BPX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BPX17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 763

Appeal from: BPX17 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3047
File number: NSD 2234 of 2017
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 14 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for (class XA) protection visas – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether judge committed jurisdictional error – whether there was a failure to find the Administrative Appeals Tribunal erred in applying the test for a real risk of significant harm – complementary protection – where appellants are a family unit comprising wife and husband – where the wife’s claim of converting religion was accepted – where appellants claim their religion requires them to proselytise throughout their home country – whether relocation was therefore not reasonable – appeal dismissed  
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 36(2B), 36(2C)

Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth)

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Opened for signature 10 December 1984. 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987)

Convention on the Rights of the Child. Opened for signature 20 November 1989. 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Opened for signature 16 December 1966. 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Cases cited:

Appellant S395/2000 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 216 CLR 473; [2003] HCA 71

Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379; [1989] HCA 62

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA and Another (2014) 254 CLR 317; [2014] HCA 45

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Anochie and Another (2012) 209 FCR 497; [2012] FCA 1440

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505; [2013] FCAFC 33

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another (2007) 233 CLR 18; [2007] HCA 40

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235; [2013] FCAFC 71

SZQDF v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 519

Date of hearing: 25 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 122
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr OR Jones
Solicitor for the Appellants: Firmstone & Associates
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms NS Laing
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

NSD 2234 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BPX17

First Appellant

BPY17

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 763
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia by the appellants, a family unit consisting of a wife and husband, who sought a (class XA) protection visa on the basis of complementary protection. The primary issue before the court was whether the judge had committed a jurisdictional error by finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) had not erred in applying the test for a real risk of significant harm under section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Specifically, the appellants argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider their claim that their religion required them to proselytise throughout their home country, and that relocation within India would not be reasonable. The court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and whether the appellants had satisfied the criteria for a protection visa under the complementary protection provisions.

In examining the Tribunal's decision, the court noted that the wife's claims of religious persecution were considered only in relation to the complementary protection criteria, as she had previously been refused a protection visa under section 36(2)(a) of the Act. The Tribunal accepted that the wife had been baptised and would likely seek to proselytise in line with her religious beliefs if returned to India. However, it held that there was no evidence before it showing that her family had threatened harm, other than claims that she was told to "stay away" from her family and that she was "dead" to them by reason of her conversion. The court also considered the husband's claims, noting that the Tribunal did not find the evidence of threats in respect of the husband's family to be serious. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellants' claims and had not erred in its application of the complementary protection criteria.

The court further explained that the relevant statutory language in section 36(2)(aa) of the Act owed itself to the international obligations Australia had assumed, and that the expression "significant harm" was defined in section 36(2A) of the Act. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was supported by the statutory history and purpose of section 36(2)(aa), which was enacted to implement international non-refoulement obligations that were not identical to those under section 36(2)(a). The court found that the Tribunal had considered the wife's claims on the terms made and that the Circuit Court did not err in finding as it did.

Based on the above, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was legally sound and that the appellants had not satisfied the criteria for a grant of a protection visa under the complementary protection provisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This case involves an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The appellants, a family unit consisting of a wife and husband, sought protection visas under the complementary protection provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The wife had converted to the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith and claimed that returning to their home country, India, would place her at a real risk of significant harm due to her religious beliefs and the associated need to proselytise. The appellants argued that relocation within India would not be reasonable due to their religious obligations. The AAT held that the wife did not face a real risk of significant harm if returned to India and dismissed the application for protection visas.

The appellants initially applied for protection visas, which were subsequently refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. They then sought review of this decision by the AAT. Following a hearing in January 2017, the AAT affirmed the delegate's decision, finding that the wife did not face a real risk of significant harm if returned to India. The appellants appealed this decision to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed their appeal. The appellants now seek further review in the Federal Court of Australia.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate stated that he was not satisfied the wife had a real chance of being persecuted for a reason under s 36(2)(a) of the Act or a real risk of being subjected to significant harm under s 36(2)(aa).TRIBUNAL’S DECISION As part of the review process, the appellants were invited to attend a hearing before the Tribunal in November 2016. This hearing was postponed twice, until January 2017. At the hearing, the appellants were represented by a migration agent and assisted by a Punjabi interpreter. The appellants provided the Tribunal with letters of support from a local congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses. The appellants’ representative provided submissions to the Tribunal in January 2017, after the hearing, in response to adverse information put to them during the hearing. These submissions referred to relocation to Nepal, and access to health care for Jehovah’s Witnesses in India, and attached country information in support. Based on authority, the Tribunal properly considered the wife’s claims only in relation to the s 36(2)(aa) complementary protection criteria, due to her having previously been refused a protection visa under s 36(2)(a) of the Act. The Tribunal set out country information in relation to Jehovah’s Witnesses, women, relocation and the treatment of returnees. It noted that the wife’s claims arose after she came to Australia, rather than having been subjected to persecution in India before her departure. The Tribunal accepted, at [70] of its decision record, that despite some concerns regarding the wife’s credibility and motivation for involvement with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, she had been baptised and would likely seek to proselytise in line with her religious beliefs if returned to India. It referred, at [71], to the claims made in regard to the wife’s family, and considered that there was no evidence before the Tribunal showing that her family had threatened harm, other than claims that she was told to “stay away” from her family, and that she was “dead” to them by reason of her conversion. The Tribunal did accept that, particularly in Punjab, the wife’s family’s honour may be diminished as a result of her conversion, however held that she would likely stay away from her family which would limit the adverse effect on her family’s honour. The Tribunal did not consider the evidence of threats in respect of the husband’s family to be serious. The Tribunal referred to the chance of the appellants being pursued or located by family members in India, and considered this was remote and far-fetched. While acknowledging that some tracing could occur through Jehovah’s Witness communities, the Tribunal considered that there was nothing to indicate that a family member, relative or community member would be so aggrieved by the appellants’ return to India that, despite their settling in another place, they would seek to locate them outside of their own villages. At [74], the Tribunal commenced its analysis by accepting that religious intolerance, especially in respect of proselytising, may lead to a reaction in the community and that the nature of the practice of evangelising by knocking on strangers’ doors would put a Jehovah’s Witness at a risk of harm each time they engaged in such conduct.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the Minister contends that there is insufficient textual support for an extension of the reasoning in Appellant S395 as contended by the appellants, whereas the Minister’s position is supported in the statutory history and purpose of s 36(2)(aa), which was enacted to implement international non-refoulement obligations that are not identical to those under s 36(2)(a). Thus, the Tribunal considered the wife’s claims on the terms made and the Circuit Court did not err in finding as it did.CONSIDERATION As noted above, the Tribunal, having considered the evidence before it said it did not accept that there was a real risk that the wife would suffer significant harm outside the Punjab as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being removed from Australia to India and so did not satisfy the criteria set out in s 36(2)(aa). I have mentioned at the outset of these reasons the key provisions of the Act that enable a person to obtain a protection visa by reason of the complementary protection provisions of the Act. I should deal with those provisions in a little more detail. Section 36(2)(aa) relevantly provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister (or in this case, on review, the Tribunal) is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has “substantial grounds” for believing that, “as a necessary and foreseeable consequence” of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, “there is a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm”. I interpolate to observe that the relevant statutory language owes itself to the international obligations Australia has assumed. See discussion: Perram J in Anochie; McAdam J and Chong F, “Complementary Protection in Australia Two Years On: An Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence” (2014) 42 Fed L Rev 441. So far as the expression “significant harm” is concerned, s 36(2A) provides that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm if:(a)the non‑citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or(b)the death penalty will be carried out on the non‑citizen; or(c)the non‑citizen will be subjected to torture; or(d)the non‑citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or(e)the non‑citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment. However, as provided for by s 36(2B), there is taken “not to be a real risk” that a non‑citizen will suffer significant harm in a country, if the Minister is relevantly satisfied that:(a)it would be reasonable for the non‑citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm; … There are other exceptions in s 36(2B), in para (b) and para (c), but they are not presently relevant. Nor are the ineligibility criteria for a grant of a protection visa on complementary protection grounds that are specified in s 36(2C).