Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v CFMEU (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2009] FCA 650

CONTEMPT – contempt of Court – penalties – considerations relevant to penalty – contempt found to be wilful – whether contempt public in nature - the effect of the contempt on the administration of justice - the contemnor’s culpability – whether any relevant prior convictions - relevance of lack of apology – whether any order for costs should mitigate penalty

Federal Court of Australia Act (1976) (Cth) s 31(1)
High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) r 11.04.01
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 24

Attorney-General v Times Newspaper Ltd [1974] AC 273 referred to
Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98 applied
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union [2004] FCA 517 considered
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hughes (2001) ATPR 41-807 referred to
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Info4PC.Com Pty Ltd (2002) 121 FCR 24 referred to
Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing & Kindred Industries Union (2000) 97 IR 474 referred to
BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2000] FCA 1853 referred to
BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2001] FCA 336 referred to
BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining & Energy Union [2002] FCA 702 referred to
Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651 referred to
Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union (2009) 254 ALR 306 referred to
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 350 applied
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1758 referred to
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Coal and Allied OperationsPty Ltd (No 2) (1994) 94 IR 231 referred to
Draffin v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2009] FCA 243 referred to
Furlong v Maxim Electrical Services (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2006] FCA 1705 referred to
Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348 referred to
Hughes v Western Australian Cricket Association (Inc) [1986] ATPR 48,134 referred to
Inn Leisure Industries Pty Ltd (Provisional liquidator appointed) v D F McCloy Pty Ltd (No 2) (1991) 28 FCR 172 referred to
Jones v Toben (No 2) [2009] FCA 477 referred to
Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2006) 164 IR 375 considered
Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 referred to
Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Design Elegance Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 494 referred to
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 referred to
Pine v Expoconti Pty Ltd (2005) 147 IR 426 referred to
Pine v Seelite Windows & Doors Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 500 distinguished
Ponzio v B & P Caelli Construction Pty Ltd

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 650
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd v CFMEU (No 2), the dispute involved a penalty hearing following findings of contempt against the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) for violations of a court order issued by Marshall J. The Applicant, Bovis Lend Lease, sought a penalty against the CFMEU for these contempts. The court was required to decide on the appropriate penalty for the contempts and the allocation of costs. The legal issues included the appropriate level of penalty considering the nature and impact of the contempts, the financial circumstances of the CFMEU, and whether the contempts significantly affected the administration of justice.

The court considered that the contempts, although minor, were part of ongoing conduct and thus warranted a penalty. The court rejected arguments that the contempts did not significantly affect the administration of justice, emphasizing the importance of respecting court orders. The court also noted that while the CFMEU was entitled to a presumption of innocence regarding unestablished charges, this did not equate to a finding of partial compliance with the court orders. The court found that the CFMEU's conduct did not demonstrate any compliance with the orders and that penalising the union would not unduly affect innocent members. The court concluded that the contempts warranted a penalty of $75,000, reflecting the seriousness of the breaches while considering the union's financial situation.

The court ordered that the CFMEU pay $75,000 within 60 days and cover the Applicant’s costs of the penalty hearing on an indemnity basis. Additionally, the CFMEU was required to pay half of the Applicant’s costs of the contempt hearing on an indemnity basis. The motion dated 20 February 2009 was dismissed, while the motion dated 24 February 2009 was successful in part, reflecting the court’s assessment of the evidence and its impact on the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

2. A penalty of $75,000.00 be imposed on the Respondent.

3. The penalty imposed in paragraph 2 of these orders, be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund within 60 days of the date of these orders.

4. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs of the penalty hearing on an indemnity basis.

5. The Respondent pay one half of the Applicant’s costs of the contempt hearing on an indemnity basis

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

TRACEY J
No evidence was filed as to the Applicant’s costs. Counsel for the Applicant advised the Court that his client’s costs were $125,000, calculated on a solicitor/client basis. As already noted counsel advised the Court that the CFMEU’s legal costs in defending the contempt charges was in the order of $78,000.CONCLUSION Although the CFMEU has been found guilty of two contraventions of the Order those contraventions occurred only a few days apart and were the result of continuing conduct. I, therefore, consider it appropriate to impose one penalty in respect of these incidents. Having regard to the considerations outlined above, I consider that a penalty in the sum of $75,000 is appropriate. The CFMEU should also pay the Applicant’s costs of the penalty hearing on an indemnity basis. The motion dated 20 February 2009 was not successful. The motion dated 24 February 2009 was successful in part. Although the majority of the evidence was filed prior to 24 February 2009, the Applicant relied on all of the evidence to support both charges. The findings of contempt related to incidents which occurred on 19 and 23 February 2009 that is on days near the beginning and the end of the relevant period. In my view, it is appropriate that the CFMEU pay half of the Applicant’s costs of the contempt proceeding on an indemnity basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: TRACEY J

No evidence was submitted by the CFMEU as to its financial position, or how the payment of a fine would penalise “innocent persons” not involved in the contempt. On the limited evidence before me, it is difficult to see how the payment of a fine would penalise “innocent persons” except in the sense that any monetary penalty which is paid out of the union’s funds would not be available to be applied to activities which might be thought to advance the interests of members. This will always be the result whenever a union is required to pay a penalty for contempt or a contravention of some statutory provision. It cannot operate as a bar to the imposition of penalties. A court may impose a lower penalty if the offending conduct is carried out by rogue officials and members. Where, as is presently the case, the conduct is that of elected officials who were acting in the course of their duties, the fact that ordinary members of the organisation may, perhaps, be affected by the imposition of a penalty, will weigh far less heavily. If the members are dissatisfied with the conduct of the officers who have engaged in or condoned the offending conduct they may vote against them when they next stand for election.The effect of the contempt on the administration of justice The CFMEU sought to argue that the contempts did not have a significant adverse effect on the administration of justice. In this context it also relied on its submissions that the Court should have regard to the fact that the objectives of the Order were not circumvented and there was no loss or damage as a result of the contempt. For the reasons outlined above, I either do not accept these submissions or accord them little weight. In addition, the CFMEU contended that it was entitled to rely on the presumption of innocence in relation to the charges laid by the Applicant which were not established and that it was proper for the Court to consider what it described as its “partial compliance” with the Order. In Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 350 Tamberlin and Goldberg JJ (with whom Moore J generally agreed) considered (at 359 [48]) that compliance with the Court’s orders by the CFMEU in Queensland was relevant and should have been taken into consideration in assessing the amount of the penalty for the CFMEU’s contempt in New South Wales. Their Honours held: “Although constituting only partial compliance, it is a significant step and it does reflect respect for the court’s orders and a readiness to comply. The weight to be given to such consideration is of course a matter for the primary judge, but it could not be excluded from consideration as irrelevant or insignificant.” In the circumstances of that case their Honours considered that the partial compliance had “considerable importance.” The argument advanced in support of the CFMEU’s “partial compliance” claim was that the evidence before the Court was not sufficient to allow the Court to make findings that any additional contraventions had occurred. While the CFMEU is entitled to a presumption of innocence in relation to the charges of contempt that were not established, it does not follow that it is entitled to the benefit of a finding of partial compliance with the Order in relation to this conduct. A lack of evidence to establish a charge does not amount to evidence of partial compliance. There was no evidence of partial compliance. Counsel did not identify any act on the part of CFMEU officials and members who were involved in the picket which constituted partial compliance with any of the orders made by Marshall J. On the contrary the CFMEU may have been liable for further contempts had the charges been framed differently. It may well, for example, have been found guilty of contempt had it been charged with failing forthwith to remove obstructing vehicles upon being served with Marshall J’s orders.“Personal” circumstances of the contemnor