Blunden v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Blunden v Commonwealth of Australia [2000] FCA 1581

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – psychological injury said to have been suffered as a consequence of collision between HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager in 1964 – whether factors set out in s 36(3) of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) taken into account.

APPEAL – party repudiating position adopted at first instance – new argument said to raise constitutional matter – whether permitted to be raised on appeal.

Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 11, s 36

State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Limited (in Liq) [1999] HCA 3 cited
Housing Commission of NSW v Tatmar Pastoral Co [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 cited
Soulemezis v Dudley Holdings Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 referred to

Paramasivam v Flynn (1998) 90 FCR 489 referred to
Noja v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 95 referred to
Lorenzo & Sons Pty Ltd v Campbell [1999] FCA 701 cited
S & B Pty Ltd v Podobnik (1994) 53 FCR 380 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431 cited
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 referred to
Commonwealth of Australia v Williams [1999] FCA 703 cited
Sydney City Council v Zegarac (1998) 43 NSWLR 195 referred to
Gronow v Gronow (1981) 144 CLR 513 cited
John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36 cited
Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 cited
Eastman v R (2000) 172 ALR 39 cited
Parker v Commonwealth (1965) 112 CLR 295 cited
University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481 referred to
Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1997) 47 NSWLR 631 followed

BARRY THOMAS BLUNDEN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
A 16 of 2000

MILES, KATZ and KENNY JJ
CANBERRA
7 NOVEMBER 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A 16 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

BARRY THOMAS BLUNDEN
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGES:

MILES, KATZ and KENNY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

7 NOVEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   Compliance with O 52  r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules be dispensed with.

2.   The applicant be granted leave to appeal.

3.   The appeal be allowed.

4.   The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CANBERRA DISTRICT REGISTRY

A 16 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

BARRY THOMAS BLUNDEN
Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

MILES, KATZ and KENNY JJ

DATE:

7 NOVEMBER 2000

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MILES J:

  1. I have read a draft of the joint judgment of Katz and Kenny JJ and gratefully adopt what their Honours have to say about the background to the matters before the Court and the…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1581
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Blunden v Commonwealth of Australia, the applicant, Barry Blunden, sought an extension of time to commence proceedings against the respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia, for personal injuries he sustained as a result of the collision between the HMAS Melbourne and the HMAS Voyager. The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time on the basis that the respondent would be significantly prejudiced by the delay in bringing the proceedings. The applicant sought leave to appeal the primary judge's decision.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge's decision was interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal, and whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court determined that the primary judge's decision was interlocutory, as it did not finally determine the applicant's entitlement to relief. The court also found that leave to appeal should be granted, as the decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration.

The court held that the primary judge's decision was interlocutory and not a final determination of the applicant's entitlement to relief. The court noted that the primary judge had considered the applicant's evidence, including medical reports and affidavits, but had not made a final determination of the applicant's claim. The court further held that leave to appeal should be granted, as the primary judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court found that the primary judge had not adequately considered the applicant's evidence and had not properly exercised the discretion provided by section 36 of the Limitation Act.

The court granted the applicant leave to appeal and allowed the appeal. The court held that the primary judge had erred in finding that the respondent would be significantly prejudiced by the delay in bringing the proceedings. The court found that the applicant had provided a good explanation for the delay and that the respondent had not demonstrated any significant prejudice as a result of the delay. The court also held that the applicant had demonstrated that it was just and reasonable to extend the period within which the action might be brought.

The final orders of the court were that compliance with O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules be dispensed with, that the applicant be granted leave to appeal, that the appeal be allowed, and that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Compliance with O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules be dispensed with.

2. The applicant be granted leave to appeal.

3. The appeal be allowed.

4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In this case, although the applicant has filed no reply and has brought an application for an extension of time up to the date of issue of the originating application, the respondent has made no application for summary judgment. The parties have argued the matter before us upon the basis that the primary judge’s decision was interlocutory and that leave to appeal was necessary. This approach is consistent with the authorities in this Court: see, e.g., Noja v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 95 (“Noja”) at 96 and Lorenzo & Sons Pty Ltd v Campbell [1999] FCA 701 (“Lorenzo”). Leave will be granted where the challenged judgment is seen, in all the circumstances, to be “attended with sufficient doubt” to warrant its reconsideration and, if wrong and leave refused, to work substantial injustice: see S & B Pty Ltd v Podobnik (1994) 53 FCR 380 (“Podobnik”) at 382; Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398-399 and Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431.the evidence before the primary judge At first instance, the applicant relied on his own affidavit (sworn 11 June 1999) and that of his solicitor (sworn 17 June 1999) in support of his application for an extension of time. Neither he nor his solicitor was cross-examined. The applicant also tendered, without objection, a psychiatric report from Dr Steven Stern dated 23 October 1998. The applicant deposed that he saw the collision and watched the Voyager as it sunk. He heard men screaming. Some of the drowned were sailors whom he had known well. He said:8.On 28 February 1964, I provided a statement to the Navy Investigators inquiring into the incident. . . .9.Pretty soon afterwards I started to have nightmares about the incident. There was no counselling offered.10.Following this I started to drink heavily and had difficulty coping with my duties.11.I was discharged from the Navy on 20 October 1967.12.I continued to experience difficulties with my drinking and with my marriage and other relationships and in maintaining employment.13.I first received counselling in about 1993 from the Vietnam Veterans Counselling Service. 14.I first received psychiatric treatment from the Woden Valley Hospital in about June 1995, although I did not at that stage know what was wrong with me. . . .15.On 22 May 1996, I was referred to Dr Brian White, a psychiatrist, who diagnosed my problem as arising from the Voyager incident. . . .16.I did not think that I could do anything about what had happened to me until I talked to Steven King of the Vietnam Veterans Association who took me to my current solicitors, Garry Robb & Associates on 25 February 1997.Annexed to the applicant’s affidavit were a copy of (1) the applicant’s statement to the Navy’s investigators in 1964; (2) a report from Dr LRH Drew, The Canberra Hospital, dated 23 October 1997, concerning the applicant’s treatment between June 1995 and March 1996; and (3) a report from Dr Brian White dated 23 May 1996. In his report, Dr Drew, who is a psychiatrist, stated:[M]y knowledge of Mr Blunden is restricted to the period June 1995 to March 1996. The history he gave was one of progressive social deterioration presumably related to his alcohol dependence (typically associated with such a course). . . . . . . It is possible that Mr Blunden’s experiences in association with the sinking of the Voyager contributed quite significantly to his development of alcohol dependence, which appears to be his primary problem. However I cannot give a firm opinion upon this from my contacts with him at this late stage. The applicant relied on the opinions of Drs White and Stern. In his report, Dr White stated:I am a Consultant Psychiatrist in Private Practice. My specialist qualification is the Fellowship of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists. I saw Barry Blunden on 22 May 1996. He is a 50 year old man who lives alone. He is divorced. He is currently on workers compensation leave for a back injury. He has had distressing events in his life including the death of his father by drowning in 1966 and the recent death of his brother.He saw service in Royal Australian Navy for four and a half years. This included duty on HMAS Sydney ferrying troops to Vietnam on three trips. He found aspects of this distressing but the major focus of his anxiety has been from his experience when he was on HMAS Melbourne when the collision with HMAS Voyager occurred. He witnessed this collision.He has had problems since 1964. He has recurrent nightmares of which the most distressing of those relates to the sinking of HMAS Voyager. He also has recurrent, intrusive memories of the Voyager. At times these have the intensity of flashbacks. . . . He has no close friends and no social life. He is socially withdrawn. When he has been at work he was not doing well. His concentration was limited. He was irritable and he does not get on well with people. My diagnosis is of chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with related Major Depressive Disorder and Alcohol Abuse (possible dependence). He drinks alcohol to help his insomnia and anxiety. My opinion is that this was largely brought on by his experience with the sinking of the Voyager. . . . I consider he is permanently unfit to work effectively in any regular full time or part time employment. . . . His prognosis is that this condition will continue indefinitely. . . . Dr Stern gave a similar opinion, stating that the applicant’s “psychiatric condition has been significantly contributed to by his employment with the Royal Australian Navy, specifically the HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager collision of 10 February 1964”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In his second affidavit, the solicitor stated that inquiries had revealed that Dr McGeorge died in 1979. He deposed to attempts to locate those who had served with the applicant. The affidavit concluded,In my opinion the inability to locate witnesses who had the opportunity to observe the Plaintiff’s behaviour in the Navy both before and following the collision and the inability of witnesses to recall matters relating to the Plaintiff will significantly effect [sic] the Defendant’s ability to test the claimed link between alcohol consumption, the other injuries and disabilities claimed and the said collision.the primary judge’s decision The application made to the primary judge was “for orders pursuant to section 36 of the Limitation Act 1985 [ACT]”. The applicant’s counsel mentioned that “there may theoretically at least be a threshold argument about whether there is a limitation period … because of when the accident happened”. He added that “I think for much more abundant caution, … it would be better to proceed as if there were.” Subsequently he told the court that:At common law, matters of limitation are procedural. [T]herefore in this Court the law to be applied is the Limitation Act of the Australian Capital Territory. That seems to be what my learned friend would say too. We may both be wrong but we both say it. So if that is right then your Honour is applying s 36 of the Limitation Act. The respondent’s counsel agreed. It is in this context that the primary judge accepted that the extension of time application was to be determined by reference to s 36 of the Limitation Act. After referring to the judgment of McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 (“Brisbane South”) at 551, his Honour observed at [9]:[T]here will be ‘presumptive prejudice’ even if actual prejudice has not been proven. Limitation periods reflect a judgment by the legislature that the general welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within the period so specified notwithstanding the real risk that legitimate claims might thereby be defeated. A judicial discretion such as that provided by s 36 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) must be exercised in this context. Consequently, whilst an applicant may have an apparently good claim and a good explanation for not pursuing it earlier those facts will not, of themselves, justify the exercise of the discretion in his or her favour. It is incumbent upon such an applicant to demonstrate that it is just and reasonable for the period to be extended notwithstanding the considerations which I have mentioned. As McHugh J observed, again at 555, it may sometimes be a lesser evil to expose a defendant to an otherwise statute barred claim than to deprive a plaintiff of the right to have it litigated. That will often be the case when the delay has occurred without significant fault on the part of the plaintiff and when it has not occasioned any readily apparent prejudice to the interests of the defendant. On the other hand, the apparent justice of a plaintiff’s claim will seldom be sufficient to warrant reinstating a right of action against a defendant who has been effectively deprived of the opportunity of fairly defending the claim or has suffered significant prejudice as a result of the delay. After summarising the submissions of both parties and some of the relevant medical reports, his Honour stated, at [22-24], that:22.These few references to the evidence may be sufficient to illustrate the nature of the problems which the defendant would encounter in attempting to defend the plaintiff’s claim should leave be granted. There are some records of his medical and psychological condition but the records of any treatment he may have received prior to 1979 which was, of course, some fifteen years after the collision, are sparse. There are few records of any of his employers and no taxation returns in relation to such employment he may have undertaken prior to the late 1980’s. Furthermore, the defendant has been unable to locate many fellow sailors who may have been able to observe his behaviour before and after the collision and those few who have been located now have little or no memory of relevant matters. In these circumstances I am unable to be satisfied that the defendant’s position has not been significantly prejudiced by the extensive delay in commencing proceedings. There are a number of issues which I think it would be difficult if not impossible for the defendant to now address. For example the suggestion that he might have had psychiatric problems at least since joining the Navy in 1963 cannot now be explored by reference to medical records, his employment history or the evidence of people who knew him. 23.The defendant would be similarly hampered in any attempt to explore other possible causes of his alcohol dependence such as some factor related to his upbringing, emotional responses to other incidents or a deliberate course of drinking to excess which he may have found himself unable to stop. It would also be difficult for the defendant to attempt to disentangle any psychological injury sustained by his response to the loss of friends following the collision from any other psychological harm sustained as a result of other factors such as his guilt over the death of his father, his service in Vietnam or being bashed in jail. 24.In all the circumstances I am not satisfied that a fair trial of the action would be possible after the passage of such a lengthy period of time. Accordingly, I am unable to be satisfied that it would be just and reasonable to extend the period within which the action might be brought. The motion must be dismissed.the applicant’s submissions in this court

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.