Business and Personal Solutions Pty Ltd v John Clive Witherspoon

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Business and Personal Solutions Pty Ltd v John Clive Witherspoon & Ors [2022] QSC 10

PARTIES:

BUSINESS AND PERSONAL SOLUTIONS PTY LTD
ACN 167 335 195

(plaintiff)

v
JOHN CLIVE WITHERSPOON AND ORS

(first defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS 8725/20

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

17 February 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 February 2022

JUDGE:

Brown J

ORDER:

1.   The plaintiff’s application filed 20 January 2022 is dismissed.

2. Pursuant to r 670 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR), the plaintiff provide security, in a form satisfactory to the registrar, for the first and second defendants’ costs of the proceeding to the first day of trial in the amount of $110,000, within 28 days.

3.   Within 28 days, the plaintiff shall provide security for the third, fourth and fifth defendants’ costs of the proceeding up to and including the first day of trial in the amount of $190,000, by payment of that sum into Court or the provision of a bank guarantee in a form satisfactory to the Registrar.

4.   Within seven days, the plaintiff is to file and serve written submissions as to the costs of the applications filed on 21 July 2021, 19 August 2021 and 20 January 2022, limited to four pages.

5.   Within seven days after receipt of the plaintiff’s written submissions, the defendants are to file and serve written submissions in response, limited to four pages.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – SUMMARY DISPOSAL – SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF OR APPLICANT – where plaintiff applies for summary judgment – where plaintiff and defendants entered into a consultancy agreement and subsequent deed of agreement – whether the Consultancy Agreement was affected by illegality pursuant to s 24 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) – whether the Deed rescinded the Consultancy Agreement by its expressed terms – whether Deed a standalone Deed of Settlement – whether order for summary judgment should be made pursuant to r 292 UCPR

PROCEDURE – CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – COSTS – SECURITY FOR COSTS – where defendants apply for security for costs separately – where plaintiff unable to provide security – whether order requiring plaintiff to provide security for costs should be made having regard to the discretionary factors in r 672 UCPR

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), s 24
Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 228
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999
(Qld), rr 292, 671, 672

Binder v Alachozous (1972) 2 QB 151, cited
Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v JK Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 202, cited
Brooks v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1969) 121 CLR 432, cited
Cannane v Cannane Pty Ltd (1998) 192 CLR 557, cited
Chen v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd & Anor [2001] QSC 043, cited
Coldham-Fussell & Ors v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] QCA 45, cited

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Details
Case
[2022] QSC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Business and Personal Solutions Pty Ltd v John Clive Witherspoon, the plaintiff sought summary judgment against the defendants for amounts owed under a consultancy agreement and a subsequent deed of agreement. The primary legal issues centred on whether the consultancy agreement was affected by illegality under the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld), and whether the deed rescinded the consultancy agreement or stood as a separate settlement deed. The court also considered whether the summary judgment application should be granted under r 292 UCPR.

The court analysed the principles of summary judgment, emphasising that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants have no real prospect of successfully defending the claim and that there is no need for a trial. The court underscored that the inquiry should focus on whether there exists a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success in the defence. The court noted that the summary judgment should be applied using the clear language of r 292 UCPR and that it should only be exercised when there is a high degree of certainty about the outcome. The court examined the nature of the deed, whether it served as a standalone settlement or merely fixed the quantum of the consultancy agreement. The court also considered the defendants' contentions regarding the illegality of the consultancy agreement and its impact on the enforceability of the deed.

The court concluded that the defendants had raised valid issues concerning the illegality of the consultancy agreement and the nature of the deed, which could not be summarily dismissed. Consequently, the plaintiff's application for summary judgment was dismissed. Additionally, the court addressed the defendants' application for security for costs, requiring the plaintiff to provide security for the costs of the proceedings to the first day of trial. The court set specific timelines for the provision of security and for the exchange of written submissions on the costs of various applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The plaintiff’s application filed 20 January 2022 is dismissed.

2. Pursuant to r 670 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (UCPR), the plaintiff provide security, in a form satisfactory to the registrar, for the first and second defendants’ costs of the proceeding to the first day of trial in the amount of $110,000, within 28 days.

3. Within 28 days, the plaintiff shall provide security for the third, fourth and fifth defendants’ costs of the proceeding up to and including the first day of trial in the amount of $190,000, by payment of that sum into Court or the provision of a bank guarantee in a form satisfactory to the Registrar.

4. Within seven days, the plaintiff is to file and serve written submissions as to the costs of the applications filed on 21 July 2021, 19 August 2021 and 20 January 2022, limited to four pages.

5. Within seven days after receipt of the plaintiff’s written submissions, the defendants are to file and serve written submissions in response, limited to four pages.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Prior to the summary judgement application the defendants confirmed to the plaintiff that they did not wish to amend their pleading.Principles of Summary Judgment The principles of summary judgment in relation to r 292 of the UCPR are not in contention. UCPR r 292(2) provides: “If the court is satisfied that – (a) the defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending all or a part of the plaintiff’s claim; and (b) there is no need for a trial of the claim or the part of the claim; the court may give judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim and may make any other order the court considers appropriate.” Rule 292 of the UCPR should be applied using its clear and unambiguous language and keeping in mind the purpose of the UCPR to facilitate the just and expeditious resolution of the real issues in civil proceedings at a minimum of expense. The key requirements of which the Court must be satisfied are “no real prospect” in the defence of a claim and “there is no need for the trial of the claim”. Rule 292 of the UCPR is expressed in clear and plain language. It requires no judicial gloss to understand its meaning.[2][2]Coldham-Fussell v Commissioner of Taxation [2011] QCA 45, at 29 [98] (White JA, De Jersey CJ and McMurdo P agreeing). The question for the Court is not whether the defendant’s case is “hopeless” or “bound to fail.” The appropriate inquiry is whether there exists a real, as opposed to fanciful, prospect of success.[3][3]Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Salcedo [2005] 2 Qd R 232, at 234-235[11] (Williams JA); Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v JK Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 202, at 206 [1] (Holmes JA), and 217 [74] (Daubney J). Issues raised in proceedings will be determined summarily only in the clearest of cases, where there is a high degree of certainty about the outcome.[4] The Court’s jurisdiction should only be exercised where the plaintiff cannot improve its position by a proper amendment of the pleading.[5][4]Neumann Contractors Pty Ltd v Transpunt No 5 Pty Ltd [2011] 2 Qd R 114, at 136, [80] - [81]; Westpac Banking Corp v Hughes [2012] 1 Qd R 581, at 602 [74] (Chesterman JA).[5]Chen v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd & Anor [2001] QSC 043. Where facts are settled and the respective rights of parties turn upon questions of law, r 292 of the UCPR would require the Court to give judgment even if it involves a difficult question of law.[6][6]Bolton Properties Pty Ltd v JK Investments (Australia) Pty Ltd [2009] 2 Qd R 202.Does the Deed Stand Alone? According to the plaintiff, the grounds raised by the first and second defendants concern an attempt to vitiate the Consultancy Agreement and are rendered otiose by the parties entering into the Deed, which the plaintiff refers to as the “Wrong Agreement Point.” The plaintiff contends that unless the first and second defendants can escape the Deed or it does not operate in the manner contended for by the plaintiff, they have no defence. Counsel for the first and second defendants accepted the latter proposition. In that respect, the first and second defendants contend that the application for summary judgment should be dismissed if it is necessary to have regard to the Consultancy Agreement to determine the plaintiff’s rights. According to the first and second defendants cl 3 of the Deed does not create a standalone engagement because:(a)if the Deed should be characterised as a compromise or settlement of the amounts owing, the Court will not enforce the compromise of an illegal contract;(b)Otherwise, if the Deed is not characterised as a compromise or settlement then on its proper construction it serves only to fix the quantum of the amount owing under the Consultancy Agreement rather than to create an independent payment obligation. Did the Deed rescind the Consultancy Agreement?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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