DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Brown v Taylor & Anor [2004] QDC 263
PARTIES:
ALAN LAWSON BROWN
Applicant
v
NATALIE TAYLOR and SUNCORP METWAY INSURANCE LIMITED
Respondents
FILE NO/S:
BD2146 of 2004
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:
Originating application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
28 June 2004
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
28 June 2004
JUDGE:
McGill DCJ
ORDER:
Extension of time as per draft; cross application dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
MOTOR VEHICLES – compulsory insurance – pre-litigation procedures – whether to extend time within which proceeding can be commenced
MOTOR VEHICLES – compulsory insurance – pre-litigation procedures – scope of duty to cooperate – does not require execution of additional authority.
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s 57(2)(b), s 45.
UCPR rule 223.
Attard v Hore [2002] QSC 437 – distinguished
Crain v Croker [2004] QDC 151 – followed
Morrison-Gardiner v Car Choice Pty Ltd [2004] QSC 124 – followed.
COUNSEL:
R P S Jackson for the applicant
R B Dickson for the respondents.
HIS HONOUR: This is an application for an extension under section 57(2)(b) of the Motor Accident Insurance Act of the time within which the applicant may bring proceedings in respect of a claim for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on 2 December 2000.
The terms of the section 57 of the Act and the question of whether there was power under that section to make the sort of order which is sought on this occasion were considered by me in the matter of Crain v. Crocker [2004] QDC 151 and I repeat the approach that I adopted there. I note that subsequently a Supreme Court Judge has taken a similar approach in Morrison-Gardiner v. Car Choice Propriety Limited [2004] QSC 124.
Accordingly, I am proceeding on the basis that there is power to make the order sought. There are discretionary considerations along the lines that I referred to earlier. That involves the situation of whether there is some good reason why proceedings have not already been commenced and the prospects of prejudice to either party depending on the outcome of the application.
I noted in the earlier decision this should not been seen as a legislative invitation to tear up the Limitation Act; rather I see it as being consistent with the clear legislative intention in the Act that there should be efforts to resolve claims without litigation and prior to the commencement of litigation. For that purpose the Act also contains a mechanism for a compulsory conference and an exchange of mandatory final offers and indeed other mechanisms prior to the provision dealing with compulsory conference for the provision of information.
In this case, the history begins with a motor vehicle accident on the 2nd of December 2000. The applicant apparently did not consult a solicitor until the 28th of August 2001 when a section 37 notice was completed and signed.
The section 37 notice was not actually given to the second respondent until the 19th of March 2002. The explanation offered for…
Continue reading Brown v Taylor
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Brown v Taylor [2004] QDC 263
- Case
- [2004] QDC 263
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the statutory requirement to cooperate with pre-litigation procedures mandated the execution of an additional authority by the plaintiff and whether Brown had demonstrated sufficient cooperation with Taylor to warrant an extension of time. The court examined the scope and intent of the pre-litigation procedures under the Motor Accident Insurance Act and the common law principles regarding extensions of time in statutory proceedings. The court found that the duty to cooperate did not necessitate the execution of an additional authority and that Brown had engaged in good faith efforts to cooperate with Taylor. The court held that Brown had made out a sufficient case for an extension of time.
The court granted the extension as per the draft order and dismissed Taylor's cross-application. The decision clarified that the duty to cooperate in pre-litigation procedures does not require the execution of an additional authority, and the court was willing to consider good faith efforts in determining whether to extend time limits for commencing proceedings. The final orders included an extension of time for Brown to commence proceedings and the dismissal of Taylor’s cross-application.
Orders
Orders of the court
Extension of time as per draft; cross application dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.