BYF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BYF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 774

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: BYF15 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 75
File number: NSD 142 of 2016
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 1 July 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal decision of Federal Circuit Court not to set aside earlier decision summarily dismissing judicial review proceedings and reinstate the proceedings under r 16.05(2) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) – whether Tribunal failed to take into account medical condition of fourth applicant - where appeal would not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant grant of leave - application dismissed.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – duties of the Court to ensure an unrepresented litigant is aware of procedural and evidential rules.

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.03C, 16.05(2), 44.12

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.12

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 417, 425

Cases cited:

AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 68

Baig v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 855

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375

House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499

MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235

SZHBX v Minister for Immigration Citizenship [2008] HCASL 131

SZHSY v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 793

SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158

Date of hearing: 16 May 2016
Date of last submissions: 30 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 49
Counsel for the Applicants: The applicants appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms N Maddocks, solicitor of DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 142 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BYF15

First Applicant

BYG15

Second Applicant

BYH15

Third Applicant

BYI15

Fourth Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 JULY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The first and second applicants are to the pay the Minister’s costs of the application as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1         INTRODUCTION

[1]

2         BACKGROUND

[7]

2.1      The first visa application

[7]

2.2      The second visa application

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read BYF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 774
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Indian citizens seeking protection visas, applied for leave to appeal the Federal Circuit Court's decision not to set aside its earlier decision summarily dismissing their judicial review proceedings and reinstate the proceedings. The Federal Circuit Court had declined to reinstate the proceedings under rule 16.05(2) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth). The applicants argued that the Tribunal failed to consider the fourth applicant's medical condition. The legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Circuit Court's decision was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and, if it was assumed to be wrong, whether substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicants if leave to appeal were refused.

The court found that the application for leave to appeal should be dismissed. The primary judge concluded that there was no reasonable excuse for the applicants' failure to appear at the hearing on 4 December 2015, and that there was no sufficiently arguable case of jurisdictional error to warrant setting aside the earlier judgment in the interests of the administration of justice. The primary judge also considered that the applicants did not have a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. The court noted that the exercise of the power under rule 16.05(2) of the FCC Rules was discretionary, and that the applicants needed to demonstrate that the primary judge made an error of the kind identified in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 in the exercise of discretion. The court found that the applicants had not demonstrated such an error.

The application for leave to appeal is dismissed. The first and second applicants are to pay the Minister’s costs of the application as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The first and second applicants are to the pay the Minister’s costs of the application as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the application for leave to appeal must be dismissed on the ground that any appeal would not enjoy any real prospects of success. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The first visa application The applicants are citizens of India, with the first and second applicants being husband and wife respectively and the third and fourth applicants being their children. The fourth applicant was born in Australia in late 2013. The first application for protection visas was made by the first, second and third applicants on 9 September 2009. Those applications were refused by the Minister’s delegate whose decision was affirmed on review by the Refugee Review Tribunal. An application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision was successful and the protection visa application was remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal. That Tribunal again affirmed the delegate’s decision. Subsequent applications to the Federal Court, the Full Federal Court and the High Court were unsuccessful, as were applications to the Minister pursuant to s 417 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). 2.2 The second visa application Following the decision in SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235, the applicants made further applications for protection visas on 29 October 2013. SZGIZ concerned the construction of the bar imposed by s 48 of the Act which prevents a non-citizen making a further application for a protection visa while in the migration zone. The Full Court held that s 48 did not prevent a non-citizen who had made a valid application on the basis of the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act from making a further application on the basis of the complementary protection provision in s 36(2)(aa) following its enactment in 2012. The first applicant (who was the primary applicant) claimed that as a member of Dera Sacha Sauda (DSS) he has been attacked and harmed in India by members of the Sikh association and militant groups. The second, third and fourth applicants relied upon on their membership of the applicant’s family unit for the grant of protection visas to them. The delegate refused to grant the protection visas on 11 August 2014. Notwithstanding that the delegate was prepared to give the first applicant “the benefit of the doubt” and accept that he was a member of the DSS at a grassroots level, the delegate did not accept that he was at risk of harm in the future if returned to India. 2.3 The Tribunal’s decision Following lodgement of the application for review in the Tribunal, the applicants’ representative provided a submission in relation to the first applicant’s claims to fear harm as a member of the religious group, the DSS. By letter dated 18 May 2015, the Tribunal invited the applicants to attend a hearing on 19 June 2015 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal agreed to a request made on 19 June 2015 that that hearing be postponed and the hearing was rescheduled to 19 August 2015.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate refused to grant the protection visas on 11 August 2014. Notwithstanding that the delegate was prepared to give the first applicant “the benefit of the doubt” and accept that he was a member of the DSS at a grassroots level, the delegate did not accept that he was at risk of harm in the future if returned to India. 2.3 The Tribunal’s decision Following lodgement of the application for review in the Tribunal, the applicants’ representative provided a submission in relation to the first applicant’s claims to fear harm as a member of the religious group, the DSS. By letter dated 18 May 2015, the Tribunal invited the applicants to attend a hearing on 19 June 2015 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal agreed to a request made on 19 June 2015 that that hearing be postponed and the hearing was rescheduled to 19 August 2015. The first applicant attended the rescheduled hearing but his wife and children did not attend. The hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Punjabi and English languages, and the applicants were represented in relation to the review by their registered migration agent. In a submission following the hearing, the applicants’ representative again submitted that the first applicant is a member of the DSS and has been attacked on two occasions, that he is a farmer whose knowledge is limited, and that his nervousness and difficulties in elaborating on his religious faith and beliefs were apparent. The representative further submitted that the fourth applicant is currently being treated for a hole in her heart and the first applicant cannot take his family back to India amidst such uncertainty. On 31 August 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants a protection visa. In line with the decision in SZGIZ, the Tribunal assessed the first, second and third applicants’ applications against the complementary protection provision in s 36(2)(aa) and (c) (membership of the same family unit) only because they had previously been refused a protection visas in Australia by reference to the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a). However the fourth applicant’s application had not been assessed against either provision. As such the Tribunal assessed the fourth applicant’s claim against both the Refugees Convention and complementary protection provisions. While acknowledging that the Minister’s delegate accepted that the first applicant was a low-level member of the DSS in India, the Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the first applicant was involved in the DSS in India. The Tribunal was drawn to the conclusion that the first applicant’s purpose in coming to Australia was to work on a farm in rural Australia. In this regard the Tribunal said in its reasons that it had explained at the hearing that it was not bound by the findings of the delegate or any previous tribunal. The Tribunal’s reasons for rejecting the first applicant’s claims to be involved in the DSS can be summarised as follows.(1)The first applicant’s evidence regarding his lack of any involvement in the DSS during his six years in Australia was not consistent with his claim to have fled India due to his commitment to or involvement with that group. (2)The first applicant was able to articulate only superficially the importance of the DSS to him and how he practices the principles of DSS in his everyday life. Given information as to the strict adherence by DSS members to specific principles, the Tribunal considered that a person who was genuinely committed to the DSS would have given considerable thought to the application of such principles in their everyday life. The first applicant’s evidence in relation to this issue together with his evidence as to his lack of any involvement in the DSS in Australia raised considerable concerns that led the Tribunal to consider that he had manufactured his claims to be a member of the DSS. (3)The first applicant did not exhibit anything other than a limited understanding of the principles and beliefs of the DSS.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge dismissed the application in a case. First, the primary judge found that he was not satisfied that the medical certificate or anything said by the first applicant at the hearing satisfactorily explained the applicants’ failure to appear at the hearing on 4 December 2015. He stated that he would refuse the application on that ground alone. Secondly, his Honour found that he was not satisfied that there was any sufficiently arguable case of jurisdictional error to warrant setting aside the earlier judgment in the interests of the administration of justice.3. CONSIDERATION3.1 Relevant principles As the Minister submitted, in determining whether or not to grant leave to appeal, relevant factors include whether the decision of the Federal Circuit Court is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and, if it is assumed to be wrong, substantial injustice would be suffered by the applicant if leave to appeal were refused: Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397. In this regard, the power exercised by the Federal Circuit Court in dismissing the reinstatement application under r 16.05(2) of the FCC Rules was discretionary. As such, it would be necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that the primary judge made an error of the kind identified in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505 in the exercise of discretion, namely that the primary judge acted upon a wrong principle, was guided by extraneous or irrelevant matters, ignored relevant or matters, made a mistake of fact, or that the discretionary decision is unreasonable or plainly unjust. In this regard the principles which govern the exercise of power under rule 16.05(2) of the FCC Rules were identified by Ryan J in MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530 at [7]: In circumstances where, as in the present case, a proceeding has been dismissed in a party’s absence and reinstatement is sought, a discretion falls to be exercised by the court before which the application for reinstatement is returnable. That discretion requires the consideration of three factors, and whether, on balance, they tend for or against the reinstatement. Those factors are:(a)whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party’s absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out; (b)the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the court is empowered to grant; (c)whether the applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. As North J said in MZKAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multi-Cultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) FCA 1066 at [18]:The decision whether to reinstate the appeal depends, however, not only on the existence of a reasonable explanation for the need to adjourn the appeal, but also whether the appeal, if reinstated, has a reasonable chance of success. If not, there is no purpose in reinstatement.(emphasis in the original.)