FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Blunden v Commonwealth of Australia [2000] FCA 1581
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – psychological injury said to have been suffered as a consequence of collision between HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager in 1964 – whether factors set out in s 36(3) of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) taken into account.
APPEAL – party repudiating position adopted at first instance – new argument said to raise constitutional matter – whether permitted to be raised on appeal.
Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 11, s 36
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Limited (in Liq) [1999] HCA 3 cited
Housing Commission of NSW v Tatmar Pastoral Co [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 cited
Soulemezis v Dudley Holdings Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 referred toParamasivam v Flynn (1998) 90 FCR 489 referred to
Noja v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd (1990) 26 FCR 95 referred to
Lorenzo & Sons Pty Ltd v Campbell [1999] FCA 701 cited
S & B Pty Ltd v Podobnik (1994) 53 FCR 380 cited
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 cited
Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431 cited
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 referred to
Commonwealth of Australia v Williams [1999] FCA 703 cited
Sydney City Council v Zegarac (1998) 43 NSWLR 195 referred to
Gronow v Gronow (1981) 144 CLR 513 cited
John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36 cited
Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 cited
Eastman v R (2000) 172 ALR 39 cited
Parker v Commonwealth (1965) 112 CLR 295 cited
University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 481 referred to
Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1997) 47 NSWLR 631 followedBARRY THOMAS BLUNDEN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
A 16 of 2000MILES, KATZ and KENNY JJ
CANBERRA
7 NOVEMBER 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY
A 16 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
BARRY THOMAS BLUNDEN
ApplicantAND:
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RespondentJUDGES:
MILES, KATZ and KENNY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
7 NOVEMBER 2000
WHERE MADE:
CANBERRA
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Compliance with O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules be dispensed with.
2. The applicant be granted leave to appeal.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
CANBERRA DISTRICT REGISTRY
A 16 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
BARRY THOMAS BLUNDEN
ApplicantAND:
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
JUDGE:
MILES, KATZ and KENNY JJ
DATE:
7 NOVEMBER 2000
PLACE:
CANBERRA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MILES J:
I have read a draft of the joint judgment of Katz and Kenny JJ and gratefully adopt what their Honours have to say about the background to the matters before the Court and the…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1581
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge's decision was interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal, and whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court determined that the primary judge's decision was interlocutory, as it did not finally determine the applicant's entitlement to relief. The court also found that leave to appeal should be granted, as the decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration.
The court held that the primary judge's decision was interlocutory and not a final determination of the applicant's entitlement to relief. The court noted that the primary judge had considered the applicant's evidence, including medical reports and affidavits, but had not made a final determination of the applicant's claim. The court further held that leave to appeal should be granted, as the primary judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. The court found that the primary judge had not adequately considered the applicant's evidence and had not properly exercised the discretion provided by section 36 of the Limitation Act.
The court granted the applicant leave to appeal and allowed the appeal. The court held that the primary judge had erred in finding that the respondent would be significantly prejudiced by the delay in bringing the proceedings. The court found that the applicant had provided a good explanation for the delay and that the respondent had not demonstrated any significant prejudice as a result of the delay. The court also held that the applicant had demonstrated that it was just and reasonable to extend the period within which the action might be brought.
The final orders of the court were that compliance with O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules be dispensed with, that the applicant be granted leave to appeal, that the appeal be allowed, and that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Compliance with O 52 r 5(2) of the Federal Court Rules be dispensed with.
2. The applicant be granted leave to appeal.
3. The appeal be allowed.
4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application for leave to appeal and the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.