Blazejczyk and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 3199 (26 August 2020)
Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number: 2020/0222
Re:Wayne Blazejczyk
APPLICANT
AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission
RESPONDENT
Tribunal:Senior Member R Olding and Member P Ranson
Date:26 August 2020
Place:Perth
DIRECTIONS
1.Each party must provide to the Tribunal and serve on the other party any further written submissions regarding the appropriate scope and period of prohibition from providing financial services by 9 September 2020.
2.Each party must provide to the Tribunal and serve on the other party any written submissions in reply by 16 September 2020.
3.For the purposes of Direction 1, the expression “scope” includes whether the banning order should be limited or permissive for all or part of the prohibition period and/or subject to conditions.
4.Unless either party advises the Tribunal and the other party in writing by 23 September 2020 that the party wishes to make oral submissions, the review will be decided on the papers without a further oral hearing.
........SGD..........................................................
Senior Member R Olding
........SGD..........................................................
Member P Ranson
Catchwords
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES - financial services – banning order – where applicant prohibited from provision of any financial services for five years – where applicant accepted banning and prohibition period but sought order limited to “personal advice” to “retail clients” – held Tribunal’s duty to make correct or preferable decision required consideration of both scope and period of prohibition – parties directed to make further written submissions on scope and period of banning order
Legislation
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 760A, 761A, 920A, 920A(1)(e), 920A(1)(f), 920B(1)(a), 920B(1)(b), 920B(3), 947C(2), 961B, 961J, ch 7
Cases
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Musemeci and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 1021
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Tarrant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AATA 926
Tarrant v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 8
Van Dieren and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 4777Secondary materials
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC’s powers to suspend, cancel and vary AFS licences and make banning orders (Regulatory Guide 98, 20 September 2018)
FOR DECISION
Senior Member R Olding and Member P Ranson
The applicant, Mr Blazejczyk, has applied to the Tribunal for review of the decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) under ss 920A(1) and 920B(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Corporations Act”)[1] to make a “banning order” prohibiting him from providing any “financial services” for a period of five years (“the Order”).
[1] All legislative references are to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) unless otherwise indicated.
Mr Blazejczyk accepts he breached a “financial services law”…
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- Case
- [2020] AATA 3199
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal was required to determine the correct or preferable decision regarding the scope and period of the banning order. Specifically, the court had to consider whether a prohibition limited to personal advice to retail clients would adequately protect the public and achieve the objects of Chapter 7 of the *Corporations Act*, which include promoting confident and informed decision-making by consumers and professionalism by financial services providers. The Tribunal also had to consider the interplay between the scope of the banning order and its duration, and whether these elements could be considered in isolation or needed to be assessed holistically to achieve the legislative purpose.
The Tribunal noted that banning orders can be permissive, allowing specified acts under certain conditions. It also highlighted that the exercise of discretion in making a banning order should promote the objects of Chapter 7 of the *Corporations Act* and ASIC's obligation to promote confident and informed participation in the financial system. Drawing on established principles, the Tribunal considered factors such as public protection, personal and general deterrence, the applicant's understanding of their role, the seriousness of contraventions, propensity for future misconduct, and the balance between personal hardship and public interest. The Tribunal expressed concern that considering the scope of the order in isolation from its period of prohibition might lead to error, suggesting that a longer prohibition period might be warranted for a limited scope, or conversely, a shorter period for a broader scope.
The Tribunal directed the parties to make further written submissions on the appropriate scope and period of the banning order, indicating that it maintained an open mind on the final decision. The court noted that the five-year period might be too harsh, irrespective of whether it was confined to personal advice to retail clients.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
A banning order may also allow the person to do specified acts, or specified acts in specified circumstances, subject to specified conditions.[17] ASIC refers to an order of this kind as a “permissive banning order”.[17] Corporations Act s 920B(3).Relevant considerations The Corporations Act does not specify considerations to which the decision-maker must or may have regard in exercising the discretion to make a banning order. Thus, such factors must be discerned from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation.[18][18] Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24. Section 920A appears in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act. The objects of Chapter 7 are stated in s 760A, as follows:The main object of this Chapter is to promote:(a) confident and informed decision making by consumers of financial products and services while facilitating efficiency, flexibility and innovation in the provision of those products and services; and(b) fairness, honesty and professionalism by those who provide financial services; and(c) fair, orderly and transparent markets for financial products; and(d) the reduction of systemic risk and the provision of fair and effective services by clearing and settlement facilities. Accordingly, in the context of this matter, we consider it is necessary to exercise the discretion to make a banning order in a way that promotes these objects; in particular, but not limited to, promoting informed decision making by consumers and professionalism of financial advisers. It has also been held that the exercise of the discretion should have regard to ASIC’s obligation, under s 1(2)(b) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (“the ASIC Act”), to “promote the confident and informed participation of investors and consumers in the financial system”. [19][19] Australian Securities and Investment Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672, [65]. In Tarrant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission,[20] a Tribunal constituted by the then President and a Senior Member, in exercising the discretion in relation to the banning of a financial adviser, had regard to 12 factors:[21][20] [2013] AATA 926.[21] These 12 factors were drawn from a list of 15 factors referred to in the decision of Santow J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483, [50], a case involving the banning of a person from acting as a director of a corporation.(i)Banning orders are designed to protect the public from the harm, which includes the protection of investors; (ii)The banning order is protective against present and future breach;(iii)A banning order has a motive of personal deterrence, though it is not punitive;(iv)The objects of general deterrence are also sought to be achieved;(v)In assessing the fitness of a person to be permitted to provide financial advice, they have an understanding of their role and obligations;(vi)In assessing an appropriate length of prohibition, consideration has been given to the degree of seriousness of the contraventions, the propensity that the defendant may engage in similar conduct in the future and the likely harm that may be caused to the public;(vii)Longer periods of disqualification are reserved for cases where contraventions have been of a serious nature such as those involving dishonesty;(viii)It is necessary to balance the personal hardship to the defendant against the public interest and the need for protection of the public from any repeat of the conduct;(ix)A mitigating factor in considering a period of disqualification is the likelihood of the defendant reforming;(x)It is necessary to assess matters such as the character of the person, the nature of the breaches, risks to others from the continuation of the person as an authorised representative of a licensed person and the honesty and competence of the person;(xi)Factors which lead to the imposition of the longest periods of disqualification include large financial losses, high propensity for the person to engage in similar conduct and lack of contrition or remorse; and(xii)Factors which lead to the conclusion that these cases were serious though not “worst cases” resulting in disqualification from 7 to 12 years, include serious incompetence and irresponsibility, substantial loss or deliberate courses of conduct to enrich themselves at others’ expense, but with lesser degrees of dishonesty.[22][22] [2013] AATA 926, [385].