Blazejczyk and Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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Blazejczyk and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 3199 (26 August 2020)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number:          2020/0222

Re:Wayne Blazejczyk

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission

RESPONDENT

Tribunal:Senior Member R Olding and Member P Ranson

Date:26 August 2020

Place:Perth

DIRECTIONS

1.Each party must provide to the Tribunal and serve on the other party any further written submissions regarding the appropriate scope and period of prohibition from providing financial services by 9 September 2020.

2.Each party must provide to the Tribunal and serve on the other party any written submissions in reply by 16 September 2020.

3.For the purposes of Direction 1, the expression “scope” includes whether the banning order should be limited or permissive for all or part of the prohibition period and/or subject to conditions.

4.Unless either party advises the Tribunal and the other party in writing by 23 September 2020 that the party wishes to make oral submissions, the review will be decided on the papers without a further oral hearing.

........SGD..........................................................

Senior Member R Olding

........SGD..........................................................

Member P Ranson

Catchwords

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES - financial services – banning order – where applicant prohibited from provision of any financial services for five years – where applicant accepted banning and prohibition period but sought order limited to “personal advice” to “retail clients” – held Tribunal’s duty to make correct or preferable decision required consideration of both scope and period of prohibition – parties directed to make further written submissions on scope and period of banning order

Legislation
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 760A, 761A, 920A, 920A(1)(e), 920A(1)(f), 920B(1)(a), 920B(1)(b), 920B(3), 947C(2), 961B, 961J, ch 7

Cases
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483
Australian Securities and Investment Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Musemeci and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 1021
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Tarrant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AATA 926
Tarrant v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 8
Van Dieren and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 4777

Secondary materials

Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC’s powers to suspend, cancel and vary AFS licences and make banning orders (Regulatory Guide 98, 20 September 2018)

FOR DECISION

Senior Member R Olding and Member P Ranson

  1. The applicant, Mr Blazejczyk, has applied to the Tribunal for review of the decision of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) under ss 920A(1) and 920B(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (“the Corporations Act”)[1] to make a “banning order” prohibiting him from providing any “financial services” for a period of five years (“the Order”).

    [1] All legislative references are to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) unless otherwise indicated.

  2. Mr Blazejczyk accepts he breached a “financial services law”…

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Details
Case
[2020] AATA 3199
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Blazejczyk seeking to vary a banning order made by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). ASIC had prohibited Mr Blazejczyk from providing any financial services for a period of five years due to uncontested breaches of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth). These breaches included failing to act in the best interests of clients, failing to give priority to client interests, and failing to include required information in Statements of Advice concerning remuneration and interests in associated entities. Mr Blazejczyk accepted the prohibition period but sought to limit the scope of the banning order to only prohibit him from providing "personal advice" to "retail clients," arguing that a broader prohibition was unduly harsh and unnecessary to achieve the statutory objects.

The Tribunal was required to determine the correct or preferable decision regarding the scope and period of the banning order. Specifically, the court had to consider whether a prohibition limited to personal advice to retail clients would adequately protect the public and achieve the objects of Chapter 7 of the *Corporations Act*, which include promoting confident and informed decision-making by consumers and professionalism by financial services providers. The Tribunal also had to consider the interplay between the scope of the banning order and its duration, and whether these elements could be considered in isolation or needed to be assessed holistically to achieve the legislative purpose.

The Tribunal noted that banning orders can be permissive, allowing specified acts under certain conditions. It also highlighted that the exercise of discretion in making a banning order should promote the objects of Chapter 7 of the *Corporations Act* and ASIC's obligation to promote confident and informed participation in the financial system. Drawing on established principles, the Tribunal considered factors such as public protection, personal and general deterrence, the applicant's understanding of their role, the seriousness of contraventions, propensity for future misconduct, and the balance between personal hardship and public interest. The Tribunal expressed concern that considering the scope of the order in isolation from its period of prohibition might lead to error, suggesting that a longer prohibition period might be warranted for a limited scope, or conversely, a shorter period for a broader scope.

The Tribunal directed the parties to make further written submissions on the appropriate scope and period of the banning order, indicating that it maintained an open mind on the final decision. The court noted that the five-year period might be too harsh, irrespective of whether it was confined to personal advice to retail clients.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The uncontested breaches are that Mr Blazejczyk, in providing advice to clients failed to comply with these Corporations Act requirements:(a)section 961B – to act in the best interests of the client in relation to the advice;(b)section 961J – to give priority to the client’s interests when giving advice; and(c)sections 947C(2)(e) and 947C(2)(f) – to include in Statements of Advice (“SoA”) information about remuneration from and interests in associated entities.FACTS While he sought to provide evidence of the “context” of events leading to the findings, Mr Blazejczyk does not contest the primary factual findings on which ASIC’s conclusions are based. Mr Blazejczyk accepts this summary of the primary facts:(a)Mr Blazejczyk has been a financial adviser for approximately 30 years, with a focus on self-managed superannuation funds (“SMSF”).(b)At the relevant times, Mr Blazejczyk was the owner (through holding companies) of a group of companies (“the Ballast Group”) that included:(i)Ballast Financial Management Pty Ltd (“BFM”), which is an Australian financial services licensee;[3](ii)Ballast Financial Planning Pty Ltd (“BFP”), which was a corporate authorised representative of BFM;(iii)Ballast Superannuation Management Pty Ltd (“BSM”), which provided superannuation administration services to SMSFs for a fee; and(iv)Bateau Asset Management Pty Ltd (“BAM”), which is the investment manager of the Bateau Global Opportunities Fund (“the Bateau Fund”) and receives commissions on investments in the Bateau Fund.(c)At the relevant times, Mr Blazejczyk was a director and responsible manager and an authorised representative of BFM.[3] Mr Blazejczyk sold his interest in BFM in May 2019.The Bateau Fund The Bateau Fund was established by Mr Blazejczyk to facilitate investment in international shares by his clients. The vast majority of the fund (95%) consists of an investment in the Ddraig Equity Fund (“the Ddraig Fund”). Mr Blazejczyk owns 40% of Ddraig Partners Pte Ltd (“Ddraig Partners”), which owns the Ddraig Fund.Compliance history In 2005, ASIC raised concerns about advice Mr Blazejczyk provided which recommended the establishment of a SMSF with a low starting balance of $55,000, contrary to an ASIC guideline calling for a minimum balance of $200,000 for SMSFs. As a result, BFM directed Mr Blazejczyk to adhere to the ASIC guideline. Aside from this issue, and the breaches identified by ASIC, there is no evidence of other non-compliance by Mr Blazejczyk with requirements of financial services laws.Advice provided by Mr Blazejczyk Mr Blazejczyk provided advice to retail clients from 2016 recommending:(a)establishment of SMSFs with starting balances of less than $200,000 contrary to the ASIC guideline;(b)investment in the Bateau Fund through the SMSFs; and(c)engagement of BSM to administer the SMSFs.ASIC’s findings in relation to the advice ASIC found and Mr Blazejczyk accepts he failed to:(a)conduct reasonable investigation into alternatives to SMSFs as a means to achieve the clients’ objectives and needs;(b)conduct reasonable investigation into alternative products to an investment in the Bateau Fund as a means to achieve their objectives and needs;(c)raise and compare such alternatives in the advice provided;(d)base the advice on the client’s circumstances, such as the relatively low starting balance the SMSF would have;(e)disclose his interest in BAM, BSM or Ddraig Partners in SoAs provided to the clients;(f)disclose in the SoAs the remuneration or benefits he would receive from the clients’ investments in the Bateau Fund; and(g)adequately identify the client’s needs and objectives.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Finally in this regard, we note there is no finding, allegation or evidence that Mr Blazejczyk acted dishonestly or with intent to defraud.Evidence of effect of banning order Mr Blazejczyk’s financial position is affected by the Order but he admits not to the extent that he has difficulty being able to financially support his family.[4] [4] Exhibit 2, Witness statement of Mr Blazejczyk, page 22; Transcript, page 63. The Order has had other effects on Mr Blazejczyk, such as cancellation of key professional memberships and difficulties in obtaining insurance and financing, and in recruitment. He is prevented from serving on the investment committee of the Bateau Fund, engaging in business development for that Fund and being the director of financial services companies.[5][5] Exhibit 2, Witness statement of Mr Blazejczyk, pages 22-25.THE BREACHES IN CONTEXT Except where otherwise clear from the context, the findings which follow are based on ASIC’s findings and the unchallenged affidavit and oral evidence of Mr Blazejczyk.Period and number of breaches in context of overall level of services provided ASIC based the banning order only on Mr Blazejczyk committing the identified breaches. It does not say this is a case where ASIC has reason to believe Mr Blazejczyk is likely to commit future breaches of a financial services law.[6][6] Corporations Act s 920A(1)(f). That being so, we note the following background to the breaches:(a)ASIC identified only eight clients over the three-year period from 1 January 2016 to 14 December 2018 for whom Mr Blazejczyk recommended SMSFs.(b)At the time the banning order was made, there were 243[7] SMSFs to whom Mr Blazejczyk or his entities provided services.[7] T3, page 47, paragraph 15.SMSFs with a starting balance of less than $200,000 While Mr Blazejczyk accepts that he should not have recommended the establishment of the eight SMSFs with starting balances of less than $200,000, he does note some context to the provision of that advice. In some cases, Mr Blazejczyk’s testimony seemed to suggest he inappropriately bowed to the client’s expressed wishes. Additionally, he provided some details of the circumstances in which the advice was given that supported an expectation the $200,000 minimum would be reached within a reasonable time of the establishment of the SMSF. For example:·In 2010, a Ms Pettorino was advised to establish a SMSF with an opening balance of $100,000 but with the understanding she had a further $90,000 in another superannuaton fund that could be located and rolled into the SMSF. She also advised she was on a salary of $220,000 p.a.[8], which means the minimum employer contribution would be $14,461pa.[9] On that basis, the Tribunal estimates her SMSF balance was expected to exceed $200,000 within one year.·In 2017, a Mr Coombs was advised to establish a SMSF with an opening balance of $121,210. His salary had risen to $250,000 p.a.[10], which means the minimum employer contribution would be $19,616[11]. On that basis, the Tribunal estimates his SMSF balance was expected to exceed $200,000 within four years.[8] T11.21 SOA of Ms S Pettorino dated 1 July 2010.[9] Based on the maximum superannuation contributions base (see for 2009/2010 of $40,170/quarter and minimum superannuation requirements (“SGC”) at 9.0%.[10] T1.3 Statement of Reasons paragraph 40(b).[11] Based on the maximum superannuation contributions base (see for 2016/2017 of $51,620/quarter and SGC at 9.5%.

Decision

Reasons for decision

ASIC maintains this case falls into the category which would call for a prohibition period in the 3 to 10 year range. The factors listed for this category include conduct of a serious nature, albeit not at the same level as the 10-year-plus category. For instance, the guide nominates “[f]alse, misleading or deceptive, or unconscionable conduct” and “[a] deliberate course of conduct to enrich themselves at others’ expense” as pointing to a prohibition period in the 3 to 10 year range.WHAT IS THE CORRECT OR PREFERABLE DECISION? Mr Blazejczyk maintained that a banning order confined to prohibiting personal advice to retail clients would have sufficient deterrent effect to achieve the protective objects of the legislation; in particular, sufficient general deterrence. He also submitted that, since the breaches were all in the context of personal advice to retail clients, a prohibition only against provision of such services was appropriate and the prohibition against providing any financial services is unduly harsh and not the preferable decision as it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the statutory objects of the financial services regime. ASIC submitted the breaches could not be compartmentalised in this way and the public protection objects of the legislation could not be achieved by a banning order confined to prohibiting the provision of personal advice to retail clients. ASIC invited the Tribunal to conclude it could not be confident the “concepts or deficiencies” underlying the subject breaches would not be evident more broadly across the provision of other financial services.[27][27] Transcript, page 88, line 28 and following. Having considered the matter further since the hearing, we are concerned with another form of compartmentalisation. Our concern is that it may not be appropriate to consider the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to make a banning order by reference to the scope of the order in isolation from consideration of the period of prohibition. For instance, the general deterrence effect of a banning order under contemplation may require consideration of both the scope and period of the proposed order. It seems artificial and potentially inappropriate to consider such factors in an isolated way rather than by reference to the effect of the proposed order as a whole. A banning order for a longer period may be warranted if the order is of limited scope. Conversely, an order for a shorter period but of broad scope may achieve the public protection objects. Whether specified activities should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions, may also intrude into the consideration of the appropriate banning order. We are concerned that to consider the scope of the banning order in isolation may lead to error. Our concern is not merely of an academic nature. Ultimately the duty of the Tribunal is to reach what it considers to be the correct or preferable decision. That is, we must make the legally correct decision or, where there can be more than one correct decision, the preferable decision.[28] Without pre-empting our final decision on which we maintain open minds, the evidence before the Tribunal, other cases decided in the Tribunal[29] and even RG 98, together raise for us an issue regarding whether the period of five years may be too harsh, whether or not confined in the way Mr Blazejczyk seeks. [28] Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577.[29] For example: Van Dieren and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] AATA 4777; Musemeci and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 1021; Australian Securities and Investment Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

A banning order may also allow the person to do specified acts, or specified acts in specified circumstances, subject to specified conditions.[17] ASIC refers to an order of this kind as a “permissive banning order”.[17] Corporations Act s 920B(3).Relevant considerations The Corporations Act does not specify considerations to which the decision-maker must or may have regard in exercising the discretion to make a banning order. Thus, such factors must be discerned from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation.[18][18] Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24. Section 920A appears in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act. The objects of Chapter 7 are stated in s 760A, as follows:The main object of this Chapter is to promote:(a) confident and informed decision making by consumers of financial products and services while facilitating efficiency, flexibility and innovation in the provision of those products and services; and(b) fairness, honesty and professionalism by those who provide financial services; and(c) fair, orderly and transparent markets for financial products; and(d) the reduction of systemic risk and the provision of fair and effective services by clearing and settlement facilities. Accordingly, in the context of this matter, we consider it is necessary to exercise the discretion to make a banning order in a way that promotes these objects; in particular, but not limited to, promoting informed decision making by consumers and professionalism of financial advisers. It has also been held that the exercise of the discretion should have regard to ASIC’s obligation, under s 1(2)(b) of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (“the ASIC Act”), to “promote the confident and informed participation of investors and consumers in the financial system”. [19][19] Australian Securities and Investment Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672, [65]. In Tarrant and Australian Securities and Investments Commission,[20] a Tribunal constituted by the then President and a Senior Member, in exercising the discretion in relation to the banning of a financial adviser, had regard to 12 factors:[21][20] [2013] AATA 926.[21] These 12 factors were drawn from a list of 15 factors referred to in the decision of Santow J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483, [50], a case involving the banning of a person from acting as a director of a corporation.(i)Banning orders are designed to protect the public from the harm, which includes the protection of investors; (ii)The banning order is protective against present and future breach;(iii)A banning order has a motive of personal deterrence, though it is not punitive;(iv)The objects of general deterrence are also sought to be achieved;(v)In assessing the fitness of a person to be permitted to provide financial advice, they have an understanding of their role and obligations;(vi)In assessing an appropriate length of prohibition, consideration has been given to the degree of seriousness of the contraventions, the propensity that the defendant may engage in similar conduct in the future and the likely harm that may be caused to the public;(vii)Longer periods of disqualification are reserved for cases where contraventions have been of a serious nature such as those involving dishonesty;(viii)It is necessary to balance the personal hardship to the defendant against the public interest and the need for protection of the public from any repeat of the conduct;(ix)A mitigating factor in considering a period of disqualification is the likelihood of the defendant reforming;(x)It is necessary to assess matters such as the character of the person, the nature of the breaches, risks to others from the continuation of the person as an authorised representative of a licensed person and the honesty and competence of the person;(xi)Factors which lead to the imposition of the longest periods of disqualification include large financial losses, high propensity for the person to engage in similar conduct and lack of contrition or remorse; and(xii)Factors which lead to the conclusion that these cases were serious though not “worst cases” resulting in disqualification from 7 to 12 years, include serious incompetence and irresponsibility, substantial loss or deliberate courses of conduct to enrich themselves at others’ expense, but with lesser degrees of dishonesty.[22][22] [2013] AATA 926, [385].