Lorenzo and Sons Pty Ltd v Campbell

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Lorenzo & Sons Pty Ltd v Campbell [1999] FCA 701

PROCEDURE – application for extension of time – application for leave to appeal – whether order extending time attended with sufficient doubt – whether issues of prejudice –whether errors of principle in relation to prejudice and delay.

Limitation Act 1985 (ACT), s 36

Motor Traffic Act 1936 (ACT) s 66
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(A)

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, cited
S & B Pty Ltd v Podobnik (1994) 53 FCR 380, considered

LORENZO & SONS PTY LTD V HELEN PATRICIA CAMPBELL
AG 92 OF 1998

GALLOP, HEEREY & R D NICHOLSON JJ
28 MAY 1999
CANBERRA


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

AG 92 of 1998

BETWEEN:

LORENZO & SONS PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

HELEN PATRICIA CAMPBELL
Respondent

JUDGE:

GALLOP, HEEREY & R D NICHOLSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MAY 1999

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal be allowed and leave be granted.

2.The appeal be allowed.

3.The order of Higgins J made on 4 September 1998 be set aside and in lieu thereof the following order be substituted:

The respondent’s application for extension of time within which to bring proceedings against the applicant be dismissed.

4.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of this application for leave to appeal and the costs of the application at first instance.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

AG 92 of 1998

BETWEEN:

LORENZO & SONS PTY LTD
Applicant

AND:

HELEN PATRICIA CAMPBELL
Respondent

JUDGE:

GALLOP, HEEREY & R D NICHOLSON JJ

DATE:

28 MAY 1999

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. THE COURT: This is an application for leave to appeal from an order of a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory made on 4 September 1998 giving leave to the respondent to proceed pursuant to s 36 of the Limitation Act 1985 (ACT) (“the Act”).

  2. The reasons of the Judge were given ex tempore on the date on which the order was made. He commenced those reasons by stating, incontestably, that the respondent bore the onus of satisfying the Court that it was “just and reasonable” to extend the time in question. That was a reference to the requirements of subs 36(2) of the Act. Subsection 36(3) required the Court also to “have regard to all the circumstances of the case” including certain enumerated matters namely, (a) the length of and reasons for the delay; (b) the extent to which, having regard to delay, there is or is likely to be prejudice to the applicant (c) the conduct of the applicant after the cause of action accrued to the respondent; (d) the duration of any disability of the respondent arising on or after the date of the accrual…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 701
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Lorenzo and Sons Pty Ltd filed an application in the Federal Court against Campbell, seeking an extension of time to bring proceedings. Campbell opposed the application, and Justice Higgins dismissed it on 4 September 1998. Dissatisfied with the decision, Lorenzo and Sons appealed to the Full Court, applying for leave to appeal and seeking to set aside Justice Higgins' order. The central legal issues were whether Justice Higgins' decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant an appeal, whether there were issues of prejudice, and whether there were any errors of principle in relation to prejudice and delay.

The Full Court found that the decision was indeed attended with sufficient doubt. The Court identified that Justice Higgins had made an error in principle in his assessment of prejudice. The Court held that there was no real risk of prejudice to Campbell if the time extension was granted, and the delay alone did not justify the dismissal of the application. Moreover, the Court emphasised the importance of considering the merits of the case rather than merely the delay in bringing proceedings. Consequently, the Full Court allowed the application for leave to appeal and set aside Justice Higgins' order, dismissing Campbell's application for an extension of time. The Full Court also ordered that Campbell pay the costs of both the appeal and the original application.

In summary, the Full Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's order. The Court held that the decision was attended with sufficient doubt and that there was no real risk of prejudice to the respondent. The Court also found errors of principle in the primary judge's assessment of the issues. The Full Court ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of both the appeal and the original application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal be allowed and leave be granted.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. The order of Higgins J made on 4 September 1998 be set aside and in lieu thereof the following order be substituted:

The respondent’s application for extension of time within which to bring proceedings against the applicant be dismissed.

4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of this application for leave to appeal and the costs of the application at first instance.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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