FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Boutros v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 851
Appeal from: Boutros v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 2271 File number: NSD 1550 of 2017 Judge: PERRY J Date of judgment: 7 June 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – where visitor visa holder applied under reg 2.05(4), Migration Regulations 1994, for waiver of “no further stay condition” to care for his pregnant sister who had medical complications – whether leave should be granted to raise new grounds on the appeal from the Federal Circuit Court – where delegate refused application for waiver – whether independent ground of delegate’s decision not challenged – consideration of the meaning of “compelling” circumstances – where any error in considering whether the circumstances were outside the appellant’s control was not material – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 41(2A)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.05(4)(a)
Cases cited: Babicci v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 77; (2005) 141 FCR 285
BZAHB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1205
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 92 ALJR 780
Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788
Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 73; (2017) 250 FCR 510
NAJT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 134; (2005) 147 FCR 51
Paduano v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 211; (2005) 143 FCR 204
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173
Rawsthorne v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 39; (2013) 140 ALD 524
Terera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1570; (2003) 135 FCR 335
Thongpraphai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1590
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 1 March 2018, 22 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 30 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr A Keevers (1 March 2018) and Ms B Rayment (22 November 2018) of Sparke Helmore ORDERS
NSD 1550 of 2017 BETWEEN: YOUSSEF BOUTROS
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave is granted to the appellant to raise the new grounds in ground 1 of the notice of appeal.
2.The appeal is dismissed.
3.Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
The appellant, Youssef Boutros, is a citizen of Lebanon and entered Australia on 29 May 2014…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 851
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles governing leave to raise a new ground on appeal. It noted that the appellant's notice of appeal challenged two aspects of the delegate's decision: (1) that the circumstances were not sufficiently forceful to be compelling for the purposes of reg 2.05(4)(a); and (2) that the circumstances were not circumstances over which the appellant had no control for the purposes of reg 2.05(4)(a)(i). The court observed that the notice of appeal did not explicitly identify an error by the Federal Circuit Court, which was necessary for an appeal from that court. However, the court decided to read the first ground as alleging by implication that the Federal Circuit Court erred in failing to find that the delegate had erred in the ways identified in ground 1. The court granted leave to the appellant to raise the new grounds in ground 1 of the notice of appeal.
The court then examined the merits of the appeal and found that any error in considering whether the circumstances were outside the appellant's control was not material. The court also considered the meaning of "compelling" circumstances and held that the delegate's construction of the word "compelling" did not establish jurisdictional error. The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.
In summary, the court granted leave to the appellant to raise the new grounds on appeal, but ultimately dismissed the appeal and reserved costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave is granted to the appellant to raise the new grounds in ground 1 of the notice of appeal.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. Costs are reserved.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
On 22 August 2018, the Minister’s solicitors wrote to the Court and the appellant advising that the decision in Hossain had been handed down. The appeal was then set down for a further hearing on 22 November 2018. 3. CONSIDERATION3.1 The issues sought to be raised on the appeal Ground 1 of the appellant’s notice of appeal (which is the only substantive ground) alleges that:1. The Department of Immigration accepted that the pregnancy of my sister was not within my control but was not satisfied that my choice to provide care and support was outside of my control. The Delegate somehow misunderstood that the circumstances of my sister are compelling because my sister had nobody in Australia to provide the support and care I did. The Delegate somehow found that my circumstances were not sufficiently forceful to waive 8503 condition.(without alteration) As such, the notice of appeal challenges two aspects of the delegate’s decision, namely that:(1)the circumstances were not sufficiently forceful to be compelling circumstances for the purposes of reg 2.05(4)(a) (the first limb of ground 1); and(2)the circumstances were not circumstances over which the appellant had no control for the purposes of reg 2.05(4)(a)(i) but were rather his personal choice to provide his sister with care and support (the second limb of ground 1). In this regard, I note that the notice of appeal does not in terms identify an error by the FCC although as this an appeal from the FCC, it is necessary for error to be established in the judgment of that Court. As the Full Court has explained, “an appeal by way of rehearing… does not mean it is an opportunity to revisit the decision of the tribunal. Save for exceptional cases, the task of a court on an appeal by way of rehearing is to correct error on the part of the primary judge”: Rawsthorne v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 39; (2013) 140 ALD 524 at [27] (the Court); see also e.g. BZAHB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1205 at [31]-[35] (Edelman J). This deficiency in the way in which the ground of appeal is framed is at least in part explained by ground 2 of the notice of appeal which simply states that “[a]s I have not received the full judgment of His Honour Judge Smith I cannot comment further.” In other words, the notice of appeal was filed after ex tempore (contemporaneous oral) reasons were given at the end of the hearing of the application for judicial review but were not published until after the notice of appeal was filed. The appellant’s failure to amend the first ground subsequently so as to be expressly directed at error by the FCC, in turn, is explicable by the fact that he is and has been unrepresented throughout the proceeding as the Minister accepted. Having regard to these circumstances therefore, and as a matter of fairness, I would read the first ground as alleging by implication that the FCC erred in failing to find that the delegate had erred in the ways identified in ground 1.3.2 Principles governing leave to raise a new ground on appeal