MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530 at [7]: In circumstances where, as in the present case, a proceeding has been dismissed in a party’s absence and reinstatement is sought, a discretion falls to be exercised by the court before which the application for reinstatement is returnable. That discretion requires the consideration of three factors, and whether, on balance, they tend for or against the reinstatement. Those factors are:(a)whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party’s absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out; (b)the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the court is empowered to grant; (c)whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. As North J said in MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multi-Cultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) FCA 1066 at [18]:The decision whether to reinstate the appeal depends, however, not only on the existence of a reasonable explanation for the need to adjourn the appeal, but also whether the appeal, if reinstated, has a reasonable chance of success. If not, there is no purpose in reinstatement.(emphasis in the original.)